

THE DIPLOMACY
OF NAPOLEON

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

**A HISTORY
OF
EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY
1815—1914**

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THE DIPLOMACY OF NAPOLEON

BY

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DIPLOMACY, 1815-1914"

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TO
H. A. L. FISHER
THIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF NAPOLEONIC STATESMANSHIP,
IN WHICH HE LED THE WAY.

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PREFACE

Statesmanship and diplomacy occupied much more of Napoleon's time than strategy. He rose to greatness as a soldier, but after he became his own master soldiering was only an incident in a tremendously busy life.

In a sense all the wars that Napoleon fought were defensive. He fought in order to keep the frontiers which the French Revolution had won. The Committee of Public Safety and Directory gained the Alps and the left bank of the Rhine. But this frontier did not ensure security. Napoleon had to defend it. At the end of a successful war of defence for the frontier of the Rhine and Alps, he had further to secure it by obtaining a barrier beyond these natural limits. Next, the barrier had to be defended, and then had to be further secured by pushing French power onwards—to the Elbe, to the Oder, the Vistula, to Warsaw, if need be to Moscow, and, if Moscow were reached, then further still.

In all these wars, Napoleon's aim was to obtain peace, to force the European Powers to recognize his Empire, incorporating the gains of the Revolution. His armies were merely the instruments of his diplomacy; and in diplomacy he made few mistakes. He never extracted the limit of concessions from a fallen enemy. By the end of the year 1807, through arms and policy he had gained the frontiers which he desired, and the peace which he sighed for, except for one weak spot in his system, his relations with England. Against the steady resistance of this country arms and diplomacy were vain. Yet at the end, in 1814, Napoleon could still have saved his Empire, with a restricted frontier, had he not made one of his few mistakes, the mistake of holding out too long. The test of a diplomatist is to know when the *final* terms have been offered to him, and to accept them before all is lost.

It is needless to say that this book owes much to the grand work of Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, perhaps the finest historical achievement of a single man (unless one prefers

the *Second Empire* of De la Gorce) since Gibbon wrote the *Decline and Fall*. Yet even Sorel could not exhaust the information in the multitude of contemporary Napoleonic memoirs and published papers. And there is still a vast amount of unexhausted material in the volumes of diplomatic dispatches in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the *Quai d'Orsay*. In the *Archives Nationales* are to be found the numerous and full reports from the French Armies of Occupation, deposited by the Ministry of War. These reports are kept in loose boxes, *cartons*, and are as fresh to-day as when they were written by the generals and pencilled over by the comments of Napoleon.

I owe a debt of gratitude to the Staff of the British Embassy at Paris for having procured me all the necessary facilities, and to the authorities at the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* and the *Archives Nationales* for their courtesy and helpfulness. And most of all I welcome this opportunity of testifying my obligation to the Charles Oldham Trustees and to the President and Fellows of my own College.

R. B. MOWAT.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

April, 1924.

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NOTE.—The *Correspondance de Napoléon* is quoted in the text according to the serial numbers of the letters. The different editions observe the same numbers for the letters.

THE DIPLOMACY OF NAPOLEON

CHAPTER I

THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF THE *ANCIEN RÉGIME* AND OF THE REVOLUTION

No revolution has ever been able to make a complete break with the past. Indeed revolutionary governments have usually only been successful in so far as they have taken over and made use of the experience and the *personnel* of the previous regime. For administration is not an easy thing to learn; and no Government can afford to do without the experience which their predecessors have accumulated, and without the trained officials whom those predecessors have produced. So it was with the French Revolution. At first glance it seems to be a great chasm across the history of France. Yet it is a long time now since Alexis de Tocqueville showed how much the *Ancien Régime* contributed both to the theory and to the practice of the Revolutionary Governments. Sorel has demonstrated the continuity of the traditions of French foreign policy before and after 1792,¹ and the patient researches of another profound Napoleonic scholar, have shown how much of the actual officials, as well as the method of business, of the monarchical Department of Foreign Affairs was absorbed in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Foreign Office.²

In the years preceding the Revolution of 1789, the Department of Foreign Affairs was situated at Versailles, and was under the

¹ Cp. Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, especially tome I, livre II, chaps. XI–XII. Cp. instructions from the *Ministère des relations extérieures* to Champagny, on his going to Vienna as Ambassador, August 15, 1801: "Citizen, you have acquainted yourself in the Archives and in the bureaux of the Department with the correspondence of the preceding French Ambassadors at the Court of Vienna since 1756" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 371).

² See F. Masson, *Le Département des affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787–1804* (Paris, 1877).

administration of the eminent Vergennes.¹ At this time the staff of the Department was generally recruited from the French legal class, or from officials transferred from the Treasury, or out of the teaching profession. In general, the same bourgeois families tended to produce Foreign Department officials generation after generation. A Report made by a Revolutionary agency in the year II (1793-94) states that "the Department of Foreign Affairs under the Monarchy was alone well administered."² The Minister of Foreign Affairs was indeed *the* Minister of the King—like the Imperial Chancellor of Austria or the Prime Minister of England. He ought to have been, and generally was, the most hard-worked public servant in France. He was highly paid: his salary was 250,000 *livres* annually, not including a further annual sum of 50,000 *livres* for out-of-pocket expenses, and a lump sum of 400,000 *livres* for furnishing his house.³ The Minister required a good allowance of money, and handsome furnishings, for he had to keep open house all the year round: not merely could all ambassadors come freely to see him, but so could the nationals of any foreign States who happened to be passing through Versailles. Table expenses therefore formed a large item in the Minister's out-goings, but the advantage to the public service was doubtless immense. The Minister lived in touch with the travelling society of Europe: he himself and his secretaries and staff had a continual source of information in the visitors who came and went; and by the same means they were continually influencing opinion.⁴ This was not the only or even the chief means of gaining information, but it was a useful supplement to the elaborate system of reports that came to the Ministry from all the embassies and legations abroad.

The Minister and his Department were the chief repository of the political traditions of France, which were almost entirely

¹ Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, held various embassies in the reign of Louis XV. Louis XVI on coming to the throne made him Foreign Minister. He died in February, 1787. His strong face still looks down from a portrait on the staircase of the Archives department of the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* on the Quai d'Orsay.

² Quoted in Masson, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

³ The *livre* was equivalent to 5 francs 8 sous, or one U.S.A. dollar.

⁴ Masson, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9. Readers of Sterne's *Sentimental Journey* will, after reading the above passage, feel less sceptical about Yorick's boasted interview with the Duc de Choiseul at Versailles. Choiseul was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1758 to 1770. The Revolutionary diplomatists gave and received banquets also. See the reports of F. de Neuchatel to the Committee of Public Safety, from Selz, in 1798 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 369)

oriented to external affairs. He and his secretaries had inherited "the high political system of thought which French diplomacy had followed, amid diverse appearances, for more than two centuries."¹ The continuity of this tradition, its ceaseless aim, has been elaborately explained and illustrated by Sorel:

The policy of the Capetians, in its continuity and in its tradition, has had two principal objects: at home, to form a homogeneous nation and a coherent State; abroad, to assure by good frontiers the independence of the nation and the power of the State. The Kings, who had answered to the national aspirations in founding the State, answered to them equally in founding the grandeur of France in Europe. . . .

In its object as in its methods, this policy results from the nature of things. Arrested by the Atlantic, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, and the Alps, the French Crown could only extend towards the east and the north. . . . France found herself naturally borne to these: necessity pushed her.²

This aim was consciously adopted by Henry IV, by Richelieu, by Mazarin, the grand architects of the Treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees.³ It was the aim of Louis XIV, until he went beyond it, and crossed the Pyrenees into Spain; it was the aim of Bernis and Choiseul when they made the celebrated alliance with Austria in 1756,⁴ and it was the aim of Vergennes when he tried to give new life and meaning to the policy of Choiseul.⁵

It was not, however, merely the *aims* of the Department of Foreign Affairs that were continuously pursued. The *methods* were fundamentally the same; the training, the habits, the business-procedure of the officials were embodied in the corporate spirit of the Department, and went on, not as a dead thing, but continually developing from age to age. For if in the eighteenth century French officials did not write the best manuals of diplomatic practice, they were on all sides acknowledged to be the leading exponents of it.

¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

² Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 244-5.

³ Cp. *Maximes et bases fondamentales*—a Memorandum composed probably by Bonaparte and Talleyrand, in 1803—"it is the idea of Richelieu, complete but pure, that it is necessary to put into execution" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 722, folio 227 verso).

⁴ They hoped to get the Austrian Netherlands, some time or other, through the alliance—France having failed many times to get it by fighting.

⁵ See Instructions to M. de Breteuil, 1774, in *Recueil des Instructions*, tome I, pp. 482-9. This is perhaps the best statement ever made concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the Bourbon-Habsburg Alliance.

The house, or rather the "appartement," as the French say, of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was in the Château of Versailles itself. There he was assigned twenty-one rooms, exclusive of accommodation for his servants, who numbered about thirty.¹ The offices of his Department were also in the Château, so that the Minister could live beside his work. The officials were not numerous, for only by keeping the number small could secrecy be secured. There were forty-one altogether, divided into four *bureaux*, known as the Political Department, the Cabinet of the Minister, the Bureau of Funds, the Archives. This last section (which had seven employés) was not housed in the Château, but in a building of its own which is now the town-library of Versailles. The small number of officials in the whole Department of Foreign Affairs was suitable to the confidential nature of their work, but it could only secure efficiency if each individual worked very hard indeed, as seems actually to have happened. Highly trained, well-informed; few in number, constantly and severely employed; long hours, no holidays, but good payments,² honourable rewards; their whole life wrapped up in the Department, unknown to the public, or even to the courtiers among whom they paced their staid way to the Royal circle; the external splendour of France their passion—such is a true picture of the life of the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Ancien Régime.

It is customary to speak of the French Revolution as "breaking" out at a particular time, but indeed it was quite a gradual affair; those who were engaged in it probably did not realise that a Revolution was taking place until many months had passed after the fateful meeting of the Estates General in May, 1789. If this was so among the politicians, it was still more so with the civil servants, a class of people who are always absorbed in the work of their departments, and whose vision is generally bounded by the labour of the day. The daily business of administration has to be done, and so long as the public servants are left at their desks, they will go on transacting it, unconsciously nourishing the illusion that

¹ Besides his official residence in the Château, the Minister might have a large private house in the town. Vergennes had two; the Department of Foreign Affairs appears to have paid the rent of one of these (Masson, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13).

² No regular official of the Department received less than 3,500 *livres* annually (Masson, *op. cit.* p. 33).

society is stable because the routine of the office goes on. Such was the condition of affairs within the Foreign Department during the early years of the Revolution.

On May 5 the Estates General, which had been in abeyance since 1614, began its sessions of 1789. On July 14 a mob of people took the Bastille by storm. On August 4 the nobility in the Estates General resigned all their privileges. Towards the end of the year the democratic majority of the Estates General, under the name of the Constituent Assembly, drafted a Constitution for France, which came into force in 1791. The Government was to consist of a King with defined powers, a Cabinet of Ministers, and a single-chamber Assembly, which was to have the determining voice on peace and war. In April, 1792, the Girondist party in the Assembly forced the King to declare war against Austria, which was plainly threatening to intervene against the now obviously revolutionary movement in France. On August 10 (1792) a mob broke into the Tuileries, and King Louis XVI was made captive and shut up in the Temple prison. In September a new Assembly called the Convention was elected and assumed supreme power in the State. These events in August and September, 1792, are the real French Revolution. The events of 1789 only prepared the way for it: the execution of the King in January, 1793, only completed it.

As the Convention of over 700 members could not really govern a country, the executive power was taken over in April, 1793, by a Committee of Public Safety elected out of the Convention.¹ Beginning with nine members, it was gradually increased to sixteen. One quarter of the total number generally retired every month, and were ineligible for another month, but at the end of this period were generally re-elected. Thus each member had usually about four months at a time in the Committee. Even during his month outside the Committee, the former member might still supervise and practically direct the affairs with which he was particularly qualified to deal. Within the Committee certain members, according to their aptitude, training and experience, were "ear-marked" for particular portions of the national business. Thus there was a sub-committee for foreign affairs which in 1793 consisted of Merlin

¹ There had been previous executive committees of the Convention, but the Committee of Public Safety was the first to become as it were established and organised on a more or less permanent basis; it was a sort of "War Cabinet." The Committee of Public Safety was "really a responsible Ministry in disguise" (Aulard, *The French Revolution*, Eng. Trans. 1910, vol. II, p. 238).

of Douai, Cambacérès, Boissy d'Anglas, Louvet, Treilhard, and Jean de Bry.¹

The revolutionary movement made little difference even to the *personnel* of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In October, 1789, the Department was bodily removed from Versailles to Paris.² The same officials were employed until Dumouriez became Minister for Foreign Affairs in March, 1792. The new Minister dismissed practically the whole staff, with small pensions. But the new employés who were appointed were taken out of the same kind of professional families as had recruited the old Department, and several of them (including the Director, Bonne-Carrère, and the *sous-chefs* of the German and Italian bureaux) had formerly been members of it. After Dumouriez' time the staff was not changed, though it was frequently added to, and, to some extent, became a refuge for republican incapables. Thus the number of employés grew from forty-one in 1789 to sixty-eight in 1793, although, owing to the state of war and the rupture of all France's old alliances, the amount of foreign business to be transacted had, for the moment, greatly decreased.

If the *personnel* of the Department of Foreign Affairs under the Revolution largely reflected the *personnel* of the Ancien Régime, the same thing is true of the traditions, aims and business-methods of the Department. The same kind of officials as formerly, trained in the precedents of the old Department, studying the same archives, faced with similar problems, naturally followed the "System" of the Ancien Régime. They aimed at the "natural frontiers"—the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine—which every French statesman had aimed at ever since King Henry II had turned French policy away from Italy and had directed it to improving the feeble eastern frontier.³

Formed by the study of the classics, renewed by the historians,

¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, p. 327. The complete list of the members of the Committee of Public Safety is in *Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution française*, by Buchez et Roux (Paris, 1838), t. 37, pp. 93-6.

² Masson, *op. cit.*, p. 68. It was established in offices in the Rue Bourbon. The Archives remained at Versailles till 1796.

³ For Henry II's policy see Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, 263, and Carloix, *Mémoires sur la vie du maréchal de Vieilleville* (in *Choix de Chroniques et Mémoires sur l'Histoire de France*, edited by Buchon, Paris, 1836, tome 12), liv. IV, chap. VIII, pp. 536-7, containing the account of the Council of October, 1551, where Vieilleville advised the King to forestall the Emperor Charles V in seizing Metz, Toul and Verdun.

spread broadcast by the men of letters, preserved in the archives of the parliaments, the tradition was thus transmitted to the two classes of men who exercised a dominant influence on the exterior policy of the French Revolution, the lawyers and the soldiers. It came to them singularly clarified and disengaged by the spirit of analysis which was in the air at the time. . . . For the soldiers, the necessities of attack and defence ; for the politicians the necessities of domestic government ; for the diplomatists the necessities of European peace—these were the only elements in the discussion. All were agreed in defining the extreme limits : Savoy and Nice on one side, the Meuse and Rhine on the other. The acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine was not for any one the direct and definite object of a political design ; it was the ideal object, the proposition of the future, the last term of the series. If people kept this last term in view, it was because it is necessary to have a last term in everything, and because this one seemed to be marked out by geography, by history, by politics. The most simple reflexion proved that if it was perhaps dangerous to advance as far as this point, in going beyond it France would certainly exceed the measure of power which is compatible with the balance of forces in Europe ; she would be passing beyond the boundaries of the domain which she can govern, defend, keep.¹

The French Revolutionary Governments easily entered into this tradition. Finally, by a decree of the Convention, October 1, 1795, "the principle of the frontiers entered into the public law of France."²

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, 321-2.

² Sorel, IV, p. 431. For the decree *see* below, p. 12. Cp. also five pieces, anonymous, sent to Boissy d'Anglas for the Committee of Public Safety, August 11, 1795, explaining that the new limits (i.e. the left bank of the Rhine) must be maintained, or else the Republic will fall (Arch. Aff. *étr.* Autriche 364).

CHAPTER II

THE CONQUEST OF THE LEFT BANK

By the beginning of the year 1793 France, according to the calculations of many observers, ought to have consumed herself in anarchy. "All the normal signs had manifested themselves there: no government, no finances, no army, civil war, factions in alliance with the external enemy."¹ Since April, 1792, Revolutionary France had been at war with Austria and Prussia. This war had been produced, on the part of France, by the Revolution's infringement of German Imperial rights in Alsace, and by the outspoken sympathy of the republicans for the "oppressed" subjects of monarchical States;² and on the part of the Austrian and Prussian monarchs, by their sympathy with the French royal family, and by their determination to interfere in the internal affairs of France.

It was expected that disorganised, revolutionary France could not withstand invasion by the powerful, professional armies of the great military monarchies of Germany. But events were to disprove the calculations both of statesmen and of soldiers. France's economic position steadily declined, but her political power recovered itself and increased. The battle or "cannonade" of Valmy, on September 20, 1792, turned a continuous French retreat into an almost equally continuous advance. "A French volunteer-corps

¹ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, vol. IV (1903), p. 1. The lack of government is seen in the Mercy-Argenteau affair; the Austrian Ambassador's goods and house were sequestered by the French authorities when war broke out in 1792. In April, 1793, the Directing Committee, in deference to Austrian protests, ordered the goods to be released and Mercy's house to be restored to his possession; but the Ministry of War, which had requisitioned the house, refused to leave it (Buchot to Kreuthoffer, March 23, 1794, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

² The enthusiasm of the governors of France for republics vanished when military and political reasons made it advisable to give them up. A *Report on Political Relations* made to the Directory, 1796-97, says that France is not anxious to impose republics everywhere. Rome did not do so: "she had always a better market with kings" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366, folio 7 ff.).

under an incompetent leader pressed forward in a mad adventure upon the flank of the Prussian army until close to Mayence; the first fortress of Germany opened its gates without resistance" ¹ (October 21, 1792). In February, 1793, Great Britain was drawn into the war, owing to the occupation of Belgium by the French (November, 1792) and their opening of the Scheldt to commerce, contrary to the stipulations of the Treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht. Thus Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and also Sardinia (for the French had invaded the King of Sardinia's Duchy, Savoy), were all in the war. Russia, Spain, Naples, and the Dutch likewise joined in the hostilities. Pitt negotiated compacts with the various enemies of France; and this rough diplomatic grouping has been called the First Coalition.²

In spite of the grandeur and energy of Pitt, the league dissolved of itself in his hands. France made a splendid military effort. Carnot created new armies through the *levée en masse*, and a series of victories, culminating at Fleurus in Belgium (June 26, 1794), saved the frontiers of the State. But the political errors of the Allies, as much as the military efforts of the Republic, were the cause of this result: "The war of the First Coalition was lost by diplomatic mistakes."³ Lack of co-ordination on the part of the Allies in the French theatre of war, and the division of their energies and attention to Poland, made the success of France possible. The Committee of Public Safety recognised that the sacrifice of Poland helped to save France, and, indeed, they were a little ashamed of it.⁴

While Russia and Prussia were bound by their engagements to concentrate their resources on war with France, they were actually conspiring against the already mutilated State of Poland. On January 23, 1793, they had signed a Partition Treaty, by which

¹ Treitschke, *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (Trans. 1915), vol. I, p. 149.

² "Their aims being as diverse as their methods were disjointed, the term *First Coalition* applied to this league is almost a misnomer." J. Holland Rose, *William Pitt and the Great War* (1911), p. 123.

³ Treitschke, *op. cit.*, p. 144. The Report of 1796-97, already quoted, says that the Emperor tired of serving the interests of England. This statement shows the suspicions which existed between the Allies (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366).

⁴ Instructions to Poterat (on mission to Austria), 7 Frimaire, An 4—Nov. 28, 1795—"avoid making any explanations about what has been done with regard to unhappy Poland" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

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Russia was to get the cities of Danzig and Thorn, and the province of Posen, while Russia got Little Russia, the Polish part of the Ukraine.¹ The Austrian Government, which participated in the Partition of 1772, was not on this occasion given any share. The Partition of 1793 was carried into effect not without a good deal of fighting, for the Poles "revolted" under General Kosciuszko, and fought successfully against Prussian and Russian forces throughout the year 1794 and part of 1795. The French republican Government, which was directed at this time by the Committee of Public Safety, ought to have supported this national rising. They refused, however, partly owing to the practical difficulties of giving support, partly because the Poles were not consciously animated by any idea of the "sovereignty of the people."² Yet it was really the heroism of Kosciuszko's soldiers which made possible the powerful reaction of France against the invaders of her own soil; it assured the victory of Fleurus for the Republic; it did more: it made the war perpetual.

With the passing of time, the policy of the French Government became more normal. When the hostilities opened, in 1792, it had tended to disregard the Law of Nations. It had put seals upon the possessions of the Austrian Ambassador, Mercy-Argenteau, and set a guard over his house.³ The Department of War then took Mercy's hotel for a bureau (March, 1793). The Ambassador's goods were declared national property and a sale of them was begun. The Austrian Government thereupon refused to exchange prisoners (July, 1794).⁴ The Committee of Public Safety then "recognised that the principles of the Law of Nations had been violated by the opposition of the seals and the sequestration of the property." The property was declared to belong to Mercy-Argenteau.⁵ The Vienna Commissioner for Foreign Affairs noticed "the salutary effects of the changes of principle which have come about in France."⁶

¹ Martens, *Recueil de Traité conclus par la Russie*, II, No. 44. See also VII, No. 232.

² Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 51.

³ Kreuthoffer to Conseil exécutif, February 5, 1793 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 164). Cp. above, p. 8, note 1.

⁴ Report of Commission for Exchange of Prisoners (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁵ Extract from Register of Committee of Public Safety, 4 Nivose, An 3 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁶ Blumendorf to Kreuthoffer, May 29, 1795 (*ibid.*). The Austrian Government on its side had from the start of the war allowed the French Ambassador's goods to be freely exported.

This normalising of the French diplomacy went on after the advent of Bonaparte.

Carnot, the organiser of victory, was the advocate of moderation. In a minute presented to the Committee of Public Safety on July 16, 1794, he stated his "views on the results which ought to be drawn, at the northern frontiers, from the successes of the present campaign."

The rapidity of our military successes and the intrepidity of the soldiers of the Republic do not permit us to doubt that we could, if we wish, in the course of this campaign plant the tree of liberty on the banks of the Rhine, and reunite to France all the ancient territory of the Gauls. But however seductive this system may be, it will be found perhaps that it is wise to renounce it, and that France would only enfeeble herself and prepare an interminable war by aggrandisement of this kind.¹

This was an echo of the old controversy, older than the War of the Spanish Succession, as old as the days of Philip Augustus and St. Louis, the controversy between those who thought that France must be moderate in her territorial aims, lest she arouse the whole of Europe against her, and those who advocated the full exploitation of her military successes, wherever they should lead.

The Committee of Public Safety, although determined not to make peace hastily,² entered into these views so far as to renounce for the time being the desire to go to the mouths of the Rhine. They contented themselves with ordering the generals in the north-eastern theatre of war to occupy and hold the territory up to the Scheldt and Meuse, so as to include Liège, Antwerp and Namur.³ For they felt that if the new limits were not maintained, the Republic would fall.⁴ But the policy of the Committee of Public Safety could never be acquiesced in by Great Britain. It was Napoleon himself who admitted, in the reflective atmosphere of St. Helena, that Antwerp was "a point for mortal attack against

¹ *Correspondance générale de Carnot* (edited Charavay, Paris, 1897), tome IV, p. 496.

² They severely reprimanded Merlin of Thionville for interviewing without authority the Prussian General Kalkreuth (C.P.S. to Bacher, December 4, 1794, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Prusse* 215).

³ *Corr. de Carnot*, IV, 503 (July 17, 1794).

⁴ Report (anon.) to Boissy d'Anglas for the C.P.S., July 12, 1795: the new limits to be maintained, otherwise the Republic will fall (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 364).

the enemy [England]";¹ it was, he remarked, "one of the great causes for his being at St. Helena." No one has stated Pitt's view better than Sorel:

To remove France from Belgium was, in his eyes, the primordial and indispensable condition of peace. He had begun fighting on the day when that condition had been destroyed; he would continue the struggle until that condition was re-established.²

In any case the Committee of Public Safety soon began to adopt the policy of going beyond the Scheldt, to the mouths of the Rhine. Carnot's idea of the frontier, though approved by a sage diplomatist like Barthélemy, was unpopular with the French public and with the bulk of the members of the National Convention. It savoured too much of moderation. In the end the forward party gained their way in the Committee of Public Safety, and Carnot himself signed the dispatch to the Generals, laying down the Rhine as the frontier to be aimed at (Nov. 25, 1794).³ Almost the last act of the Convention was to pass the famous decree of October 1, 1795, annexing the whole of Belgium, all the Austrian dominions "on this side of the Rhine." Moreover by the Treaty of the Hague with Holland (May 16, 1795), France had by *force majeure* "reserved" Maastricht and Venloo on the Meuse, and obtained the right to place an "exclusively French garrison" in Flushing at the mouth of the Rhine."⁴ In order to achieve this, the Committee of Public Safety was ready to acquiesce in Austria's desire to absorb Bavaria.⁵

This policy of getting the whole Rhine frontier involved France in sinking sands. For she could not go to the Rhine without

¹ Las Casas, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* (1823), tome IV, partie VII, pp. 43, 44. See also J. Holland Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I* (1916), I, 439.

² Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, 206.

³ Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, 179. The dispatch is in *Corr. de Carnot*, IV, 719-21.

⁴ Treaty of peace between France and the United Provinces, concluded at the Hague, May 16, 1795, arts. 12 and 13, in De Clercq, *Recueil des Traités de la France* (1864), I, 236.

The Decree of the Convention, October 1, 1795, defining the Rhine frontier as the aim of France is in *Procès-Verbal de la Convention Nationale* (Paris, An 4), t. 68, pp. 158-161. Cp. Hermann Oncken, *Die historische Rheinpolitik der Franzosen* (Gotha, 1922), p. 17. The Decree declares (after annexing Liège, Stavelot, Malmédy and other places): *sont pareillement réunis au territoire français tous les autres pays en deçà du Rhin, qui étoient avant la guerre actuelle sous la domination de l'Autriche.*

⁵ Bacher to the Citizen Représentant at Bâle, September 26, 1795 (Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 364).

provoking a reaction of Europe against her. This reaction she could only meet by crossing the Rhine, defeating the European armies, and then setting up, on the east of the river, a barrier (either fresh occupied provinces or client buffer States) between the Rhine and her enemies.¹ So she must advance from the Rhine to the Weser, and from there to the Elbe, and so on, *ad infinitum*. This is why the victory of Fleurus, and the way in which it was exploited, made war permanent, or to endure at least for twenty years.

Yet for a long time, although finality was never attained, the policy of territorial extension seemed to triumph; for it was carried on with eminent military and diplomatic skill. The years 1793 to 1795 form the heroic age of the republican armies. Led by youthful, chivalrous generals, filled with eager, friendly soldiers,

these armies seemed to arise in the dawn of a fine day. The freshness of the air, the sure expectation of coming repose and of a happiness which would not end, gave to their appearance something of joyousness and exaltation, which made them march without thought of trials and temptations. . . . People saw them with astonishment, tattered, pale, emaciated, but proud, gay, martial and disciplined, advancing in their conquest with the dust and the remnants of the routed enemy.²

"It was the time," wrote Soult later, "when I worked hardest, and when the leaders were most exacting . . . it was the period of war when there was most virtue in the troops."³ And of these glorious soldiers, the type was not Bonaparte, but Hoche, "warrior, without fear and without reproach, knight-errant of hope, who, by force of valour and magnanimity, would have solved the enigma."⁴ Perhaps Hoche, had he lived, would have done so. It was more than Barthélemy the diplomatist could do, even by his famous Peace of Bâle.

Prussia had vigorously taken part in the war of 1792 against the French Revolution, but since the end of the year 1793 her

¹ "The formation of a powerful State on the right bank of the Rhine to serve as a bulwark for France against Austria" (*see* Memorandum, *De la Barrière de la France contre l'Autriche*, dated "vers l'an 4," in Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 364).

² Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, 160.

³ *Ibid.*, note 2, and Soult, *Mémoires* (1834), tome I, pp. 198-9.

⁴ Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 225.

energy had distinctly waned.¹ The attention of King Frederick William II and Hardenberg, who was now, for a time, displacing Haugwitz as his chief adviser, was being diverted again towards Poland, where the greatest spoils were to be gained : for it was clear that no French provinces could be torn from the grasp of revolutionary France. The Committee of Public Safety was alive to the chances of peace, or rather to the chances of breaking up the First Coalition : generals and political agents alike could not help noticing the growing feebleness of Prussian action in the West.²

During this war, as indeed during all great modern wars, Switzerland was the place where negotiations and subterranean intrigues of all sorts were concentrated. In 1795 the French political agent at Bâle was François Barthélemy, a professional diplomatist, who had learned his business as Secretary in the French embassy at Stockholm under Vergennes (1771). He had subsequently held appointments in the embassies at Vienna and London. Since 1792 he had been minister of France to Switzerland. Barthélemy was thus very much a *diplomate de carrière*, and furnishes an example of the continuity of the method of French foreign affairs under Monarchy and Republic.

When the Committee of Public Safety discovered that it was possible to detach Prussia from the Coalition, the conduct of the negotiation was entrusted to Barthélemy. He met the Prussian minister Hardenberg—a man “still young, elegant, looking half English, half Prussian”³—on the neutral soil of Bâle. His instructions were to secure that “the Rhine shall be the new limit of France.”⁴

The negotiations were drawn out to a great length, the Prussian Government striving, naturally, to keep its territories on the left

¹ Bacher, who was chief French agent at Bâle until the appointment of Barthélemy, received from Keguelin at Strasbourg intimation that French prisoners in Prussian hands could now get their liberty for a payment of 24 *livres* (Letter of 8 Vendémiaire, An 3, September 29, 1794, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

² Bacher to General Michaud, commanding Army of Rhine, October 4, 1794 : “The Prussian army has made no other movement than that which it has agreed to make in a passive manner in the direction of Cerf. It has re-entered the previous position and nothing on earth will make it come out” (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

³ Rewbell to his colleagues of the Committee of Public Safety, 5 Fructidor, An 3 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

⁴ Committee of Public Safety to Barthélemy, 19 Nivose, An 3—January 8, 1795 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

bank of the Rhine, while the Committee of Public Safety would take nothing less than the left bank. Barthélemy, indeed, counselled moderation, and the Committee would have dispensed with his services if they could, but "this diplomat had become necessary to them."¹

The Treaty of Bâle was signed by Barthélemy and Hardenberg on April 5, 1795. Its chief clauses were of the very highest significance. Articles 1 and 2 provided for the cessation of hostilities, and for peace, friendship and good intelligence between the two Powers. Article 4 stipulated for the evacuation by the French armies of the Prussian territories on the *right* bank of the Rhine. Article 5 stated that

the troops of the French Republic will continue to occupy the part of the States of the King of Prussia, situated on the left bank of the Rhine. Every definitive arrangement with regard to these provinces shall be postponed to the general pacification between France and the Germanic Empire.

In Article 11 the King of Prussia promised his good offices, which France agreed to welcome, in favour of Princes and States of the Empire who wished to enter into negotiation with her. France, on her side, agreed for the space of three months not to treat as enemies those Princes and States on the right bank of the Rhine for whom the King of Prussia should intercede.

By this, the patent or public Treaty of Bâle, France obtained two marked advantages : firstly, the virtual cession of the Prussian provinces on the left bank of the Rhine (i.e. the greater part of Cleves and of Guelderland) ; and secondly, the means of forcing the other smaller German States to enter into the peace, either through the good offices of the King of Prussia, or through the threat of ravaging them when the three months suspension of arms was over. A Secret Convention attached to the Patent Treaty aimed at the same effect. It enacted (article 3) that

in order to remove the theatre of war from the frontiers of the States of H.M. the King of Prussia, to preserve the repose of the north of Germany and to re-establish the entire liberty of commerce between this part of the Empire and France as before the war, the French Republic consents not to push the operations of war, nor to let its troops enter, by land or by sea, in the country and States situated beyond the following line of demarcation.

¹ Fain, *Manuscrit de l'an III* (1828), p. 209.

This Line of Demarcation neutralised all North Germany (except the territory immediately east of the Rhine, south of Duisburg), under the protectorate of the King of Prussia. It ran from East Friesland down the Ems to Münster, then to the Duchy of Cleves (on the right bank of the Rhine), then up the Rhine to Duisburg; from there it went to Homburg (the northern Homburg about 23 miles east of Cologne) and to Limburg on the Lahn; thence to Höchst on the Main, then along the frontier of the Palatinate (which it included) to the Neckar, then to the frontier of Bavaria (left outside the Line), and finally to the frontier of Bohemia (also outside the Line) to Silesia.¹ The King of Prussia guaranteed the neutrality of all the States within the Line of Demarcation. The territory thus included within the Prussian neutrality is roughly equivalent to the North German Confederation of 1866-1871. Already in 1795 Prussia had a design to head a league of the Protestant States of Germany.² The Line of Demarcation also ensured that Austria would have to bear the whole weight of the French attack.³

What did Prussia gain? She lost her possessions on the left bank, but article 2 of the Secret Convention stated that

if, at the general pacification between the Germanic Empire and France, the left bank of the Rhine remains to France, the King of Prussia will come to an understanding with the French Republic on the manner of cession of the Prussian States situated on the left bank of this river against such a territorial indemnity as shall be suitable. In this case, the King of Prussia will accept the guarantee which the Republic offers him as this indemnity.

What indemnity was meant by this? There can be no doubt that it was Hanover, which belonged to the King of England, and which, although at war with France, was now included within the Line of Demarcation, and thus came under the Prussian guarantee of neutrality.⁴ By a Secret Convention with France of May 17,

¹ There is a contemporary map of the Line of Demarcation, coloured, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 217.

² Bacher to Committee of Public Safety: "Prussia aspires to head a league of the Protestant States against Austria and the Catholic States devoted to her" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

³ *Observations patriotiques et respectueuses*, Prairial, An 3 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁴ Barthélemy suggested to Hardenberg that Prussia should take Hanover in pledge. Prussia promised to do so, "if the case arose." Sorel, *L'Europe et la Rév.*, IV, 249. Cp. Committee of Public Safety to Barthélemy, September

1795, Prussia undertook "in case the Government of Hanover refused its neutrality . . . to take the electorate into deposit." In addition the Prussian Government, being quit of the French war, obtained freedom of action in Poland, and was able to secure at the extinction of that unhappy State an enormous accession of territory, including Warsaw. But no one, outside France, was really pleased with the Prussian action, and it has had no sincere defenders then or since. Barthélemy wrote to the Committee of Public Safety that the Prussian Government itself did not like the Line of Demarcation, but that Hardenberg, who was a Hanoverian by birth, negotiated it, in order to remove war from his native country.¹

Economic considerations influenced Revolutionary diplomacy from the start, just as they continued vitally to do under the Napoleonic Empire. A Memorandum sent by Bacher, the First Secretary of the Legation at Bâle, at the end of 1794, pointed out how a peace (such as was concluded three months later by Barthélemy) would help French finance. Peace with Prussia and the neutralisation of Mayence would enable French financiers and merchants to dispense with the middlemen of Switzerland, and thus would deliver them from the "insatiable avidity of the exchange-brokers"; French merchandise could go direct to Hamburg.² A minor but still important advantage of the peace was that salt could now be imported from Neuchatel and Valengin (principalities of the King of Prussia) into the French district of Franche Comté.³

10, 1795: the activity of the English and the Prince of Orange is such *dans l'Electorat d'Hanovre, qu'ils ne laisseront plus au Roi de Prusse d'autre parti que celui de prendre le pays en dépôt* (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 216).

¹ *Papiers de Barthélemy* (ed. Kaulek, 1894), t. V, p. 464. The Patent Treaty of Bâle is in De Clercq, I, 232-4. The Secret Articles are pp. 234-6. The Convention of May 17, 1795 (otherwise secret), made public the Line of Demarcation (Martens, *Recueil*, tome VI, p. 503).

² Bacher to Committee of Public Safety, December 21, 1794 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 216).

³ Hardenberg to Barthélemy, June 5, 1795 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

CHAPTER III

THE ARRIVAL OF BONAPARTE

That the French Revolution would lead to Cæsarism had been foreseen almost from the first by Edmund Burke. The Continental Governments became aware of it a little later. In 1794, however, while the Monarchical and Revolutionary armies were still balanced against each other in a terrific struggle, the Empress of Russia, Catherine II, wrote to her friend, Grimm : " If France gets out of this, she will have more vigour than ever ; she will be obedient like a lamb ; but she requires a superior man, clever, courageous, above his contemporaries, and perhaps even above his century ; is he born ? isn't he ? " ¹ He had already been born some twenty-five years, and had attained the rank of brigadier-general. Bonaparte had recently risen to note in the siege of Toulon, which had been defended by the French Royalists and a British fleet against the Revolution Government (August-December, 1793). When the Empress Catherine uttered her prescient words in April, 1794, Bonaparte was in command of the artillery in the Army of Italy which was operating under General Dumerbion in the neighbourhood of Nice, against the forces of the Kingdom of Sardinia. He had made his mark as a soldier, though it is very unlikely that the Empress Catherine had ever heard of him at this time. His career had been only a moderate success, while Hoche, who was just a year older, already commanded an army ; Marceau, less than six months older, was a famous general of division, beloved by all the soldiers ; Pichegru, who was seven years senior, was the conqueror of Holland, and was used by the Committee of Public Safety as their right-hand man, likely, it appeared, to be a sort of Cromwell, or perhaps a Monk. But Marceau died of a wound received on the field of Altenkirchen in 1796, Hoche succumbed to consumption when campaigning in 1797 ; and Pichegru, becoming politically suspect, after being deported to Cayenne, and subsequently escap-

¹ Quoted in Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 58.

ing, was in the end strangled in prison at Paris in 1804. Besides these three there were other young generals who in 1794 were better known than Bonaparte. Three years were still to pass before he was to become famous.

In July, 1794, Bonaparte was sent on a mission, half political, half military, to Genoa, where he made his *début* in diplomacy. His instructions were to discuss with the Doge of this neutral State the condition of the roads and other communications between France and Italy, and secretly to study the fortifications of Savona.¹ The fifth and sixth clauses of the Instructions issued to him by Ricord (the Representative on Mission of the Convention) were as follows :

Go to the bottom of (*approfondir*) the civic and diplomatic conduct of the minister of the French Republic Tilly, and of his agents, concerning whom various complaints arrive.

Take all the steps and collect all the facts which may reveal the intention of the Genoese Government relative to the Coalition.²

When Bonaparte returned to Nice, Robespierre fell from power and was guillotined (July 28, 1794). Bonaparte, as a friend of the younger Robespierre, came under suspicion of political disaffection, and was thrown into prison, and deprived of his military rank (August 12, 1794). He was released, however, within eight days, and thereafter for months he hung around the bureaux at Paris, soliciting some appointment. Never losing hope, never relaxing his habits of work, he drafted plans for the campaigns of the time, and had them considered by the Ministry of War. On September 20 (1794) he had been restored to his rank as brigadier-general. In March, 1795, he was given command of the artillery in an expedition for the recovery of Corsica. The expedition was a total failure.

In August, 1795, Bonaparte obtained an appointment on the bureau of the Ministry of War which prepared plans of campaign. Next he was offered a command in the Army of the West, where he would have had the disagreeable and unpopular task of suppressing civil war among the peasantry of La Vendée. He refused, and his name was accordingly struck off the list of active officers ;

¹ Bonaparte left Nice on July 11 and spent five days in Genoa. He was in Nice again on July 27. Nothing is known of his doings in Genoa.

² See *Order to the General Bonaparte to betake himself to Genoa to confer with the Government of Genoa*, in J. Colin, *L'Éducation militaire de Napoléon* (1900), p. 304.

but almost at the same time he was designated to head a military mission to Turkey.

It was while he was waiting for the final arrangement of this mission that the "day" of 13 Vendémiaire, Year IV (October 5, 1795), took place. There was serious rioting in Paris against the Convention, and open disaffection among the National Guard. The Convention appointed the Comte de Barras, who was both a soldier and a politician, to defend it. Bonaparte at once offered his services to Barras, who had made his acquaintance at the siege of Toulon. He was given command of the artillery, and did not scruple to use it. A "whiff of grapeshot" quelled the rising, and made the fortune of Bonaparte. After the 13 Vendémiaire the Convention put in force the new Constitution which had been drafted in the previous April (the Constitution of the Year III), and elected the Directory. Barras was one of the five who were elected Directors. It was he who secured Bonaparte's appointment to the command of the Army of Italy.¹

Bonaparte was gazetted to the command on February 27, 1796. Before leaving Paris he married Josephine Beauharnais, whom he had met and fallen in love with after Vendémiaire. He left Paris for his army on March 11. If he could swiftly defeat the Austrians he would bring to a head negotiations which already had been on foot for six months.²

¹ Carnot later claimed to have proposed Bonaparte's appointment, and this is not unlikely, as he had a great talent for finding good officers.

² In October and November, 1795, the Citizen Poterat was in Vienna, having been charged by the Committee of Public Safety with the conduct of peace-negotiations. Thugut had declared that the Emperor "n'est point acharné à faire la guerre à la France" (*see* Instructions to Poterat, November 28, 1795; but the "informal invitation" to Thugut to make peace was delivered on October 5, 1795. Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

CHAPTER IV

BONAPARTE IN ITALY

The campaign of 1796 is one of the wonders of military history, but it was not the first time that Napoleon had seen war on the grand scale. Nor was it the time when he made his *début* in diplomacy (for he had done that at Genoa); yet it was the first occasion on which he engaged in diplomacy of the large and critical kind. The mission to Genoa had been a small affair on which nothing particular depended. In Italy, however, in 1797, he had to meet and pit his untrained wits against the fine flower of the Austrian diplomatic service, against the expert and able Louis Cobenzl. And Cobenzl was fain to admit that he had found his match.

There are indeed indications that Bonaparte's attention had been directed to political as well as to military affairs before he went on the campaign of '96. He was a great student, as is amply proved by the remarkable exercise-books which he filled as a young soldier between the years 1786 and 1792.¹ In one of these *cahiers* is a remarkable analysis of English history from the earliest times to 1689. There is also the celebrated dialogue known as the *Supper of Beaucaire* (written in 1793), in which Bonaparte convinces a Marseillais merchant that the cause of the Republic will triumph in France, both for military and political reasons.² That he already had a clear insight into the way in which military and political considerations must be regarded together is strikingly shown in the *Note on the political and military position of our armies in Piedmont and Spain* (1794).³

¹ The *cahiers* are in the Laurentian Library at Florence. They have been published in *Napoléon inconnu* (1895), by F. Masson and G. Biagi. The *précis* of English history is in tome I, p. 340.

² Text in *Napoléon inconnu*, tome II, p. 479.

³ This Note was subscribed by the younger Robespierre, but Captain Colin has proved that Bonaparte was the inspirer of it—see *L'Éducation militaire de Napoléon*, pp. 295–6. The text of the Note is on p. 443. It was written on the special paper used in the Staff of the Artillery of the Army of Italy, and no other examples of it exist except those on which Bonaparte is the writer.

In this Note it is stated that—

Austria is our most determined enemy. . . . It is necessary to overwhelm Germany ; that done, Spain and Italy fall of themselves. . . . The offensive system in Piedmont reacts on Poland and encourages the Grand Turk. . . . The point of view of political considerations ought to offer us the perspective, in one or two campaigns, of the overturning of a throne and of the changing of a Government.

It is clear that Bonaparte went to Italy in 1796 with something more than a mere military plan of operations in his head. His views for the campaign had been far wider than the views suggested by the celebrated plan of the Maréchal de Maillebois in 1745, to which, apparently, Bonaparte owed very little.¹

On March 27, 1796, Bonaparte joined his headquarters staff at Nice ; and soon his ragged but thoroughly seasoned troops were launched upon their amazing career of victory. Piedmont was invaded. French victories at Montenotte and Dego in April had for result the withdrawal of the Austrian army into Lombardy. A French victory at Mondovi on April 22 had a similar effect upon the Piedmontese army : it retreated northwards by way of Cherasco towards the capital of the Sardinian kingdom, Turin. Bonaparte, in the full tide of success, could have gone forward and dictated peace to King Victor Amadeus in the capital, but preferred a quicker, though less spectacular method. He wished to lose no time, for he had the still unconquered Austrians to deal with.

The control of the Directory, exercised from Paris through Saliceti, civil commissary with the Army of Italy, was to trouble him, although not for long. The Instructions with which the Directory had sent Bonaparte to Italy included an order to make no convention or even armistice without the consent of Saliceti. But Saliceti, an old patron of Bonaparte, had the sense now to turn his eyes aside, and to bury himself in the affairs of the treasury : after all, if he could send several millions of money to the Directory, they would be satisfied.

After the battle of Mondovi, Bonaparte had proposed to the Piedmontese General Colli that a suspension of hostilities should ensue, on condition of Coni, Alessandria and Tortona being given into the hands of the French. He had then advanced to Cherasco, where he arrived on April 25 and established himself in the mansion of a local nobleman, the Comte de Salmatoris.

¹ See *L'Éducation militaire de Napoléon*, pp. 338-9.

He had already formed the habit of maintaining considerable state. Small, pale with lank hair, and plainly dressed, he nevertheless impressed all who came near him. Affable to the common soldiers, he kept his high officers at a distance.

The three Sardinian officers¹ designated by General Colli arrived at Cherasco, on April 26, at half-past ten o'clock in the evening, having been guided on their way to the outposts by the camp-fires of the French soldiers which lit up hill and plain.² They were received in the General's palace by Berthier the chief of staff. The room was comfortable, with a cheerful fire burning in the grate. Here they had to wait for half an hour until the General was ready to receive them. Then Bonaparte appeared, grave, self-possessed, in uniform, but without his sword, hat or scarf. He betrayed no nervousness in this, his first big negotiation. When the Sardinian officers complained of the hard conditions, Bonaparte pointed out that since these conditions were offered, his army had taken three more towns: "nevertheless," said he, "I have not heightened my first demands." Midnight passed. When the officers still resisted, and were maintaining their objections until one o'clock, Bonaparte pulled out his watch, and gave them an hour to decide: "the general attack is ordered for two o'clock." He then withdrew³ and left the two Sardinians to discuss details with Berthier. At two o'clock on the morning of the 27th a provisional agreement was signed by exchange of letters between Bonaparte and the Sardinians. At the same time a counter-order was issued cancelling the order for the general attack which was to have taken place.

During the negotiation there had been nobody in the room except the Sardinian officers, Bonaparte and Berthier. A young staff-officer was introduced to put the terms down in writing. When the business was finished, the senior Sardinian officer, the elderly General de la Tour, asked to be refreshed with some coffee. Bonaparte had to send into the town to get it. A few French officers next came in—Murat, Marmont and two or three others. The whole company passed into the dining-room. There they had rather a plain supper, over which they spent very little time. When

¹ The General Baron de La Tour, the Colonel Marquis Costa, and the Captain de Seyssel.

² Costa de Beauregard, *Un homme d'autrefois* (1877), p. 332.

³ Costa (*op. cit.*, p. 334) says Bonaparte merely turned away and sat down to write, in the same room. But B.'s own account shows that he had left the room (*see* letter quoted below, p. 24).

the meal was over Bonaparte became more expansive and the conversation took an interesting turn. Bonaparte passed some severe criticisms on the Austrian generals, and complimented the Sardinians on their military skill: "you withdrew yourself very adroitly two or three times from my clutches." He took the Colonel Costa, second Sardinian envoy, into his own chamber and showed him the little portmanteau "which composed all his equipage," contrasting this with the huge amount of luggage that accompanied every Austrian army. Then, leaning his elbows on the window-sill, he watched the dawn growing into day, and continued talking for an hour.¹

After the Sardinian mission had departed, he sat down to write his report to the Directory:

To-day at two hours after midnight, the aide-de-camp of General Colli has brought me the letter of which I enclose copy. I have given the enclosed reply. I attend to-night his final decision. . . . The King of Sardinia will be obliged to make the peace you prescribe, since, independently of the country between Coni, Cherasco, Alba and Alessandria, we have the town and forts of Coni, and the town and fortresses of Tortona and Alessandria. . . .

If I had not fulfilled your object, and done something contrary to your projects, it would be, I assure you, the greatest misfortune that I can imagine. I did, in time, foresee what has happened, and asked for instructions. The reply given was that I must take counsel from the events in unforeseen circumstances.²

The Directory had to be content with the General having taken the decision of diplomatic affairs out of their hands. Bonaparte civilly professed that his decision could be reversed without difficulty by them: "if you do not conclude with the King of Sardinia, I will keep the fortresses and march on Turin."³ He even suggested: "if your project is to dethrone the King of Sardinia, amuse him for a little, and let me know." And he threw out a further seductive bait: "as regards Genoa, I believe that you should demand fifteen millions indemnity from her."⁴

¹ The bulk of the above account of the Cherasco negotiation is drawn from the narrative (*Un homme d'autrefois*, chap. XVI) of the Marquis Costa de Beauregard, a great-grandson of the Colonel Costa who formed part of the Cherasco mission. The narrative was put together from papers left in the family archives by Colonel Costa.

² Bonaparte to the Directory, April 27, 1796, in *Correspondance de Napoléon* No. 253, tome I, p. 232.

³ B. to Directory, April 28, 1796, *ibid.*, p. 236.

⁴ B. to Directory, April 29, 1796, *Corr.*, No. 266.

Civil and cynical and just a little contemptuous, Bonaparte got his way with the Directory. The armistice left the French in occupation of Piedmont from the sea to the River Stura, and of the bridge across that important river. Article 4 stated that "the French troops shall have the right to cross the Po at Valenza." Bonaparte had this inserted merely to mislead the Austrians, who were defending the line of the Po: his diplomacy and strategy served each other.¹

After the Armistice of Cherasco, Bonaparte lost no time in prosecuting the war against the Austrians. His *ruse* in stipulating in the armistice for the right to cross the Po at Valenza was apparently successful, for he was able to cross practically unopposed at Piacenza. The Austrians then evacuated Milan and prepared to defend the line of the Adda. Bonaparte forced the passage of this river in a fight that became almost legendary in its celebrity, at Lodi (May 10, 1796). On May 16 he entered Milan. The lower classes made little sign of welcome to receive him, but the rich, educated Milanese, both men and women, greeted him joyously as the apostle of chivalry and freedom. He installed himself in the Palazzo Serbelloni, where all the wit and beauty of Milan paid him court. "You are free," he said to them, "and Milan will be your capital."²

Bonaparte was not unmindful of the Directory's instructions to him to collect contributions. France was now a parasitical State. She could not maintain her war-government from her own internal revenues. On the day before he risked his life in the charge at Lodi, Bonaparte had concluded an armistice with the Duke of Parma. The Duke undertook to pay two million *livres* "in letters

¹ Text of Armistice of Cherasco in *Corr.*, No. 256. The final peace with Sardinia was made by the Directory at Paris, on May 15, 1796. It incorporated the Armistice terms in a stricter form (Text in De Clercq, I, 271).

² Quoted by Sorel, V, 81. Compare (or rather, contrast) *Corr.*, No. 437. B. to the Directory (May 16, 1796): "Milan is very eager for liberty. . . . We shall let the existing forms of government remain; we shall change only the persons. . . . We shall draw twenty million of contributions from this country. . . . If the people demand to be organised as a republic, shall we accord it?" For the enthusiasm at Milan, see Stendhal, *Souvenirs de Milan en 1796*, in *Revue des deux mondes* for 1855 (tome XI), p. 1128: "*ce fut le plus belle moment d'une belle jeunesse*" (p. 1136). Cp. *Report on the political relations of France with Austria touching Italy, 1796-7*. This was composed in the French Foreign Office. It asks the question: "Shall we republicanise Italy?" The Directory, in a marginal note, answers "No" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 366, folio 7).

of change on Genoa or in silver or in money"; and to hand over twenty pictures, to be chosen by the General.¹ A similar convention was made with the Duke of Modena, at Milan, on May 17; the Duke had to pay seven million *livres* in money of France, and to hand over twenty pictures.² At the same time all pillaging was expressly forbidden among the troops, and all officers were ordered to send away the women whom they had with them.³

The Austrian forces had retired to the Mincio. Bonaparte soon resumed his military and diplomatic course. The Directory at Paris had its own ideas about the proper policy to pursue in Italy: it disliked, for instance, the idea of coming to terms with the Papacy, or with the Bourbon monarchy of Naples. But Bonaparte had made it clear that they must either leave him untrammelled or else recall him.⁴ They were, however, loth to recall a general who won so many battles, and sent home much treasure.

While the campaign around Mantua was going on, Bonaparte made the first step in the tortuous negotiations in which he was soon to be involved with regard to Venice. The Venetian *terra firma* extended westwards to the Adda, and englobed Lake Garda. The Austrian troops had entered Peschiera; so Bonaparte complained of this as a breach of neutrality, and sent Masséna to occupy Verona, the Venetian fortress on the Adige. At the same time, a threat of a military expedition against Naples induced that monarchy to separate itself from the Coalition.

The Neapolitan armistice was arranged through the mediation of Count Miot de Melito, Minister of the French Republic to the Court of the Grand Duke of Tuscany at Florence. Miot was a professional diplomatist who had begun his official career under the Ancien Régime, in the year before the Revolution. He now came from Florence, first to Milan, then following in the wake of Bonaparte to Brescia. There he met the young General:

Nothing could be more unlike the idea my imagination had formed of him. In the midst of a numerous staff, I saw a man below the middle

¹ Text in *Corr.*, No. 368.

² Text in *Corr.*, No. 439. A general list of pictures to be transported to Paris is in No. 444; it includes pictures by Rubens, Leonardo, Raphael, Corregio, Titian, and a manuscript of Virgil which had belonged to Petrarch; many were from Milan, which Bonaparte was "freeing."

³ *Corr.*, No. 400. *Ordre du jour*, of May 11, 1796.

⁴ "I can render essential services to the fatherland only if invested entirely and absolutely with your confidence." B. to the Directory, written from Lodi, May 14, 1796 (*Corr.*, No. 420).

height, and of an extremely spare figure. His powdered hair, oddly cut and falling squarely below the ears, reached down to his shoulders. He was dressed in a straight coat, buttoned up to the chin, and edged with very narrow gold embroidery, and he wore a tri-coloured feather in his hat. At first sight he did not strike me as handsome; but his strongly marked features, his quick and piercing eyes, his brusque and animated gestures, revealed an ardent spirit, while his wide and thoughtful brow was that of a profound thinker.¹

Miot informed Bonaparte that Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, the Neapolitan envoy, was present in Brescia. The general replied that "he saw no objection to treating for an armistice." Miot suggested as one condition that the Neapolitans should close their ports to the English. The "closing of ports" was part of the French Revolutionary *Continental System*, which was much older than Napoleon's. At this moment, however, Bonaparte demurred:

"Ah! That is the policy of the diplomatist," he answered abruptly. "What we must stipulate for just now is that Naples shall immediately withdraw her troops from the Austrian army. The infantry is worthless; but you are aware that they have four excellent regiments of cavalry which have already given me a great deal of trouble. I should like to get rid of these as quickly as possible. Send M. de Belmonte to me; the treaty shall soon be made." And in fact the treaty was drawn up and signed in the course of that day—in less than two hours.²

Bonaparte was still in what might be called the military stage of his diplomatic career. The armistice, signed on June 5, did stipulate for the withdrawal of the Neapolitan forces from the Austrian army. They were to go into cantonments on Venetian territory. No contributions of treasure were demanded, for the obvious reason that the French did not occupy a foot of Neapolitan territory and so could not "squeeze" the people or Government. But Miot managed to insert a clause to the effect that the Neapolitan vessels should be withdrawn from the English Mediterranean fleet. The Neapolitan armistice was a much more moderate instrument than the Directory had hoped that Bonaparte would be able to make.³

¹ *Memoirs of Count Miot de Melito* (Trans. by Hoey and Lillie, 1881), vol. I, pp. 103-4.

² Miot, *op. cit.*, I, p. 105.

³ The Directory hoped that Sicily might be conquered: "It is so fertile; it would completely free our Southern departments from want." At least the port of Trapani might be annexed, "but do not insist too much upon this" (Rapport of 1796-7 in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366, folio, 20, 27).

After Naples, came the turn of the Pope. Miot had sent two proposals to the Directory, stating two objects which he thought should ensue from Bonaparte's Italian victories. One was "the complete destruction of the power of Austria in Italy." The other was "the overthrow of the Papal Government." He had really come up from Florence to Brescia to ascertain the views of the General who "was rather inclined to dictate orders to the Directory than to receive them."¹ After the affair of the Neapolitan armistice, Miot began to discuss policy with Bonaparte and to allude to Saliceti, the Civil Commissary to the Army of Italy. But Bonaparte cut him short:

"The Commissioners of the Directory," he answered impatiently, "count for nothing in my policy. Let them busy themselves, and welcome, with the administration of the public revenues, for the moment at least; the rest does not concern them. I do not expect that they will long retain their posts, nor will the Directory send me others in their room. On the other hand, Citizen Miot, I will read your Memorandum, and I hope you will meet me at Bologna, where I shall be, no matter what are my future plans, in a fortnight's time. I shall send a courier to inform you of my arrival. Adieu."²

The General, like a young eagle, was beginning distinctly to feel his wings. The Directory might wish to refuse to recognise the Pope as a sovereign, but Bonaparte had a policy of his own. It was, thinks Sorel, to use the Pope to bring about the pacification not merely of Italy, but also of France.³ The anti-papal policy of the Revolution had set all the priests and loyal Catholics in France against the Republic. Bonaparte was now beginning his long-drawn-out effort (it lasted sixteen years) to bind the Pope diplomatically to his chariot-wheels.

So on June 8 he came down to Bologna, which was in the Papal States. The Directory regarded itself as in a state of war with the Pope. Bonaparte therefore, "in order to make it clear that the Pope's magic over the people had no effect upon us . . . authorised the Bologna Senate to consider the decrees of Rome against their liberty as non-existent."⁴

The Pope's States were obviously exposed to the ragged, voracious and invincible armies of the Directory. So he had hastened

¹ Miot, *op. cit.*, I, p. 97.

² Miot, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

³ Sorel, V, 91.

⁴ Bonaparte to the Directory, June 21, 1796 (*Corr.*, No. 665).

to send up from Rome Azara, the Spanish Ambassador at the Vatican. Bonaparte and Azara discussed terms at Bologna. The usual things were mentioned: money, statues, pictures, the exclusion of French royalist *émigrés*. Azara knew that the Pope was prepared to go far in concessions: he even transmitted to His Holiness Bonaparte's request for a Bull against all priests who should preach civil war under the pretext of religion. Pius VI went so far as to prepare such a Bull, but although it was printed in the *Moniteur* at Paris, there was some irregularity which invalidated it. The Armistice was concluded at Bologna, on June 23, 1796. The Pope was to close his ports to the ships of States which were at war with France (art. 4); the French army was to continue in occupation of the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara (art. 5); Ancona was to receive a French garrison (art. 6); the Pope was to deliver to the French Republic one hundred pictures, busts, vases or statues, to be chosen by the Republican commissioners, including the bust in bronze of Junius Brutus, and that in marble of Marcus Brutus: finally he was to pay twenty-one million *livres* of money (arts. 8 and 9).¹

So far, Bonaparte had made no treaties, but only Armistice Agreements. These Agreements, however, did practically compel the Directory to complete them by negotiating definite treaties later.² The huge monetary indemnities by themselves made it almost inevitable that the Directory should endorse Bonaparte's policy. The Directors might have ideas of their own about the political settlement of Italy, but a greater authority really held the decision. With regard to the Papacy, for instance, Bonaparte followed his own line. Miot de Melito wrote later:

To treat with the Pope was to recognise his power, and to guarantee his existence both as Prince and Pontiff. I pointed this out to Bonaparte, but he evaded an explanation, and I perceived that he had no intention of taking advantage of our victories to destroy the double power of the Holy See, and that notwithstanding the sacrifices he was about to extract from the Papal Court, he was careful to maintain the principle of its existence and anxious for its safety. Was he already thinking of the use which he would one day make of it? That he was, cannot be proved; but subsequent events have shown that the conjecture is at least plausible.³

¹ De Clercq, I, 276-277.

² Final Treaties concluded by the Directory with Sardinia, May 15, 1797; with Naples, October 10, 1796; with Parma, November 5, 1796 (De Clercq).

³ Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, I, 116.

Throughout the summer and the rest of the year 1796, the French forces were busily engaged in the siege of Mantua, and in meeting the Austrian armies that came to relieve it. On February 2, 1797, Mantua surrendered, and the Austrians were driven out of all Lombardy. But Bonaparte, fond though he was of glory, was not going to waste time over a spectacular capitulation of the Austrian commander of Mantua. He had gone off to Ancona, leaving General Sérurier to receive the submission of the grand fortress. From Ancona Bonaparte quickly got into touch with the Papal Curia. He was still only a general, with no diplomatic powers, but he associated with himself Cacault, the agent ¹ of the French Republic, and so could conclude treaties, subject to the ratification of the Directory. In the interesting little hill-town of Tolentino, about thirty miles south-west of Ancona, he met and concluded a treaty with the Cardinal Mattei, on February 19, 1797. The treaty was dictated almost at the mouth of the French cannons: for Bonaparte's troops were on the march for Rome. Yet the victorious general was not without magnanimity, and omitted the most humiliating clause of his original proposal—the clause stipulating that the Pope should deliver up General Colli and banish the Cardinal Albani. The Pope had to pay contributions amounting to thirty million *livres*, and had to cede Avignon, and also the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara and Romagna. The city and territory of Ancona were to remain in French hands until the conclusion of general peace in Europe.

The Treaty of Tolentino completed Bonaparte's policy for Italy south of the Po. Immediately south of this river was to be a French client-State, the Cispadane Republic consisting of Bologna, Ferrara and Romagna with Modena.²

Ancona was not to be included in this new State: it was to be purely French, and to serve as a naval and also a political base for further extensions:

It is necessary that we should keep the port of Ancona until the

¹ Even with Cacault to regularise his actions, Bonaparte thought it well to give five reasons to the Directors for concluding the treaty. One reason was that if he had not hastened the negotiations, the King of Naples would probably have intervened. February 19, 1797, *Corr.*, No. 1510.

² The Armistice of May 17, 1796, with Modena had never been converted into a treaty; in September the Duke had been driven from his State by French troops. The proclamation of the Cispadane Republic had taken place at Bologna on October 16, 1796.

general peace, and that it remain always French. This will give us a great influence over the Ottoman Porte, and make us masters of the Adriatic, as we are of the Mediterranean through Marseilles and Corsica.¹

The Papal States (reduced) and the Kingdom of Naples were still to be left, so long as they conformed to the French system, and especially so long as they excluded English ships of war. Moreover, Bonaparte was of opinion that the natural consequences of the Treaty of Tolentino would make Rome itself the helpless tool of the French Republic :

My opinion is that Rome, deprived of Bologna, Ferrara and Romagna, and of the thirty millions that we take from her, can no longer exist : that old machine will fall to pieces by itself.²

¹ Bonaparte to the Directory, February 15, 1797 (*Corr.*, No. 1497). Bonaparte wished to be able to keep an eye upon Austrian designs upon Bosnia and Herzegovina (cp. Clarke to Minister of Exterior Affairs, August 2, 1797, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 367).

² B. to the Directory, February 19, 1797 (*Corr.*, No. 1510).

CHAPTER V

LEOBEN AND CAMPO FORMIO

The great Italian campaign was now coming to an end. The battles around Mantua—Castiglione (August), Arcola (November, 1796), and Rivoli (January, 1797)—had been fought and won; Mantua itself had surrendered (February); and all France was now ready for peace. But Austria, her armies falling steadily back into the mountains of Carinthia, had still to be induced to sign a treaty. Napoleon pursued the Austrian armies through the territory of Venice, the neutrality of that State being in nowise respected. On he went, through the Pontebba Pass, through Tarvis, Villach, and Klagenfurt. From this last place, on March 31, 1797, Bonaparte wrote a touching appeal which reads like a sincere expression, to the Austrian Commander-in-chief, the Archduke Charles. Throughout the letter he assumes equality with the Archduke by calling him *M. le Général en chef*.¹

Monsieur le Général en chef, brave soldiers make war and desire peace. Has not this war endured six years? Have we killed enough people and committed enough evils on poor humanity? Peace is demanded on all sides. Europe, which had taken arms against the French Republic, has laid them down. Your nation remains alone,² and yet the blood goes on flowing more than ever.

* * * * *

As to me, *Monsieur le Général en chef*, if the overture which I have the honour to make to you can save the life of a single man, I shall hold myself more proud of the civic crown which I shall have merited, than of the sorrowful glory that can come from military successes.³

¹ General Thiébault notes this *ton de l'égalité* at the time (*Mémoires*, II, 75).

² England was still at war with France, but Bonaparte wished the Austrians (who complained that England did not help enough) to feel their isolation. The Report on French Relations with Austria touching Italy, 1796-7, says that Austria was tired of serving the interests of England, and was obstinately desirous to extend her own dominions (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366).

³ *Corr.*, No. 1663. Negotiations had been started, on the part of the French Government, for a separate peace with Austria, before the Italian campaign (see Mission of Citizen Poterat, November, 1795, to May, 1796, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

At the same time as he was making this appeal, Bonaparte with magnificent impudence issued a proclamation counselling the inhabitants of Carinthia to abstain from this "horrible war," and establishing a provisional Government under French rule for the whole province.¹

Naturally, Bonaparte did not remain idle while his message to the Archduke was being considered at Vienna. On April 7 Masséna entered Leoben, about one hundred and fifty miles from Vienna. It is highly improbable that Bonaparte's sentimental appeal from Klagenfurt had any effect, for the Austrian Government was strictly "realist" in policy, and waged war and made peace according to its interests or its necessities. Thugut, the Chancellor, seems, on the whole, to have been in favour of making a great national effort against the invader,² but the court was inclined to peace, the army was very depressed, and Vienna itself seemed in danger of a French occupation. Yet Bonaparte's position in the (to him and his men) unknown valleys of Styria, without the possibility of being reinforced, was by no means safe.³

Nevertheless Thugut agreed to send envoys to Leoben. He chose General Merveldt of the Austrian army, and the Marchese di Gallo, Neapolitan Minister at Vienna. Bonaparte received them in the Castle of Göss at Leoben. Merveldt arrived on April 13, Gallo on the 14th.

Bonaparte at first hesitated to receive the Marquis Gallo. As Naples was now in friendly relations with France, Gallo was a strange sort of plenipotentiary for an enemy Power like Austria. On thinking the matter over, however, Bonaparte did not persist in his objection to Gallo—

because this would have involved many delays, and because he appeared to be endued with great confidence from the Emperor; finally because the Austrians and the Hungarians are very irritated at seeing strangers play the principal rôle in such an important affair, and because if we

¹ April 1, 1797, in *Corr.*, No. 1667.

² The Directory knew that Thugut would be an obstacle to peace; and when they sent Clarke (January 14, 1797) to Italy they instructed him to try and influence Thugut, either by bribery or by revealing secrets about him which were in the French archives. But I can find no evidence of this plan having been tried, though the Directory resorted to it more than once (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 366, folio 53).

³ For an account of the march from Tarvis to Leoben, see *Mémoires du Général Baron Thiébault* (1894), tome II, pp. 85-95.

break it off, it will be a very considerable means of exciting discontent against the Government of Vienna.¹

Nevertheless Bonaparte (who, it should be remembered, was still under thirty years of age) thought fit to twit the experienced Neapolitan diplomatist, and succeeded, apparently, in making Gallo feel rather small:

In receiving M. de Gallo, he asked who he was. The favourite courtier, disconcerted at having to give his name, replied that he was the Marquis de Gallo, charged on the part of the Emperor to make certain overtures. "But," said Napoleon, "your name is not German?"—"It is true," replied M. de Gallo, "I am ambassador of Naples."—"And since when," replied the French General dryly, "have I to treat with Naples? We are at peace. Has not the Emperor at home any of the negotiators of the Old Rock? Is all the ancient aristocracy of Vienna extinct?" M. de Gallo, terrified lest such observations should officially reach the Cabinet of Vienna, was from this moment occupied only in agreeing in everything with the young General.²

The next difficulty arose from the Austrians' demanding that the name of the Emperor should always occur before that of the Republic. Bonaparte refused. In the end it was agreed that the same ceremonial should be employed as before the war³—that is to say, in the Austrian copy of the Convention the name of the Emperor should occur first; in the French copy, the name of the Republic. The firmness with which Bonaparte insisted on maintaining the dignity of the Republic was a curious commentary on his statement (which was quite true) to the Austrian envoys that the French Government "was quite indifferent in all that concerned etiquette."⁴ The Austrians offered to "recognise" the French Republic. Bonaparte answered that the Republic did not wish to be recognised: "it is in Europe what the sun is on the horizon; so much the worse for anyone who does not wish to see it and does not wish to profit by it."⁵

¹ Bonaparte to the Directory, April 16, 1797 (*Corr.*, No. 1735).

² Las Casas, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, tome III, partie VI, pp. 266-7.

³ See Preliminary Treaty of Leoben, art. II. De Clercq (*Recueil*, I, 319) gives the French copy; Bonaparte (*Corr.*, No. 1743) reproduces the Austrian copy. Both copies are in French.

⁴ B. to the Directory, April 16, 1797 (*Corr.*, No. 1735). The Minister of Exterior Relations on May 6, 1797, wrote to Bonaparte: "It [the Directory] attaches much less importance than the Emperor to the dispute about etiquette, which M. de Gallo is raising" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 387, folio 233).

⁵ *Ibid*; cp. *Mémoires de Thiébault*, II, 75.

Gallo desired that a place should be neutralised, where the conferences could be continued *en règle*.

A garden was chosen, in the midst whereof is a pavillion. We have declared it neutral, a farce to which I have willingly lent myself, to satisfy the puerile vanity of these people. This supposed neutral point is environed on all sides by the French army, and in the midst of the bivouacs of our divisions.¹

The preliminary Treaty of Leoben was signed at the Château of Eggenwald on April 18, 1797. The chief terms were as follows : a Congress formed of plenipotentiaries of France and the States of the Empire was to meet to settle a definite peace "on the basis of the integrity of the Germanic Empire" (art. 5). Austria renounced all rights over her "Belgian provinces," and "recognised the limits decreed by the laws of the French Republic."² The cession of Belgium was to be subject to an equivalent indemnity being given to the Emperor "at his convenience" (art. 6). By article 7 France agreed to restore to the Emperor all the other Austrian territories occupied by French armies. Such were the terms of the Patent Treaty.

A secret convention included in the treaty considerably modified the public terms. Article 1 stated :

That, in spite of the disposition of article 7 of the preliminaries of peace decided between the two Contracting Parties, under the date of to-day, H.M. the Emperor renounces that part of his States in Italy which lie beyond the right bank of the Oglio and of the right bank of the Po, on condition that His Imperial Majesty be indemnified for this cession, as well as for that made in article 6 of the Preliminaries, by the part of the Venetian terra firma comprised between the Oglio, the Po, the Adriatic Sea, and his hereditary States, as well as by Dalmatia and Venetian Istria ; and by this acquisition, the engagements contracted by the French Republic in regard to His Imperial Majesty, by article 6 of the Preliminaries, are fulfilled.

This idea of giving Venice or part of it to Austria was Bonaparte's own plan, and it had been necessary for him to get the consent of the Directory.³

In articles 2 and 4 of the secret convention, France agreed to compensate Venice (which, being an island, was not included in the

¹ *Corr.*, No. 1735.

² This refers to the Constitutional Limits of October 1, 1795. *See above*, p. 12.

³ *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 366, folio 125.

cession to Austria) for her losses by ceding to her the Legations of Romagna, Ferrara and Bologna. These territories had been acquired from the Pope by the Treaty of Tolentino and, at the moment, formed part of the Cispadane Republic. At the same time Venice was to hand over to France her territory between the Adda and the Oglio.

The territory acquired in Italy by France both from Austria and from Venice was to form an independent republic (the Cisalpine Republic)—art. 8. The whole treaty—Patent and Secret Articles—was signed by Bonaparte, Gallo, and Merveldt.¹

Even in its truncated (and indeed practically untenable) position, the Venetian Republic was not long to be left alone. The negotiations at Leoben were really a conspiracy against the European System. Article 6 of the Patent Treaty declared that France would restore to Austria all occupied territory except Belgium; Article 1 of the Secret Treaty declared that Austria renounced nearly all her old Italian territory, but was to gain instead the Venetian terra firma. The public statement was therefore a lie, told with the sole object of covering the atrocious conspiracy against Venice. There is no possible means of condoning this course of meanness, treachery and falsehood on the part of Austria and Bonaparte. Far from wanting to partition Venice, the Directors at Paris had at first intended to increase her territory by the addition of Brixen and Trent, in return for a payment of sixty million *livres*.²

After the negotiation at Leoben, Bonaparte requested permission of the Directory to return to France, but was refused.³ He therefore went back to Lombardy, and took up his residence in the Château of Mombello (near Milan), which he chose "for the beauty of the site and of the air which one breathes there."⁴ He was no longer merely the Republican general; he was now the great consul, with a distinctly regal, indeed imperial aspect—"Cæsar

¹ The Patent and the Secret Articles of Leoben are given in De Clercq, I, 319-22.

Before Bonaparte took the negotiations in hand, the Directory, which was a little afraid of the "nationalism" of republics, thought of giving Milan to the Duke of Parma (*Rapport sur les relations politiques de la France avec l'Autriche touchant l'Italie*, in Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 366, folio 25).

² Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 366, folio 26.

³ *Ibid.*, folio 132.

⁴ These are Sorel's words (*L'Europe et la Révolution française*, V, 174).

in Gaul," in fact.¹ Miot de Melito found him keeping court like any sovereign :

I was received by Bonaparte, at the magnificent residence of Montebello [Mombello], on the 13th Prairial (June 1), in the midst of a brilliant court rather than the headquarters of an army. Strict etiquette already reigned around him ; his aides-de-camp and his officers were no longer received at his table, and he had become fastidious in the choice of the guests whom he admitted to it. An invitation was an honour eagerly sought, and obtained with great difficulty. He dined, so to speak, in public ; the inhabitants of the country were admitted to the room in which he was eating, and allowed to gaze at him with a keen curiosity. He was in no wise embarrassed or confused by these excessive honours, but received them as though he had been accustomed to them all his life. His reception-rooms and an immense tent pitched in front of the palace were constantly full of a crowd of generals, administrators and great contractors ; besides members of the highest nobility, and the most distinguished men in Italy who came to solicit the favour of a momentary glance or the briefest interview.²

Bonaparte was beginning to feel thoroughly at ease in the grand affairs of civil as well as of military life : he would soon be ready to meet the eminent Louis Cobenzl, the best diplomatist of the Austrian service, at the final peace negotiations. Of Gallo and Merveldt (who had followed him from Leoben to Montebello) he thought nothing. Of General Clarke, of the French Foreign Office, whom the Directory had attached to him as diplomatic adviser, he thought less : " he is a spy," said Bonaparte to Miot, " whom the Directory have set upon me ; besides Clarke is a man of no talent—he is only conceited." ³ In later life he admitted that Clarke was useful : " his chief talent is in being a great worker. . . . He had the mania for parchments." ⁴

In September, Bonaparte was back again in Venetia, to arrange

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 175.

² Miot de Melito, *Memoirs*, I, 183-4.

³ Miot, *op. cit.*, I, 187. Nevertheless when Clarke fell into disgrace with the Directory, Bonaparte sent to Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, a very generous appeal for fair treatment for him. Clarke, wrote Napoleon, had only done his duty ; besides " he knows all the secrets, as well as all the relations of the Republic " (Sept. 26, 1797, No. 2260). As First Consul and as Emperor, Napoleon gave Clarke various appointments, and ultimately made him Duke of Feltre. Clarke's Instructions, which were to the effect that he was only to act in concert with Bonaparte, were dated January 17, 1797 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366, folio 51).

⁴ Conversations with Las Casas (*Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, tome III, partie VI, pp. 268, 271).

with the Austrian envoys the final peace. Since the Preliminary Treaty of Leoben the appetite of both parties had grown: and Manin (the last of the Doges) would have probably agreed with the words of the Danish Minister Bernstorff, had he known them, that after great wars it is always the little States which furnish material for the accommodations of the great.¹

Venice had for long been marked down as accommodating material. An Austro-Russian treaty of 1795 (January 3) had stated that Austria, in compensation for having got nothing at the Second Partition of Poland, could take Venice.² This treaty was not improbably known to the French Government; or Bonaparte may easily have guessed that Austria had cast hungry eyes on Venice. In June, 1796, when the fight for Mantua was beginning, he had occupied the Venetian fortress of Verona, and had embroiled France and Venice in a convenient quarrel about the neutrality of the Venetian fortress, Peschiera. "If your project is to draw five or six millions from Venice, I have expressly brought about this rupture for you," he wrote to the Directory.³ After the preliminary Treaty of Leoben, he had defended his action in ceding Bologna, Ferrara and Romagna to Venice (in return for the robbery of her mainland) by saying that these territories "remain always in our power": in fact "it is evident that the Republic of Venice will find itself influenced by the Lombard [Cisalpine] Republic, and is at our disposition." Then he goes on to hint at the coming extinction of the Signory:

The Government of Venice is the most absurd and tyrannical of Governments: besides it is beyond doubt that it wished to profit by the moment when we were in the heart of Germany to assassinate us. Our Republic has no bitterer enemies. . . . Moreover this binds the Emperor to France and will oblige that prince, during the early period of our peace, to do everything that may be agreeable to us. This common interest that we have with the Emperor replaces the balance in our hands: we are placed by it between Prussia and the House of Austria, having major interests to arrange with one and the other.⁴

A serious outbreak against the French garrison of Verona (a Vene-

¹ Quoted by Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, 31.

² The text of this agreement, which was signed at Petersburg, is given by Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen* (1868), *Ergänzung*, p. 235.

³ June 7, 1796, *Corr.*, No. 582.

⁴ To the Directory, April 19, 1797, *Corr.*, No. 1745.

tian town), on April 17, furnished the pretext for treating the Venetian Government as an enemy.

The peace conference, which according to the Preliminaries of Leoben ought to have been held at Berne, took place at Udine in Venetian territory, with (at first) the same plenipotentiaries as at Leoben, namely Gallo and Merveldt for Austria, Bonaparte (with the assistance of Clarke) for France. "We are the Congress of Berne *here*," wrote Bonaparte.¹ It began on August 31. By September 6, the three plenipotentiaries had held two sessions, and were engaged on their third. Bonaparte soon became impatient with the formality and dilatoriness of the two Austrians.

It would be impossible to have to conduct a negotiation of this importance with more timid men, more poor logicians, or with people who have less credit at their court.

Gallo: a foreigner. Although supported by the Empress,² he never dares, as a foreigner, to clash with the intentions of Thugut.

Merveldt: colonel of a regiment of light-horse, very well got-up in his person, is like the rest; never blushing at the absurdities which they are made to say, and at the most manifest contradictions in the steps which they take. When they have said, "These are our instructions," they have said everything; this has come to be so absurd, that I said to them: "If your instructions stated that it was night, you would say it was, then?"³

Bonaparte knew that the Court at Vienna wanted peace, but that Thugut was against it. Probably Thugut was right, for Bonaparte's military position was not without serious danger.⁴ But he put a bold face upon it, and told Gallo and Merveldt that though he was not a Gascon, he would assure them that within fifteen days of the reopening of the campaign he would be "very near Vienna," and that at his approach "the people who had, the first time, broken the windows of M. Thugut, this time would hang him."⁵ He fixed

¹ To the Minister of Exterior Relations, September 3, 1797, *Corr.*, No. 2145.

² The second wife of the Emperor Francis II was Maria Theresa, daughter of Ferdinand IV (I) of Naples. Gallo, being a Neapolitan representing the Kingdom of Naples at the Court of Vienna, was, naturally, *persona grata* to the Empress.

³ To the same, September 6, 1797 (*Corr.*, No. 2153).

⁴ "You know without doubt better than I that one cannot remain all winter in this position." To the Minister of Exterior Relations, *ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* Thugut was undoubtedly anxious to keep his engagements with England and Russia, in spite of many offers made by the Directory to enter into a separate peace (see Pöterat to Minister of Exterior Relations, January 4, 1796, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 364).

October 1 as the date at which the negotiations must be completed, or else hostilities would begin. On September 15 Merveldt returned to Vienna to consult with Thugut, while Gallo remained at Udine. Thugut resolved to send Cobenzl to take over the negotiations with the surprisingly alert Republican diplomatist. He arrived at Udine on September 26.

Louis Cobenzl was the premier Austrian diplomatist, for the star of Metternich had not yet become brilliant. Brought up in the inner circle of Austrian aristocracy, trained under the great Kaunitz, he was "the man of the Austrian Monarchy, the soul of its projects, the director of its diplomacy. He had occupied the chief embassies in Europe."¹ He came with a great reputation to Udine. Forty-four years of age, fat, ugly, powdered, he was a man of ready wit, of polished conversation, and of complete self-control. But he was to meet his match, even in diplomatic finesse, in the young Republican general; yet Bonaparte was to learn something from him too.

The sessions began on September 27, at Udine. Both sides knew exactly what each wanted now. The French Government and Bonaparte were determined to get whatever was still outside their dominion on the left bank of the Rhine, including Mayence—in spite of article 5 of the Preliminaries of Leoben, which stipulated for the integrity of the Empire. The Austrian Government was eager to compensate itself with the acquisition of all Venetia (including the city of Venice); and hoped (not without reason) to induce Bonaparte to agree to this, in spite of the Treaty of Alliance which he had made with Venice (or with what was left of it after Leoben) on May 16, 1797.²

The duel between Bonaparte and Cobenzl, which is very fully described in Cobenzl's ably written dispatches to Thugut,³ resulted, on the whole, in both parties getting what they wanted. Cobenzl

¹ Napoleon's words, in Las Casas, *op. cit.*, tome III, partie VI, p. 265.

² Treaty of Milan, signed by Bonaparte and Lallemand for France, and by Dona, Justiniani and Mocenigo for Venice. Article 2 provided for the abdication of the hereditary aristocracy of Venice, and recognised the sovereignty of the people. By art. 3 the French Republic "by request" (*sur la demande qui lui en a été faite*) "accorded" to the Venetian State a division of French troops. Under art. 5 the first care of the new Venetian Government was to bring to a conclusion the trials of the instigators of the *Pâques Véronaises* of April 17. Besides this Patent Treaty, there were secret articles concerning contributions. De Clercq, I, 324-6.

³ Given with copious extracts in Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen* (1868), I, 407 ff.

defended himself with article 5 of the Preliminaries of Leoben—the integrity of the Empire. Bonaparte brushed this aside: the Emperor had already ceded Belgium in the Treaty of Leoben, and Belgium, though a hereditary possession of the House of Austria, was a part of the Imperial circle of Burgundy. This was a fair criticism. Bonaparte was equally happy, and even more cynical, in his criticism of Cobenzl's plea for a European Congress, to be held at Berne (under art. 4 of the Leoben Treaty), to settle the final terms: "It would be contrary to all reason," said Bonaparte, "to call Europe to be witness of an act as scandalous as the spoliation of the Republic of Venice."

Mayence and the left bank of the Rhine—without which the French Government would not make peace—remained the difficulty. Cobenzl showed a bold front: when Bonaparte, who was apt to lose his temper during these negotiations, said, "Your stay at Udine will not be of long duration," and threatened to renew war, Cobenzl replied: "The Emperor desires peace, but he does not fear war. As for me, I shall at least have the satisfaction of having made the acquaintance of a man as celebrated as he is interesting." Bonaparte, however, got his rapier in between Cobenzl's armour-joints when he pointed out that in the Treaty of Bâle Prussia had already recognised France's title to the left bank of the Rhine, in return for which France had made to Prussia certain promises of compensation: "but if we make an arrangement with you, we have no need to let Prussia take anything."

Bonaparte's difficulties came not merely from the Austrian side. At Paris the *coup d'état* of 18 Fructidor (September 4) had purged the Directorial Government of its moderate elements, and made the demands which came by courier to Udine more incessant. The strain of war and diplomacy, the conduct of high affairs of politics and administration, combined with the daily duel with Cobenzl, could not help telling on Bonaparte's nerves. "I can scarcely mount my horse," he wrote to Talleyrand, Minister for Exterior Relations, on October 1; "I require two years of repose."¹

On October 11 he arrived at Udine from his headquarters at Passariano, at nine o'clock in the evening, tired and excited. Cobenzl noticed that he drank thirstily and frequently from the punch which was kept on the table, as if he had a fever.² The usual

¹ *Corr.*, No. 2272.

² Cobenzl to Thugut, April 14, 1797, in Hüffer, *op. cit.*, I, 452-3.

debates took place over Venice and Mayence. Cobenzl still opposed to him the integrity of the Empire. At last Bonaparte's passion blazed forth :

"The Empire is an old woman-servant, accustomed to be violated by everybody. The Constitution of the Empire is only a pretext to repel my demands. Victory has always accompanied the French arms, and will accompany them always. You talk like a victor over France, when you are the vanquished. Precedence has been taken over me. I have been refused *the alternative* in the signatures.¹ I estimate myself higher than all the kings, and I will no longer tolerate this conduct towards me. You forget then that you are negotiating here in the middle of my grenadiers."

This menace of the grenadiers would have condemned Bonaparte as a diplomatist for ever had it been meant really as a threat. It was merely a puerile outburst. For Cobenzl "it was the A B C of the art, for a diplomat by profession, to remain impassive during this tempest of words."² This only made Bonaparte worse. He seized his hat, and went off, knocking over a porcelain vase in his excitement.³

Next day he was quiet again. On the morning of October 13, Bourrienne, Bonaparte's secretary, on opening his window at day-break perceived that the mountains were covered with snow.

I proceeded, as I always did, at seven o'clock in the morning, to the General's chamber. I woke him and told him what I had seen. He feigned at first to disbelieve me, then leaped from his bed, ran to the window, and, convinced of the sudden change, he calmly said, "What ! before the middle of October ! What a country is this ! Well, we must make peace."⁴

¹ The *alternative* was the arrangement by which each Contracting Party was alternately allowed to sign first, when occasion arose. Besides wishing to sign first in protocols, Cobenzl had taken the *pas* from Bonaparte in Gallo's house : *Ich hatte sogar im Hause des Marquis de Gallo der Vortritt vor ihm genommen*. Hüffer, *op. cit.* The speech is given in abstract in a letter of Cobenzl to Thugut, October 19, 1797 (Hüffer, *op. cit.*, I, 454). The full record given above is taken from Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 247, who had the French originals from Hüffer (see also Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 234 note).

² Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 247.

³ This famous incident was related by Napoleon himself to Las Casas at St. Helena (*Mém. de Sainte-Hélène*, tome III, partie VI, p. 265). Napoleon says that it was a tea-set which the Empress Catherine had given to Cobenzl. He says too that he threw down the tea-set as a deliberate act of defiance, after saying to Cobenzl : "*You wish war ; then you shall have it.*" Hüffer, *op. cit.*, I, 450 ff. throws doubt on the whole incident, as does Sciout, *Le Directoire*, tome III, pp. 89-90 (see especially p. 89 note).

⁴ Bourrienne, *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte* (Trans. Phipps, 1885), I, 97.

Bonaparte wanted peace ; not merely was he tired, but he recognised that the chances of war, if he advanced further into Austria, were not by any means all in his favour. As often happens when the strain of negotiations is at its worst, suddenly the solution is found. By October 16 both Bonaparte and Cobenzl had made up their minds. Campo Formio, half-way between Udine where Cobenzl lodged, and Passariano, where were Bonaparte's headquarters, was chosen as the place of signature. While the texts of the treaty were being written by the secretaries, Bonaparte took the Austrians to his lodgings at Passariano ; both sides, as men are apt to do after a prolonged mental strain, relaxed into quiet, cheerful, social intercourse. As darkness closed in, Bonaparte forbade the candles to be lit, and passed the time in telling ghost-stories. At midnight the texts of the treaty were brought in, and were signed by Bonaparte for France, and by Gallo, Cobenzl, Merveldt, and the Baron de Degelman for Austria. Berthier was at once sent off with the French original to Paris.¹

The treaty was concluded just in time. At the moment of signature a courier from the Directory was on the way, and arrived a few hours afterwards, bearing dispatches which would have prevented the signing.² Talleyrand's dispatches prove that the Directors had ordered Bonaparte to accept war rather than to cede Venice to Austria.³ It is clear also that the Directors meant to leave Venice independent. As late as September 29 they had written to Bonaparte saying that Austria could acquire the Venetian territory east of the Isonzo : the rest of Venice was to be free ; " the French Republic does not wish to keep anything on the continent of Italy." ⁴ Nevertheless, when Bonaparte had signed the treaty, they agreed with him : " the Directors approve all the dispositions which you have taken relative to Venice." ⁵

Like most of Bonaparte's treaties the Campo Formio act had both

¹ The treaty is subscribed as " made and signed at Campo Formio, near Udine, October 17, 1797." Bonaparte writes to the Directory on October 18, " the peace was signed yesterday at one hour after midnight, at Campo Formio " (*Corr.*, III, 518). Cobenzl's dispatch shows that the treaty was signed at Passariano. See Hüffer, *op. cit.*, I, 469-70, and La Valette, *Mémoires et Souvenirs* (1831), p. 57. Degelman was Austrian Minister to Switzerland. The authority for the ghost-stories is also La Valette (*ibid.*).

² La Valette, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

³ See Pallain, *Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire* (1891), especially No. XXI, on pp. 159-61.

⁴ Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 367

⁵ *Ibid.*

patent and secret articles. In the Patent Articles number I contains the customary peace stipulation in a rather more elaborate form than usual. This article now reads curiously alongside of Cobenzl's correspondence with Thugut, where the Austrian plenipotentiary says, "everything which happens at this moment should only be considered as a truce, through which we take foothold in Italy more easily and quickly than by the most successful war; besides, the affairs of Germany give us, instead of one, *twenty* means to recommence the war, if we wish."¹

By article 3, the Emperor renounced all rights over the Belgian provinces in favour of the French Republic. France took over the debt of the Provinces (art. 4). France also acquired the formerly Venetian Ionian Isles along with the Venetian establishments on the mainland of Albania (art. 5). Bonaparte attached tremendous importance to this cession: on September 13, 1797, he had written to the Ministry of Exterior Relations: "I think that henceforth the grand maxim of the Republic ought to be never to abandon Corfu, Zante, etc. . . . they will be of great interest for us in the future movements of Europe."²

By article 6 "the French Republic consents" that the Emperor should acquire in full sovereignty Istria, Dalmatia, "the former Venetian isles of the Adriatic" (except the Ionian Isles), the city of Venice, the lagunes and the country as far as the Adige.³ On the other hand, the Cisalpine Republic acquired the former Austrian lands in Italy (i.e. Lombardy).⁴ Austria also consented to

¹ To Thugut, October 10, 1797, in Hüffer, *op. cit.*, I, 438.

² *Corr.*, No. 2195; cp. H. A. L. Fisher, *Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany* (1903), p. 27. But the idea was already contained in the Dispatches from the Directory to Bonaparte; the Instructions sent by Talleyrand contemplated the acquisition of the Ionian Islands (Pallain, *Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire* [1891], No. XXI, p. 159). The Directory were anxious to get Corfu, at least, because of its commercial advantages, but were willing to give up the other Ionian Islands for a bargain (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 367, folio 233).

³ The portion ceded to Austria included also territory between the lower Adige and the mouth of the principal branch of the Po.

⁴ While at Mombello, Bonaparte had also caused the Valtelline, Bormio and Chiavenna (all under the Grisons Confederation) to be added to the Cisalpine Republic. Before the annexation was carried out (January 10, 1797) a plébiscite was held by order of Bonaparte. The Emperor protested against the annexation of the Valtelline. The reply of the Directory was that although the Treaty of Campo Formio had defined the frontiers of the Cisalpine Republic, it could not prevent those frontiers from being subsequently extended (*Directory to F. de Neuchatel*, 19 Prairial, An 6, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 369).

recognise the Cisalpine Republic as an "independent Power," which should include, besides Austrian Lombardy, all that was left of Venetia (Bergamo, Brescia, Crema, Peschiera—i.e. from the Adige to the Adda): also the Duchies of Mantua and Modena, the Principalities of Massa and Carrara, and the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara and Romagna. These famous Legations had been formed after the Treaty of Tolentino into the "Cispadane Republic," but this short-lived State now disappeared, merged into the Cisalpine (arts. 7 and 8).

Article 9 assured to the inhabitants of ceded territories the enjoyment of their property, and gave them the option of leaving the country within three months, and of disposing of their movable or immovable goods.¹ Ceded territories were to continue to carry the debts which were hypothecated on their soil. No inhabitant of ceded territory was to suffer for his political opinions, or his civil, military, or commercial actions, during the war (art. 16). The Duke of Modena was to be indemnified for the loss of his hereditary State by being given the Breisgau by the Emperor (art. 18).

A Congress "uniquely composed of the Plenipotentiaries of the Germanic Empire and those of the French Republic" was to meet at Rastadt to arrange the peace between the two Powers, within a month after the signature of this treaty, or as soon as possible (art. 22).

These Patent Articles, it will be observed, offered a considerable satisfaction to Austria, the vanquished party; but to France, the victor, comparatively little. The Secret Articles, however, remedied this defect from the French point of view: in particular, by article 1 the Emperor

consents that the limits of the French Republic extend to the line designed below, and engages to employ his good offices, at the peace with the German Empire, in order that the French Republic may obtain the said line, namely:

The left bank of the Rhine, from the frontier of Switzerland below Bâle to the confluence of the Nette, above Andernach, including the bridge-head of Mannheim on the left bank of the Rhine, and the city and fortress of Mayence; both banks of the Nette from its mouth to its source near Bruch; from there a line . . . to . . . the Roer;

¹ The periods of months or years were to run from the date of the publication of the treaty.

both banks of the Roer¹ . . . to Linnich; from there . . . to . . . Venloo and its district [on the Meuse].

As France by the Treaty of Bâle had the Prussian territories on the left bank, and by the Patent Articles of Campo Formio annexed Belgium, and as she controlled the Batavian Republic (formerly Holland or the United Netherlands), she now by this article of the Secret Convention gained most of the rest of the left bank of the Rhine below Bâle, and so had the whole of it from the frontier of Switzerland to Amsterdam, with the exception of the Archbishopric of Cologne.

At the close of article 1 there is a remarkable paragraph which contains a promise of deliberate treason and deceit on the part of the Emperor against the Empire. It shows how outworn was the old fabric of the Empire, and how the highest-placed members of it, like the Emperor and the King of Prussia, had come to look upon it as a solemn farce. This paragraph of number 1 of the Secret Articles is as follows :

And if, in spite of the good offices of H.M. the Emperor, the Germanic Empire did not consent to the acquisition by the French Republic of the line of frontiers above designed, H.M. the Emperor engages formally only to furnish to the army of the Empire his contingent which cannot be employed in the fortresses, without, by this act, any obstacle being made to the peace and friendship which have just been established between his said Majesty and the French Republic.

Article 2 arranged for the navigation of the Rhine to be free, not to the whole world, but to France and the Germanic Empire.

By article 4, the Emperor was allowed to take the Principality-Archbishopric of Salzburg, and the Bavarian territory on the right bank of the Inn.² Article 9 stated that

the French Republic has no difficulties in restoring to the King of Prussia his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. Consequently there will be no question of any new acquisition for the King of Prussia, and this the two Contracting Parties mutually guarantee with each other.

¹ The Roer is a tributary of the Meuse, and must not be confused with the Ruhr, which is a right-hand tributary of the Rhine.

² The Helvetic Republic, in which Bonaparte began to be interested, was also to get something, namely, the Frickthal and the Austrian territory on the left bank of the Rhine between Zurzach and Bâle (now part of the Canton of Aargau). In return for this cession, Austria was to get "a proportional compensation in Germany that will be at her convenience" (No. 6 of the Secret Articles).

So Prussia was not to share in any of the "compensations" which were to be handed around in Germany at the coming Congress of Rastadt. She was to be cheated out of the price of her desertion of the Allied cause at Bâle in 1795, by Austria who now, in turn, was deserting her allies. And (as events showed) she was not even to get back her left-bank territories as the Treaty of Campo Formio stipulated. The other States of the Empire who should suffer loss in consequence of the present treaty, or of the treaty to be made with the Germanic Empire, were to receive "suitable indemnities in Germany" (art. 12). The feudal rights of the old Germanic Empire in Italy were to be done away with: or rather, as they had already been suppressed by France in favour of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics,¹ the Emperor engaged himself to use his good offices to induce the Germanic Empire to renounce its rights of suzerainty (art. 11).

Europe was not to be left for long with only the Patent Articles to read and comment on. For the Congress of Rastadt had to meet, and then

the unhallowed secret had to be made public. At Christmas, 1797, Mayence was evacuated by the Imperial troops. The hopelessly confused situation of the two nations of central Europe, whose destinies had been intertwined by fate, now came to light, for on the same day the French occupied the unconquered bulwark of the Rhineland, and the conquered Austrians entered the town of St. Mark.²

The Treaty of Campo Formio was a work fashioned according to the worst side of eighteenth-century diplomacy: it has the same savour as the treaties which partitioned Poland. For France there is some excuse: she did not profess to believe in the old-established system of Europe; but for Austria there is really none: she tore up the charter of Europe which was her only title to rule.³

¹ The old Genoese State was endowed with a new constitution by treaty, signed by Bonaparte and the Deputies of Genoa, at Mombello, June 6, 1797. It took the title of the Ligurian Republic. De Clercq, I, 328.

² Treitschke, *History of Germany* (trans. 1915), I, 193.

³ Cp. Sorel's remarks, *op. cit.*, V, 190. The Patent and Secret Articles of Campo Formio are in De Clercq, I, 335-343. The plan of indemnities and redistribution in Germany was suggested in a letter from the Minister of Exterior Relations, Talleyrand, to Clarke, 18 Ventose, An 5, i.e. March 8, 1797 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366, folio 80).

CHAPTER VI

RASTADT

The Treaty of Campo Formio was the first really big monument of Bonaparte's diplomacy. It was the realisation of the French dream of the Rhine frontier: and the rest of French history until 1812 is the story of the effort to make Europe submit to this arrangement.¹ In order to attain the Rhine frontier, the old political system, the old territorial units in the Netherlands, in Germany and in Italy, had to be upset: *Europe disappears—L'Europe s'en va*—as Mallet du Pan had already said in 1795. To complete the Treaty of Campo Formio, French armies had to go to Vienna in 1805, to Berlin in 1806, to Vienna again in 1809, and to Moscow in 1812; and in order to undo (or partially to undo) the treaty, the Allied armies had to go to Paris in 1814.²

In any case, whatever the Continental Powers thought, there was one Power, England, which could never voluntarily agree to the French holding Belgium and the lower Rhine.³ So Malmesbury, who for eight weeks had been at Lille, trying to negotiate peace with the Directory, even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Campo Formio, returned to London, convinced that there could be no relations between England and Directorial France but war.⁴ What Gentz wrote four years later was true even then, at the end of the year 1797:

Europe now possesses no federal constitution, now scarce retains any public law. . . . It is not enough to say that France has extended

¹ See Sorel's remarks, *op. cit.*, IV, 464; the final effort to make Europe submit to the Rhine frontier was the Moscow Expedition.

² Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 258.

³ Cp. Poterat to Min. des Rel. extérieures, February 1, 1796: "the peoples of Germany have no hatred against you. . . . She [England] has always been, is and will be eternally your most irreconcilable and most dangerous enemy" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

⁴ Harris (Malmesbury) left Lille on September 18, 1797. The negotiations broke down over the English demand for the evacuation of Belgium.

her limits on all sides by conquest ; has added to the impregnability of her frontiers by new ramparts, and increased her influence over the neighbouring States in a formidable degree ; the truth is, that France, in her present state, is contained by no limits.¹

The Congress of Germany and France which, according to article 20 of the Treaty of Campo Formio, was to settle the pacification of the Empire (still at war with France), was to meet within a month of the signing of that treaty. To begin with, matters were hastened forward with praiseworthy rapidity. On October 29, 1797, Reitzenstein, Minister of Baden at Paris, writes in his regular dispatch to Karlsruhe : ²

General Bonaparte himself and the citizens Treilhard and Bonnier, of whom the first is one of the most striking and influential men in France, are named for the Congress of Rastadt. I have been assured that there is no doubt, that Bonaparte is coming in person to fulfil this commission. . . . Without doubt the indispensable repairs to the Château . . . and the civilities which our Court will have occasion to offer from time to time at Karlsruhe to that august reunion will be the object of a fairly considerable expense, but on the other side we shall have the advantage, that these gentlemen will see with their own eyes the terrible sufferings and losses which we have experienced. . . . Besides there will be traced around Rastadt a radius, from which all the troops will have to retire, and I am promised that this radius will embrace the greater part of the lower and middle Margraviate, so that that poor country will at last be able to breathe a little.

Once more ³ then it will happen that our country will give peace to Germany. What will be the conditions ? The cession of the left bank of the Rhine, from Germersheim to Bingen, including Mayence, is in the first instance certain and appears even to have been guaranteed at Udine.⁴

The Imperial Decree for the assembling of the Deputies went out on November 1, and within about a fortnight the assembly was gathering together. Murat preceded the French delegation, in order to make things ready for them. With the advent of Bonaparte, France, instead of Austria, had become the leading force in

¹ Gentz, *On the State of Europe before and after the French Revolution* (trans. Herries, 1804), pp. 209 and 231.

² Erdmannsdörffer und Obser, *Politische Correspondenz Karl Friedrichs von Baden*, 1783-1806 (1893), Band III, p. 3.

³ The previous occasion was the Peace of Rastadt between Louis XIV and the Empire, at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, March 7, 1714.

⁴ The real terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio were however worse than even this shrewd guess.

Germany.¹ On November 17 Treilhard and Bonnier arrived. Bonaparte came later. He did not leave Milan until November 17. His journey through Switzerland (by way of the Mont Cenis and Geneva) was quite a triumphal procession: local deputations met him at various places, and presented and received addresses. On the 24th Bonaparte had reached Bâle. He arrived at Rastadt on the 25th, at eight o'clock in the evening, and was received with the greatest respect by the authorities.² He was lodged in the Château, in the chamber which Marshal Villars had occupied in 1714. He remained for exactly a week, until December 2.

When Bonaparte arrived at Rastadt none of the Emperor's own representatives, except Merveldt, had arrived. From the first Bonaparte expresses nothing but contempt for the Imperial authorities:

I was not a little astonished to see that these blockheads of plenipotentiaries of the Emperor had not yet arrived, except Merveldt. General Berthier has brought back the treaty of peace which, this time, will content MM. the Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, because it is very fine and well gilded on the edges.³

Cobenzl, the chief Imperial delegate, did not arrive until November 28, in the evening. He was, apparently, the last to arrive, except for one more Imperial delegate, the Comte de Metternich (the elder), who was not expected for three or four days. This delay induced Bonaparte to say out loud, in full assembly,

that it must be agreed that Messieurs the Austrian or Imperial Ministers well observed in all circumstances their prerogative of always arriving last, but that this was not at all honest or seemly, when people had reciprocally fixed a rendezvous: that he had been very near departing after a few days to go to Paris, leaving all the business to his colleagues, who had adequate full-powers.⁴

¹ Just before the Treaty of Campo Formio, it was said that Austria, "having muzzled Prussia by the Partition of Poland," was absolutely dominant in Germany (Bacher to Minister of Exterior Relations, December 15, 1795, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 364). This could not be said after 1797.

² Documents in Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.* Also Napoleon, *Corr.*, No. 2379.

³ Bonaparte to the Directory, November 26, 1797 (*Corr.*, No. 2379). The reference is to the Treaty of Campo Formio, as ratified by the Directory on October 26. The art of decorating books and manuscripts was in a state of perfection in France at this time. Cp. Otto to Talleyrand, October 10, 1801: "The writing, the embroidery and the seal of our copy of the Treaty [i.e. Preliminary Treaty of London] are the admiration of the Ministry" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Angleterre* 596).

⁴ Edelsheim to Karl Friedrich, November 29, 1797, in Erdmannsdörffer, III, 17.

As a matter of fact, Bonaparte departed as soon as he had seen Cobenzl and had arranged finally about the evacuation of Mayence by the Austrians. Meanwhile he made himself agreeable to the German delegates with one or two exceptions. The Margrave of Baden gave him a present of four horses; they arrived drawing a *berlin* which apparently was not included in the present, but Bonaparte did not understand this, and accepted the *berlin* too. "In any case," writes the courtly Edelsheim (the Baden Minister of State) to the Margrave, "it will be a sacrifice more useful than many other expenses which are often inevitable owing to accessory circumstances, but none the less very futile."¹ Bonaparte proposed to make a personal visit to the Margrave at Carlsruhe, and apologised for the awkward manners of Junot, the aide-de-camp whom he had sent; and said that he had chosen another—Marmont—who would conduct himself more wisely. To the Deputies of the Free Imperial Cities he showed himself equally gracious; he commended their love of freedom, and assured them of the protection of the French Republic.²

On the other hand, he was gratuitously outspoken and indeed rude to M. d'Albini, the delegate at Rastadt of the Elector-Archbishop of Mayence. Bonaparte was reported to have said, when M. d'Albini paid him a ceremonial visit on November 29, "Where will the Elector have his residence, after he has lost Mayence?"³ He spoke equally plainly, it seems, and contemptuously, to the officers of the Baden garrison when they paid him a visit of politeness: "he informed them of the little significance of the Baden Defence Force in the military world"⁴; this remark from one member of an honourable profession to others of the same calling is an almost incredible piece of ill-breeding.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Report of the Frankfort Delegate, in Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, III, 18, note. It should be observed that a little over five years later Bonaparte was instrumental in depriving 46 out of 51 of these Free Imperial Cities of their freedom (see below, p. 110). Yet by leaving six in independence Bonaparte still considered himself to be the Protector of German liberties and in particular "of the six Imperial Cities that were preserved" (Bulletin of Ratisbon, November 19, 1802, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 720).

³ Edelsheim to Karl Friedrich (Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, III, 18).

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 18 note. Contrast Cobenzl's behaviour when he arrived: "He has overwhelmed me with politeness and attention" (Edelsheim to K.F., *ibid.*, III, 18). Edelsheim expected this treatment even from an enemy—he says one must not build any expectations on Cobenzl's politeness.

The King of Sweden, as prince of Western Pomerania, was a member of the Empire, and had a Deputy at the Rastadt Congress. This Deputy was the Count Fersen, a member of a very distinguished Swedish family. Fersen was a man of the highest courage and loyalty, who had held a commission, and fought, in the French army before the Revolution, had watched the progress of the Revolution in Paris, and had risked his life on several occasions in romantic attempts to save the Royal Family. Among other enterprises he had made (and paid for) all the arrangements for the flight of Louis XVI, in 1791, and had himself driven the carriage, with the Royal Family in it, through the streets to the gate of Paris on its way to Varennes.

Bonaparte, as people do who are not by nature gentlemen, seemed to take a positive pride in those actions and words which most strikingly showed his lack of breeding. This is how he describes the interview which took place when Fersen paid him a complimentary visit :

The King of Sweden has sent M. le Baron de Fersen as his ambassador to the Congress. The King hopes to intervene in the Congress as guarantor of the peace of Westphalia : you see that his date is a little far off. If one authorised the King of Sweden, this would also authorise the Emperor of Russia to intervene in it, as guarantor of the peace of Teschen.¹

M. le Baron de Fersen came to see me surrounded by all the fatuities of a courtier of the *Œil-de-bœuf*.² After the usual compliments, which both persons say without listening to each other, I asked him who was the minister of H.M. the King of Sweden at Paris. He said that for the moment there was none, but that this was the result of one of those little misunderstandings which are easily put right, and that already the little difference, which had arisen between the two countries, was settled. I then spoke to him in these terms :

"The French nation and the House of Sweden have been united for several centuries ; they have reciprocally helped each other to destroy the ambition of that proud house which, in the past centuries, aimed,

¹ May 13, 1779, between Austria and Prussia. Bonaparte's reasoning is at fault. The Emperor of Russia was not a member of the Germanic Empire, although he was a guarantor of the Treaty of Teschen. The King of Sweden was, for Pomerania, a lawful member of the *Reich*, and, under article 20 of the Treaty of Campo Formio, the French Government was bound to admit his right to send a delegate to the Rastadt Congress.

² The *Œil-de-Bœuf* was the name given to the royal ante-chamber at Versailles.

with some likelihood of succeeding, at universal monarchy.¹ A Power² more dangerous for Sweden, because it is nearer, makes it a duty not less serious to cultivate the friendship of the French Republic, and reunites (*sic*) geographically the political systems of the two Powers. How then explain the conduct of the Court of Sweden, which appears to labour to seize every occasion to send, whether to Paris, or to deal with the various French plenipotentiaries, agents, ministers or ambassadors whose persons are essentially disagreeable to every French citizen? Without doubt, the King of Sweden would not see with indifference a minister who had endeavoured to raise the people of Stockholm.³ No, Sir, the French Republic will not suffer men who are too well known by their connections with the ancient Court of France, borne perhaps on the list of *émigrés*, to come setting at naught the ministers of the first people of the earth. The French people, before consulting policy and interest, will consult above all the sentiment of its dignity."

During this discourse, M. le Baron de Fersen changed colour successively; he made his decision like a courtier; he replied that His Majesty would take into consideration what I had said to him, and departed. I reconducted him, as was proper, with the usual ceremony.⁴

This protest of Bonaparte's, which was obviously meant to bring about the removal of the Swedish Deputy from the Congress, did not deter Fersen from remaining for four months at Rastadt. In the end, his departure is said to have been due to the unfriendly attitude of the Empire, rather than of France.⁵

The real business of the Congress, though they did not know it, was soon to be done. On the evening of November 28, Cobenzl arrived at Rastadt. At midday on the 29th, Bonaparte came to visit him with his whole staff. On December 1 the two plenipotentiaries came to an agreement, which was kept secret, for the evacuation of Mayence. Mayence was the capital of the Electorate of the same name, and was under the protection of the Empire.

¹ Bonaparte means the House of Habsburg. But he himself aimed at universal dominion for France. See *Bonaparte to Directory*, October 18, 1797, announcing the Peace of Campo Formio: "Let us concentrate all our activity on the side of the navy, and destroy England; this done, Europe is at our feet" (*Corr.*, No. 2307).

² Prussia.

³ Fersen had not endeavoured to raise the people of Paris against their Government, but to support the existing Government against the people of Paris.

⁴ Bonaparte to the Directory, November 30, 1797, *Corr.*, No. 2382.

⁵ Hüffer, *Diplomatische Verhandlungen*, Band II, p. 10.

Article 3 of the agreement between Bonaparte and Cobenzl stated that the Austrian troops in Mayence were not to exceed 1,500 by December 25. "On the same day the French army shall evacuate the Venetian territory which H.M. the Emperor is to occupy" (art. 4). On December 10 the French troops were to invest Mayence, but to leave a way open for the departure of the Austrians (art. 8). The Emperor also agreed to evacuate his troops from the other Imperial fortresses on the Rhine and in South Germany, and to withdraw them behind the Inn. Thus he exposed all the States of Germany, outside the Franco-Prussian Line of Demarcation, to French arms. This was Austria's contribution to the negotiations for peace between France and the Empire. It must be remembered, however, that the handing over of Mayence to France had been practically arranged between Prussia and the Committee of Public Safety at the Peace of Bâle in 1794-95.¹

On December 2, at midnight, Bonaparte left Rastadt for Paris, and never made his promised visit to the Margrave. He assured Edelsheim that he would soon return, and would then visit His Highness at Carlsruhe.² The little States were left to negotiate about peace, compensations and secularisations, with the "Citizens" Treilhard and Bonnier, ministers of the French Republic. The capitulation of Mayence on December 29 probably took few people by surprise. The intricate compensation-negotiations made little headway, and the three hundred or so Deputies of large and small German States got no satisfaction. On April 15, 1798, Cobenzl left Rastadt, convinced that there was no use in staying, once it became clear that Bonaparte was not going to return. Austria was already well on the way to renew the struggle, by entering on the Second Coalition with England. Nevertheless the Congress remained at Rastadt for another year. Its last session—the 97th—took place on April 22, 1799.³ The French repre-

¹ Prussian troops had formed the garrison with Austrians in 1795. During the Bâle negotiations, the Prussian Government agreed to withdraw its contingent. See Bacher to Committee of Public Safety, December 9, 1794: "[General] Möllendorff cannot abandon it [Mayence] before getting a pretext for an honourable retreat; this pretext will present itself, naturally, as soon as the negotiations for peace are taken in hand" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

² Edelsheim to K. Friedrich, December 1, 1797 (Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, III, 21).

³ Hüffer, *op. cit.*, III, 310.

sentatives left on the night of April 28.¹ Austria had already declared war upon France, and the Empire had never made peace. Thus, before the Congress ended, the war had become general.

¹ Bonnier and Roberjot were murdered just outside the Gate of Rastadt, near the bridge at the Rheinau, by Austrian Hussars. Though no order for murder from high authorities has been found, there is little doubt that Thugut and the Archduke Charles intended that at any rate the enemy's papers should be seized: see Hüffer, *op. cit.* (*Der Gesandtenmord*), III, 312-59, especially p. 359. While the Congress of Rastadt was sitting, F. de Neuchatel, acting for the Directory, had been holding conferences at Selz, in 1798; but these conferences produced nothing except *grands diners* (F. de Neuchatel to Directory, June 8, 1798, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 369).

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND COALITION

Miot de Melito says that Bonaparte had left Italy extremely dissatisfied with the Treaty of Campo Formio, and "had gone to Rastadt in the hope of amending his work."¹ The Directors, however, felt uneasy about his position at Rastadt, where "he was the arbiter of peace and war."² When Miot came to Paris, he found Bonaparte living quietly with Josephine (he had taken a house in the Rue Chantierine).

I was with Bonaparte on the evening of the 16th Floréal (May 4, 1798). He had been talking to me a great deal about his journey to Rastadt; the expedition to Egypt seemed quite forgotten. He was even telling us of the kind of life he meant to adopt on his return from Germany. Just at that moment Barras entered the room, looking extremely gloomy. He took little part in the conversation, and after a few moments' silence, he and Bonaparte went into an adjoining cabinet.

The interview lasted barely a quarter of an hour. Barras came out first, and passed through the drawing-room, scarcely exchanging a word with Madame Bonaparte. The General next made his appearance, spoke to nobody, and returned to his cabinet, slamming the door behind him. During the night he started for Toulon, and I saw him no more until after the 18th Brumaire.³

The same acute observer says that the project of an Egyptian expedition had been originated at Passariano, during the Campo Formio negotiations, and that its inventor was not Bonaparte, but Monge,⁴ the eminent mathematician, who accompanied the Army

¹ Miot de Melito, *Memoirs* (trans. 1881), I, 265.

² *Ibid.*, I, 268. The Directory probably had the same views as the Committee of Public Safety about Generals who engaged in diplomacy. Cp. C.P.S. to Bacher, December 27, 1794: *un général doit se battre et non pas politiquer* (Arch. Aff. étr. Prusse 215).

³ Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, I, 270.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 266. Cp. Bonaparte to the Directory, September 13, 1797: "If at the peace with England we were obliged to cede the Cape of Good Hope,

of Italy as Commissioner for the choice of works of art. There is no doubt, however, that the idea of some great enterprise in the East had been floating in Bonaparte's brain for some time previously. On August 16, 1797, he had written from Milan to the Ministry of Exterior Relations: "It is in vain that we would support the empire of Turkey; we shall see its fall in our days. . . . Corfu and Zante make us masters of the Adriatic and the Levant."¹ On September 23, the Directory had replied (through Talleyrand): "Your ideas concerning Egypt are grand."² For the rest of his career, the East influenced Bonaparte's policy, although not until 1807 did it begin in some respects to dominate Napoleonic diplomacy.

The Instructions which Bonaparte took with him were that "he should take possession of Egypt, chase the English from the East, and destroy their counting-houses on the Red Sea; he will cut the Isthmus of Suez and assure the possession of the Red Sea to France; he will ameliorate the lot of the natives of the country and will keep himself as far as he can in a good understanding with the Grand Signor."³ Supplementary Instructions commanded him to take possession of Malta.⁴

No definite course of action was prescribed to him: he was given three methods to choose from: (1) "To remain in Egypt, there to form an establishment; (2) to pass into India, where he will find men ready to unite with him; (3) to march to Constantinople, there to be present usefully for France at the eventual partition of the Ottoman Empire."⁵

On his way to Egypt Bonaparte took possession of Malta, and there caused to be printed the now famous proclamation (for use in Egypt) in which he said: "Peoples of Egypt, I respect more

it would be necessary for us to take possession of Egypt" (*Corr.*, No. 2195). La Valette (*op. cit.*, tome I, chap. XI, p. 53) says that during the Campo Formio negotiations, while he was with Bonaparte at Passariano, the Egyptian project was *sur le tapis*.

¹ *Corr.*, No. 2106.

² Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 367. Fain (who was writing to Bonaparte's dictation in 1801) says that the idea of the Egyptian Expedition "was entirely the General's," and that it was in no way due to the Directory wishing to remove Bonaparte from France (Doc. endorsed Sergent-Major Reichel in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687).

³ Instructions of Directory to Bonaparte, April 12, 1798, in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687.

⁴ Same date. *Ibid.*

⁵ Directory to Bonaparte, November 14, 1798, in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687.

than the Mamelukes God, his prophet Mahomet, and the Koran.”¹

Bonaparte was absent from France, engaged in the Egyptian expedition, from May 19, 1798, to October 9, 1799. During the period of this unfortunate enterprise, Bonaparte had practically no scope for diplomacy. He tried to get into touch with Tippoo Sahib of Mysore, who was engaged in a campaign against Arthur Wellesley, the future conqueror of Napoleon. The letter to Tippoo is brief :

You have already been informed of my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire of delivering you from the yoke of iron of England.

I hasten to make known to you the desire that I have that you should send to me, by way of Muskat and Moka, news on the political situation in which you find yourself. I should like even if you could send, to Suez or to Grand Cairo, some adroit man, who has your confidence, with whom I could confer.²

This letter had no visible result.³ His attempts to negotiate with the Ottoman Porte, which had declared war upon France in January, 1798, were no more successful.⁴ There was no obvious advantage to Turkey in a peace-offer, because the French Mediterranean fleet had been destroyed by Nelson on August 1, 1798, and the French army was bound to waste away in Egypt. Nevertheless Bonaparte sent to the Grand Vizir (through an “effendi” captured at the battle of Aboukir) an excellently reasoned letter, on August 17, 1799. He pointed out that France and Turkey were naturally friends “owing to the distance of their frontiers from each other”; that the French Republic was the enemy of Turkey’s enemies, Russia and Austria: “how does your Excellency not see that every Frenchman killed is one support less for the Porte?” He puts a bold face upon his circumstances :

What the Sublime Porte will never attain by force of arms, it can get by negotiation. I will beat all the armies when they try to invade

¹ Proclamation dated 14 *Messidor du mois de Muharrem, l’an de Hegire* 1213. It was printed in the *Journal de Malte* for August 31, 1798, in French and Italian. There is a copy of the Journal in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687.

² January 25, 1799, *Corr.*, No. 3901.

³ A reply is said to have come after Bonaparte left Egypt (*see Rapport*, undated, but obviously of year 1803, in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687).

⁴ When Turkey declared war France had no ambassador at Constantinople, the last, General Aubert du Cayet, having died some months previously (Report of Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Constantinople, July 1, 1798, in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687).

Egypt, but I will reply in a conciliatory manner to all the overtures of negotiations which are made.¹

No overtures, however, were made by the Porte ; and Bonaparte, who had received very disquieting news about France (from newspapers courteously or maliciously sent to him by Sir Sidney Smith ²) took a small party of Generals in two frigates, and made a lucky passage to Fréjus (October 9, 1799). The Army of Egypt remained at Cairo under General Kléber. Bonaparte's Instructions from the Directory left him free to return to France whenever he chose.³

The expedition had really been a disastrous failure. This result the Russian chargé d'affaires at Constantinople ascribed to the fact that Bonaparte had committed "the capital fault of embarking upon this enterprise without first having assured himself of the Divan."⁴ But a dispatch from Bonaparte to the Directory, written on October 7, 1798, proves that this criticism is not fair. The dispatch states that Bonaparte had arranged for Talleyrand to go to Constantinople by the land-route as soon as the fleet left Toulon, but that Talleyrand "did not go, and the General was abandoned to his own diplomatic forces, just as he was abandoned to his own military resources."⁵ Bonaparte's arrival in France worked like magic. Within a month (November 9, 18th Brumaire), he had, with the assistance of his brothers and personal friends, carried out a *coup d'état* against the now thoroughly discredited Directory,⁶ and had established the Constitution known as the Consulate, with himself as First Consul. France, which looked as if it were falling to pieces while Bonaparte was in Egypt, soon felt the control of a firm hand and will: "Gentlemen, we have a master," remarked

¹ *Corr.*, No. 4364.

² Las Casas, *op. cit.*, tome III, partie VI, p. 10. The elaborate Note composed in May, 1801, concerning the Egyptian Expedition, in Fain's handwriting, says simply: "He quitted Egypt at the news of the defeats of Scherer in Italy and Jourdain in Germany" (Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687).

³ This is stated in the Doc., in Fain's handwriting, endorsed Sergeant-Major Reichel (undated) in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1687: "He could always return ; on this, as on all the other things, he was free judge (*libre arbitre*)."

⁴ Report of July 1, 1798, in Arch. Nat. *ibid.*

⁵ Arch. Nat. *ibid.*

⁶ Failure in the war of the Second Coalition, and corrupt administration, had discredited the Directory. Local reports from various parts of France show that there had been serious losses in agriculture in 1794-5 and 1795-6, owing to hail-storms, and that the north-eastern regions and La Vendée had suffered badly through being the scene of warfare (*Extrait du Régistre du Directoire* in Arch. Nat. AF III, 175).

Sieyès to his friends : " he knows everything, he can do everything, he wills everything."

Since he had been away in Egypt, much had happened. Even before he had left France for Egypt, the French Government, with only modified approval from Bonaparte,¹ had unmasked its ambitions to old Europe. On February 15, 1798, General Berthier, with 1,200 men, had effected a Revolution in Rome, tearing up the Treaty of Tolentino, and establishing a Roman Republic.² Pope Pius VI, refusing to abdicate, was allowed to find refuge in the Carthusian monastery at Pisa. Rome became a French dependency ; an indemnity of twenty million francs was imposed.³

The turn of Switzerland came next. The old Confederation was not democratic in the modern sense, for some cantons were suzerain, some subject. A rising of the Vaudois against the aristocratic canton of Berne gave the Directory an opportunity of intervening. Bonaparte seems to have had nothing to do with this. General Brune was charged by the Directory with intervening. On March 4, 1798, he entered Berne, and on March 22 he made a proclamation establishing the Helvetic Republic, no longer to be a federal, but unitary State. To this the Grisons, hitherto an independent Confederacy, were added (April 26). About the same time the Batavian Republic was more completely "enfeoffed" to France : a Treaty of Alliance, April 12, 1798, charged the Dutch with maintaining an army of 25,000 French soldiers.⁴ It was like the system of "Subsidy Treaties," which Earl Mornington in India was arranging between the East India Company and the Native States.

While Bonaparte was in Egypt, and while the Congress of Rastadt was still fruitlessly dragging on its existence, Great Britain, Austria and Russia were preparing seriously to endeavour not merely to put a limit to the encroachments of France, but to destroy her ascendancy and restrict her territory to the ancient frontiers. Great Britain had been the one consistent Power : she had never turned

¹ Bonaparte was mildly anxious, it is said, to maintain the Pope—Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 290-1. During the Udine negotiations, the Austrian delegates had warned him of the Emperor's attachment to the Pope's spiritual and temporal power (L. Cobenzl to F. de Neuchatel, June 1, 1798, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 369).

² It need scarcely be said that the Austrian Government was alarmed by this action of France (*see* Cobenzl to Minister of Exterior Relations, May 1, 1798, in Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

³ Sciout, *Le Directoire*, tome III, pp. 275-310. The terms imposed upon the "Roman Republic" are given textually in pp. 307-10.

⁴ De Clercq, I, 355-8.

back since the war began in February, 1793; Pitt was determined to go on fighting until he had secured the evacuation of Belgium. Thugut, who disliked the Peace of Campo Formio, was looking for allies with whom to begin the contest afresh. On April 5, 1798 (a month before Bonaparte left Toulon for Egypt), he had written to the Tsar Paul of Russia, who was said to be "the docile instrument of the Cabinet of St. James's"¹: "Without an accord between the various Powers for the conservation of their respective Governments, all Europe perishes, and Russia alone can arrange and consolidate such an accord. . . . It is felt that a revolution in Spain is near and inevitable; the King of Sardinia will be obliged to descend from his throne at the first order of a French general; the Court of Naples believes itself to be very near to complete ruin."²

Thugut's letter was prophetic. The last gleams of independence in the Italian Peninsula were soon to die out. But before this took place, the great States (all but Prussia) were astir. The chief motive power in the formation of the Second Coalition was the indefatigable Pitt. On November 16, 1798, he sent to Lord Whitworth, English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a dispatch which has become justly celebrated.³ The dispatch pointed out how proposals for a Coalition would best come from the Tsar, acting through his ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna: that "no indemnity should be sought by Austria in Germany," but that she should recover the Milanese in Italy. The King of Prussia was to be "invited to explain himself confidentially and fully on this head [i.e. on the question of territorial gains for Prussia], and to define and limit by precise stipulation the nature and extent of any such advantages, if any such are in his contemplation." Switzerland and Holland were to have their independence restored. France was to be reduced to her ancient limits, thus losing in particular Savoy (which would go back to the King of Sardinia) and the former Belgic provinces of Austria. But as it was doubtful if Austria would herself wish to undertake the administration of the Belgic provinces herself,

it will remain to be considered what plan will be most effectual to provide for the defence of this highly important barrier against the

¹ Gaudin to Minister of Exterior Relations (June 15, 1798, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 369).

² Quoted in Sorel, *op. cit.*, V, 305.

³ A large extract has been printed by J. Holland Rose, in *Napoleonic Studies* (1914), pp. 54-8.

future encroachments of France. None has here occurred which is thought equally effectual and practicable as the uniting of those provinces to the Dutch Republic under the administration of a Stadtholder, and with such provisions as may be best adapted to the maintenance of their respective civil and religious constitutions.

To prevent disintegration from overtaking the proposed Second Coalition as it had happened to the First (so-called) Coalition,

His Majesty would propose that the whole plan should be guaranteed by all the four Powers to each other, and that they should enter into solemn engagements not to lay down their arms till it should have been accomplished.

The plan of the Second Coalition was carefully thought out, and eventually formed the basis for the final peace-settlement of 1814-15 at the Congress of Vienna. But in 1798-9 the plan was only put into effect in a very imperfect way ; it was incomplete by reason of the abstention of the Prussian Government,¹ which could not make up its mind ; and the English diplomacy was unsuccessful in arranging a general pact between even the Three Powers of Great Britain, Russia and Austria. The Second Coalition was a very loosely associated group.² Great Britain and Russia bound themselves together by a treaty of December 29, 1798.³ Austria likewise had a treaty of alliance with Naples (May 19, 1798).⁴ Great Britain and Russia also entered into agreements with Naples⁵ and Turkey.⁶ With Austria Great Britain made an alliance later, on June 20, 1800, to last until February 28, 1801.⁷

The war actually began, quite spontaneously, by the Court of Naples, certainly the weakest of all the opponents of France,

¹ Cp. the Hereditary Prince of Orange to the Prince of Orange, April 9, 1799 : "The dispositions of the Court of Berlin afflict me no less than Lord Grenville, and in particular because people have succeeded in so completely removing the King from all idea of war" (*Dropmore Papers*, V, 4).

² Cp. Introduction to *Dropmore Papers*, V, p. vi : "The consequence was that at the breaking out of war, France found herself confronted by a coalition so loosely constructed as to afford little promise of long life. It was a triple league of which the Tsar was centre, and connecting link ; his Allies, the Governments of Austria and Great Britain, forming plans in concert with him but without communication with each other."

³ Martens, *Recueil*, VI, 557.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VI, 456.

⁵ November 29, December 1, 1798. *Ibid.*, VI, 528, 524.

⁶ December 29, December 23. *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, 61.

suddenly throwing down the gauntlet. Disturbed and made angry by the French occupation of Rome, stimulated by the arrival of Nelson and the British Fleet, encouraged by the Austrian Field-Marshal Mack, the student of strategy, the beautifully appointed general of *salons*—the Neapolitan Monarchy issued a manifesto against France on November 24, 1798, and sent its army across the frontier of the Papal States. A brief occupation of Rome was the prelude to an inglorious retreat of Mack's Neapolitans with the eager soldiers of Championnet on their heels. Then followed the occupation of Naples by the French, and the establishment (January 23-4, 1799) of a shortlived ¹ *Parthenopæan Republic* by Championnet, the last of those young, heroic, unselfish Generals which the grand days of the early Republican armies had seen.²

The conquest of Naples, however, was almost the last success of the Directory. By March, 1799, France was again at war with Austria, and hostilities, with the powerful aid of the Russian armies, were starting in Italy and on the Rhine. The Austrians began to win battles. In March, 1799, the Archduke Charles defeated Joubert at Magnano (this was in the last days of the Congress of Rastadt). On April 28 the Russian General Suvorov was in Milan; on May 20 Turin (which the French had taken from the King of Sardinia) was captured. Joubert was killed in action against Suvorov at the battle of Novi (August 15). A daring Austro-Russian invasion of Switzerland was next undertaken, with a view ultimately to the invasion of France through Franche Comté; but a brilliant campaign by the tenacious Masséna preserved the Helvetic Republic for the French. An Anglo-Russian expedition into Holland laid the French north-eastern frontier open to attack; but the Batavian Republic too was saved for France, by General Brune; the Allies evacuated Holland by the Convention of Alkmaar, October 18, 1799.

The campaigns of 1799 had for result the defeat of the Allies in Holland and Switzerland, but the total loss of Italy for the French. And as the Allies undoubtedly had more resources and greater staying-power (especially owing to the British command of the sea),

¹ After the victories of Suvorov and the Archduke Charles in North Italy in the summer of 1799, the French had to evacuate Rome and Southern Italy, and concentrate all their troops for the campaign in Lombardy and Switzerland. On June 13, 1799, the Parthenopæan Republic was dissolved by Cardinal Ruffo, who re-occupied Naples on behalf of King Ferdinand.

² Championnet was recalled to France at the end of February, 1799. He died at Antibes on January 9, 1800, in his thirty-eighth year.

the prospects of the French were gloomy. The loss of Italy had cut off the chief treasury of the bankrupt Directory. Such was the condition of affairs when Bonaparte made his lucky passage from Egypt in October, 1799, and four weeks later made himself First Consul by the *coup d'état* of the eighteenth Brumaire (November 9, 1799). He was already recognised as a "clever tyrant." The same observer added: "France will finish by having its Cromwell."¹

France soon reacted to Bonaparte's gifts of leadership. Yet from the moment of his taking over control of the resources of the country, he appears to have aimed at peace. The war of 1800 was defensive: all he asked for was to keep the gains of 1797—Holland, Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine²; but these were just the gains which the rest of Europe was not prepared permanently to concede.

Nevertheless he made an attempt to get into touch with the British Government. On December 25, 1799, he sent a letter to George III with an overture of peace, although no precise terms were indicated:

The war, which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world—must it be eternal? Is there no means of coming to an understanding? How can two nations, the most enlightened in Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their safety and independence require—how can they sacrifice to ideas of vain grandeur the well-being of commerce, domestic prosperity, the happiness of families? . . . These sentiments cannot be strange to the heart of Your Majesty who governs a free nation, and with the sole object of rendering it happy.³

This letter, as Pitt admitted to Dundas, was "very civil in its terms; and seems, by the phrase which describes the two countries as being both more powerful than their security requires, to point at their being willing to give up at least a part of the French conquests if we do the same as to ours."⁴

¹ Miranda to Pinto de Sousa, November 27, 1799 (in French, translated from Portuguese), in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 369.

² On January 29, 1800, Bonaparte offered to make peace with Austria on the basis of the Treaty of Campo Formio (Minister of Exterior Relations to Thugut, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 370).

³ *Corr.*, No. 4445. There is a translation, which was laid before Parliament, in Hansard, *Parliamentary History*, XXXIV, 1198.

⁴ Pitt to Dundas, December 31, 1799; text in Stanhope, *Life of Pitt* (1879), II, 339.

Bonaparte's letter was transmitted to London with a covering note written by Talleyrand, who was still Minister for Exterior Relations. The Cabinet of Pitt considered the proposal, and decided to reject it, on the ground that the existing situation in France was not sufficiently stable to give promise of a permanent treaty-settlement.¹ The Cabinet further decided that the answer should not go from the King to the First Consul, but from Lord Grenville, the Secretary of State, to Talleyrand, the *Ministre des relations extérieures*. Accordingly Lord Grenville (January 4, 1800) informed Talleyrand that His Majesty saw no reason for departing from the accustomed forms for transacting business with foreign States; and that the interests of peace and security would not be served by negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution had recently placed in power. Their whole spirit would have to be changed. And the best pledge of such change, added Grenville, would be "the restoration of that line of princes which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home, and in consideration and respect abroad."²

In spite of this rather pointed retort to the First Consul, Talleyrand was permitted to go on with the negotiation in proper form. But Grenville closed the correspondence, pointing out in passing that the overtures of France were addressed to England only; but that whenever the security of England and of Europe could be sufficiently provided for, His Majesty "would eagerly concert with his allies the means of immediate and joint negotiation."³

Bonaparte's attempt at direct negotiation with the King received the support of six votes in the House of Lords (January 28, 1800), and sixty-four (against two hundred and sixty-five) in the House of Commons (February 3). Pitt's long, closely reasoned speech carried the House. One passage is especially famous: "as a sincere lover of peace, I will not sacrifice it by grasping at the shadow, when the reality is not substantially within my reach—*Cur igitur pacem nolo? Quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest.*"⁴

The truth is that the British Government had never wavered

¹ *Ibid.*

² Text in Hansard, *Parl. Hist.*, XXXIV, 1198-1200.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1203.

⁴ Hansard, *Parl. Hist.*, XXXIV, 1349. The quotation is from Cicero, Philippic VII, § 9. The original has *turpis*, not *infida*; Pitt doubtless changed the quotation to express the fact that he could not engage in negotiations without the consent of the Allies.

from the principle of the dispatch of November 16, 1798, namely that France should be reduced to her ancient limits, if indeed the Bourbons should not be restored.¹ Yet although there were many prudent, well-to-do French officials and politicians, like Cambacérès, for whom a safe, constitutional Orleanist, if not Bourbon, Monarchy—a “Monarchy of July”—was as it were a promised land,² none of these relished the idea of France’s losing the famous Rhine frontier. As Merlin of Douai said, it was not to return shamefully to the ancient limits that France had sustained a desperate war.³

Bonaparte’s peace offer of December 25, 1799, was probably no more than a legitimate military ruse to divide the Allies: while Grenville’s *fin de non recevoir* was an intimation that the British Government saw the ruse and checked it.⁴

Bonaparte, it is true, had not opened a joint negotiation for peace all round with the Allies. He had done something more subtle, though not obviously very different; he had written separately to each Head of the Coalition Powers. Like George III, the Tsar received a letter from the First Consul, to which Paul returned no answer. To the letter addressed to the Emperor of Austria, Thugut replied politely, “putting aside rather than rejecting the overture, and leaving a door open for discussion.”⁵ Thus even before the Marengo campaign, Bonaparte’s diplomacy was preparing the way for the peace with Austria which came in 1801. Meanwhile, however, Austria had to be beaten.

On the same day as Bonaparte sent his letter to George III, he issued a proclamation to the French armies:

You are the same men who conquered Holland, the Rhine and Italy, and gave peace under the walls of an astonished Vienna. Soldiers!

¹ See above, p. 61.

² Cp. Sorel, *op. cit.*, IV, 467.

³ *Ibid.*, V, 21.

⁴ Lord Grenville’s tenacious and straightforward diplomacy was more successful than even his friends thought that it might be; cp. The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, January 2, 1800: “I am persuaded that you will be forced to negotiate (at least to entertain a negotiation) and that the opinion of the country will compel you to hear *what Bonaparte has to propose*” (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 95).

⁵ Introduction to the *Dropmore Papers*, VI, p. xliii. An observer, the Portuguese minister at Vienna, had remarked that Austria would be likely to take her own line in the Coalition, although she was not the chief maker of it (Miranda to Pinto de Sousa, November 13, 1799, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 369).

It is no longer your frontiers that it is necessary to defend : it is the enemy States that it is necessary to invade.¹

As a matter of fact Italy had to be conquered again. Bonaparte had told Miot de Melito in 1797 that the Directory, if left to themselves, would lose Italy.² It was the loss of Italy which finally had shaken the Directory to its foundations. So Bonaparte had now to lead the army to recover it. If he had failed in Italy, if he had lost the battle of Marengo, his position in France would have been ruined ; he could not have survived a second Egypt. Not merely in France would enemies have leapt from all sides, but, outside, the dogs of war would have rushed forward from every quarter ; doubting Prussia would certainly have opened hostilities at last. In spite of the Treaty of Bâle, Prussia was still asking for the restitution of the left bank of the Rhine.³ But an overwhelming French victory in Italy would make Prussia recoil on her paces, and would probably drive the Austrians straight out of the war. Russia had already practically gone : in December, 1799, the Tsar Paul had informed Michael Vorontzov, ambassador in London, that he intended to withdraw from the Coalition, although he would not evacuate his troops from western Europe till the end of the winter.⁴

The campaign of summer 1800, which, in its final and stunning success at Marengo on June 14 was as lucky as Bonaparte's crossing from Egypt in the autumn of 1799, sealed the fate of the Second Coalition. Russia not merely went clear out of the war : she went further and became practically an open enemy to Great Britain. The annoyance of the Tsar Paul at the British threats to Malta (for he claimed to be Grand Master of the Knights of Malta) may partly account for this change.⁵ Bonaparte, through the subtle

¹ *Corr.*, No. 4449, December 25, 1799.

² Miot de Melito, *Memoirs* (trans. Hoey and Lillie, 1881), I, pp. 226-7.

³ Cp. Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 38. The Emperor likewise had demanded that the left-bank provinces of Prussia be restored to her, according to the Treaty of Campo Formio (F. de Neuchatel to the Directory, June 28, 1798, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 369).

⁴ *Dropmore Papers*, VI, 109. Paul I to Vorontzov, December 2, 1799. Cp. Beurnonville's Mission from the First Consul to Berlin, to induce Frederick William to arrange for a peace between France and Russia, 1800. Beurnonville was given Full Powers (dated October 2, 1800) to sign peace with Russia. (The documents concerning the Mission are in *Arch. Aff. étr. Prusse* 228.)

⁵ After the capture of Malta by Bonaparte on his way to Egypt, in June, 1798, a number of Knights, who belonged to the Russian section, declared the deposition of the existing Grand Master, the Baron Hompesch, and

Talleyrand, who was an adept at fomenting dissension between allies, wrote to the Chancellor Panin offering Malta and the sword of an ancient Grand Master to Paul.¹ On September 5, 1800, the French garrison in Valetta surrendered to a British fleet, and Malta passed into British hands; and on December 16 Paul concluded the Convention, forming the Armed Neutrality of the North, with Sweden and Denmark. It was a plain denial of Great Britain's command of the sea.

Great Britain was prepared to fight on, but she was only a naval Power, and therefore could not protect Austria—a purely military and continental State—from the armies of France. There was more than a vain threat in Bonaparte's remark to the Prussian Minister in Paris: "Let Austria yield, or I march on Vienna." The veteran Chancellor Thugut, that man of furious industry² in the Austrian Chancellery, might spend his life in the effort ever to increase the territories of the Habsburgs, and break the power of France, but, as in 1797, so now in 1800, he had to submit, to comply, to watch the times. Loyal though he was to the Coalition,³ he felt unable to continue the struggle.

elected the Tsar Paul. Great Britain by a Treaty signed at St. Petersburg, December, 1798, had bound itself to hand over Malta to Paul as soon as it should be recovered from the French. "Lord Grenville seems to have considered the British Government absolved from it [the Treaty], by the Tsar's conduct in accepting the Island from Bonaparte, and espousing the cause of his Scandinavian allies." Introduction to *Dropmore Papers*, VI, p. lx.

¹ See *Corr.*, No. 4965 (First Consul to Talleyrand, July 4, 1800).

² William Wickham, writing from Vienna to Lord Grenville, October 9, 1800, alludes to Thugut's "habit of passing eighteen hours a day in what Suvorov called the *antre infernal*" (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 342). The infernal cave was presumably Thugut's cabinet or office.

³ Thugut, writing to Talleyrand, May 2, 1800, had refused to make peace without England; this was just six weeks before Marengo (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 370).

CHAPTER VIII

LUNÉVILLE

Among the political agents of Austria in Italy at the time of the battle of Marengo was the Count St. Julien, an Austrian officer, who was well known at the Court of Vienna.¹ Bonaparte, who had the advantage of concentrating in himself executive power in diplomatic as well as in military affairs, took advantage of the presence of this well-connected Austrian to write a letter to the Emperor and to send St. Julien to Vienna with it. The letter expressed a general desire for peace, and was couched in appealing humanitarian terms.² Before St. Julien arrived, however, the Emperor had, after prolonged negotiations and delays, signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, on June 20.³ Nevertheless the Emperor returned a favourable answer, without committing himself to anything, and sent St. Julien with the reply to Paris.

St. Julien was a polished young Viennese aristocrat, without any experience in diplomacy. Thugut gave him Instructions expressly forbidding him to sign even a preliminary Convention. His mission (in which another officer, Colonel Neipperg, was associated with him) really was to observe conditions at Paris, and to talk over with Talleyrand possible bases for peace, without committing any party. It was reasonable that the Austrian Government should have some indication how far Bonaparte was prepared to go in the way of peace.⁴ But St. Julien was conceited and officious, and,

¹ St. Julien was not at the battle of Marengo; it was his brother Franz who was made prisoner there (*The Negotiations preceding the Peace of Lunéville*, by L. M. Roberts, in Transactions of Royal Hist. Soc., 1901, p. 60).

² *Corr.*, No. 4194 (June 16, 1800). In the same way Talleyrand wrote to Thugut, on June 5, 1800, saying that the slaughter of Austrian and French soldiers in Italy was only putting the commerce of the world into England's hands (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 370).

³ The treaty included a clause stipulating that the two Powers should not make separate peace with France.

⁴ The letter of the Emperor Francis to Bonaparte (July 5, 1800) stated St. Julien's mission as being to find out "in at least a general manner if the bases which you wish to propose for peace are such as we can flatter ourselves will lead to this desirable end" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 370).

under the skilful handling of Talleyrand (who had Full Powers from Bonaparte to sign a treaty of peace),¹ magnified his mission into something bigger. The whole episode shows how foolish it is for any Government to employ in diplomatic affairs amateurs, who do not see how far they may be committing their Government and prejudicing its future action. The trained diplomatist, like the trained lawyer, is nothing if not cautious. St. Julien was not cautious. On July 28, 1800, he signed so-called "preliminaries of peace" on the basis of the Campo Formio terms. Bonaparte "ratified" the terms at once,² but no exchange of ratifications took place at Vienna.

When St. Julien went back to Vienna on August 5 he received a warm welcome. "There does not exist in history," wrote Thugut to Colleredo, "an example comparable to the madness of St. Julien's conduct."³ St. Julien's treaty was declared to be *nul et non venu*.⁴

Nevertheless this "sort of preliminaries," though the Austrian Government could reject them, inevitably compromised the Government with all the world. As the Emperor did firmly desire peace, the only way in which to go on with negotiations was to continue them on the basis of St. Julien's "preliminaries." So although St. Julien and Neipperg received the disciplinary correction of imprisonment in a fortress, the Emperor offered to send plenipotentiaries to meet the French at Lunéville.

Thugut ruffled Bonaparte's and Talleyrand's diplomatic calm for a moment by proposing that Great Britain should be invited to the Conference: but this side of the episode was closed by the refusal of the British Government. Great Britain would only consent to a naval armistice under condition that Valetta and Alexandria (which the French still held) could be provisioned for no more than ten days at a time.⁵ Lord Grenville had also declared

¹ Full Powers, dated July 20, 1800 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 370).

² Even if the preliminaries were rejected by the Emperor, the negotiation might have important collateral results. For instance, Bonaparte used it as an argument to induce Portugal, through the mediation of Spain, to make peace with him. Grenville to Minto, August 29, 1800 (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 309).

³ August 5 and 7, 1800: Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 62. The Minutes of the conferences between St. Julien and Talleyrand are given in Du Casse, *Histoire des Négociations diplomatiques relatives aux Traités de Mortefontaine, de Lunéville et d'Amiens* (1855), II, 422-31.

⁴ Thugut to Talleyrand, August 11, 1800 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 370).

⁵ See Introduction to *Dropmore Papers*, VI, p. liii. Valetta did not capitulate till September 5, 1800.

in a despatch to Thugut that Great Britain would never be a party to any treaty allowing France to keep Belgium.¹

In truth, the Austrian army in Italy having been destroyed, the Emperor had some excuse for wanting peace; for the Austrian Inn and Rhine armies had become demoralised during the armistice.² Early in September, General Moreau, commanding the French army on the Inn, gave notice of terminating the armistice, and the Emperor only secured its prolongation by handing over Ulm, Ingolstadt and Philipsburg. Thugut on hearing of the convention (which the Emperor personally made) shed tears of rage and mortification, and resigned his post of Chancellor. The Emperor put Cobenzl in his place, and the faithful old servant of the Habsburgs retired into the background, though he still exercised some influence on policy.³

As soon as he became Chancellor, Cobenzl set about negotiating a definite peace with France.⁴ Although bound by a mutual engagement with Great Britain, Austria was acting under something like necessity. She had kept the British Government informed of her diplomatic proceedings. Her engagement with Great Britain had only about three months to run.⁵ British statesmen did not hold that Austria was acting dishonourably:

It has long been my opinion that, putting by other considerations, on the mere question of peace we should treat with great advantage by treating for ourselves alone, and therefore, in this view, I do not see for my part much to regret in the Lunéville peace of Austria and France.⁶

Bonaparte appointed as plenipotentiary to negotiate with Austria at Lunéville Joseph, his elder brother, an amiable man, who

¹ As Great Britain would not make peace on the French terms, it was generally expected, at least in Prussia, that Austria would continue fighting. The news that Austria was going to make a separate peace was received in Berlin "with astonishment" (Beurnonville to Talleyrand, October 3, 1800, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 228).

² An armistice made after Marengo suspended hostilities in Italy, June 15, 1800 (*Corr.*, No. 4911). Moreau signed an armistice for the hostilities in South Germany, on July 15, 1800.

³ "I am assured that the dismissal of M. de Thugut is only formal" (Beurnonville to Talleyrand, October 10, 1800, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 228).

⁴ Passports were issued by Talleyrand, on October 7, 1800, for Cobenzl to come to Lunéville (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 370).

⁵ It was to expire in February 28, 1801 (Treaty of June 20, 1800, in Martens, *Recueil*, VII, 61; see above, p. 62).

⁶ Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 9, 1800 (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 343).

esteemed himself a little above his abilities, and who liked playing the *grand seigneur* at the estate which he had acquired at Morte-fontaine.

The Instructions to Joseph Bonaparte are dated October 20 (1800); he was to ascertain if Austria would consent to make peace without England; and if she would, then Joseph was to demand the whole left bank of the Rhine as far as it was in German hands. Austria was to have an indemnity in Italy.¹ The Emperor, naturally, was unaware of these instructions. He hoped to get the former Papal Legations (Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna) as his indemnity. Cobenzl was chosen as being the best of the Austrian diplomatists. He was, says Metternich, "an intelligent man . . . a man of the drawing-room above all . . . not fitted to direct a cabinet."² He had shown himself at Campo Formio to be an able and tenacious negotiator. He had also established there familiar relations with the General Bonaparte—relations which, it was expected, he would renew when he went to Paris at the end of October (1800) to open the negotiations, preparatory to meeting Joseph at Lunéville. These hopes, however, were not realised: for the First Consul was a much more stately personage than General Bonaparte.

Cobenzl arrived at Paris on October 28 at eight o'clock in the evening. At nine he called, by appointment, at the Tuileries. He was met by Talleyrand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with the duty of introducing him to the First Consul. Talleyrand describes the episode in his Memoirs:

There took place a somewhat curious scene. Bonaparte gave him a first audience at nine o'clock in the evening at the Tuileries. He [Bonaparte] had himself arranged the disposition of the room in which he meant to receive him; it was in the *salon* before the closet of the King. He had caused to be placed in the corner a small table, before which he was seated; all the chairs had been removed; there only remained, and this at some distance, one or two sofas. On the table were some papers and a writing-desk; there was only one lamp: the chandelier had not been lit. M. de Cobenzl entered: I conducted him. The obscurity of the room; the distance which it was necessary to cover to arrive near the table where Bonaparte was, whom he could hardly see; the sort of embarrassment which resulted from this; the movement of Bonaparte, who rose up and then sat down; the im-

¹ Text of Instructions in *Corr.*, No. 5131.

² Metternich, *Mémoires* (1886), I, 40.

possibility for M. de Cobenzl to avoid standing on his feet, put everyone immediately in their place, or at any rate in the place which the First Consul wished to fix.¹

Cobenzl's task was not made easier by the arrival at Paris on the same day (October 28) of Lucchesini, a Prussian minister much favoured by the French Government.² If Bonaparte could get from Prussia a guarantee of the left bank of the Rhine, Austria would be left in complete, and almost helpless, isolation. Lucchesini's arrival did not appear to expedite the Austro-French negotiations, which went much too slowly for the First Consul. Cobenzl remained at Paris, tenaciously holding out for something more than the line of the Oglio. At last Bonaparte terminated the armistice and ordered the armies both in Italy and in Germany to advance. Joseph and Cobenzl went to Lunéville (arriving on November 7),³ and continued to negotiate by exchange of notes, with little effect. The victory of Moreau at Hohenlinden on December 3, 1800, was a stroke against which all Cobenzl's tenacity and finesse could avail little: it opened the way to Vienna.

Joseph and Cobenzl opened the official protocol at Lunéville (where they had already been for nearly two months) on January 2, 1801. Cobenzl had no chances of success: "What I suffer is inexpressible," he had written on December 27, 1800, to Colleredo, his colleague in the Chancellery at Vienna. Yet he did not lower his tone. On January 2 (the same day as the protocol was opened) Bonaparte in a message to the *Corps Législatif* at Paris declared that peace would only be made on condition that France got the left bank of the Rhine, and that Austria was content to accept the Adige frontier. Cobenzl complained with reason of this brusque act which prejudiced the course of the negotiations at Lunéville. Joseph, who was a little jealous of his younger brother, took pleasure in associating as a man of the world with Cobenzl, and as one who observed the courtesies of the diplomatic profession. This

¹ Talleyrand, *Mémoires* (1891), I, 281.

² Lucchesini possessed estates in Lucca. During Beurnonville's Mission to Berlin steps were taken by the French authorities to exempt Lucchesini from the absentee tax there. At the same time, orders were given that his house in Lucca should not be requisitioned for military lodgings (General Brune to Clément, October 10, 1800, in Arch. Aff. étr. Prusse 228). About a week after this Lucchesini was appointed to the Paris Embassy (Frederick William III to First Consul, October 19, 1800, in Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

³ Du Casse, *Histoire des Négociations diplomatiques relatives aux Traités de Mortefontaine, de Lunéville et d'Amiens* (Paris, 1855), tome II, p. 66.

may have made him somewhat pliable with Cobenzl, although he does not seem to have been exceeding his Instructions. On January 15, Cobenzl offered (and Joseph accepted) the left bank of the Rhine for France, while the Adige was to be the line for Austria in Italy, with Tuscany to be restored to the Grand Duke. Moreover the offer of the left bank of the Rhine was made by the ruler of Austria, and not as representing the whole Germanic Empire.

When this project of treaty was sent by Joseph to Paris it was at once rejected. "It was difficult to show more ill-timed weakness than Joseph had done, and to nullify more completely the policy of the First Consul."¹ It was not however so much that Joseph was weak as that events had marched quickly, and that Bonaparte's appetite had consequently grown. "A change as complete as it was sudden had taken place in the requirements of the First Consul."² The reason was that the Tsar of Russia was not merely withdrawing from Austria and England; he was making definite offers to France. The Armed Neutrality treaties had been concluded in the North in December; on January 20, 1801, a very friendly letter came to the First Consul from the Tsar;³ and now a Russian plenipotentiary was on the way to Paris.⁴

Amended instructions were sent to Joseph by Talleyrand on January 24. Tuscany was to be abandoned by the Grand Duke without an indemnity; the left bank of the Rhine was to be given up by Austria in the name of the whole Empire; the dispossessed princes were to receive compensations in Germany at the expense of the ecclesiastical princes, the chief supporters of Austria.⁵ A few days after the arrival of this dispatch, another arrived with a threat which Austria would feel only too keenly: "The animosity of the Emperor of Russia against Austria is such," wrote Talleyrand, "that it could enter into his views to restore to the Venetian State its ancient organisation."⁶ Bonaparte had some time

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 94.

² Lanfrey, *Napoleon* (trans. 1872), II, 42.

³ *Corr.*, No. 5315.

⁴ Kolytchef arrived in Paris on January 26.

⁵ Text in Du Casse, *op. cit.*, II, 240 ff. The Instructions made the removal of the Grand Duke from Tuscany a *sine qua non* of the proposed Treaty, because of France's interest in "taking Leghorn from the English." The French Government had nothing against the Duke personally. On February 28, 1798, General Clarke had reported after an interview with him, "he appeared frank and loyal and to possess a sound judgment" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 366, folio 87).

⁶ Du Casse, *op. cit.*, II, 315. Talleyrand to Joseph, February 6, 1801.

previously, in one of his outbursts of spleen, talked to Cobenzl about setting up a Republic at Vienna.¹ Cobenzl must have felt himself at the end of his resources. On February 9, he signed the Treaty of Lunéville.

The treaty had too much the air of being merely the dictation of a conqueror to be lasting: Austria "submitted to constraint, and she remembered it."² Apparently, there must be some give and take, some moderation, in any treaty that is to be lasting. Nevertheless, the conclusion of peace by Austria was considered by the Prussians to be something of a gain made over themselves. In the early stages of the negotiation the British Minister at Berlin had reported to Lord Grenville:

As to Lucchesini's mission [to Paris], I believe he had no instruction whatever, but generally to watch Cobenzl, and if possible to prevent the separate peace of Austria, in the hope that, somehow or other, Prussia might creep into a general negotiation. The universal consternation here when it was known that Cobenzl had the start could not have been exceeded if the whole French army had passed the Line of Demarcation; and the particular friends of Lucchesini poured a torrent of abuse upon Haugwitz, who could not interrupt his course of pleasure to dispatch him in time.³

The Treaty of Lunéville was as follows: Article 1 stated:

There will be, for the future and for ever, friendship and good intelligence between H.M. the Emperor, King of Hungary and of Bohemia, stipulating both in his own name and that of the Germanic Empire, and the French Republic.

Article 2 renewed "in the most formal manner" the cession of the former Belgic provinces to the French Republic, as stipulated in the Treaty of Campo Formio. By the same article, the County of Falkenstein and the Frickthal⁴ were ceded to France, the Republic reserving the right to cede the latter country to Switzerland. By article 3, Austria continued to possess Istria and Dalmatia and

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 83.

² Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, III, 53.

³ Earl of Carysfort to Lord Grenville, December 5, 1800 (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 401). Beurnonville had reported from Berlin that Carysfort was "perfectly instructed" about French policy and was stirring up Prussia's resentment (Beurnonville to Minister of Exterior Relations, September 26, 1800, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Prusse* 228).

⁴ Falkenstein and the Frickthal had already been ceded by Austria by the Treaty of Campo Formio, but the cession had not been yet carried into effect. The Frickthal is now part of the Swiss canton of the Aargau.

the former Venetian isles of the Adriatic, and the Bocche di Cattaro : on the Italian mainland Austria was to hold Venice and the territory inland to the Adige. The *thalweg* of the Adige from the Tyrol to its mouth was to be the limit : thus Verona and Porto Legnago were cut in two.

The Duke of Modena (as in article 18 of Campo Formio) was to have the Breisgau from Austria, in compensation for his lost Italian dominion (art. 4). The Grand Duke of Tuscany renounced his Grand Duchy, and that part of the Island of Elba which depended on it, to the Infante, the Duke of Parma.¹ The Grand Duke was to receive an indemnity in Germany ² (art. 5).

Article 6 stated :

H.M. the Emperor and King, both in his own name and in that of the Germanic Empire, consents that the French Republic possess henceforth, in full sovereignty and property, the countries and domains situated on the left bank of the Rhine, which are part of the German Empire ; so that, in conformity with what was expressly consented to at the Diet of Rastadt by the Deputation of the Empire, and approved by the Emperor, the *thalweg* of the Rhine shall be henceforth the limit between the French Republic and the Germanic Empire, from the place where the Rhine quits the Helvetic territory, until it enters the Batavian territory.

Thus a clean sweep of everything pertaining to German sovereignty was made to the west of the Rhine, including the left bank. But as the Empire thus sacrificed the interests of princes on the left bank, the Emperor undertook to provide compensation for them on the right :

in conformity with the principles formally established at the Congress of Rastadt, the Empire will be bound to give to the hereditary ³ princes who find themselves dispossessed on the left bank of the Rhine a com-

¹ Louis, son of Ferdinand Duke of Parma, was the husband of Maria Louisa, daughter of Charles IV of Spain. His establishment in Tuscany was part of the bargain by which Bonaparte got Louisiana from Spain (*see below*, p. 137).

² He received the Principality-Archbishopric of Salzburg by the Recess of 1803.

³ The ecclesiastical princes were not to be compensated : indeed, it was at their expense that most of the compensation was to be made. "These prelates," the Memorandum of Bonaparte and Talleyrand at the beginning of 1803 stated, "have no need of a temporal principality in order to remain the princes of opinion, and from this sole principle is derived the greater part of the means for compensation of States ruined by the war or by the dispossession" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 722, folio 224).

pensation (*dédommagement*) which will be taken in the bosom (*sein*) of the said Empire, according to the arrangements which, according to these bases, shall be ulteriorly determined (art. 7).

Article 8 safeguarded the payment of debts secured on the soil of the ceded or exchanged territories. This principle had already been recognised at Campo Formio. Inhabitants of the ceded territories were guaranteed enjoyment of their property and revenues (art. 9). The navigation of the Adige was declared free, and no ship of war was to use the river (art. 14).¹

Such was the celebrated Convention, which few people can have regarded as a final settlement. On the very day on which Joseph Bonaparte and Cobenzl put their seals and signatures to the act at Lunéville, Wickham, who was quite conversant with the course of the negotiations, wrote to Lord Grenville from Vienna :

The army is rising like a phoenix out of its ashes, and this wonder is effected without a soul in the town of Vienna having a suspicion of what is doing. I live in admiration of all that is going forward in the north. I consider our own situation, as I ought, with reverence, but without doubt or fear, and I never had better hopes of the result of the contest since the war began.²

¹ Text of the Treaty of Lunéville in De Clercq, I, 424 ff. The Treaty was signed at 5 p.m. on February 9, 1801 (Du Casse, *op. cit.*, II, 319). The approval of the Diet of the Empire was given on May 7 (*ibid.*, II, 356).

The negotiations at Lunéville were conducted in Joseph's and Cobenzl's lodgings, as the beautiful château of the Dukes of Lorraine could not be prepared in time (*ibid.*, II, 66).

² *Dropmore Papers*, VI, 440. Wickham was one of the most enterprising of the British diplomatic agents on the Continent. Before this he had been agent at Berne. The ingenious French agent, Poterat, thought that he was outwitting Wickham, but the Englishman generally held his own in these subterranean contests of wits (cp. Poterat to Minister of Exterior Relations, May 21, 1796, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

CHAPTER IX

THE CONCORDAT

The special relations of revolutionary France with the Church began on August 4, 1789, when the privileged classes renounced their feudal rights. In this act was included the surrender of tithe and other advantages by the clergy. The next stage came with the enactment by the Convention of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (July 12, 1790), an enactment which made the hierarchy into a salaried service of the State. In the previous year all the property of the Church in France had been taken over by the French Government (Law of November 2, 1789). Lastly, on November 27, 1790, an oath of fidelity to the political and civil Constitution of France was imposed on the priests. At this point the Revolution completely severed itself from the Roman Church, for the Pope never assented to any of these enactments. A considerable number of bishops and priests became *émigrés*, rather than accept the Revolutionary system.

The political, as distinct from the ecclesiastical relations of revolutionary France with the Papacy, were equally hostile.¹ The *enclaves* of Avignon and the Venaissin were annexed in 1791; and Bonaparte, after the famous campaign of 1796 in Lombardy, found time to dictate terms to the Papal plenipotentiary at Tolentino (February 19, 1797).² By this treaty the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, were annexed to what was then called the Cisalpine Republic. This treaty, naturally, did not improve the political relations of France with the Papacy: and the existence of many non-juring French bishops outside France did not improve her

¹ It is an interesting fact that from the very first the British Government was opposed to the French Revolutionary Government's designs against the Papal States. Cp. Report of April 26, 1793, to Committee of Public Safety: "England and Russia are in accord in being absolutely against the dismembering of the ancient State of the Pope" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

² See above, p. 30.

ecclesiastical relations. Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon became First Consul. The Pope with whom he had to deal, after March, 1800, was the gentle Benedictine monk, Barnabé Chiaramonti, Pius VII.

The French Government began to take interest in the new Pope before all the formalities of his election, which took place at Venice, had been completed. While the conclave was actually sitting (December 1, 1799, to March 13, 1800), Talleyrand as French Minister of Exterior Relations sent a Note to Don Ygnace de Muzquiz, Spanish ambassador at Paris. The Note stated that the French Government—which meant the First Consul Bonaparte—regarded the election that was going on at Venice “under the absolute influence of the House of Austria” as illegal and irregular. He invited the concurrence of Spain in refusing to recognise the Pope who should be elected.¹ The Government of Spain did not acquiesce so far as to refuse to recognise Pius VII as Pope ; but it gave the Marquis Labrador, Spanish ambassador at Rome, instructions which dictated an almost unfriendly attitude on the part of Spain to the Pope ; and it communicated these instructions to Alquier the French agent at Rome.² With France and Spain thus acting in concert, the Pope had to be very careful not further to alienate either of them from himself. In spite of this, however, he plainly showed his feelings by announcing his election not to the French Government, but to Louis XVIII.³ Meanwhile the campaign of Bonaparte against the Austrians in Italy was undecided, and Pius VII at first thought of remaining under Austrian protection in some Adriatic port ; but after some hesitation he embarked for Ancona on June 6. Contrary winds delayed his voyage, and when he reached Ancona the battle of Marengo had been fought and lost by the Austrians ; but with the news of the defeat came the news of the Armistice of Alessandria, concluded on the day after the battle.⁴ So the Pope knew that he could go safely on to Rome, but that at the same time the Papal States lay at the mercy of Bonaparte.⁵

¹ Talleyrand to Muzquiz, February 18, 1800, in Boulay de la Meurthe, *Documents sur la Négociation du Concordat* (1891), No. 1. This work is alluded to hereafter as *Doc.* There were only nine Cardinals present in the Conclave, and the influence of Austria is incontestable. Cp. *Doc.* 8 (Ghislieri to Thugut).

² Alquier to Talleyrand, March 30, 1800: *Doc.* 3.

³ *Doc.* 6.

⁴ *Doc.* 10.

⁵ *Doc.* 11, Ghislieri to Thugut, July 3, 1800, *la crainte . . . d'une invasion des Français dans la Romagne*, cp. *Doc.* 12.

Having arrived at Rome, the Pope had tidings of an unexpectedly favourable attitude displayed by Bonaparte towards the Catholic clergy. On entering Milan he had convoked the bishops and *curés* and made known his intention of maintaining the religious organisation in the same manner as in 1796.¹ On June 18 he was present in the cathedral when the *Te Deum* was sung, and he made a great parade in going there "in spite of what our Atheists of Paris would say,"² and he announced his presence at the *Te Deum* in a Bulletin.³

On June 25 (1800) Bonaparte quitted Milan to return to Paris. He spent the night at Vercelli, and saw the bishop, Cardinal Martiniana, who reported the First Consul's proposals to the Pope. These proposals were firstly that all the French bishops, those inside France as well as *émigrés*, should be deposed from their sees, and that "he who shall be the representative of sovereignty in the nation should choose new bishops, who should be canonically instituted and receive the bulls of the Holy See." The second proposal was that, as the property of the Gallican Church had been irretrievably lost in the Revolution, the number of dioceses should be reduced, and each of the reduced number should receive a state-pension of 2,500 Roman crowns "until they could be endowed with property."⁴

These proposals will be found to be the basis of the famous Concordat of 1801. They were received very favourably by the gentle Pontiff, who wrote very kindly to Martiniana and asked him to inform Bonaparte that the Pope would willingly open a negotiation.⁵ The news of the First Consul's overtures caused great chagrin to the Austrians. Ghislieri in reporting the Martiniana interview to Thugut could not forbear from saying that Bonaparte, with that eloquence which he displayed in Egypt to appear a zealous Musulman, played before the Cardinal the rôle of a Catholic Apostolic Roman.⁶ There was no question now of France not recognising Pius VII as Pope: in fact Bonaparte was believed to have told Martiniana "that the choice which had been made of the present Pope was perfectly agreeable to him."⁷

¹ Doc. 13.

² June 18, 1800, *Corr.*, No. 4923: Doc. 14.

³ *Corr.*, No. 4927.

⁴ Martiniana to the Pope, June 26, 1800: Doc. 16.

⁵ Doc. 17: *ella può rispondere al Primo Console, che noi ci presteremo volentierissimo ad una trattiva.* Martiniana sent the letter on to Bonaparte (Doc. 25).

⁶ Ghislieri to Thugut, July 10, 1800: Doc. 18.

⁷ Jackson to Grenville, July 21, 1800: Doc. 20.

The Austrians did all that was in their power to prevent the Pope and Bonaparte from coming to an understanding. They attempted to involve the Pope in the war by asking for a loan, and also for Papal troops.¹ Pius VII refused and at once decided to send the Cardinal Spina to open formal negotiations at Vercelli. When, however, Spina had got as far as Florence, he received, through Martiniana, a letter from Talleyrand, enclosing passports, and asking Spina to go on to Paris. To negotiate in Paris was a very different thing from negotiating at Vercelli. Bonaparte's *démarche* was a kind of bombshell.² Spina referred back to Rome for instructions; the complaisant Pope, after consulting his cardinals, ordered him to agree, and to proceed to Paris.³ Louis XVIII (writing from Mitau in Courland) was appalled at the news: "perhaps never," he wrote to the Tsar Paul I, "has the cause of the French monarchy run a greater danger than at this moment."⁴

Spina arrived at Paris on November 5, and had his first interview with Talleyrand on the 6th.⁵ The Cardinal hoped to avoid assuming a formal diplomatic character, but Bonaparte would not permit this. The Spanish Government, which was marching in step with Bonaparte, supported the French demand that Spina must appear in the rôle of official diplomatist.⁶

The negotiations on the French side were carried on partly by Bonaparte in person, partly by Talleyrand, and to a great extent by Bernier, described by Muzquiz, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, as *el famoso Bernier*, the curé of La Vendée.⁷ The two points which attracted most discussion were the question of a total removal of the French Bishops, and the question of recognising the Roman Catholic religion as *dominant* in France. The first point would be a concession on the part of the Pope, the second on the part of France. At first it appeared as if both these points might, perhaps,

¹ Jackson to Grenville, September 10, 1800: *Doc.* 44.

² Ghislieri to Thugut, October 1, 1800: *Doc.* 53.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ September 8, 1800: *Doc.* 66.

⁵ Lucchesini to the King of Prussia, November 7, 1800: *Doc.* 75.

⁶ *Sin embargo, si el Primer Cónsul no quisiese admitirle sino con la denominación de tal legado ó ministro, ha creído Su Santidad que en atención á la gravedad del asunto, ya que la importancia de reunir al gremio de la Iglesia católica tantos milones de hijos debe prevalecer en su ánimo á toda otra consideración, se verá precisado á consentir en ello.* Urquijo to Campo de Alange, November 5, 1800: *Doc.* 71.

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be satisfactorily arranged : the question of "dominancy" was the more difficult, but Bonaparte did not raise any objections to it at first.¹ Pius VII on his part was willing, as a concession, to "exhort" the *émigré* bishops to resign.²

Spina had his first interview with the First Consul on November 9, and received quite a "festive" welcome. The interview lasted half an hour, and Spina retired perfectly charmed.³ But after this the negotiations did not go quite so well, and months passed without anything definite being settled. The reason was, perhaps, that Bonaparte's views were developing : he was beginning to think that he might gain more than he had demanded from the Papacy at Vercelli. The victory over the Pope's chief friends, the Austrians, at Hohenlinden, December 3, 1800, may have had something to do with this.⁴ Parallel with the papal negotiations at Paris, the terms of the Austrian peace treaty were being tenaciously debated on both sides at Lunéville.

The Curia was becoming apprehensive, not merely because French troops might occupy Rome, but because none of Spina's dispatches of November and December reached Rome that year.⁵ But Spina was working hard and resisted four different projects for a Concordat. At last, on January 10, his dispatches began to come in to Rome.⁶ All this time Murat was in Tuscany, and straining at the First Consul's leash, pressing for permission to occupy the Castle of Sant' Angelo in Rome.⁷ Pius VII and Consalvi were aware of this.⁸ An understanding, however, was brought a little nearer by a visit made by Murat, on the Pope's invitation, to Rome,⁹ where the *beau sabreur* (who arrived there on February 22)

¹ *Yo no dudo que Bonaparte y Talleyrand piensen en restablecer como dominante y la del gobierno la religion católica en Francia* : Muzquiz to Urquijo, November 9, 1800 : *Doc.* 77 ; cp. Spina to Bernier, November 11, 1800 : *Doc.* 79.

² With regard to the renewal of the bishops, this, if carried out, would affect twenty-four *émigré* bishops. Those who had remained in France might be reinstituted in their sees : *Doc.* 77.

³ . . . *devo confessare fui soddisfattissimo* : Spina to Consalvi, November 12, 1800 : *Doc.* 81.

⁴ Spina to Consalvi, December 10, 1800 : *Doc.* 102.

⁵ *Sempre debbo ripeterle che dai 29 ottobre . . . io non ho più avuta una sua riga, onde sò il suo arrivo a Parigi solamente dalle gazzette* : Consalvi to Spina, December 27, 1800 : *Doc.* 169.

⁶ Consalvi to Spina, January 10, 1801 : *Doc.* 206, acknowledging receipt of a dispatch of December 20, 1800.

⁷ Murat to First Consul, January 28, 1801 : *Doc.* 228.

⁸ Spina to Consalvi, February 13, 1801 : *Doc.* 239.

⁹ Murat to Talleyrand, February 18, 1801 : *Doc.* 280.

conducted himself with great amiability, and, when he departed, left behind him a seductive memory.¹ Shortly afterwards Murat occupied Tarentum, in the Kingdom of Naples, with a view to pursuing the war in Egypt.

Pius VII was thus being encircled. The olive-branch, however, was still held out to him by Bonaparte, who seems to have been the only influential man in France in favour of peace with Rome; on February 28, he nominated Cacault to proceed as Minister of the Republic to Rome: but he was not to take the title of Minister Plenipotentiary until all the discussions between the Pope and the French Government were terminated.² But Bonaparte would not wait indefinitely: and on May 30, 1801, Cacault presented an ultimatum to Consalvi: the project for a Concordat (the fifth project) must be accepted within five days: otherwise the French envoy would leave Rome.³ Then Consalvi decided to go to Paris himself. On June 6 the Cardinal and the French Envoy, in friendly wise, left Rome in the same carriage.⁴ This boded well for the prospects of a Franco-Papal *entente*.

Before Consalvi went to Paris, he had transmitted to Bernier (through Cacault) a Roman project for a Concordat. This project Bernier sent, with favourable comments, direct to the First Consul, not through Talleyrand, the Minister for Exterior Relations,⁵ whose good-will towards the Papacy was suspect.

Consalvi arrived at Paris on June 20, 1801; he was received with great state, and wore his robes as Cardinal. On or about June 1, Talleyrand left Paris to take the waters, and his absence gave the Concordat a better chance of being concluded.⁶ The eighth French project and the third Roman counter-project for a Concordat were discussed. At last on July 12 the First Consul appointed Joseph

¹ He stayed at the Palazzo Sciarra; he had only a small suite, which included Berthier (Ghislieri to Colloredo, February 23, 1801: *Doc.* 286). Jackson wrote to Hawkesbury: *Murat and His Holiness parted in perfect good humour with each other*: March 6, 1801, *Doc.* 298.

² *Doc.* 307. His Instructions are *Doc.* 324.

³ *Doc.* 502.

⁴ *Doc.* 523. Cacault to Talleyrand, June 8, 1801: *Me voilà arrivé à Florence. Le Cardinal Secrétaire d'État est parti de Rome avec moi. . . . Nous avons fait route ensemble dans le même carrosse.*

⁵ *Doc.* 530.

⁶ Consalvi to Doria, July 1, 1801: *La voce che corre è, che l'affare si andrà a concludere. Questa voce è appoggiata alla partenza per i bagni del ministro degli affari esteri*: *Doc.* 616. He did not return to Paris until July 25, after the Concordat had been concluded.

Bonaparte, Cretet and Bernier as plenipotentiaries "to negotiate, conclude, and sign."¹

The French plenipotentiaries had a session with Consalvi on July 13, beginning at 8 p.m. They found the Cardinal very tenacious of the Roman point of view, and very suspicious of the French. Indeed Consalvi (in his subsequently written Memoirs) practically accuses Bernier of making an attempt at fraud. He says that Bernier offered him for signature a copy of the Concordat which was substantially different from the draft already agreed upon. Fortunately Consalvi noticed the difference in Bernier's copy before he signed it.² When expostulated with, Bernier admitted that alterations had been introduced into the draft at the order of the First Consul, "affirming that as long as a treaty is not signed, changes can be made in it."

No suspicion of fraud can be attached to Joseph Bonaparte who had merely come from Mortefontaine (where he was engaged in negotiations with Cobenzl) to sign the treaty. The fact that changes had been made in the draft treaty by Bonaparte or Bernier is indisputable.³ But there was no intention whatever on anybody's part to deceive. It was naturally and correctly assumed that Consalvi would read the agreed draft over again before he signed it. Bernier when he appointed Joseph Bonaparte's house for the place of signature enclosed in his note to Consalvi a copy of the draft *as amended*; thus the Cardinal had plenty of time to read it and to compare it with the copy in his own possession.⁴

In spite of this incident, the delegates were able to come to a settlement, which, however, Joseph felt that he must refer for decision to his brother. On receiving the articles on July 14, the First Consul, with one of his frequent outbursts of anger, put them in the fire.⁵ However he quickly became master of himself, and showed a strong desire to carry on the negotiation. A second conference of the plenipotentiaries was opened on July 15, and the Concordat was signed the same day. After some opposition

¹ Doc. 635.

² Consalvi, *Mémoires* (edited Cretineau-Joly, 1864), II, 364-5.

³ See Cretineau-Joly, *Bonaparte et le Concordat de 1801* (1869), 81 ff. Haussonville, *L'Église Romaine et le Premier Empire* (1869), I, 106-7.

⁴ This is Consalvi's own admission in his dispatch to Doria, July 16, 1801: *ma come potrà io qui esprimere la mia sorpresa, quando con tal biglietto trovai annessa la minuta di un nuovo progetto* (Boulay de la Meurthe, *op. cit.*, III, 228: Doc. 647).

⁵ Consalvi to Doria, July 16, 1801: *gettò la carta sul fuoco*: Doc. 647.

among certain of the Cardinals, Pius VII, acting chiefly on the advice of Spina, ratified the Concordat. Talleyrand also testified his approval of the document, although regretting the concessions made to the Papacy; after all, the French Government could rectify these concessions by "posterior acts."¹ The ex-bishop was always ready with a subtle and seductive temptation.

The text of the Concordat shows what had been the chief difficulties in the way of the long negotiation, and that the victory, on the whole, lay with Bonaparte. The preamble stated:

The Government of the Republic recognises that the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Religion is the religion of the great majority of the French citizens.

Thus Roman Catholicism was *not* declared to be the *dominant* religion, as had been at first agreed upon at Vercelli.

Article 1 stipulated that the Roman Catholic religion should be exercised freely in France, "conformably to the regulations of police which the Government shall judge necessary for the public tranquillity." By article 2, the Pope agreed to make "in concert with the French Government a new *circonscription* of the French dioceses." Article 4 stated:

The First Consul of the Republic shall, in the three months which shall follow the bull of His Holiness, appoint to the archbishoprics and bishoprics of the new *circonscription*. His Holiness shall confer canonical institution, according to the forms established with regard to France before the change of government.²

The bishops, before entering on their sees, were to make, "between the hands of the First Consul," the oath of fidelity which was in use before the change of government, in the following form: "I swear and promise to God, on the Holy Gospels, to keep obedience and fidelity to the government established by the constitution of the French Republic" (art. 6). Priests were to make the same oath between the hands of the civil authorities (art. 7). Bishops were to appoint the priests of parishes (art. 9): and at the end of the holy offices, the formula in all the Catholic Churches of France was to be: *Domine salvam fac Rempublicam, Domine salvos fac Consules* (art. 8). Only priests agreeable to the French Government

¹ Talleyrand to the First Consul, August 29, 1801: *Doc.* 778. The exchange of ratifications of the Concordat took place at Paris on September 10, 1801: *Doc.* 789.

² i.e. before the Revolution.

were to be nominated by the bishops (art. 13). All the churches which had not been alienated were put at the disposal of the bishops (art. 12). The Pope declared that he would not trouble in any way those persons who had acquired alienated ecclesiastical property (art. 13). The Government promised a suitable income to the bishops and priests of parishes (art. 14). The Pope recognised in the First Consul the same rights and prerogatives as in the *Ancien Régime* (art. 16).¹

The prolonged negotiation of the Concordat was now finished. The First Consul had got what he wanted : he had regularised the international status of the Republic ; he had restored, in a simplified form, the ecclesiastical system of the *Ancien Régime*. He had done more ; he had established a diplomatic situation in which he could use the Pope for his own grandeur and for that of France.

The period 1802–1805 is that in which he reaped the fruits of his negotiation of the Concordat. First of all, on April 8, 1802, he enacted through the Council of State a series of Organic Articles, the administrative and police regulations under which the Concordat was to operate. The article which had most effect on the relations of France and the Papacy was to the effect that no Papal bulls, no legates, and no decrees of General Councils might enter France without permission of the Government. Thus Bonaparte asserted the most extreme claim of the French Monarchy at its height in the reign of Louis XIV.

¹ Doc. 645. De Clercq, I, 446.

CHAPTER X

AMIENS

On February 5, 1801, Pitt tendered his resignation to the King, on failing to carry through his plan for a Roman Catholic Relief Act. An administration was formed under Henry Addington, a close friend of Pitt. The Cabinet contained several of the old members : its political complexion and foreign policy was the same as those of Mr. Pitt's Cabinet.

In handing over the care of the Foreign Office to Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Grenville wrote :

There is nobody to whom I should with more pleasure give up the very difficult and arduous situation which I have held than to yourself. You will find it surrounded with embarrassments in the present moment, from that despicable weakness which drives the powers of the Continent, from motives of fear alone, into the arms of France. My unchangeable opinion is that firmness will, and that firmness alone can, extricate the country from the difficulties which the successes of France upon the Continent have brought upon us.¹

Lord Grenville had made a great reputation for the Foreign Office.

All the important papers issuing from his office were drafted by himself, and bore the stamp of his own character. It was a character thoroughly English in its qualities and its defects. Its patriotism was so ardent as to inspire a profound belief that the cause of England in all its developments, and all circumstances, was the cause of right and civilisation. A high and haughty spirit, which scorned anything resembling mean trickery or petty evasion, informed his public utterances, and guarded well in times of danger and discouragement the dignity of the British crown, and the interests of the monarchy. And he prided himself on maintaining in international relations the high standard of rectitude by which he governed his private conduct.²

¹ February 11, 1801 (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 443).

² Introduction to *Dropmore Papers*, VI, p. xi. The French diplomatists in their dispatches, naturally, do not pay compliments to English diplomacy,

Yet, although respected, Great Britain was not loved abroad, when Grenville resigned the seals of office. England's maritime policy—her inflexible opposition to neutral trading with the enemy—had turned the Continent against her. "The dominant principle of European policy," wrote Getnz, "and the dominant principle of all the political reasoners and writers is, at the actual moment—jealousy of the British power."¹

The position of England was made more difficult by a diplomatic achievement of the French Government in the year before the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville. This triumph was in making a treaty of friendship with the United States of America.

In spite of the Franco-American Alliance of February 6, 1778, the relations of the two countries were very troubled. After the declaration of war by France against the British Government in 1793, the United States went on trading with Great Britain, to the great profit of both countries. On November 19, 1794, the United States and Great Britain even signed a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with each other. This treaty was not known in France until the year 1796, when its publication caused great indignation in that country.² Friction between France and the United States became so intense that on July 7, 1798, a law of Congress declared the Government to be exonerated from the stipulations of all the treaties concluded with France. The United States prepared for war, and some hostile incidents took place between French and American ships of war.

The Directory, acting through Talleyrand, their Minister of Exterior Relations, were anxious to heal this breach, and offered to regulate the differences by a fresh treaty (September, 1798). Three American commissioners were accordingly sent to France.

but there is an interesting testimony to the fairness of the English Press, in a report of Baudus, on mission in Germany, dated February 22, 1803, quoting Archenholtz: "The German journalists never imitate those of London, who always keep themselves within the boundary of the proprieties—*sur la ligne des convenances* (Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 705).

¹ Mémoire of Gentz, included in Carysfort's letter to Lord Grenville, November 12, 1800 (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 374). To correct this prejudice against Great Britain on the Continent, Gentz was engaged by the British Government to write propaganda, and was given £200 a year.

² Du Casse, *op. cit.*, I, 179. On the other hand, there is evidence of sympathy between some people of the U.S.A. and France. Op. The Representatives of the People at Brest to Mayor of Brest, September 26, 1794; order to pay to Isaac Williams, captain of an American ship, 860 *livres* for expenses incurred on an important mission (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

Before they arrived the *coup d'état* of Brumaire had occurred, and Bonaparte was now First Consul. Talleyrand, however, remained at the Foreign Office, and the First Consul showed his interest in the American negotiation by appointing his brother Joseph, along with Roederer and Fleurien, as commissioners to treat with the American delegation.

The two commissioners exchanged notes and conferred at Paris through the summer of 1800. The ensuing Convention, called the Convention of Paris (although it was actually signed at Joseph's country-seat, Mortefontaine), was concluded on September 30.¹ Article 1 stipulated for peace and friendship between France and the United States. Article 2 stated that the question of the Alliance of February 6, 1778, was left over to future negotiations. Articles 5 and 11 declared commerce to be free to both nations, subject to payment of dues according to the "most favoured nation" scale.²

Undoubtedly this Convention was a great success for the First Consul's diplomacy. As Pichon, a member of the French diplomatic service concerned in the negotiation, wrote to Talleyrand: "The United States is not so much an ally for France as a rival for England."³ Talleyrand was quite aware of this. His Instructions to Joseph pointed out that England was piling up a large war-debt; that the exporting of her industrial wares to the United States was a great source of the prosperity by which she was able to carry her load of debt; and that therefore to detach the United States Government from the English interest and to diminish Anglo-American commerce "would be for France a success of greater consequence than the most fortunate war" (with America).⁴

Lord Hawkesbury, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after Lunéville, had as a young man witnessed the fall of the Bastille; and he was as inflexible as Grenville against Revolutionary France. Yet he felt that the time had come to make a treaty (as indeed Pitt had felt in 1797). So he let Otto (the French agent, present in London, nominally, to negotiate a naval armistice) know that Great Britain was prepared to treat with France.⁵

Bonaparte on his side was ready to negotiate. He was then,

¹ Du Casse, *op. cit.*, I, 329.

² Text in De Clercq, I, 400 ff.

³ *Rapport de Pichon*, in Du Cass. *op. cit.*, I, 247.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 248.

⁵ Du Casse, *op. cit.*, III, 3.

and for the rest of his active life, continuing the effort at which the diplomacy of the Republic had so persistently aimed—the effort to arrange a series of satisfactory treaties with Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, Russia, and the secondary Powers.¹ “Satisfactory” treaties meant instruments which should recognise the Revolutionary Government and the “natural” frontiers of France.² Bonaparte had settled with Austria, for the time being at any rate, at Lunéville. He was now ready to arrange matters with Great Britain.

Bonaparte was all the more ready to arrange peace with England, as the prospect of an alliance with Russia had come to nothing. At first he appeared to imagine that he could rule Europe through Russia. A book or pamphlet called *De l'État de la France à la fin de l'an VIII* appeared early in 1801. It was written by Hauterive, a highly placed official of the *Ministère des Relations extérieures*, who had entered the office before the Revolution.³ The book expounded, as the British Minister at Berlin wrote to Lord Grenville, “the nature and extent of the scheme which, at the bidding of our inveterate enemy, these Northern Powers have undertaken for our destruction.”⁴ Hauterive’s book was answered by Gentz in an illuminating work called *On the State of Europe before and after the Revolution*. It was translated into English and at once passed into several editions.⁵

At the same time Russia began to draw back. Kolytchef, a typical Russian aristocrat, did not relish his mission to a Government of Jacobin adventurers, as he considered the Consulate to be. His negotiations with Talleyrand broke down over the question of Taranto and Malta. Bonaparte wanted to garrison Taranto (a possession of Naples); and Paul wanted Malta, of which Bonaparte

¹ Cp. Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 71.

² Cp. Memorandum for Committee of Public Safety, July 12, 1795: “the new limits to be maintained, otherwise the Republic will fall” (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364).

³ The Count Alex. Hauterive (1754–1830) had been introduced into affairs of state by the Duc de Choiseul, and in the time of Vergennes served in the Constantinople Embassy under Choiseul-Goffier.

⁴ Carysfort to Grenville, February 13, 1801 (*Dropmore Papers*, VI, 446). Hauterive’s book was translated into English by L. Goldsmith and published in 1801. Chapter V explains the maritime views of France. The rest of the work is an instructive study of the States System of Europe, and of the internal condition of France.

⁵ *Von dem politischen Zustande von Europa vor und nach der Revolution*, translated by J. C. Herries (London, 1804).

would only concede the "Grand Mastership" (March, 1801).¹ Moreover, as regards the Armed Neutrality of the North, of which Bonaparte held such high hopes, the English stroke came suddenly. As soon as the ice melted, Admirals Hyde Parker and Nelson sailed into the Baltic and destroyed or captured all the Danish Fleet (April 2, 1801). A few days before, the author of the Armed Neutrality himself, the Tsar Paul I, had been murdered in his palace at St. Petersburg (March 24). The leaders of this palace revolution were anti-Bonapartists, in favour of the British policy. The new Tsar, Alexander I, a young man of twenty-three years, was in their hands. Bonaparte's scheme to control the Baltic and the Mediterranean with the help of the Tsar was definitely checked. The last French soldiers in Egypt too, beaten at Alexandria by Sir Ralph Abercromby on March 21, were compelled, a few months later, to capitulate (September, 1801). Everything was ready for peace.

On April 12, 1801, Bonaparte learned of the murder of the Tsar Paul.² On April 16 he heard of the bombardment of Copenhagen. The news caused him to decide for peace with England at once. In the meantime he thought it best to secure as much territory as possible, so on April 12, the same day as he heard of Paul's murder, he issued a decree annexing Piedmont (although he antedated the decree to April 2, in order to hide his motive³).

The preliminaries of peace were signed at London on October 1, 1801, by Lord Hawkesbury and Otto, after negotiations which lasted for several months.⁴ Very little is known about these negotiations. Otto communicated to Lord Hawkesbury the text of the Franco-Portuguese Treaty of June 6, 1801,⁵ and intimated

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 111-112. Incidentally, it should be noticed that Malta was securely garrisoned by the British and guarded by the Fleet.

² *Corr.*, No. 5522.

³ *Corr.*, No. 5525: First Consul to General Berthier, April 12, 1801: "You will find attached, Citizen Minister, a decree. You will note that it is antedated by ten days; this is done intentionally. You will point it out to General Jourdan, in order that he be not astonished by it."

⁴ The Otto-Hawkesbury conversations began apparently in March, 1801. See *Correspondence of Charles First Marquis Cornwallis*, edited by Ross (1859), III, 385.

⁵ The Franco-Portuguese Treaty was signed on June 6, 1801, by Lucien Bonaparte and L. Pinto de Sousa, at Badajos (De Clercq, I, 437). It was subsequently converted into a definitive treaty on September 29, and the ratifications were exchanged on October 19, 1801 (*ibid.*, I, 455). Portugal had to cede a large portion of Portuguese Guiana to France.

that the First Consul would not ratify the treaty, but would proceed to conquer the whole of Portugal unless Great Britain assented.¹ As regards the island of Tobago (captured by Great Britain) Otto was instructed to make no definite agreement, but to give a verbal promise that its fate would be settled at the final peace negotiations; as for Malta, the French Government demanded that it should be returned to the Knights of St. John, without Russia being named as Guaranteeing Power.²

Otto did not confine himself to the official conversations with Lord Hawkesbury. He spoke with the Premier Addington, "and with other less prominent but very influential persons." Thus he was able to infer just how far he could hope to resist England's demands and how far he must yield.³ So, with regard to Malta he managed a skilful compromise: the island was to be restored to the Knights, not under Russia's guarantee, but "under the guarantee and protection of a third Power."

When the Preliminaries had been signed (October 1), Bonaparte at once ratified them and sent General Lauriston to London with the document. "Never," wrote Otto, "was ratification of peace accompanied by such extraordinary circumstances." On the way to the house in St. James's Street which Otto had prepared for him, Lauriston was surrounded by a great crowd of people who unyoked his horses and drew his carriage a distance of two miles. When the General left his house with Otto to visit Lord Hawkesbury, again the crowd unharnessed the horses and drew the carriage to the Foreign Office, amid shouts of *Vive la République française, vive Bonaparte!*⁴

The treaty contained no mention of Belgium, in which Great Britain was so keenly interested, nor of Piedmont. All colonies captured by Great Britain, except Trinidad and Ceylon, were to be restored: Malta was to be evacuated. Article 15 stipulated that plenipotentiaries were to meet at Amiens to settle the definitive peace.⁵

The preliminaries were really a sort of maritime truce: and Bonaparte took full advantage of this. He was anxious to restore

¹ Otto to Hawkesbury, June 10, 1801 (Du Casse, III, 7). This note was written from Paris.

² Talleyrand to Otto, September 25, 1801, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Angleterre* 596.

³ Otto to Talleyrand, October 1, 1801 (*ibid.*).

⁴ Otto to Talleyrand, October 11, 1801, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Angleterre* 596.

⁵ De Clercq, I, 464.

France's sea-borne commerce, almost strangled by the naval war. In November he dispatched a naval and military expedition under General Leclerc to recover San Domingo from the negroes who had risen against French authority under Toussaint L'Ouverture. General Leclerc carried with him a proclamation of the First Consul to the blacks, stating that all peoples had joined the French, and had sworn peace and friendship with them.¹ Great Britain feared an attack on her colonies, and Lord Hawkesbury made a remonstrance, which Talleyrand smoothed over. But there were other causes of anxiety on the part of England. Bonaparte was now taking over Louisiana, which Spain had ceded to France by the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso.² General Lannes, sent on diplomatic mission to Portugal, found no difficulty in maintaining French ascendancy there. In January, 1801, Bonaparte was elected President of the Cisalpine Republic. Thus for many reasons the British statesmen were not very hopeful that the negotiations which had been going on for a couple of months at Amiens would issue in a permanent settlement.

As article 15 of the Preliminaries of London necessitated a Conference, Talleyrand issued Instructions to Joseph Bonaparte, who was designated as plenipotentiary by the First Consul. Joseph had negotiated a satisfactory settlement with the United States by the Convention of Mortefontaine or Paris. If he had not given quite so much satisfaction during the negotiations at Lunéville, that was perhaps really due to lack of precision on the part of the First Consul at Paris. Joseph was not the best diplomatist in France, but the First Consul still wished to employ him; this was evidently part of a scheme to give his family the highest offices, marking it out, as by Blood Royal, from the rest of official France

¹ Proclamation, November 8, 1801 (*Corr.*, No. 5859). Bonaparte later, at St. Helena, said that this expedition was his greatest mistake. "I ought to have been content to govern it [San Domingo] through the intermediary of Toussaint" (Las Casas, *op. cit.*, tome II, partie IV, p. 179). San Domingo was a Spanish Colony, ceded to France by the Treaty of Bâle, between France and Spain, July 22, 1795, article 2 (De Clercq, I, 245). The island was recovered by Spain in 1806.

² October 1, 1800, De Clercq, I, 411. The cession of Louisiana was Spain's part of the bargain by which, through the Treaty of Lunéville, the Infanta Duke of Parma was given Tuscany (Instructions of Talleyrand to Joseph Bonaparte, January 24, 1801, in Du Casse, *op. cit.*, II, 243; *cp.* above, p. 76).

Louisiana was originally a French colony. It was ceded to Spain in 1762, and retroceded to France in 1800.

Joseph's Instructions, as drafted by Talleyrand, contained, among other things, four chief points: concerning Malta, the Scheldt, the Treaties of the Eighteenth Century, and Commerce. Talleyrand's remarks on these four points show the nature of Bonaparte's diplomacy.

As regards Malta, the Preliminaries of October 1, 1801 (art. 4), had stipulated that it should be restored by Great Britain to the Order of St. John, and that its independence should be placed under the guarantee of a third Power (presumably Russia). But Bonaparte had no intention now of letting Russia get a footing in Malta. Talleyrand's Instructions observed that

that guarantee [of Malta] is precious, by article 4 of the Preliminaries; if the English negotiator insists that it be defined, we cannot refuse; but if he demands that it be devolved upon Russia, it appears expedient to suggest that Russia has too little connection with the commerce and navigation of the Mediterranean, to be thus called to exercise a right of guarantee and protection. If the Court of Vienna is proposed, it will again be expedient to put this proposal aside, and it will be necessary to endeavour to obtain that this guarantee be admitted on the part of the Courts of Madrid and of Naples: that of Naples still appears preferable.

As regards the Scheldt, and France's annexations or semi-annexations of territory in which Great Britain was especially interested, Talleyrand wrote:

Concerning the pretention which we can ascribe to the British Government, to wish to bring into the discussions at Amiens the affairs of the King of Sardinia,¹ the establishment of the French at Flushing,² the navigation of the Scheldt,³ the entertainment of a certain number of French troops by the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics, etc., and finally to try and renew some connection with the affairs of Germany, these are still points to which it is necessary to attend, being ready however to resist in this respect all discussion and all insertion in the treaty.

Great Britain's attachment to the treaty-system of Europe, as this system existed in the eighteenth century, was well known. An appeal to the system, to the old public law of Europe, was difficult

¹ His continental dominions of Savoy and Piedmont had been annexed to France on November 27, 1792, and April 2, 1801, respectively. The island of Sardinia was preserved to him by the British Fleet.

² Garrisoned by French troops since May 16, 1795.

³ Opened to Navigation (contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht) on November 19, 1792.

to resist, but it was the last thing which Bonaparte, who had played fast and loose with the old frontiers of Europe, desired. To Joseph, Talleyrand's Instruction on this point was :

If the British Government demands that the treaty to be concluded should recall formally the previous treaties as far back as Utrecht, it is necessary not to consent to this. . . . Besides, it will not be difficult to refuse this recognition, because the French Government has made it a rule not to recall in this way any former treaty in all those which have terminated the quarrels of the Continent. In fact, this war has been too general in its effects, too extraordinary in its results, for any of the previous pacts to be able to become the basis of the new relations which are being established.

Talleyrand was entirely cynical. On this occasion he would not hear of Great Britain citing the ancient treaties ; nevertheless, when it suited him to do so, he was the first to insist on the treaties since the Peace of Westphalia as the bases for negotiations.¹

Finally, Talleyrand impressed upon Joseph that no concessions in the direction of free trade must be made to Great Britain.

I add that if the British Minister should propose likewise the insertion of a clause with regard to the re-establishment of commercial relations, from which it would result that they would be replaced upon the same footing as they were before the war, it would be necessary also to reject it, because the last treaty of commerce² has been the object of clamour, and because it is a question to reconsider completely.³

These Instructions are well worth noting, both in their general tenor, and in their particular details, as they explain the unsatisfactory atmosphere in which the negotiations at Amiens were conducted ; they clearly point to the omissions in the treaty itself, and to the reserves in the minds of both Contracting Parties. The Instructions of Talleyrand to Joseph did, in effect, remove from the negotiations all the points which alone could have made for a per-

¹ E.g. in his negotiations with Thugut in 1800 : Thugut refused to make a new treaty on the basis of Campo Formio. Talleyrand replied that it was usual since the Peace of Westphalia at the conclusion of a war to take the preceding treaty as a basis (T. to Thugut, April 8, 1800, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 369).

² Treaty of Commerce between France and Great Britain, September 26, 1786. This treaty formed part of Pitt's effort towards Free Trade.

³ The Instructions are printed in Du Casse, *op. cit.*, III, 8-18. Lord Hawkesbury's Instructions to Lord Cornwallis are partially given in the *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, edited by Ross (1859), vol. III, pp. 388-9 and 393-4.

manent settlement of Europe: in a word, they explain why the Treaty of Amiens proved to be only a truce. It would have been better if it had never been made. In the long run, it only prolonged the Wars.

The British plenipotentiary was the Marquis Cornwallis, a courageous and able soldier (although he had been compelled to capitulate to George Washington at Yorktown in 1781), an eminent Governor-General of India, the Viceroy of Ireland who had carried into effect the Act of Union. He was, after Pitt, the most respected of British statesmen, and his moderate and honourable nature was universally recognised. "Lord Cornwallis," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "is the first Englishman who has given me a really good opinion of his nation."¹ The sincere desire of the British Government for peace was proved by their choosing as plenipotentiary Cornwallis (who, owing to his absence in India as Governor-General and his period of office in Ireland, had not committed himself to any particular line of policy with regard to France), rather than the Earl of Malmesbury, the premier English diplomatist, who was a convinced opponent of Revolutionary France.

Cornwallis sailed from Dover on November 3, 1801. He reached Calais after a stormy passage, at about 10 p.m., and found all the authorities waiting for him on the pier. They received him with every mark of honour.² He proceeded forthwith to Paris.

On November 8 Cornwallis met the Minister of Exterior Relations: Talleyrand was civil, and said that the First Consul was anxious to see him. Two days later he had an interview with Bonaparte, but in the presence of Talleyrand.

Bonaparte was gracious to the highest degree; he enquired particularly after His Majesty and the state of his health, and spoke of the British nation in terms of great respect, intimating that as long as we remained friends there would be no interruption of the peace of Europe. . . .

The concourse of people at the fireworks last night was very great; no carriages were allowed to pass but those of the Foreign Ministers, and as I drove through them I was astonished to find such a multitude so perfectly quiet, and I heard nothing near my coach but expressions of civility.³

¹ Las Casas, *op. cit.*, tome II, partie IV, p. 170.

² *Correspondence of Cornwallis*, III, 387.

³ Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, November 10, 1801 (*Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 390-1). Actually Cornwallis' carriage was the *only* carriage which was

The First Consul avoided seeing Cornwallis, without a third person being present, until Cornwallis was leaving Paris, when Bonaparte saw him for half an hour, and spoke like a king.¹ On November 24, the ambassador had his first interview with Joseph Bonaparte, who

declared that his intention was to deal fairly and openly, that he was a stranger to the diplomatic arts, and should not attempt to gain any point by cunning and chicanery, and that he made no doubt, from my character and the line of life in which I had been engaged, that I should approve of those sentiments, and readily concur with him in the determination to act on the principles which he had avowed, during the whole progress of our intercourse.²

The question of Malta was taken first, as being one of "the most susceptible of discussion."³ Joseph proposed that Naples should be the guaranteeing Power; Cornwallis observed that Naples was weak, and proposed Russia instead. Joseph demurred, and so Cornwallis suggested that while Russia might be the guaranteeing Power, the actual garrison of Malta might consist of Neapolitan troops.⁴ In this accommodating spirit, the Paris negotiations were terminated, and the plenipotentiaries removed to Amiens on November 29.

The British Foreign Office was a little afraid of Talleyrand's cleverness and lack of scruple. Lord Hawkesbury had written to Cornwallis at Paris:

There certainly cannot be the least objection to your listening to anything Talleyrand may have to say, and to your entering into any explanations with him which may appear to you to be likely to facilitate the speedy termination of the business. At the same time you are probably apprised that he is a person who is likely to take every unfair

allowed by the authorities to pass. He mentions elsewhere that without a carriage people had to wade through "a great deal of mud" (C. to Ross, November 8, 1801, *op. cit.*, III, 390).

¹ "*Il parle en roi*" (Cornwallis to Ross, December 7, 1801, *ibid.*, III, 406). The interview is described in a despatch to Hawkesbury, dated December 3, 1801 (*ibid.*, III, 397-404).

² Heads of conversations between Lord Cornwallis and M. Joseph Bonaparte, Paris, November 24, 1801 (*Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 397-8).

³ Joseph to Talleyrand, November 25, 1801 (Du Casse).

⁴ This was the project actually favoured by the Tsar Alexander I, and was apparently suggested to Lord Hawkesbury by Count Simon Vorontzov, Russian Ambassador in London (Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, November 14, 1801, in *Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 392).

advantage in conducting business with others, and should therefore be treated with more than usual caution and circumspection.¹

Lord Cornwallis was of the same opinion as Hawkesbury. On November 20, he wrote :

I was led to believe that I might have had interviews with the First Consul, and that the business would have been conducted in a more liberal, as well as a more expeditious manner than at a formal diplomatic assembly.

I have, however, since had reason to believe that I am not likely to be favoured with any confidential interviews with the First Consul, and that the only difference between my transacting the business at Paris or at Amiens would be that I should have to deal with Talleyrand on the spot, instead of negotiating with him through the medium of Joseph Bonaparte, who has the character of being a well-meaning, although not a very able man, and whose near connection with the First Consul might perhaps be in some degree a check on the spirit of chicanery and intrigue which the Minister of the Exterior so eminently possesses.²

At Amiens the customary visits were exchanged before the plenipotentiaries proceeded to business. Joseph could not praise too highly the obligingness and extreme politeness of Cornwallis.³

The Congress of Amiens included, besides the French and British plenipotentiaries, also Schimmelpenninck, delegate for the Batavian Republic, and, in the later stages, Azara, deputy for Spain. The British Government wished also to include a Portuguese representative in the Congress, but the French Government refused, and Cornwallis did not press forward the proposal. Neither the Dutch nor the Spanish delegates were permitted by France to take any important part in the negotiations, for they might have raised awkward questions about Ceylon and Trinidad (Dutch and Spanish possessions to be ceded to Great Britain), or about Louisiana, which Spain had a few months previously retroceded to France. Talleyrand notes in his Memoirs that the indemnities at the peace between France and England were all made at the expense of Holland and Spain.⁴ Cornwallis did not ask for a French island,

¹ November 14, 1801 (*Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 393).

² *Ibid.*, III, 394-5.

³ Joseph to Talleyrand, December 5, 1801 (Du Casse).

⁴ *Mémoires* (1891), I, 283: "Peut-être son [i.e. France's] honneur eût-il à souffrir de ce qu'elle laissa tout le poids des compensations à la charge de l'Espagne et de la Hollande, ses alliées, qui n'avaient été engagées dans la guerre que pour elle et par elle."

for instance Tobago, because the First Consul had himself assured him at Paris that he would never consent to cede an inch of French territory.¹

The negotiations at Amiens were long-drawn-out. For one thing, the Spanish Government, furious at the cession of Trinidad, postponed indefinitely the arrival of their plenipotentiary, Campo Alongo, by a "diplomatic illness." The Chevalier d'Azara, however, on the part of Spain, was present at the Congress in February and March, 1802. Next, the French Government refused absolutely to admit a Portuguese delegate to the Congress: so the Chevalier de Sousa, although nominated to the Congress by the Portuguese Government, had to stay in London.²

Cornwallis was apparently troubled with requests from highly placed people in England to do a little smuggling on their behalf. To his friend, Major-General Ross, he writes:

However averse I am to all contraband concerns, you will tell Lady Spencer that she shall be an exception to my general rule, and that I will take care that her glass shall be brought over with my baggage when I return to England, if she will send through you the proper directions.³

There was, he says, "no material difficulty in the negotiation," and Joseph Bonaparte was all that could be desired as a negotiator: "a very sensible, modest, gentlemanlike man, totally free from diplomatic chicanery, and fair and open in all his dealings."⁴ Nevertheless,

unless the French Government had [*sic*] manifested a much more liberal and conciliatory disposition than we have hitherto experienced on their part, it appears to me that the present Congress may last as long and terminate as unfavourably as that of Rastadt, if we depart on either side from the letter and spirit of the preliminaries.⁵

¹ *Quant à Tobago, Lord Cornwallis lui a dit plusieurs fois, que le premier Consul l'avait assuré personnellement que jamais il ne consentirait à ceder un pouce de territoire français*: Joseph to Cornwallis, December 17, 1801 (Du Casse). Bonaparte had said something like this to Cornwallis at the last interview between them at Paris, on November 28, 1801 (Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, December 3, 1801, in *Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 402). But Bonaparte would have exchanged Tobago for another French island captured by Great Britain, or for territory in India (*ibid.*).

² *Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 415.

³ December 15, 1801 (*ibid.*, III, 413).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ To Addington, December 27, 1801 (*ibid.*, III, 419).

On December 31, however, Lord Cornwallis notes that a change had taken place for the better :

You will see by the conversations which have passed this day between me and the French plenipotentiary, contained in my dispatch No. 21, that affairs are much changed for the better since I wrote to you yesterday. I cannot account for the sudden alteration, but conclude that it must proceed from some unexpected difficulties which have occurred, and which have induced the First Consul to press the conclusion of the treaty.¹

Nevertheless, three more months of incessant discussions were required, with continual references on both sides to London and Paris, before the laboriously discussed protocols could be reduced to a Final Treaty. In spite of Joseph's courtesy, Lord Cornwallis found these months very trying. He was troubled by gout. The society of Amiens, consisting of a small number of people whom he met at dinner every other evening, either at his own table, or at Joseph's or Schimmelpenninck's, was dull and not to his taste. Colonel Nightingall, a member of his staff, writes on January 10, 1802 :

With whom we live, might be answered in a few words ; and indeed many of the male part of our society might, without deviating from the truth, be called *rogues*, and many of the female part, with equal propriety—. This, you will allow, is not . . . exactly the sort of society Lord Cornwallis would mix with by choice.²

Cornwallis felt his responsibility to be very heavy :

I have had as serious difficulties, and have suffered as much painful anxiety of mind, as you have ever known me to experience, and you have been witness to some severe trials. The apprehension that an unguarded expression, or an error in judgment on my part, might be the cause of renewing a bloody, and, in my opinion, a hopeless war, or, what would be still more dreadful, might dishonour and degrade my country, has constantly preyed upon me, and I have often wished myself either in the backwoods of America, at 200 miles distance from my supplies, or on the banks of the Caveri, without the means of either using or withdrawing my heavy artillery.³

¹ To Hawkesbury, December 31, 1801 (*ibid.*, III, 424).

² To Ross, *ibid.*, III, 436.

³ To Ross, February 22, 1802 (*ibid.*, III, 460). The professional English diplomatists thought that Cornwallis was rather slow in his methods. Jackson writes from the British Embassy at Berlin, March 12, 1802 : " He is, indeed, looked upon as a fine old boy, and as conscientiously desirous to do the work

The Treaty was signed on March 27, 1802, by Joseph, Azara, Schimmelpenninck, and Cornwallis in the Amiens Hôtel de Ville, where the conferences had taken place. Joseph then returned to Paris, Lord Cornwallis to London. He died three years later, in his second period as Governor-General of India.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Amiens declared that there should henceforth be peace, friendship, and good intelligence between the Contracting Parties. Article 2 concerned exchange of prisoners. Articles 3 and 4 stipulated for the restoration to France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic of the possessions and colonies which had been taken by the British forces: but Trinidad (Spanish) and Ceylon (Dutch) were not to be restored. The Cape of Good Hope was to be given back to the Dutch, in full sovereignty: the ships of the Contracting Parties were to have the right of stopping there and buying provisions (art. 6). The territories and possessions of Portugal were to be preserved in their integrity, as they existed before the war, except that the French acquisition of part of Portuguese Guiana¹ was to be maintained (art. 7). The territory, possessions and rights of the Sublime Porte were maintained in their integrity (art. 8). The Republic of the Seven Isles (Ionian Isles) was recognised (art. 9). Malta, Gozo and Comino were to be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The British troops were to evacuate the Isle and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of ratifications. The independence of the isles was put under the protection and guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia and Prussia (subject to consent). The permanent neutrality of the Order was proclaimed (art 10). The French troops were to evacuate the Kingdom of Naples and the Roman State: the British troops were to evacuate Porto Ferrajo (in Elba) and all the ports and isles occupied by them in the Mediterranean or Adriatic (art. 11).²

Thus the temple of Janus was closed for the only period (sixteen months³) between 1792 and 1814.

he has been charged with, in the best manner. But, as if aware that he is not qualified for it, he cannot move a step without reference to England." Jackson, *Diaries and Letters* (1872), I, 74.

¹ See Treaty of Madrid, September 29, 1801 (above, p. 91, n. 5).

² Text in De Clercq, I, 484.

³ Sixteen months, reckoning from the Anglo-French preliminary Treaty of Peace, October 1, 1801.

CHAPTER XI

RATISBON

"The epoch of the peace of Amiens," writes Bourrienne, "must be considered as the most glorious in the history of France, not excepting the splendid period of Louis XIV's victories and the most brilliant era of the Empire."¹ Reports which came to the British Foreign Office, even during the war, shortly before the peace of 1801-2, adverted to the satisfactory material condition of Paris.²

The society of the capital was splendid, if somewhat bizarre in the eyes of a foreign observer. During the negotiations at Paris before the Amiens Conference, Viscount Brome, the son of Lord Cornwallis, sent a lively description home of the society which he met in diplomatic circles :

My time was really occupied almost totally by sights in the morning and society in the evening : by society I mean great dinners of 40 or 50 people with the dress of mountebanks and manners of assassins. We had occasionally a mixture of *ladies* at these dinners, among whom the most conspicuous is Talleyrand's mistress, who is an old East Indian acquaintance of yours ; her name is Grand, she is very like him, and he is everything that is detestable.³

Greed for money had been a feature of Paris politics since the start of the Revolution. The First Consul himself was superior to this sordid passion, but it seems that Joseph Bonaparte used his diplomatic station and knowledge as means whereby to make

¹ Bourrienne, *Memoirs* (trans. 1885), I, 461. Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 214, says that the splendour of the period is in the retrospect of historians : that contemporaries scarcely noticed it.

² *Dropmore Papers*, VI, 289 : "At Paris instead of the devastation, disorder and misery, which I expected, the houses and streets in every quarter are in a most perfect state of decency and order" (J. Edwards to Lord Grenville, August 12, 1800).

³ Viscount Brome to Major-General Ross, December 12, 1801 (*Cornwallis Corr.*, III, 410).

money. Bourrienne and the anonymous *Life of Talleyrand*¹ tell a curious story of Joseph having, at the Lunéville negotiations, bought Republican Funds on the expectation that they would rise when peace was made. When the treaty was signed, however, it was found that the effect of peace had been discounted, and the Funds actually fell. Joseph lost heavily, and could not meet his engagements. His brother the First Consul was unable to see any way of helping him, but on Bourrienne's advice asked Talleyrand. The Minister of Exterior Relations coolly told the First Consul that he could raise the price of the Funds. "Deposit pledges in the Mont de Piété or in the sinking fund, and you will have money enough to make the funds rise: then Joseph may sell out and recover his losses." Bourrienne concludes:

None but those who have heard M. Talleyrand converse can form an accurate idea of his easy manner of expressing himself, his imperturbable coolness, the fixed unvarying expression of his countenance, and his vast fund of wit.²

It can scarcely be doubted that Talleyrand too employed his knowledge of foreign affairs, as well as his knowledge of the world, in financial speculations, which, to judge by his immense fortune, must have been as a whole successful.³

Miot de Melito, who returned to Paris in October, 1802, after two years spent in Italy and Corsica, found everywhere "monarchical customs," instead of "austere republican forms." There were no longer high-boots, sabres and cockades, but knee-breeches, silk stockings, buckle-shoes, dress-swords, and hats carried under the arm.⁴ The First Consul was becoming very grand, withdrawing himself to the seclusion of St. Cloud, instead of living in the Tuileries, where "a sovereign cannot even take the air at a window without immediately being the object of curiosity of the public."⁵ Miot noticed that "the Tuileries and St. Cloud were no longer the seat of Government, the abode of the first Magistrate of a Republic, but the Court of a Sovereign."⁶

¹ *Life of Prince Talleyrand* (London, 1836), III, 99-100.

² Bourrienne, *Memoirs* (trans. 1885), I, 439.

³ "M. de Talleyrand . . . had his imagination filled with the rise and the fall of the funds" (*Life*, III, 98); cp. below, pp. 106-7. See also Jackson's *Diaries and Letters*, I, 65. Jackson says that Talleyrand used his power to issue permits to *émigrés* to return to France to obtain large sums of money in payment for such permits.

⁴ Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, I, 490.

⁵ Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, I, 397.

⁶ Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, I, 491.

Outwardly the First Consul seemed to preserve his balance, his composure, although Talleyrand says that it was at this period—after the Peace of Amiens—that he began to depart from moderation.¹ Certainly the offers that came from Germany were tempting enough to make him feel that, on the *terra firma* of Europe at least, there were no limits to his power.

The Treaty of Lunéville, in attaching the left bank of the Rhine to France, had stipulated for compensations in Germany for dispossessed hereditary princes (art. 7). Accordingly on October 2, 1801, the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon had appointed a Deputation or Delegation of eight members to make the necessary adjustments of territory within the Empire. But the First Consul of France was to be the real arbiter. In the same month, October, 1801, the Prussian chief minister, Haugwitz, in order to forestall any initiative by Austria, sent through Beurnonville (French ambassador at Berlin) a plan of redistribution to the Minister of Exterior Relations.

The Prussian scheme was that the Grand Duke of Tuscany should be compensated for the loss of his Italian dominion by acquiring the ecclesiastical States of Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, Brixen and Trent, which were to be "secularised" for this purpose. As the Grand Duke was an Austrian prince, Prussia was to be indemnified for this increase in the territories of the Habsburg family, as well as for the loss of her dominion on the left bank of the Rhine.² The ecclesiastical electorates—Mayence, Trèves and Cologne—were to disappear (practically, they had already done so, and were already divided into French Departments).³ The Elector of Mayence was to be transferred to Ratisbon.

Faced with Haugwitz's scheme, Bonaparte had to make a decision. It was impossible to leave Germany in its present condition, with princes dispossessed from the left bank of the Rhine wandering about *in vacuo*, and with the policy of secularisation in the air. He had only two lines of policy to choose from: one was to support

¹ *La paix d'Amiens était à peine conclue, que la moderation commença à abandonner Bonaparte: Mémoires* (1891), I, 290.

² Prussia had already provisionally compensated herself by occupying George III's Electorate, Hanover, in March, 1801. Cp. *Cornwallis Correspondence*, III, 388.

³ The four Departments of the left bank of the Rhine (Mont-Tonnerre, Rhin-et-Moselle, Roer and Sarre) were established on February 11, 1798; see Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine* (1921), III, 30.

Austria : this would mean restricting secularisations to the lowest possible point (as Austria always stood for legitimacy, at any rate in Germany), and as far as was practicable sparing the susceptibilities and interests of the small States. The three ecclesiastical electorates might be maintained, merely being transferred to the right bank of the Rhine. But all this could only be done by leaving Prussia outside any scheme of compensation.

The other line of policy which Bonaparte might choose was to accept the Prussian scheme, join hands with that Power, secularise States extensively, suppress wholly the three ecclesiastical electorates, and rely especially on the Secondary States of Germany, such as Saxony, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden.¹

Which alternative should Bonaparte choose ? Past French history was very little guide to him, for since 1793 French foreign policy had pushed far beyond the prudent limits of the *Ancien Régime*. The traditional policy of France had always been to support the Secondary States of Germany—Baden, Wurtemberg, Saxony—but also to ally herself closely with the ecclesiastical electorates of Mayence, Trèves, and Cologne, and with prince-bishoprics like Wurzburg, and thus to maintain a sphere of interest on both sides of the Rhine. But now Bonaparte was in something of an *impasse* : if he decided to support Austria, he would retain the support of the ecclesiastical electorates and prince-bishoprics, but he would lose that of the Secondary States, who would be disgusted at the loss of their expected territorial extensions. If he decided to side with Prussia, he would become the patron and protector of the Secondary States, but he would feel the absence of the pliable ecclesiastical States, secularised for the aggrandisement of the Secondary. He accepted the Prussian plan. At the back of his mind was the idea of suppressing all German States except those which could either keep their own independence or keep it under the guarantee of France.²

The territorial compensations, which were meant to be arranged by the Imperial Deputation at Ratisbon, were really settled in a series of treaties negotiated by various States at Paris. Together these treaties amounted to nothing less than a reconstruction of the political map of Germany.

¹ Op. Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, tome III, p. 173.

² *Maximes et bases fondamentales*, circa January, 1803 (the work probably of Bonaparte and Talleyrand), in Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 722.

Before the changes of 1802-3, the Germanic (or Holy Roman) Empire had consisted of about ninety-five secular princes holding sovereign power in fealty to the Emperor, seventy-four "immediate" ecclesiastical rulers, fifty-one Free Imperial Cities, and a large number of Free Imperial Knights. The territories of these numerous rulers, in many cases, consisted of widely separated parts. Fragments of one State were *enclavé* inside the territory of another State. The eighteenth-century map of Germany was a mosaic of States and morsels of States. The arrangements, the indemnities, of 1802-3 were to change this.

The chief of these indemnity treaties was made by Prussia, being signed at Paris by Lucchesini on the one hand, and Beurnonville on the other, on May 23, 1802.¹ After citing the Treaties of Bâle and Lunéville, the treaty recognised Prussia's cession to France of all her left-bank territory, namely the Duchy of Gueldres, the Principality of Meurs, the Lordship of Crefeld, and part of the Duchy of Cleves. The tolls on the river in these parts were suppressed, both on the French left bank and on the Prussian right bank. As compensation for his territorial losses on the left bank the King of Prussia was to get two prince-bishoprics (Paderborn and Hildesheim), five sovereign-abbeyes, three Free Imperial Cities (Mülhausen, Nordhausen, Goslar), and certain other lands. The Prince of Nassau, renouncing all right to the Stadtholderate of the United Netherlands, was to be indemnified with three Abbeyes and three Free Imperial Cities, to be held in full sovereignty.

Wurtemberg had a similar compensation-treaty. It was signed at Paris on May 20, 1802, by Hauterive and Normann. The Duke of Wurtemberg renounced his left-bank territories—the Principality of Montbéliard, and several minor Counties and Lordships. The French Republic agreed to use its good offices to obtain for Wurtemberg equivalent indemnities of territory situated conveniently to the existing State of the Duke.²

Treaties were also entered into with Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Baden. All the German States had their agents at Paris, and enormous bribes were given to Talleyrand, and other officials of

¹ De Clercq, I, 583.

² De Clercq, I, 581. The treaty was not so favourable to Wurtemberg as the Prussian treaty was to Prussia. The treaty of France with Prussia, May 23, 1802, did not merely promise good offices of France to obtain the territorial indemnities for Prussia in Germany. It (art. 7) stated bluntly that "Prussia acquies, à titre d'indemnité . . . the following, etc."

the Ministry of Exterior Relations. Reitzenstein, Baden envoy at Paris, writes to his Government :

Having learned that the Court of Berlin has sent to M. Talleyrand a snuffbox of about a thousand louis in value and one hundred thousand francs in bank-notes, I think that it will be extremely proper, if we give exactly the same present, which will make for us, compared with the 150,000 ll. originally intended, a saving of 20,000 ll. at least, which will suffice to cover what we have been advised to give to M. Durant, in addition to the 30,000 ll. originally intended. M. Mathieu on his side will no more have ground for complaint, if, instead of going as far as 150,000 ll. with him, we restrict ourselves to the 100,000 of which I have already spoken, in order to have 50,000 ll. left over, which it will be necessary to give to M. Laforest. Your Excellence nevertheless will judge better than me, if it is expedient to confine ourselves to these presents or to give more magnificent. I am assured that M. de Waitz has on him bills of exchange up to 1,000,000 crowns.¹

Originally 100,000 *livres* had been allotted as a present for Joseph Bonaparte, but ultimately it was thought better to use this sum to augment the *douceur* to Talleyrand. The total value of the presents given by the Baden Government by the end of the year 1802 was 499,889 *livres*.²

When all the German envoys at Paris were bribing thus freely, and the sums changing hands, the amount of corruption in the French Ministry of Exterior Relations must have been tremendous. Only the First Consul and his brother Joseph appear to have been above bribery. Apparently Talleyrand and Matthieu were honest brokers—they gave value for their presents or in the expectation of presents. The Baden envoy writes from Paris :

Talleyrand has again represented to the First Consul with so much force the necessity of doing more in favour of the Margrave that he has succeeded as it were in tearing from him, that we ought to have an augmentation of 50,000 souls of population.³

¹ Reitzenstein to Edelsheim, August 17, 1802 (Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, IV, 186). Durant was Chief of the First Political Division in the Ministry of Exterior Relations. Matthieu was Sub-Chief of the German Division of the *Ministère*. Laforest was French Minister at the Court of Bavaria. Waitz was the agent in Paris of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.

² Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, IV, 202, 204. Twenty-four *livres* equalled one *louis d'or*; 1 *livre* equalled 5 *francs*, 8 *sous*.

³ Edelsheim, May 20, 1802 (Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, IV, 129). There are not very many mentions of bribery in French diplomatic history of the period 1793–1815. In 1797 the Directory tried to bribe Thugut, apparently unsuccessfully (Instructions to Clarke, January 17, 1797, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 366).

All thinking people, in Germany at any rate, were tremendously excited at the idea of indemnities and secularisations. A certain Citizen Baudus, who made a journey from France into Germany in September, 1803, wrote to the French Foreign Office that indemnities were the habitual subject of conversation on the frontier; but that when the frontier was crossed, and the stranger entered any important town, a "sort of buzzing" was heard on every side, and all about the indemnities.¹

Bonaparte was not going to make a piecemeal settlement, nor was he making it quite alone. He had a complete scheme discussed and drafted in concert with Russia. In 1801 (October 8), France and Russia, who had been formally at war since the formation of the Second Coalition, made peace at Paris, over the signatures of Talleyrand and Markoff. By a Secret Convention made two days later, the two Powers bound themselves to act in concert relatively to the principle to be followed for the indemnities in Germany.²

Accordingly meetings were held at Paris, in which Markoff, the Russian ambassador, took part, and Talleyrand, the Minister of Exterior Relations; Bonaparte states that as First Consul he presided at many of the discussions.³ A scheme was at last finally approved, and presented to the Diet at Ratisbon on August 18, 1802.⁴ The King of Prussia had already adhered to the plan: so had the Elector of Bavaria. The Emperor (Austria) objected to it, and defied the Mediating Powers (France and Russia) by occupying Passau, which the plan assigned to Bavaria. But France, Prussia and Bavaria delivered an ultimatum giving the Emperor sixty days within which to withdraw his troops, and to

¹ Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 705.

² De Clercq, I, 474. The two treaties of October 8 and 10, 1801, are in anticipation of Tilsit. Besides the German question, the balance of power throughout the world, and the freedom of the seas, were put into the concert of France and Russia (art. 11 of the Secret Convention).

³ He said that he presided at all the meetings: see the *Report to the Senate*, August 21, 1802, in De Clercq, I, 594. But apparently he only presided at decisive meetings affecting a particular State. The discussion of details before the final decision was carried on between Talleyrand, Markoff and the interested party, e.g. the Minister of Baden. See Reitzenstein to Edelsheim, May 20, 1802, in Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, IV, 127-9.

⁴ See Declaration made by France, Prussia and Bavaria, in a tripartite Convention, Paris, September 5, 1802 (De Clercq, I, 605). The Convention states that these Governments adhere to the plan which the First Consul and the Tsar have made known to the Diet.

accept the plan "in its totality."¹ The Emperor submitted. Passau was divided, the ex-Grand Duke of Tuscany getting the part of the bishopric on the side of the Iltz and Inn towards Austria, Bavaria getting the rest. The Emperor's assent to the French plan was incorporated in a treaty between France and the Empire, signed by Joseph Bonaparte, Cobenzl and Markoff, at Paris, on December 26, 1802. The plan was the basis of the Recess drafted by the Imperial Deputation at Ratisbon, made into a decree on February 23, 1803, approved by the Diet (March 24), and ratified by the Emperor (April 27).²

The broad result of the Imperial Recess was that the number of States in the Empire was about halved. Forty-five Free Imperial Cities disappeared, absorbed into their more powerful neighbours; six only (Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Frankfort, Augsburg, Nuremberg) remained. Of the three ecclesiastical Electors, two (Trèves and Cologne) were wiped off the map,³ and their territories made into French Departments, as was also done with the territories of the third, the Elector of Mayence: he however retained his prerogatives and titles, and was transferred to a new Electoral State, made out of the Bishopric of Ratisbon, the grand-bailliage of Aschaffenburg, and other territories.

Prussia and Bavaria gained enormously, both in extent and in concentration of territories. Instead of her outlying domains on the left bank of the Rhine, Prussia received valuable territories in Westphalia (Paderborn, Münster, Hildesheim), and in Saxony (Erfurt, Mülhausen, Goslar, and other places). Instead of Zweibrücken and other left-bank territories, Bavaria got the bishoprics of Bamberg, Würzburg, and part of Passau (including the cities of the same name), the city of Ulm, and many other places. The accessions of Baden and Wurtemberg had a similar effect of concentration. In addition their rulers received the dignity and pre-

¹ See the Convention of September 5, 1802, cited above. The complete plan is given in De Clercq, I, 596-603, signed by Talleyrand. The Act or "Recess" of the Imperial Deputation is in Martens, *Recueil*, VII, 435 ff.

² There were, however, two articles which the Emperor did not ratify: No. 1, relating to Austrian indemnities; and No. 32, relating to the Council of Princes.

³ The Elector of Trèves, out of consideration of the fact that he was deprived of all his Trèves rents, and because he was a good and popular man, was allowed to keep his house at Augsburg (of which city he was bishop) for life (Laforest to Min. des Relat. extér., November 19, 1802, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 720).

rogatives of Imperial Electors, as did also the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.

Simplification and concentration were the main results of Bonaparte's diplomacy in Germany in 1802-3. Altogether one hundred and twelve States were suppressed. The increase of Prussia, as well as of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden,¹ obviously decreased the influence of Austria in Germany. The influence of Austria, moreover, was largely dependent on the maintenance of the Imperial Constitution. This constitution remained, but the smallest States, which had most interest, owing to their helplessness, in maintaining the Empire, had greatly diminished. All the ecclesiastical States, except one, had been suppressed: all but six Free Imperial Cities were extinguished. Many minor secular princes and Free Imperial Knights (of the last there were about 1,000, each administering a few square miles) still remained. Most of these were to meet their fate in 1806.

It is difficult to see why Bonaparte engaged himself in this vast plan of simplifying the territorial system of the German Empire. In some ways the simplification strengthened Germany, by substituting States of fair size and power for a large number of diminutive and feeble princes. On the other hand, the plan of 1803 weakened the Germanic Constitution, by giving Austria, hitherto preponderant in the Empire, a number of colleagues instead of satellites. According to the Bulletin of Ratisbon, the distribution of territory was damaging to the prestige of Prussia as well as of Austria, and correspondingly increased that of France.²

Thus the settlement of 1803 was a step towards the disintegration of the German Empire, a disintegration which was completed by the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806. That the idea of such a Confederation was in the air earlier is proved by a letter from the well-informed Baden representative at Paris to his Government at Carlsruhe. Writing on September 16, 1802, he said that France had arranged by treaty that Prussia should form a League of Princes (*Fürstenbund*) in Germany. This rumour was

¹ Bonaparte, in the favour which he showed to Baden, was adopting an idea of Barthélemy, who wrote from Bâle to the Committee of Public Safety, June 2, 1795: "The Margrave of Baden is certainly worthy of favour and of the protection of the French Government, for his principles and for his conduct" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Prusse* 216).

² Bull. de Ratisbon, *Légation française*, November 19, 1802 (*Arch. Aff. étr. Allemagne* 720).

not accurate, but Laforest's reports from Berlin prove that a League was being thought about.¹

The comparative ease with which the territorial changes were put into effect is explained by the fact that they only accelerated a tendency which had been in operation for years—the tendency, namely, of the great States of Germany to eat up the smaller.²

Besides the disintegration of the Empire, there is one other result, which must not be lost sight of. The secularisation of all the ecclesiastical States (except Mayence-Ratisbon, and the Grand Masters of the Teutonic Order and Order of St. John) was a tremendous blow at the prestige of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet this was the period of Bonaparte's great reconciliation with the Papacy—the period of the Concordat.³ It was certainly not love for the Protestant religion which led Bonaparte to establish a majority of six Protestant Electors out of the total Electoral College of ten; and a majority of fifty-three Protestant States as against twenty-nine Catholic in the Council of Princes. In France Roman Catholicism was useful to Bonaparte; in Germany it was nothing to him: if it helped any State politically, that State was Austria. So he destroyed the political power of Roman Catholicism in the Empire. The Church in eighteenth-century Germany had been princely and national. But now "the result of secularisation was to give the nobles a dislike for the service of the Church. So far as is known, during the Napoleonic epoch, not a single young nobleman of ancient lineage entered the priesthood."⁴

The new priesthood was plebeian and remote from the governing class. "The Church was its only home."⁵ It looked to the Rome beyond the Alps. It became ultramontane; and when Bonaparte (in 1809) broke with the Papacy, most of the German clergy went against him too.

Yet too much responsibility must not be laid upon Bonaparte. In the policy of secularisation, as in other things, he was the heir

¹ Erdmannsdörffer, IV, 197. Laforest, the French delegate at Ratisbon, wrote to Talleyrand on November 26, 1802, that the result of the changes would be to give Bonaparte the chance of being "the veritable regulator of the Empire"—this statement may also refer to some plan for a Confederation (Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 720).

² Laforest to Talleyrand, December 1, 1802 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

³ See above, chapter IX.

⁴ Treitschke, *History of Germany* (trans. 1915), I, 218.

⁵ *Ibid*

of the Revolution. A plan for secularisation had nine years earlier been in the minds of the Committee of Public Safety.¹ Bonaparte adopted it not in order to weaken Catholicism in Germany but in order to take religion out of German politics altogether : his secularisations destroyed the old idea of Germany being divided into a Corpus Catholicum and a Corpus Evangelicum.² His policy in fact was neither Catholic nor Protestant, neither religious nor anti-religious : it was non-religious.

¹ Bacher (Agent at Bâle) to C.P.S., November 23, 1794: "The Landgrave of Hesse and all the Protestant princes have claimed the intervention of the King of Prussia. This league would leave great latitude to the French Republic, since that league would interest itself feebly for the Elector of Mayence, of Trèves, of Cologne, as Catholics and devoted to the House of Austria" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Prusse* 215).

² Laforest to Talleyrand, December 14, 1802: "it is necessary to make abstraction of all sub-division of Germany into Catholic Party and Protestant Party" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 720).

CHAPTER XII

THE RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS

The peace of Amiens was bound to be transitory, for it really settled nothing. The vital dispute between Great Britain and France was not really about Malta or Trinidad, although Bonaparte, like the Directory, was very much interested in Malta.¹ The dispute was really about the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine which France now commanded, and about the stability of the European States System which France had overwhelmed. So, until these questions were settled, the war, for want of any other means of settling them, had to be continued. Bourrienne, who had sufficient imagination to look at a question from his adversary's point of view, wrote: "I have always thought that the conclusion of peace, however necessary to England, was an error of the Cabinet of London."²

In the months after the Peace of Amiens had been made there was much ground for complaint on both sides. "The first grievance complained of by England was the prohibition of English merchandise, which had been more rigid since the peace than during the war."³ Great Britain was in the full career of her Industrial "Revolution": she desired a "vent" for her merchandise, and, not unreasonably, looked to the Continent of Europe for a good portion of her markets for foreign trade. The British Government would have liked some commercial treaty like that of 1786, which provided for a reciprocal lowering of duties. But Bonaparte was a protectionist, and would have nothing to do with a commercial treaty.⁴ He thought that such a treaty would be a death-blow to

¹ For Directory, see *Ministre des Relations extérieures to Bacher*, September 23, 1797: *Le Directoire approuve vos idées sur Malte* (Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 367).

² Bourrienne, *Memoirs* (trans. 1885) II, 79.

³ Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, II, 82.

⁴ Cp. Talleyrand's Instructions to Joseph for the Amiens negotiations (see above, p. 95).

France's rising trade.¹ On the other hand, the Treaty of Lunéville had given him a practical hegemony of Europe, and the commerce of the whole Continent lay open for France to exploit.²

Bonaparte, on his side, felt himself compelled to concentrate his efforts more and more on the Continent of Europe. By the summer of 1802, the usual fate of West Indian expeditions had overtaken the force which he had sent out to San Domingo in November, 1801. The troops perished from fever. "With this expedition, falls the grand design in Louisiana and on the Mississippi. The only way now to bring pressure to bear on England is through Europe."³ So on September 11, 1802, he completes the annexation of Piedmont (which had been announced for over a year) by Senatorial decree. He had already annexed to France (August 25, 1802)⁴ Elba, an island off the west coast of Central Italy, belonging to the Kingdom of Naples, although he had undertaken to evacuate that kingdom by the Treaty of Amiens (art. 7). But the greatest step taken during the lull after the Treaty of Amiens to control what was left of free Europe was with regard to Switzerland.

The Treaty of Lunéville (art. 11) had stipulated for the independence of the Helvetic Republic (along with the Batavian, Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics). Since the invasion of Switzerland by the Austrian and Russian troops, and their defeat, in the War of the Second Coalition, the internal history of Switzerland had not been happy. French troops remained in occupation. There was intense political agitation on the part of the people who believed in a unitary constitution for the country, such as had been established by the French Directory in 1798, and among those who believed in a federal constitution. The internal dissensions only became worse when Bonaparte, in the summer after the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, withdrew his troops. "The evacuation of Switzerland at this precise moment was one of the most perfidious masterstrokes

¹ Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, II, 83.

² France's commanding position in Germany since the territorial rearrangement of Ratisbon, and in particular her position as Protector of the six surviving Free Imperial Cities, opened to her "the counting-houses and privileged *entrepôts* of the productions and industries of all the commercial nations" (Bulletin de Ratisbonne, November 19, 1802, in Arch. Aff. étr. Allemagne 720).

³ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 253. Louisiana was sold to the United States (Treaty of April 30, 1803, in De Clercq, II, 59). The sum paid was 60 million francs.

⁴ *Gazette National ou le Moniteur Universel*, 8 Fructidor, An 10, No. 345, p. 1409.

of Napoleonic statecraft.”¹ So writes the most eminent modern Swiss historian. Yet it is difficult to see how Bonaparte could have acted otherwise: he was only carrying out the stipulation in the Treaty of Lunéville respecting Swiss independence.

Whatever the First Consul's motive was in ordering the evacuation, the result was to throw Switzerland back into civil war, and a regular pitched battle took place by the Lake of Morat between rudely-armed forces of the Unitary and Federal parties. This spectacle was too much for the orderly mind of Bonaparte to view with equanimity; so on October 4 General Rapp arrived at Lausanne, bearing a summons for Swiss delegates to proceed to Paris and accept the First Consul's mediation.² Some difficulties ensued, which were settled by an invasion and occupation of the country by General Ney; and finally, after discussions held at Paris between the Federalist and Unitary delegations in the presence of the First Consul, the Act of Mediation was concluded at the Tuileries on February 19, 1803.

The Act of Mediation superseded the unitary constitution of the Helvetic Republic by a Federation of nineteen sovereign cantons. It has received approval from many quarters,³ and was undoubtedly popular among the cantons.⁴ Yet its actual result was to make the central authority so weak that the constitution could only be preserved by the guarantee of France. The concluding words of the Act of Mediation are:

We recognise Helvetia, constituted conformably to the present Act, as an independent Power.

We guarantee the Federal Constitution, and that of each canton, against the enemies of the tranquillity of Helvetia, whoever they may be; and we promise to continue the benevolent relations which have been for several centuries between the two nations.⁵

The consequence of this guarantee was that General Ney con-

¹ W. Oechsli, *History of Switzerland*, 1499-1914 (1922), p. 347.

² The French Government might be considered as having a kind of mediatorial position owing to its ancient alliance. Cp. *Observations of Ney*, July 30, 1803: "the Peace of 1516 is always considered as the precious foundation of the alliance which has subsisted for so long between France and the Helvetic Confederation" (Arch. Aff. étr. Suisse 481).

³ E.g. Dändliker, *A Short History of Switzerland* (trans. 1899), pp. 232-3.

⁴ The various memorials presented to Bonaparte in favour of the re-establishing of the old cantons, in 1803, prove this. They are to be found in Arch. Aff. étr. Suisse 480.

⁵ De Clercq, II, 55.

cluded with the new Swiss Government a Military Capitulation for twenty-five years for the recruiting of 16,000 Swiss to serve in the French army; and also, on the same date and at the same place (Fribourg, Sept. 27, 1803), a perpetual Defensive Alliance.¹

That Bonaparte tended to regard Switzerland as merely part of the French political system is also proved by his act with regard to the Valais. This territory had been an ally or adjunct of the old Swiss Confederation, and in 1798 became a canton of the Helvetic Republic. On August 28, 1802, Bonaparte separated the Valais off from Switzerland and made it an "independent" republic.² He did this because he was building a grand military road over the Simplon Pass, through the Valais. Nevertheless, while resolved that Switzerland should serve the interests of France, he was ready for France to serve the interests of Switzerland too.³

On all sides Bonaparte's diplomacy after the Peace of Amiens was all-pervading and active. In October, 1802, General Brune was sent as ambassador to Constantinople, with Instructions as follows :

The intention of the Government is that the ambassador at Constantinople should resume, by every means, the supremacy which France had for two centuries in that capital. The house which is occupied by the ambassador is the finest. He must constantly hold a rank above ambassadors of other nations, be surrounded with a numerous suite, and take no step without a great display. He should retake under his protection all the hospitals and all the Christians of Syria and Armenia, and especially all the caravans which visit the Holy Places.⁴

Brune's real object seems to have been to induce the Porte to compel the Mameluke Beys of Egypt to expel the English influence.⁵

¹ Both Capitulation and Alliance are in De Clercq, II, 71-82. There were Swiss regiments in the French service before the Revolution. When the Treaty of Campo Formio was being negotiated, the Directory had instructed Bonaparte (19 Vendémiaire, An 6) to negotiate for the enrolment of as many Swiss soldiers as possible, although this was "unusual since the Revolution" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 367).

² It was made "independent" under the "guarantee" of the three Republics—the French, Italian, Helvetic Republics. See *Gazette National ou le Moniteur Universel*, 27 Fructidor, An 10 (1802), No. 357, pp. 1455-6.

³ See Bonaparte to Ney, (circa) August 10, 1803: "The intention of the 1st Consul is to treat the Swiss well in everything that is not prejudicial to our interests" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Suisse* 481).

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 6378, October 18, 1802.

⁵ Report of Lesseps, February 4, 1804, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687.

It is notable how Bonaparte was coming more and more to employ soldiers as ambassadors, perhaps as being men whose normal attitude was to issue commands rather than make requests, and who deal little in compromise. Thus he sent General Brune to Constantinople, General Gouvion St. Cyr to Madrid, General Lannes to Portugal, General Andréossy to London, Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt.¹ Sebastiani's Instructions were to put an end to a dispute between the "Italian Republic" and the Bey of Tripoli, and to make notes on the British and Turkish forces in Egypt.² A French frigate took him to his destination. The energetic Colonel went, made his observations, and returned. His report, which, like that of any other French agent, was a proper subject for the eyes of the First Consul, was on January 30, 1803, published in the official *Moniteur*, for all the world to read. Miot de Melito notes that

the displeasure caused in England by Colonel Sebastiani's report, published in the *Moniteur*, relating to his mission in Egypt, and which openly revealed the First Consul's designs of transforming that country into a French Colony, indicated an impending rupture; and this took place before long.³

Sebastiani wrote: "General Stuart [commanding the British garrison at Alexandria] is a man of a mediocre spirit." Then followed statistics of the British forces (16,140 men). Then, adverting to the Turkish garrison, Sebastiani concluded these observations thus:

It is useless to add that this is not an army: the men are badly armed, without discipline, without confidence in their chiefs, and enervated by excesses of debauch. The chiefs resemble their soldiers in everything: ignorant of the first elements of the military art, and actuated solely by the lust for riches, they think only of enriching themselves, and of finding the means to retire with security. Six thousand French would suffice to-day to conquer Egypt.⁴

¹ Contrast Napoleon to Metternich: "Soldiers are no good at all for diplomatic missions" (Metternich, *Mémoires*, 1886, II, 157). This was the Emperor's opinion in 1808.

² *Corr.*, No. 6308, September 5, 1802.

³ Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, I, 518.

⁴ *Gazette National ou le Moniteur Universel*, 9 Pluviose, An XI (January 29, 1803), No. 130, pp. 523-6. The Report is also given in Hansard, *The Parliamentary History*, vol. XXXVI, p. 1349 ff. The complete report is in Arch. Nat. AF 1687, and contains many passages which are scored out by the pencil of Bonaparte.

The British ambassador at Paris sent a copy of the *Moniteur* to the Foreign Office, observing that Sebastiani's allusions to the British General Stuart were "highly indecent," not to say "disgusting."¹

On Bonaparte's side there were grievances against Great Britain. The British newspapers, the *émigrés*, the conspirators, all irritated him. In the summer of 1802 Bonaparte ordered Talleyrand to give an interview to Mr. Merry, British Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, and to put before him the First Consul's views :

Make him realise the inconvenience that there would be to send an ambassador to England when London is the focus of a war against France ; when the Bishop of St. Pol de Léon always continues to distribute funds ; when the Bishop of Noyon, of Montpellier and others, seek to trouble the State by all the means that are in their power ; when the French princes have appeared at dinners where M. Otto was present, and have even appeared there with emblems of the House of Bourbon ; when Georges² lives at London and when his existence, in the capital of England, is a veritable outrage to the French Government. . . . We demand that the rebel bishops be removed from the capital of England, and from the coasts near to France ; that no distinctive mark of the French *ancien régime* be permitted at London, and especially at Court ; that the French princes be sent away to Warsaw ; that Georges and the principal Vendéens be sent to the colonies ; finally that the English Government make the journals keep the limitations which are usual in England towards Powers with which she is at peace.³

The French protectorate of Switzerland and Holland formed the weak points in Bonaparte's diplomacy in 1802-3. The weak point in England's was Malta. Article 10 of the Treaty of Amiens had stipulated that the Isle of Malta would be given back to the

¹ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 31, 1803, in *England and Napoleon in 1803, being the Dispatches of Lord Whitworth and others*, edited by O. Browning (1887), p. 57. Sebastiani was not proud of the remarks himself, and when sitting next to Whitworth at dinner at Talleyrand's "recanted everything he had said in his report disrespectful to General Stuart, and mentioned him in terms of great esteem" (Whitworth to Hawkesbury, February 3, 1803).

² Georges Cadoudal, the leader of the Chouans. He was a refugee in England at this time, along with Hyde de Neuville.

³ *Corr.*, No. 6108, June 1, 1802. Cp. VIII, 114, Instructions to Otto and Andréossy (ambassador) in England. Similar demands were made through Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth at Paris (Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 4, 1803, in Browning, *op. cit.*, p. 38). The British Government declined to comply.

Order of St. John of Jerusalem. There is no doubt that Great Britain did not wish to give it back ¹; but this fact would not have prevented the Island from being given up if a real peace had followed the Treaty of Amiens. The argument advanced by the British Foreign Office against the execution of article 10 of the Treaty was that such execution was conditional on France observing the other stipulations of the treaty—for instance, article 11, respecting the evacuation of Naples ²; and particularly conditional on Bonaparte's not changing the *status quo*, the territorial arrangements of Europe as they existed at the signing of the Treaty of Amiens.

In the communications which took place between the two Governments previous to the signature of the preliminary articles, His Majesty proposed as the basis of the negotiation that if the French Government would not relinquish the Continental acquisitions which they had obtained from other Powers in the course of the war, His Majesty would claim the right of keeping part of his conquests as a compensation for the important acquisitions made by France on the Continent. This principle was formally recognised by the French Government in an official note in the following words: "*Cependant on reconnoit que les grands événements survenus en Europe, et les changements arrivés dans les limites des grands Etats du Continent, peuvent autoriser une partie des demandes du Gouvernement britannique.*" The terms of the treaty of peace were negotiated in conformity to this basis, and it appears, therefore, clear that the then existing state of possession and of engagements as respect (*sic*) the Continent were the foundation of the peace itself, and that His Majesty has, therefore, an undoubted right to interpose in consequence of the treaty in every case in which the state of possession may appear to him to have undergone any material alteration, or in which the engagements which were then subsisting had been violated to the prejudice of His Majesty, or of the other Powers of Europe.³

The British Government held that the annexation of Piedmont, and the interference in Switzerland,⁴ really amounted to drastic alterations of the territorial *status quo* of Europe in favour of France; and that these alterations (which were certainly breaches of the

¹ See Memorandum in the *Dropmore Papers*, vol. VI, 385.

² Bonaparte annexed the Neapolitan island of Elba on August 25, 1802. See above, p. 114.

³ Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, November 14, 1802, in Browning, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

⁴ "By the Treaty of the Hague the French Government were permitted to keep garrisons in that country *only* till the time of the general peace." Hawkesbury to Whitworth, November 14, 1802, Browning, *op. cit.*, p. 8. The Treaties of Lunéville and Amiens were a general peace.

public law of Europe) automatically involved a reconsideration of the terms of the Treaty of Amiens.

Lord Whitworth was the ambassador appointed to deal with the relations between England and France after the Treaty of Amiens. He received his Instructions (dated September 10) from Lord Hawkesbury on November 14, 1802.¹ These Instructions, which were only meant for Whitworth's eye, declared His Majesty's "determination to observe with scrupulous good faith all the engagements at present subsisting between us and the French Government." But these engagements depended on the maintenance by France of the territorial *status quo*, as it existed when the Treaty of Amiens was signed. Actually, the *status quo* had been very materially altered by Bonaparte. Lord Hawkesbury enumerated the points: Piedmont (annexed), Parma (renounced by the Duke in favour of France, "a circumstance which was concealed at the time of negotiating the peace"), Switzerland (occupied), Batavian Republic (garrisons retained). He concludes:

His Majesty would certainly be justified in claiming the possession of Malta, as some counterpoise to the acquisition (*sic*) of France, since the conclusion of the Definite Treaty.²

Whitworth crossed to Calais on November 10; "we were received on our landing by an immense concourse of people, and with much huzzaing. The guns were fired, and flags displayed on the steeples, etc."³ He arrived at Paris on November 15, and took over the charge of affairs from Mr. Merry, who had officiated at the Embassy since the Amiens negotiations. On November 16 Whitworth had a formal interview with Talleyrand. On December 7 he was presented to the First Consul. At the introduction Bonaparte said: "I repeat continually, it is on peace between our two grand nations that the happiness of the world depends." Whitworth then fell back into the circle of guests, but Bonaparte afterwards came round to him, and spoke very pleasantly. On returning home, Whitworth found an invitation to dine with the First Consul on the same day, at 6 o'clock. He went to the dinner,

¹ The Dispatches relating to Lord Whitworth's embassy are partially given in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1802-3, vol. X; more fully in *England and Napoleon in 1803, being the Dispatches of Lord Whitworth and others*, edited by O. Brown-ing (1887). The quotations given below are from Browning's edition.

² Hawkesbury to Whitworth, November 14, 1802.

³ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, November 10, 1802.

when there were two hundred and fifty people. The meal only lasted half an hour ¹; after it was over, the First Consul and the ambassador had some more general conversation.

A few days later, Whitworth's wife, the Duchess of Dorset, was presented to Madame Bonaparte; after this, the Duchess was regularly invited to diplomatic dinners. A difficulty was experienced owing to the fact that at these dinners the mistresses of French ministers and officials were present. The dignity of the British ambassador would not permit his wife to accept invitations where these ladies were to be of the company. An exception was made in regard to the household of Talleyrand (who had been in priest's orders), because "the lady who presides in his house bears his name, and is in fact married to him, as far as the sanction of the Roman Church can make such a marriage lawful." ²

Whitworth saw the First Consul at the receptions, and conversed with him on various subjects. He did not form a very high opinion of Bonaparte :

The First Consul is living retired in the country [at St. Cloud, ten miles from Paris], without enjoying any of the smallest degrees of domestic comfort: occupied the whole day with the most trivial details of internal arrangement, and such as suit the natural turn of his mind, prone to all the extremes of suspicion. He passes three or four hours each day in reading over the letters of individuals, which are sent to him for that purpose from the post at Paris, and from which he collects pretexts for tormenting frequently those who are nearest to him, as well as those who think themselves the safest by the distance from him. Three or four different polices equally desirous to manifest their zeal are established in this city, and from their inquisition no class of society is secure. In short he is a scourge to himself and the nation, which for his punishment he has subdued to his will. But I must repeat to your Lordship that the nearer he is viewed the less formidable he appears to those not immediately under his grasp. ³

¹ This was Bonaparte's habit, but it was not general in Republican circles. The dinners of Cambacérès, the Second Consul, were famous for their sumptuousness, which was maintained, partly, for reasons of State. See Bourrienne, *Memoirs* (trans. 1885), I, 440: "As to Cambacérès, he did not believe that a good government could exist without good dinners."

² Whitworth to Hawkesbury, December 13, 1802. On June 29, 1802, Talleyrand was authorised by Brief of Pius VII to revert to the secular state. The brief was made effective in France by an authorisation of Bonaparte as First Consul (*Corr.*, No. 6261). Talleyrand married Madame Grand on September 10, 1803. Cp. *Moniteur Univ.*, An X, p. 1360.

³ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, January 17, 1803. The "Black Cabinet" of the Post Office, which opened letters for inspection, was an inheritance from

Whitworth came to the conclusion, as the result of his observation, and especially after the publication of Sebastiani's report about Egypt, that Bonaparte would seize the first favourable opportunity for making war on Great Britain. He put his views before Lord Hawkesbury in a dispatch of February 7. These views, he wrote, will certainly go far to justify the assertion, however paradoxical it may appear, that the continuance of peace does not depend upon our fulfilling, under the present circumstances, the Treaty of Amiens, but on keeping in our hands those possessions [Malta and Alexandria], the immediate re-occupation of which by the French would force us into a war under every disadvantage.

The publication of Sebastiani's report (January 30, 1803) seems to have been the dividing line in the Whitworth-Bonaparte negotiations. Lord Hawkesbury described it (after receiving the report in Whitworth's copy of the *Moniteur*) as a *very extraordinary publication*.¹ The attitude of the Foreign Office stiffened. At the same time Bonaparte became more emphatic: Whitworth, when he next visited the First Consul, was received only "with tolerable cordiality."² Bonaparte enumerated the provocations he had received from England.

He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and of the two he had rather see us in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than Malta.³

Louis XV's *régle* (see Bourrienne, *op. cit.*, II, 57). Besides supplying the First Consul with information, the *Cabinet Noir* sometimes unconsciously misled him through handing on letters which people had forged, or in which fictitious information was conveyed (Bourrienne, II, 58). The police reports gradually became a wonderful intelligence system, which passed through Fouché to Bonaparte brief summaries of all that happened in every corner of the French Empire. They are of some value for Bonaparte's diplomatic history (Hauterive, *La Police secrète du Premier Empire* (1908), and Arch. Nat. F⁷ 3200).

The British Government had its own intelligence system, which eluded both the Black Cabinet and the police. Foreign banking houses were one of the means for collecting and transmitting information from France and the French client States. Whitworth's dispatches from Paris were conveyed by special messenger in a bi-weekly bag, every Wednesday and Saturday (Whitworth to Hammond, November 20, 1802).

¹ To Whitworth, February 9, 1803.

² To Hawkesbury, February 21, 1803.

³ To Hawkesbury, February 21, 1803. Cp. Note relative à la diplomatie, Egypte, Malte, by Citizen Ponce, December 30, 1799: "the possession of Malta is the point of communication between Egypt and France" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687).

This assertion was definite enough. Yet Bonaparte was prepared to compromise, and he proceeded, as it were, to lead the English ambassador up to a high tower, and to show him the kingdoms of the earth for spoil:

He expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries: France with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men; . . . and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas. . . . Two such countries by a proper understanding might govern the world.

He went on to throw out more specific hints. Had it not been for the persistent enmity of the British Government since the Treaty of Amiens,

there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate—participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the Continent, treaties of commerce, in short anything that could have given satisfaction and testified his friendship.

The conversation (or rather monologue, for Bonaparte gave the English ambassador little opportunity to say anything) endured for two hours. Whitworth did manage to allude cautiously to accessions of territory gained by France since the Treaty: "I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland," said the First Consul: "*ce sont des bagatelles*." For a time Bonaparte seemed to lose his temper. At the end, however, he regained his good humour, talked for a few moments on indifferent subjects, and retired.

The British Government, although it would not conspire with Bonaparte to partition Europe and dominate the world, was, nevertheless, not unfavourable to compromise. It appears to have been ready, if Bonaparte would give way on the question of Malta, to recognise him as King or "Consular Majesty," with hereditary succession in his family. This negotiation, of which the record is rather shadowy, appears to have taken place in March, 1803, and to have been conducted on the part of Lord Whitworth through a certain M. Huber, a Swiss, who was one of the "friends of England."¹ The overtures were passed on to the pacific Joseph Bonaparte, and, apparently, reached the First Consul, who would

¹ The *amis d'Angleterre* were the well-wishers and agents of Great Britain in Paris and other parts of France. They were more or less organised, and were in regular touch with the British Foreign Office. See Huber to Whitworth, May 3, 1803 (Browning, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-12). Huber shows that Fouché was in relations with the Friends of England.

have nothing to do with them.¹ The negotiation is important as showing that the British Government was willing to compromise one of its war-aims, namely the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne of France.

Bonaparte had one weakness as a diplomatist: he too easily gave way to irritation, especially if anybody seemed to insinuate that he was afraid of war. When Lord Whitworth met Bonaparte on Sunday, March 13, he found him "under very considerable agitation." "So you are determined to go to war," were Bonaparte's first words. Then he exploded: "The English want war, but if they are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to lay it down. They do not respect treaties. It will be necessary henceforth to cover them with black crêpe." By *them* "I suppose he meant the treaties," adds Whitworth, who was careful about words.

The First Consul then went round those present at the reception, but was soon back at Whitworth again. Becoming more and more agitated, he raised the tone of his voice, saying: "It is necessary to respect treaties; misfortune to those who do not respect treaties. They shall be responsible for it to all Europe." Two hundred people overheard what he said. Whitworth retired, feeling that he must abstain from attending these receptions if he was "to be attacked in that public manner by the First Consul."²

On April 14 Lord Hawkesbury wrote to Whitworth stating that the discussions between the British and French Governments must be brought to an issue as soon as possible, consistently "with the deliberation which must be given to objects of so much importance." He enclosed the British Government's offer—not as an absolutely final offer, but at any rate as a "basis of negotiation."

Malta to remain in perpetuity to His Majesty.

The Knights of the Order of St. John to be indemnified by His Majesty for any losses of property. . . .

Holland and Switzerland to be evacuated by the French troops.

The island of Elba to be confirmed by His Majesty to France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged.

The Italian and Ligurian Republics to be acknowledged by His

¹ Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, I, 521.

² To Hawkesbury, March 14, 1803. Napoleon at St. Helena denied that there had been anything unpleasant or unusual in the interview of March 13. Whitworth's report, he said, was part of the usual "propaganda" reports of British diplomacy (Las Casas, *op. cit.*, II, partie IV, pp. 164-6).

Majesty, provided an arrangement is made in Italy for the King of Sardinia which shall be satisfactory to him.¹

It must be admitted that this was not a very brilliant offer to make to the ever-victorious Bonaparte; he refused to consider it even as a "basis of negotiation." An offer of the British Government to consent to hold Malta for only ten years, provided that it obtained the sovereignty of Lampedusa,² proved not to be any more acceptable, although Bonaparte was ready to grant Lampedusa *without* Malta.³

The negotiation drew to an end amid the preparation of armaments, and the marching of troops to the ports. On May 2, Lord Whitworth applied to Talleyrand for his passports. Nevertheless he did not leave Paris; and eleventh-hour attempts to find solutions of the questions at issue were made by the friends of peace, particularly by Joseph Bonaparte. Talleyrand, too, was on the side of peace, declaring in an official Note to Lord Whitworth that it was impossible to conceive how a grand nation could declare war on account of a miserable rock.⁴

Since the now celebrated scene at the Tuileries on March 13, Whitworth had only seen the First Consul on one occasion, April 3, when, wrote the British Ambassador, "I had every reason to be satisfied with his manner towards me."⁵ He was not to see the First Consul again. On May 12, he once more asked for his passports, which had not been delivered; he was now getting no answers at all in return for his Notes to the *Ministère des Relations extérieures*.⁶ He began to feel that by staying any longer he was merely being the dupe of the French: "I have been delayed much longer than I wished by the infamous chicanery and difficulties which have occurred."⁷

Whitworth left Paris at 10 p.m. on Thursday, May 12. He

¹ To Whitworth, April 4, 1803.

² Hawkesbury to Whitworth, April 13, 1803.

³ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, April 23 and April 28, 1803. Lampedusa belonged to the Kingdom of Sicily; Bonaparte thought of this later in the course of the negotiations, and withdrew the consent, saying that the island was not his to give (Talleyrand to Whitworth, May 2, 1803).

⁴ May 4 (14 Floréal), 1803: *puisque'il s'agit d'un si misérable rocher*.

⁵ To Hawkesbury, April 4, 1803. Bonaparte kept the whole *Corps Diplomatique* waiting from one o'clock till five, while he inspected the knapsacks of about eight thousand soldiers in the Court of the Tuileries (*ibid.*).

⁶ To Talleyrand, May 10, 1803.

⁷ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, May 12, 1803, 8 o'clock p.m.

travelled very slowly, partly because of "the incumbrance of a large family," and partly because he hoped to be overtaken by a dispatch from Joseph Bonaparte, who was still engaging with the First Consul in a "conflict" which was "very severe," in favour of peace. Talleyrand requested Whitworth to conform to what he (Talleyrand) called the "established usage," namely that the British ambassador should wait at Calais until the French ambassador, coming from London, had reached Dover, and that the persons attached to the English mission should not leave Paris until all the French mission were leaving London. As Whitworth had never heard of such transactions except "between the most barbarous and uncivilised nations," he refused to conform to them.¹

At Breteuil, on May 14, the British ambassador was overtaken by a dispatch from Talleyrand, in which Great Britain was offered Malta for ten years, if France could be permitted to occupy Otranto and Taranto.² The offer was transmitted by Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, who replied that it was "entirely repugnant to the principles by which His Majesty has been uniformly actuated in the late discussions, and incompatible with that security which it has been the great object of his solicitude to obtain." It can only have been made, wrote Hawkesbury, "to procrastinate the negotiation, the protraction of which had already been so injurious to the interests of this country." Whitworth was therefore ordered to embark for Dover with as little delay as possible.³ The ambassador forthwith made his way to Boulogne: "from Paris to this place I have witnessed but one general appearance of gloomy discontent and despondency at being thus dragged into a war by the obstinacy of one man, and for a cause totally foreign to France."⁴ In conversation with Huber Talleyrand agreed with this opinion about Bonaparte:

I repeat to you that we wish peace—we wish it more than ever—which if it escape us, it will simply be because of the little care you have taken for the *amour propre* of the Consul. You others outside do not realise what is this *amour propre*, but we know it, we who have

¹ To Hawkesbury, May 13, 1803.

² To the same, May 14, 1803.

³ Hawkesbury to Whitworth, May 16, 1803. There was a French squadron at sea, which might get into a Spanish port, if hostilities could be deferred a little. See Talleyrand's conversation with Huber in Browning, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

⁴ To Lord Hawkesbury, May 16, 1803.

to manage it. If the British Cabinet had wished to adopt less severe forms in their dealings with him, it would have already succeeded.¹

This last remark of Talleyrand is scarcely just. The British Government had taken especial pains to spare the feelings of the First Consul. Lord Hawkesbury had offered to put the Malta concession into a *secret* article, so that the patent treaty to be concluded should not contain any hint that Bonaparte was yielding.² Moreover, to prevent the irritation which the First Consul experienced in personal interviews, Whitworth had been avoiding as much as possible to attend dinners and receptions on the plea of ill-health.³ On the only occasion on which he did visit the First Consul after the famous scene of March 13, he submitted to wait five hours in an ante-chamber without complaining.⁴

The ultimate cause of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens is thus described by a French historian. ". . . Holland was the real cause. By continuing the occupation of Flushing and Utrecht in contradiction of the formal engagements he had entered into, in the Treaty of Lunéville and the Convention of the Hague, Bonaparte gave the English the right to retain Malta as an equivalent. In vain was a compromise proposed to him. He refused to evacuate Holland despite the lawful claims made by the British Cabinet, which was thus forced to recall Lord Whitworth."⁵

¹ Huber to Whitworth, May 13, 1803.

² Hawkesbury to Whitworth, May 7, 1803. Whitworth to Talleyrand, undated, but obviously sent on May 9, 1803 (Browning, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-2).

³ Whitworth to Hawkesbury, May 2, 1803. To Talleyrand, April 30, to the *Préfet du Palais*, May 1.

⁴ To Hawkesbury, April 4, 1803. See above, p. 125, note 5.

⁵ Coquelle, *Napoleon and England*, 1803-1813 (trans. 1904), p. viii. The Convention of the Hague referred to above was an Act concluded on August 29, 1801, stating that French troops would remain in the Netherlands until the definitive Peace with England (De Clercq, I, 452).

CHAPTER XIII

BONAPARTE AND THE PUBLIC LAW

The famous peace, the period of the Treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, was at an end. Napoleon was still at peace with Austria and Prussia; but he was at war with Great Britain. France had obtained the left bank of the Rhine, but in order to hold all this left bank it would be found necessary to go over to the right, to take more territory as a buffer or a screen in front of the Rhine frontier. In course of time, the buffer or the screen itself would have to be protected; so Bonaparte must go to Vienna, to Berlin, to Tilsit, to Moscow.¹ When would France learn to substitute, for the policy of continental supremacy, the policy of disinterestedly, as well as interestedly, pursuing the equilibrium of Europe?

The great war went on, but not because Europe wanted war. In the beautiful concluding passage of *Quintus Fixlein*, Jean Paul Richter, who lived through the period, depicts Quintus walking home, by woods and valleys, through the quiet and perfumed summer night. Suddenly the hour of half-past two is heard, struck from some near-by steeples: "About this hour, in 1794, Mars went down in the west, and the Moon rose in the east; and my soul desired, in grief for the noble warlike blood which is still streaming on the blossoms of Spring: 'Ah, retire bloody War, like red Mars; and thou, still Peace, come forth like the mild divided Moon.'"²

The sentiment was felt in Europe after 1801 as after the Treaties of Bâle in 1795. It was felt in England too. After the cessation of hostilities in 1801, the well-to-do English gentry and their

¹ Cp. Napoleon's conversation with Clarke towards the end of October, 1806, in Las Casas, *op. cit.*, III, partie VI, p. 270 (*à l'Elbe, et peut-être à la Vistule . . . Alors . . . , alors . . .*).

For the early realised necessity of getting control on the *right* bank as well as on the left, see *Concerning the Barrier of the Republic against Austria*, "towards the year 4," in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 364.

² Carlyle's trans. in *Miscellanies*, vol. I, essay on J. P. Richter.

families resumed their habit of Continental travel; among these were Lord Aberdeen, who kept an interesting journal about his visit to France, and Charles James Fox, who was allowed by Talleyrand to read in the Foreign Office archives.¹ On May 22, 1803, four days after the declaration of war, Bonaparte ordered that all the British tourists in France should be seized. There appear to have been about one thousand.² The seizure of these non-combatants was done professedly as a reprisal for the British Government having seized French vessels. There is some doubt on the point whether the seizures were made by the British before the actual declaration of war; but even if they had been, the British action would have been according to international usage.³ Bonaparte's action was not conformable to this. Still more against the laws and customs of nations was his arresting of Lord Elgin (of "Elgin Marbles" fame), British ambassador at Constantinople, who was passing through Paris, on May 23 (1803); and of Sir James Crawford, British Minister to the Court of Denmark, who was made a prisoner at Calais about the same time. Both diplomats were delayed in France, after the declaration of hostilities, through illness.⁴ To violate the persons of ambassadors was an atrocious act. The arrest of the tourists was bad enough. Junot, to whom the duty of executing Bonaparte's order was given, greatly disliked the task. He found the First Consul fuming with passion against the English: "This measure must be executed by seven o'clock this evening. I do not choose that the most insignificant theatre or the lowest restaurateur of Paris should this evening see an Englishman in its boxes or at his tables." Junot ventured to remonstrate: Bonaparte burst forth: "Again! what! is the scene of the other day to be renewed? Lannes and you take strange liberties. . . . But by heavens, gentlemen! I will let you see that I can put my cap on the wrong way. Lannes has found it out

¹ For Lord Aberdeen's Journal in 1802. See *The Life of George, 4th Earl of Aberdeen* (1922), by Lady Frances Balfour, vol. I, pp. 15-22.

Fox's visits to Talleyrand's Hotel are mentioned in the anonymous *Life of Talleyrand*, vol. III, p. 207.

² Rose in *The Life of Napoleon I* (edn. 1922, p. 426) gives the number as ten thousand. One thousand is the figure of P. Coquelle, *England and Napoleon, 1803-1813* (trans. 1904), p. 73. Stanhope's *Life of Pitt* (edn. 1879), III, 127, says "several thousand." There appears to be no official return of the exact number.

³ Coquelle, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Elgin did not get back to Great Britain until 1806.

already, and, I suspect, is not much delighted with eating oranges at Lisbon. For yourself, Junot, do not trust too much to my friendship. The day when I doubt yours shall destroy mine."¹ Junot had to carry out the order, although he obtained one relaxation for the unfortunate prisoners: they were only to be confined in certain towns, where they could lodge freely, "so long as they remained peaceable." Nevertheless Junot's frank and honourable conduct prejudiced him in the eyes of the despotic First Consul.² Bonaparte's disregard of the customs of nations damaged himself more than ever in the eyes of the British. The cynical way in which he outraged international custom was on several occasions to harm his cause: particularly when he had the Duc d'Enghien kidnapped and shot.

The last of the Condés was living a life of exile at Ettenheim, a pretty village in Baden, near the Rhine, under the slopes of the Black Forest. Bonaparte, who was very nervous about conspiracies, suspected the Duc d'Enghien of being implicated in a plot of Georges Cadoudal. Bonaparte decided to have him seized. Enghien was living in a house belonging to a certain Baron Ichtratzheim. There he cultivated flowers, and looked across the Rhine towards France, seven miles away. He was, probably, secretly married to the Princess Charlotte de Rohan, who lived at Ettenheim, a place formerly belonging to her uncle, the Bishop of Strasbourg.³ On the night of March 14, General Ordener with three hundred dragoons and some files of gendarmes crossed the Rhine at Rheinau on pontoons, and rode quietly along the road by Kappel and Altdorf to Ettenheim. They surrounded the house of the Duke, and about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 15th the gendarmes made him a prisoner. He was taken first to Strasbourg, and lodged in the citadel. On March 18 he was removed to Paris, tried by court martial, and shot, not for conspiracy (for that charge was disproved) but as an *émigré* who had borne arms against France.⁴ The execution took place at half-past

¹ *Memoirs of the Duchess of Abrantès* (trans. 1893), vol. III, p. 4.

² Abrantès, *op. cit.*, III, 10.

³ See Welschinger, *Le Duc d'Enghien* (1888), pp. 284-9.

⁴ The Duc d'Enghien, when under seventeen years of age, was taken out of France by his parents, in July, 1789, first to Brussels, then to Turin. He was not an *émigré*, but was *banished* by the Republican Government (Welschinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20, 323, 332). He had borne arms in the "Army of Condé," which fought in the Allied forces. The Army of Condé was disbanded after

two on the morning of March 21, in the fosse of the Château de Vincennes.

The news of the seizure and execution of the Duc d'Enghien was received with horror throughout Europe.¹ The arch-villain of the piece appears really to have been not Bonaparte (although his action was sufficiently bad) but Talleyrand. Talleyrand in a note, dated March 8, suggested to the First Consul that he must bring about the death of the Duc d'Enghien, in order to show that he, Bonaparte, was whole-heartedly for the Revolution, and was not playing the part of a General Monk, who would end by restoring the old Monarchy.² And what was the result? Who can say what subtle currents of opinion in the long run combine to destroy Principalities and Powers? M. Welschinger believes that the execution of the Duc d'Enghien was as fatal to the Empire of Napoleon as was that of Louis XVI to the Revolution³—a difficult statement to grasp. Yet it is probably true to say that political mistakes are more costly than military: and the execution of the Duc d'Enghien set the same indefinable mark of universal ostracism on Bonaparte, as did the executions of Captain Fryatt and Nurse Cavell on the Junker rulers of Imperial Germany.

Bonaparte's imperialistic designs, both inside and outside France, soon became more evident than ever. On May 18, 1804, a decree of the Senate gave him the title of Emperor of the French. On December 2, Napoleon (the name of Bonaparte was dropped) placed the imperial crown on his head, after being anointed and blessed by the Pope. Soon, imperial fiefs around France sprang into existence: Italy was made a kingdom—Napoleon himself being King, with Eugène Beauharnais as Viceroy (March, 1805). Piombino was given to his sister Elisa as a principality—"the beginning the Treaty of Lunéville. Enghien was not serving when made prisoner, and he was seized on neutral territory.

¹ Proofs in Welschinger, *op. cit.*, chap. XXI.

² The note disappeared after the year 1822 from the *Archives of the Emperor*, but it had been seen and commented on by, among others, Chateaubriand and Michaud (see Welschinger, *op. cit.*, p. 420). Sorel thinks that Talleyrand's motive was merely to give a proof of his justly suspected loyalty to the Revolution and to Bonaparte (Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 346-7).

³ Welschinger, *op. cit.*, p. 451. In 1811 Marshal Davoust suggested a *coup* somewhat similar to that perpetrated against Enghien. His plan was that the King of Prussia should be kidnapped in Berlin (where there was a French garrison). Napoleon, however, on this occasion was too wise to be tempted (Auerstädt to Emperor, November 25, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

of a new feudality, the first application of the system of appanages, complementary to the French Empire.”¹

Just as Bonaparte had ushered in the Empire by proclaiming his contempt for the law of nations (as well as of ordinary decency and justice) in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, so he confirmed the European outlawry of his new régime by a similar breach of international custom. In this instance there was no room for argument: the affair of Rumbold was a violation of the oldest of diplomatic observances—the immunity of ambassadors; in addition to this, it was a violation (like the affair of Enghien) of a neutral State.

Sir George Rumbold was British Minister to the Hanseatic Cities. His headquarters were at Hamburg, and he had a country villa at Grindel, on the right bank of the Elbe. The British diplomatists on the Continent during the Napoleonic period were extraordinarily busy, and were continuously spinning political webs which Bonaparte vainly endeavoured to trace and to cut. The seizure of the Duc d'Enghien was partly due to the idea of Bonaparte that he would find among Enghien's papers some of the documents of English secret diplomacy; but he got little or nothing. He had induced the pliant sovereigns of Bavaria and Baden to expel the British Ministers—Drake from Munich, Spencer Smith from Stuttgart. Drake merely passed on to what Metternich called the “post of observation for the Courts of the North,”² that is, to Dresden.

Bonaparte probably thought that Rumbold's papers would be found particularly fertile in clues, because Hamburg was a great commercial centre for the North as Frankfort was for South Germany: and financial or commercial agencies were among the chief means of collecting and transmitting semi-official secret diplomatic intelligence. Bonaparte therefore in cold blood planned to kidnap Rumbold, who as a diplomatist in a tiny neutral State was absolutely without physical protection.

The operation was carried out through Bernadotte, who was in command of the French troops in Hanover (occupied on June 5, 1803, by Napoleon after the opening of war with England). On the night of Thursday, October 25, 1804, French soldiers crossed

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 429.

² Metternich, *Mémoires* (1886), I, 35. See also *The Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson* (1872), I, 193, 196, 205. Drake was described as *extrêmement actif et intrigant* in the Bulletin de Ratisbonne, December 21, 1802, in Arch. Aff. étr. Allemagne 720.

from the left bank of the Elbe and landed at Altona. They entered the villa of Sir George Rumbold, took him captive, and brought him to Hanover. Thence he was taken to Paris.

Frederick William of Prussia was furious, as the neutrality of Hamburg was placed under his guarantee.¹ Either in response to the Prussian Government's remonstrances, or simply because there was nothing to be gained by keeping Rumbold prisoner, Napoleon released him on November 12 (1804). He had, however, to sign an engagement not to reside within fifty post leagues of the present station of the French armies during the war—a promise which was not considered to be creditable by his brother-diplomatists. Nothing particularly valuable for Napoleon seems to have been found among the English diplomatist's papers.²

¹ It was within the Line of Demarcation according to the Treaty of Bâle, although the Line was no longer observed. In any case Hamburg was in the Lower Saxon Circle, of which Frederick William III was Director.

² Malmesbury, *Diaries and Correspondence* (1844), IV, 330-35. Jackson, *Diaries and Letters*, I, 242-52.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ORIGIN OF THE SPANISH TROUBLE

Spain during the Napoleonic period passed through extraordinary vicissitudes : first it was the enemy, then the ally, of Revolutionary France ; next, the ally of Napoleon, later his dupe, and finally his deadly enemy. In Spain Napoleon appeared to have a weak and gullible partner : yet he probably made more mistakes in his diplomatic dealings with the Spanish Crown and people than he did even in his relations towards Austria and Prussia.

At the beginning of the French Revolution, the Spanish people proved itself ardent in the cause of oppressed royalty. The Archbishop of Malines, an experienced politician and diplomatist, goes so far as to say that "the King of Spain, Charles IV, was the only sovereign of Europe who, at the time of the for ever deplorable catastrophe of Louis XVI, gave active proofs of interest in this unfortunate prince."¹ This attitude of Charles IV evoked a declaration of war on the part of the Convention (March 7, 1793). Two years of war, however, only showed that bravery and ardour could not compensate for inefficiency in high places. Manuel Godoy, Lieutenant-General of the Spanish armies, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was no man to conduct a grand national war. The French, although unable to concentrate anything like their full strength on the Spanish campaigns, gradually turned the tide of success against the Spaniards ; and on July 22, 1795, after long negotiations, peace was signed at Bâle.² As a whole the terms of the Peace of Bâle were not unfavourable. France restored all the conquests which she had made from the Spanish (art. 4). Spain, in return, ceded her portion of Saint Domingo (art. 9). The French Government agreed to accept the good offices of the amiable Charles IV with the view of his arranging a general pacification

¹ De Pradt, *Mémoires historiques sur la Révolution d'Espagne* (1816), p. 1.

² Signed by Barthélemy for France and Yriarte for Spain. De Clercq, I, 245.

between France and the Coalition Powers (art. 16). Godoy, who "from the depths of the palace"¹ had directed the operations both of war and peace, received from the grateful king the title of Prince of the Peace.

"From the reconciliation of the two countries to an alliance between them, there was only one step."² It is difficult to explain this remarkable *volte-face* on the part of the Spanish Government. Absolute monarchies directed by favourites are notoriously inconstant and subject to sudden reversals and aberrations of policy. "The cabinet of Madrid," it is said, "flattered itself that it could untie the knot which it had been unable to cut, and triumph by secret manœuvres over the Power which had conquered it. It is here that one must look for the true explanation of the *liaison* which subjected, rather than united, Spain to France."³

If the Prince of Peace thought by guile to turn the French Government round his finger, he was to be sadly undeceived. The French Government had a deliberate design to employ the resources of Spain in the warlike adventures of France.⁴ For ten years after the treaty of 1795, Spanish soldiers, and more especially the Spanish navy, were to be sacrificed in vain conflicts on behalf of France: and when the Spanish people at last threw off the shackles of the French alliance, Spain had practically lost her colonial empire, and the Spanish navy was at the bottom of the Atlantic.

On August 19, 1796, Godoy, Prince of Peace, for Spain, and General Pérignon, ambassador at Madrid, for France, signed the First Treaty of San Ildefonso. Article 1 was: "There shall exist in perpetuity an offensive and defensive alliance between the French Republic and the King of Spain." Each Power, "without reserve or exception," guaranteed the territories of the other; and

¹ De Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Godoy was believed to be the paramour of the Queen, Maria Luisa of Parma.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ De Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 5. It is stated specifically by De Pradt that Godoy aspired to influence certain members of the French Directory to accept the second son of Charles IV as King of France: "the name of the negotiator is known, the time of his sojourn at Paris, and the way in which he was refused" (*ibid.*, p. 6, note).

⁴ See Bruix, Minister of Marine, to Directory, February 27, 1799. Bruix says that the war with Turkey has rendered communication with Egypt dangerous. "To avoid this inconvenience, I propose to invite the Court of Spain to allow these expeditions henceforth to be made under the Spanish flag." The context shows that he meant Spanish sailors and Spanish ships to be used as well as the flag (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687).

if, "on whatever pretext," one of the two States was menaced, the other would be obliged to assist it with good offices, and, "on request," with fifteen vessels of the line, six frigates, and forty corvettes; also with twenty-four thousand troops.¹ The alliance really was a complete subjection of Spanish forces to the needs of France:

These succours shall be put entirely at the disposition of the Power demanding support, which shall be able to leave them in the ports or the territory of the other Power, or to employ them on expeditions which she shall judge suitable to undertake without being held to account for the motives which have determined her (art. 7).

The disgraceful pact was kept secret until October 7 (1796), when it was published in a royal manifesto. Not even in the bad days of Charles II had Spanish diplomacy been so disgraced.² The result of the alliance was quickly seen. Spain joined in the war against England; and on February 14, 1797, a Spanish fleet of twenty-five ships was defeated, with the loss of four of their number, by Admiral Jervis, off Cape St. Vincent. The Spanish colony of Trinidad also fell to the British arms. The territories of the Duke of Parma, brother-in-law of Charles IV, had already been occupied by General Bonaparte in the Italian campaign of 1796. All these events, combined with the now unpopular memory of the Peace of Bâle, occasioned so much public indignation against Godoy that at last, in March, 1798, he had to retire from his position as Minister. Yet he retained some influence still at Court.³

While Bonaparte was in Egypt, and fortune frowning on the operations of the Directory in Italy, the Spanish Government recovered some of its natural independence of spirit. But the return of Bonaparte, and his sudden elevation to be First Consul, soon restored the preponderance of France at Madrid. The First Consul sent General Berthier as ambassador to Madrid, and gave to Charles IV and the Prince of Peace the significant present of some costly weapons. Poor Charles IV hastily sent in return sixteen of his fine horses, and ordered the painting of two portraits of Bonaparte by David.⁴ He had to be careful too to see that the

¹ Arts. 2, 3 and 5. De Clercq, I, 288.

² Baumgarten, *Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der französischen Revolution* (1865), Theil I, p. 75.

³ Baumgarten, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 94-6.

⁴ Baumgarten, *op. cit.*, I, 100-1; Lafuente, *Historia General de España* (1859), t. XXII, p. 284.

Spanish servants who took the horses to France did not wear the Royal livery, because that was the same as was worn under Louis XVI.¹ On October 1, 1800, the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso was signed.² It was a secret treaty, and in nowise creditable to Spain. Article 1 was a concession to Charles IV: it stipulated that the French Republic would obtain for the Duke of Parma, brother-in-law of Charles, an aggrandisement of territory, which should bring his estates to over one million inhabitants. He was also to have the title of King. Article 2 proposed that this aggrandisement should consist of Tuscany (to be called Etruria). In return for this concession, which was scarcely of value to Spain,³ the Spanish Government was to cede Louisiana to France (art. 3); and also to hand over six ships of war in good condition, each with seventy-four cannon (art. 5).

Thus Spain was bound more firmly than ever to the chariot-wheels of France. Bonaparte had also laid the first (and, as it proved, practically the last) course in the great colonial edifice that he was planning. He had, too, started on his career of king-making (with the King of Etruria), regardless of the fact that this was a somewhat curious policy for a Republican magistrate to put into practice.

That he meant Spain to do his bidding was soon seen by his attitude towards Urquijo, the same Minister who had just finished signing the Treaty of San Ildefonso. Urquijo sent through the Spanish ambassador in Paris a pressing, even peremptory, demand for the return of the Spanish warships which for some years now had been rotting in Brest, waiting to co-operate in a French expedition. Bonaparte's reply was to send his brother Lucien to Spain, to demand the dismissal of Urquijo. The unfortunate Minister, with the approval of Godoy, it is said,⁴ sent a dispatch to Paris expressing the King's surprise at the *démarche* of the First Consul, and demanding the recall of Lucien. Bonaparte had one of his

¹ Talleyrand to Bonaparte, April 30, 1800, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1706².

² De Clercq, I, 411. The treaty was signed by Berthier, and by Urquijo, the Minister who had succeeded to the portfolio of Godoy.

³ The only tangible gain to Spain was that she would be relieved from having to pay the pension which was due annually to the Duke of Parma. Previously to the Revolution France and Spain had shared the charge of this pension. Since the Revolution, the Spanish Government had borne the whole charge. De Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 11, note 2.

⁴ Baumgarten, *op. cit.*, I, 102.

explosions of anger when he received this message, and at once sent off a courier, with peremptory orders to Lucien to continue with his mission. Lucien was travelling slowly over the execrable Spanish roads on his way to the capital. The courier overtook him at Vittoria. He at once left his suite and baggage, and with one attendant rode post-haste to the Escorial, where the Spanish court then was. Soon afterwards Urquijo was dismissed from office, and was confined in the citadel of Pamplona ¹ (November, 1800). Thus was Godoy restored to full power.

The next result of Lucien's embassy, after the retirement of Urquijo, was a treaty of alliance between Spain and France with the specific object of making war upon Portugal. This small State had hitherto stood by the English alliance, and had refused to sign a treaty of alliance with the French in 1797. Bonaparte could not get at Portugal by sea, because of the British fleet: so he had to send troops by way of Spain. Accordingly Charles IV of Spain concluded a treaty with Bonaparte on January 29, 1801, stating in the preamble that "war resolves all political problems." The King bound himself to present "the ultimatum of his pacific intentions" to Portugal, and to fix a term of fifteen days for the final answer. If Portugal agreed to accept peace, one-fourth of her territory would be taken away and given as an indemnity to Spain. The Portuguese ports would also have to be opened to French ships, and closed to British. If these terms were refused, France would provide 15,000-20,000 troops, as the strength of the Spanish forces alone was "not sufficient to accelerate this enterprise." Care was to be taken by the First Consul that the French officers sent were such as were "capable of adapting themselves to the customs of the peoples among whom they would be moving and of making themselves loved." On Portugal's refusal of the Spanish terms, she was to be treated as a conquered province.²

By the time this treaty was completed through Bonaparte's ratification, the Peace of Lunéville had been concluded (February 9, 1801); and the First Consul was more free to pursue his Spanish policy. By article 5 of the Treaty of Lunéville, the Grand Duke

¹ Baumgarten, *op. cit.*, I, 102. Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 296-7.

² The preliminary treaty of January 29, 1801 (9 Pluviose) was signed at Madrid by Lucien Bonaparte and Cevallos, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a cousin of Godoy's. This treaty was amplified by the Ratification of the First Consul, which was quite a treaty by itself (although only unilateral), on February 17, 1801. De Clercq, I, 420-24.

of Tuscany (who was a Habsburg) renounced his hereditary territories in favour of the Duke of Parma. This condition was implemented by a treaty signed at Aranjuez on March 21, 1801, by Lucien Bonaparte and Godoy. The Duke of Parma renounced his hereditary territories in perpetuity in favour of the French Republic. The son of the Duke of Parma was (instead of his father) to become sovereign of Tuscany with the title of *king*, but France was to retain the Tuscan part of the Island of Elba (arts. 3, 4, 5). On failure of the line of the King of Tuscany (or Etruria), the kingdom was to revert to the Crown of Spain (art. 7). The treaty reiterated that the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France would now be carried into effect (art. 6).¹

The Franco-Spanish military alliance speedily produced (May-June, 1801) an invasion of Portugal by Godoy, as Generalissimo for Charles IV. The Portuguese frontier fortresses were captured, and the Government was compelled to sign at Badajoz a treaty, by which it agreed to close its ports to the English, and to cede the fortress of Olivenza to Spain. In return Charles IV guaranteed the integrity of Portugal.² Lucien Bonaparte signed a similar treaty with Portugal, on the same day, and at the same place.³ The terms of this Treaty of Badajoz were much more favourable to Portugal than the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Alliance had specified. Accordingly Bonaparte refused his approval of it. The easy campaign against Portugal (in which a French corps under Leclerc had taken part) led Bonaparte, as always, to go on and on exploiting his success: and in his anger at Charles IV he even hinted to the Spanish ambassador Azara that the Spanish Bourbons might be put off the throne, like their kinsmen of France and Parma.⁴ Here perhaps is the actual origin of the Peninsular design of Bonaparte, which was in the end to destroy his Empire.

The Spanish Government had to bow to the storm and to suppress the Treaty of Badajoz. The same fate met the parallel treaty which Lucien Bonaparte had signed with the Portuguese Minister, Pinto de Sousa, at Badajoz on June 6. Portugal had to accept new terms in a treaty with France, concluded on September 29,

¹ De Clercq, I, 431.

² Treaty signed on June 6, 1801, by Godoy for Spain and by Luis Pinto de Sousa for Portugal. Ratification of Charles IV given on July 6, 1801. Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 319.

³ De Clercq, I, 435.

⁴ Baumgarten, *op. cit.*, I, 106.

1801.¹ This treaty stipulated that Portuguese ports in Europe were to be closed to all kinds of English ships and open to all French ships. Portugal ceded a portion of Guiana, a concession which enabled Bonaparte to hope that he would at last be able, in French Guiana thus enlarged, "really to found an interesting colony."² In commercial affairs France was to have the same treatment as was accorded by Portugal to the most favoured nation. An additional article secured an indemnity of twenty million *livres tournois* to France. Also Spain was allowed by Bonaparte to retain the small gain she had made by the Treaty of Badajos. But to punish her, Bonaparte resolved to let the English keep the Spanish island of Trinidad,³ in return, of course, for a concession to France. Thus it was that when Bonaparte made the long-wished-for Peace of Amiens with Great Britain, on March 27, 1802, it was made at the expense of Spain, which lost Trinidad, as well as of the Dutch, who lost Ceylon.⁴

Meanwhile for a time Bonaparte ceased to trouble about Spain. At the end of 1801 he had withdrawn his troops from the Peninsula. French and Spanish policy now only touched over the question of Louisiana.

Louisiana was a magnificent domain; its cession to France by Spain in 1800 was like a restoration of the grand colonial empire of the eighteenth century. But between formal cession by treaty and actual delivery there is a great difference. The Spanish Government regretted the cession, and put off the delivery, in spite of Bonaparte's protests.⁵ But for France to take possession of Louisiana while still at war with England would be merely to present a priceless prize to the enemy. The cessation of hostilities with England in October, 1801, had given the First Consul the chance of sending an expedition peacefully to occupy Louisiana.

¹ Signed at Madrid by Lucien Bonaparte and Cyprian Ribiero Freise (De Clercq, I, 455).

² Exposition of motives to the Corps Législatif, accompanying the copy of the treaty (De Clercq, I, 463).

³ "The Cabinet of Madrid ratified separately the Treaty of Badajoz, and thus made a sacrifice of Trinidad" (*Exposé des motifs*, De Clercq, I, 461).

⁴ See above, p. 101. The Treaty of Peace between Spain and the Batavian Republic on the one hand, and Great Britain on the other, was signed, like the Franco-British Treaty of Amiens, at Amiens on March 27, 1802 (De Clercq, I, 484).

⁵ First Consul to Lucien Bonaparte, Ambassador at Madrid, December 1, 1801, in Lecestre, *Lettres inédites de Napoleon I* (1897), I, 35.

In November, 1801, Leclerc's celebrated expeditionary force had sailed for Saint Domingo, really with the object, after making a secure base there, of taking over Louisiana. Leclerc, however, got no further than Saint Domingo; he was detained by a revolt of the negroes, and died of fever on November 2, 1802.

Still Bonaparte naturally expected the Spanish Government to hand over Louisiana. To quench their scruples he even engaged never to cede Louisiana to a third Power.¹ However Spain still kept the Province. Meanwhile Jefferson, the President of the United States, had gained knowledge of the proposed transfer of Louisiana, and had made up his mind that this meant war with France.² He therefore, in January, 1803, sent James Monroe (the future President) as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to act with the regular American Minister at Paris. Monroe was authorised to open negotiations for the purchase of as much of Louisiana (the east bank of the Mississippi and the island of New Orleans) as would make the United States safe. Talleyrand still believed in the French colonial empire, and was against selling. But when Livingston got into touch with the First Consul directly, he received warm encouragement. The First Consul was ready to sell not merely a part, but the whole of Louisiana (April 11, 1803).³ It was while the negotiation was in this condition that Monroe arrived in Paris (April 12).

The negotiation was soon completed. On April 30, 1803, the Treaty of Cession was signed at Paris by Barbé-Marbois (Minister of the Treasury) for France and Monroe and Livingston for the United States. By article 2, the First Consul in the name of the French Republic ceded to the United States the territory of Louisiana, in the same manner as he had acquired it from Spain.⁴ A separate Convention, bearing the same date as the main treaty, bound the United States to pay sixty million francs. For fifteen months the United States Government was to pay six per centum on the sixty-

¹ See Note of French Ambassador at Madrid (M. de St. Cyr) to Spanish Minister of State, July 22, 1802, printed in J. A. Robertson, *Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France and the United States* (1911), II, 77-8.

² Jefferson to Livingston, Minister in Paris, April 8, 1802 (McMaster, *History of the People of the United States* [1903], II, 620). Rumours of the cession made by the Treaty of San Ildefonso reached America in the spring of 1801 (Winsor, *History of America* [1888], VII, 478).

³ McMaster, *op. cit.*, II, 627.

⁴ De Clercq, II, 59-62.

million francs (11,250,000 dollars); after fifteen months ¹ from the exchange of ratifications payment of the principal was to begin at the rate of not less than three million dollars a year.

The Spanish Government had reluctantly to accede to the terms of the Franco-American Treaty.² It was not until November 30, 1803, that the French Commissioner Laussat received possession of Louisiana from the last Spanish Governor.³ The Commissioner forthwith notified the American Commissioners, William C. C. Claiborne and James Wilkinson, who were waiting at Fort Adams for the message. They immediately took ship and peacefully received the transfer. On December 20 the standard of the United States was unfurled at New Orleans.

¹ Not fifteen *years*, which is the time stated in McMaster, *op. cit.*, II, 627. The dollar is called the *piastre* in the treaty. Its value was fixed, for the purposes of the treaty, at five francs eight sous (art. 3).

² Talleyrand to First Consul, January 17, 1804, in Bertrand, *Lettres inédites de Talleyrand*, pp. 85-6. The *reluctance* to accede can be seen from the highly interesting correspondence between Casa Irujo (Spanish Minister to the United States) and Cevallos, July 24, 1803, to June 12, 1804, and printed in Robertson, *op. cit.*, II, 67-219.

³ Laussat to the American Commissioners, November 30, 1803, *ibid.*, II, 219.

CHAPTER XV

PRESBURG

The Third Coalition had long been germinating ; and Napoleon's diplomacy, on the whole, seemed to accelerate its growth rather than retard it, although he was now, as always, trying for alliance with Austria.¹ Pitt, who had again become Prime Minister after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, was incessant in his efforts to re-energise Europe against the ever-advancing frontiers of Napoleon. On April 11, 1805, Pitt's efforts came to success : a treaty of alliance was signed by Lord Granville Leveson for Great Britain, and by Prince Adam Czartorisky and M. Novosiltzoff for Russia. The two Powers bound themselves to wage war against Napoleon, and to endeavour to raise a general league against him ; the aims of the allies were to be the evacuation of Hanover by France, the evacuation of Switzerland and Holland, the restoration of the King of Sardinia, and the establishment in Europe of an order of things which would present a barrier against future usurpations.² These aims were moderate, particularly in not stipulating for the return of the Bourbons. On August 9 the Emperor Francis, acting through Count Stadion, his patriotic and energetic ambassador at St. Petersburg, acceded to the treaty. The British Government by a special Convention agreed to subsidise Austria with money. Sweden also acceded, and was granted a subsidy. Thus the Third Coalition was practically completed, for Prussia never joined it.

The Third Coalition was the last grand work of Pitt. And just when the life of the great Englishman was drawing to an end, another powerful (though much less constant or honest) opponent of Napoleon was coming to the fore. This was Metternich. He

¹ When Champagny went as ambassador to Vienna in 1801, the Instructions which Talleyrand gave him (August 15) drew his attention to the correspondence of all the previous ambassadors at the Court of Vienna since 1756—the period of the Habsburg-Bourbon Alliance (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 371).

² Stanhope, *Pitt*, IV, 305.

had acquitted himself creditably at the Dresden Embassy. His father had recently received (by the Imperial Recess of 1803) the secularised Abbey of Ochsenhausen, in compensation for the loss of his "immediate" fiefs on the left bank of the Rhine, and had been raised to the rank of prince by the Emperor, in order to increase the number of *virile voices* in the now attenuated Diet. In December, 1804, the young Metternich was sent as Austrian ambassador to Berlin.

Berlin, at the moment, was really the centre of European diplomacy, because Prussia was the last great neutral State left in Europe, the last potential ally to be gained. Here Metternich met the experienced Laforest, the aged but still vivacious and active Alopeus (Russian ambassador), and the English diplomatist, Francis James Jackson, with his lively young brother, George Jackson.¹

The grand army of Napoleon at Boulogne provided the excitement of the day: "the majority of prophets considered the preparations of the camp of Boulogne as presaging a descent upon England; some better instructed observers saw there the concentration of a French army getting ready to pass the Rhine, and this opinion was also mine."² So says Metternich, who has a habit in his Memoirs of assuming the omniscience which perhaps really comes of being wise after the event.

Napoleon did, for a time at any rate, give up his idea of invading England. By September 27, his armies were marching towards the Danube. On October 6, the Russian Ambassador, and Prince Dolgorouki, a special envoy from the Tsar, delivered to the King of Prussia, at Potsdam, a letter from Alexander himself, pressing for the opening of the Prussian frontier to the passage of Russian troops. But Frederick William III only protested his "unbreakable resolution" to be neutral.³ He dismissed the two diplomatists.

Yet scarcely had Alopeus and Dolgorouki returned to Berlin than they were caught up by Hardenberg, bearing a letter to the

¹ George Jackson was unpaid attaché to his brother. The British embassy rented, for £300 a year, a wing of the Palace of Mme de Lichtenau, *Unter den Linden*. The centre of the palace was occupied by an English tourist, Mr. Rose, with his family and his eighteen servants. See *Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson*, I, 103-9.

² *Mémoires*, I, 38. George Jackson notes that Metternich was "at considerable pains to cultivate an intimacy with M. Laforest [French Ambassador]." Jackson, *op. cit.*, I, 226.

³ Metternich, *op. cit.*, I, 44.

effect that Frederick William would accede to the Tsar's proposals. The reason for this sudden change was that Frederick William had received startling news: Napoleon, with his habitual contempt for the law of nations, and for the susceptibilities of people, had sent twenty thousand French troops, marching towards Neuburg on the Danube, through the Prussian territory of Ansbach.¹ As they passed the French troops requisitioned provisions, without payment (Oct. 3, 1805). The news caused a "movement of anger" in the King's breast; and although Duroc and Laforest, the French diplomatists, were allowed to remain at Berlin, Hardenberg was able to inform Metternich, on October 15, that the King had passed to the Austrian side with all his military forces.²

Alexander (who was in Poland), on receiving news of the King's change of attitude, at once set out for the Prussian Court. He arrived at Berlin on October 25, and was greeted by the whole populace with joy.³ On November 3, the Convention of Potsdam was made. The terms were that Prussia was to offer armed mediation to Napoleon, on the basis of the Treaty of Lunéville, with an indemnity to the King of Sardinia, and an extension of Austrian territory in North Italy. In a secret article, the Emperor of Russia promised to use his good offices to gain Hanover from the King of Great Britain for Prussia. After the signature of the Convention, Alexander and Frederick William testified to their union by shaking hands and embracing: but Hardenberg could not feel any ground for confidence in the aspect of the King's face.⁴ Yet it was currently believed that, to strengthen their pact, the two monarchs had gone down into the vault at Potsdam and had sworn unbreakable friendship at the tomb of Frederick the Great.⁵

Haugwitz, who was the advocator and possibly the inventor of the "system of neutrality," could not help drafting the treaty, but at the same time he secured the task of delivering it to Napoleon.

¹ This was not a *casus fœderis* according to a Declaration of May 24, 1804, made by Russia and Prussia, which stated: "The *casus fœderis* will come into effect at the first enterprise of the French against a State of the Empire situated on the right bank of the Weser" (Sorel, VI, 461).

² Metternich to Colloredo, October 15, 1805, in *Mémoires*, II, 55; see also II, 52, 54, and I, 44. Napoleon, at St. Helena, said that Frederick William III never forgave him for the violation of Ansbach. Las Casas, *op. cit.*, II, partie IV, p. 229.

³ Ranke, *Denkwürdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Hardenberg* (1877), II, 305.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 317.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 335.

By this time the Austrian General Mack had capitulated at Ulm (October 20); and on November 13 the French army (which was strengthened by Wurtemberger, Bavarian, Badener and Darmstadter forces) had entered Vienna. Hither then Haugwitz, having deferred his departure for eight days,¹ went to deliver the contents of the Treaty of November 3 to Napoleon. But when he got to Vienna, the Emperor of the French had departed. So Haugwitz went off to the French headquarters at Brünn to find him: "but instead of fulfilling the mission that had been confided to him, he gave to his action (*démarche*) the character of a simple act of courtesy on the part of the King, his master."² On November 28, the two statesmen had an interview at Brünn. Haugwitz went so far as to propose his royal master's mediation.³ To this Napoleon appeared to consent, on condition that no troops, whether Russian, Hanoverian or Swedish, should cross the Dutch frontier. It was as if Napoleon had divined the arrangements being made between the Prussian and British Governments for an expedition into Holland.⁴ Without coming to any decision, Napoleon induced Haugwitz to go back to Vienna, to confer with Talleyrand, the *Ministre des Relations extérieures*. The truth is that a grand battle was imminent. "There will probably be a very serious battle with the Russians to-morrow," wrote Napoleon,⁵ and he, not unreasonably, wished to see the result of this, before he should decide on his attitude towards Prussia. On December 2, the battle of Austerlitz took place, and the Austro-Russian armies were shattered. Haugwitz, when next he met Napoleon (at Vienna on December 14), congratulated him on the victory. Napoleon dryly asked him if, supposing the battle had gone otherwise, he would still have spoken of the friendship of the king, his master.⁶

The battle of Austerlitz brought about the end of the Third

¹ Metternich, *op. cit.*, I, 46.

² Metternich, *op. cit.*, I, 47.

³ Friedrich Wilhelm III to Alexander I, December 10, 1805, in *Briefwechsel König Friedrich Wilhelms III und der Königin Luise mit Kaiser Alexander I* (Publicationen aus den K. Preussischen Staatsarchiven, 1900, Band 75), p. 90. See also Napoleon to Talleyrand, November 30, 1805 (*Corr.*, No. 9532).

⁴ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 501.

⁵ To Talleyrand, November 30, 1805 (*Corr.*, No. 9532).

⁶ Metternich, *op. cit.*, I, 47; see also II, 93, M. to Stadion: "It is without doubt that war had been decided on [by Prussia] but for the day of December 2" [i.e. Austerlitz].

Coalition. Great Britain, indeed, did not abandon the contest, although Pitt died on January 23, 1806, and was succeeded by a less determined Ministry, with Fox as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Fox actually opened negotiations, which came to nothing. Meanwhile Napoleon was thinking out his continental policy. His great aim, undoubtedly, was to impose peace upon Great Britain, to force the British Government to acquiesce in his "system."¹ With the British Isles themselves he could do nothing. The battle of Trafalgar (October 21, 1805) had settled that. Napoleon could not rule over the sea; but he might oppose command of the land, of the Continent of Europe, to command of the sea. His victory at Austerlitz gave him the opportunity for doing this.

For controlling the Continent, different policies were proposed. Some of Napoleon's counsellors advocated alliance with Prussia. Napoleon himself rather inclined towards this: he thought it worth while at least to confer an obligation upon Prussia, and at the same time to sow bitter dissension between her and Great Britain, by giving Hanover to Prussia. Hanover, the Electorate of George III, had been occupied by French troops since June, 1803; Napoleon now, by a treaty concluded with Haugwitz at Vienna on December 15, gave it to Prussia.² But the friendship of Napoleon and Prussia was of the kind which Aristotle characterises as "watery": it was a thin and unstable element.

Talleyrand was the advocate of another policy, an anticipation of that which Bismarck was so successfully to carry out after the Prussian victory over the Austrians at Sadowa sixty years later. This plan of Talleyrand, who seems generally to have tried to make Napoleon's diplomacy conform to that of the *Ancien Régime*, was to treat Austria lightly,³ and to form an alliance with her. This

¹ Cp. Bonaparte's message to Frederick William of Prussia, March, 1803: "For fifteen years I have made war against England, for fifteen more I am ready to continue the contest; but I wish for peace" (Jackson, *op. cit.*, I, 132). See also Minute by Bonaparte, December 26, 1795, in which he says that unless France can afford money to build a great fleet, "it is necessary *really* (sic) to renounce any expedition against England" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687).

² De Clercq, II, 143. This treaty was not ratified by the King of Prussia. A somewhat similar treaty, however, permitting Prussia to take possession of Hanover, was signed by Haugwitz and Duroc at Paris two months later, February, 15, 1806 (De Clercq, II, 143).

³ Talleyrand to Napoleon, December 5, 1805: "Your Majesty can now break the Austrian Monarchy or restore it. . . . The existence of that mass is necessary to the future safety of the civilised nations" (*Revue Historique*, XXXIX, quoted by Manteneyer, *L'Offre de Paix séparée de l'Autriche*, Paris,

would be a return to the system of Bernis, of Choiseul, of Vergennes, the sagacious Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the period 1756-89. Even before the battle of Austerlitz, before the capitulation of Ulm, he had drafted a Memorandum (October 17, 1805) pointing out how Austria might be separated from Great Britain, put in opposition to Russia, and reconciled to France. This was to be done by attributing Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and part of Bulgaria to her, in exchange for Venetia, Tyrol and Suabia. In a word, Talleyrand was an advocate of the Austrian, as against the Russian alliance, towards which he saw Napoleon moving.¹

Napoleon would have none of this scheme. "The Emperor," he had written in Bulletin of the Grand Army, No. XXIV (November 15, 1805), issued at Vienna, "is working in the Cabinet of Maria Theresa."² This idea appealed to his pride and his imagination, and he was not going to make any concession to the pride of the Habsburgs.

He was ready enough to make peace (not indeed such a mild peace as he would have granted *before* Austerlitz),³ for his situation was still dangerous. His army was "weakened by its victories," and was in "a very precarious position, lying as it did between the fortress of Olmütz (any siege of which, during winter, with the enemy's army close by, was out of the question), and the hostile population of Vienna, who were hard to hold."⁴ Communications with France were insecure; Russia, whose tremendous military resources remained almost intact in spite of the defeat of Austerlitz, might advance again; and although Prussia had signed, she had not ratified, a treaty with Napoleon.

Negotiations, which had begun between Talleyrand and Stadion before Austerlitz, proceeded more rapidly after the battle. It

1920: p. 392). Cp. Napoleon's conversation with Metternich, August 15, 1808: "the Emperor, in the presence of the diplomatic corps, protested that he had never ceased to desire friendship with Austria" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

¹ Sorel, *op. cit.*, VI, 489-90. The Memorandum is in Bertrand, *Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoleon* (1889), pp. 156-72. Cp. Talleyrand, *Mémoires* (1891), I, 296-7.

² *Corr.*, No. 9496.

³ Napoleon, *before* the battle of Austerlitz, would have made peace gladly with Austria on very easy terms—e.g. allowing Venice to remain under Habsburg rule, not indeed the rule of the Emperor Francis, but of his brother the Elector of Salzburg (to Talleyrand, November 30, 1805, in *Corr.*, No. 9523).

⁴ Napoleon's conversation later with Montgelas, the Bavarian statesman, quoted by Fournier, *Napoleon I* (trans. 1911), vol. I, p. 388, note.

has been said that Napoleon in a personal interview (at which the armistice was arranged) with the Emperor had softened before the entreaties of Francis, and had agreed not to demand Venice.¹ Yet Napoleon's correspondence with his Foreign Minister reveals no such intention. "Tell M. Stadion," he writes, "that the battle being lost, the conditions can no longer be the same."² This was a sufficiently plain statement to satisfy any diplomatist.

Stadion soon ceased to be a plenipotentiary, on his being made Chancellor in place of Cobenzl who still resolutely led the war-party.³ Until December 19 the negotiations were conducted at Brünn between Talleyrand for France, and Gyulai and Prince John of Liechtenstein for Austria. They were then transferred to Presburg, where they proceeded rather more quickly. Napoleon meanwhile kept his quarters in the Imperial Château of Schoenbrunn at Vienna.

The delays all came from the Austrian side. Napoleon knew that his position was not very secure, and he did not wish the Austrians to divine this fact. At the same time he found it a little difficult to avoid acceding to requests for personal meetings. The Archduke Charles was both a highly placed prince and also a fine soldier. He desired an interview with Napoleon, who fixed a meeting for December 27, and wrote to Talleyrand to try and get the treaty signed before that.⁴ If Talleyrand could not arrange for the signing at once, he was to put it off till January 1, but no longer. On that date the Republican calendar was to be replaced by the Gregorian: "I have a few prejudices," wrote Napoleon, "and I shall be very glad if the peace dates from the renewal of the Gregorian calendar, which presages, I hope, as much happiness to my reign as it did to the *ancien régime*."⁵ He could afford, he thought, to defer the conclusion of the treaty until the New Year, because the interview with the Archduke Charles would occur too late (December 27) to influence the negotiations; moreover, Napoleon would avoid questions of policy with the Archduke: "at the

¹ The statement is made by Fournier, *op. cit.*, I, 385. The interview took place at Nasiedlowitz on December 4.

² To Talleyrand, December 3, 1805, in *Corr.*, No. 9540.

³ The Document appointing Stadion as Chancellor is dated December 24, 1805 (text in Beer, *Zehn Jahre österreichischer Politik*), but no doubt he had been given the confidence of the Emperor Francis before the change was announced.

⁴ December 23, 1805, *Corr.*, No. 9613.

⁵ *Ibid.*

rendezvous which I have appointed, I shall spend two hours ; one will be taken up with dinner, the other in talking about war, and in exchanging reciprocal protestations.”¹ Napoleon knew well, when occasion required, how to play the part of the simple soldier, chivalrously complimenting his defeated adversary, and receiving compliments.

The signing of the treaty did not need to be put off. Actually while Napoleon was writing to him, Talleyrand appears to have induced the Austrian plenipotentiaries to conclude. The Treaty of Presburg was signed on December 26, 1805, by Talleyrand on the one part and Liechtenstein and Gyulai on the other.

The conditions of the treaty were serious for Austria, who had to cede the gains made at Campo Formio and confirmed at Lunéville—that is to say, she lost the Venetian territory, not merely on the Italian mainland, but on the other side of the Adriatic (Istria and Dalmatia).² The Emperor of Austria recognised Napoleon as King of Italy ; it was agreed, however, that the Crowns of France and Italy should be separated at a later date “when the Powers named in that Declaration [Declaration made when Napoleon first became King of Italy] shall have fulfilled the conditions expressed in it” (art. 5). The Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, allies of France, were recognised as Kings, according to certain agreements which Napoleon had made with them (art. 7). At the same time the Emperor of Austria renounced large and valuable German territories of his own, in favour of the two new kings. Bavaria received (among other places) the remaining part of the territory of Passau,³ Tyrol, Brixen, Trent and the Vorarlberg. Wurtemberg was to get five small towns on the Danube (Ehingen, Munderkingen, Riedlingen, Mengen, and Sulgaw), the Landgraviate of Nellenberg, part of the Breisgau, and other places. The Elector of Baden got the rest of the Breisgau and the city of Constance (art. 8). These gains were scientifically marked out to consolidate the frontiers of the two new kingdoms, and except with regard to Tyrol, probably did not violate any national sentiment.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Article 4 of Treaty of Presburg, in De Clercq, II, 147.

³ By the *Imperial Recess* of 1803, the Archduke, formerly Grand Duke of Tuscany, was given in addition to Salzburg the portion of the Bishopric of Passau, situated beyond the Itz and the Inn, on the side of Austria (*Recess* in Martens, *Recueil*, VII, 435). This was in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Lunéville (*see* above, p. 76).

A small compensation was made to the Emperor of Austria, who was allowed to take over Salzburg and Berchtesgaden from his brother the Archduke Ferdinand, former Grand Duke of Tuscany (art. 10) : and the Archduke was to be indemnified by getting from Bavaria the Principality of Wurzburg, which had been secularised by the Imperial Recess of 1803 (art. 11). But for this too there was to be compensation : the King of Bavaria was to be allowed to occupy the Free Imperial City of Augsburg (art. 13).

The integrity of the truncated Empire of Austria was (rather ignominiously for Austria) guaranteed by Napoleon (art. 17). By a separate article, the Emperor of Austria, "in redemption of all contributions imposed upon his diverse hereditary States occupied by the French army and not yet collected," agreed to pay 40,000,000 francs (gold value) ; of this sum, eight millions were to be disbursed at the ratification of the treaty (which took place on January 1), and the rest would be handed over in bills of exchange on Hamburg, Amsterdam, Augsburg, Frankfort, Bâle, or Paris, payable at fixed dates (chiefly two millions every two months). Miot de Melito's comment on the treaty was : "Never had victor imposed harder conditions on the vanquished."¹ The terms may have been hard, but they were nothing to those that Prussia was to accept six months later.

One thing is clear. Just as the Treaty of Lunéville had destroyed Austria's predominance in Germany, so the Treaty of Presburg destroyed all chance of Austria dominating the Adriatic. This had been the aim of the Directory at the time of making the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797 : they had wanted then to retain Preveza, Arta and Cattaro, in order to prevent Austria from becoming "mistress of the Adriatic."² In 1797, however, Bonaparte had gone his own way and had made a different sort of peace : but now, in 1805 at Presburg, he tried to rectify this, by acquiring Dalmatia through the Treaty of Presburg.

¹ *Memoirs* (trans. 1881), II, 150.

² *Ministre des Relations extérieures* to Bonaparte and Clarke, les 5 jour complémentaires à l'an 5 (Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 367).

CHAPTER XVI

THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE

The changes brought about by Napoleon in Germany greatly simplified the political map of that country, and helped onward (and perhaps alone made possible) the progress of Germany in the nineteenth century. In place of many of the little States, with their sleepy, stationary society, he substituted larger bodies. Enclaves and detached fragments of States were exchanged and consolidated; and State territory was arranged according to reason and not accident. Napoleon's orderly mind took pleasure in reducing to a reasonable system the confused morcellation of political Germany, and wiping away what Talleyrand called the *dust of sovereigns* there.¹ But it is doubtful if his immediate or essential object was to produce order and system; he was apt to deal with situations as they arose. In 1802-3, and again in 1805-6, it suited the military situation of France to aggrandise the medium-sized German States, to suppress the tiny insignificant States, and especially to decrease the weight of the two great States, Prussia and Austria.²

The reorganisation of Germany in 1805-6 had two distinct parts: the first was the increasing of the extent of the medium-sized States which annexed the little States. This merely completed the work done in 1802-3: at that time the ecclesiastical States (along with most of the Free Imperial Cities) were suppressed.

¹ The Memorandum of 1803 called *Maximes et bases fondamentales* does indeed say that by the changes then to be made through the agency of the French Government in Germany, "we have the advantage of not forgetting the interests of the peoples. We shall withdraw them from that dust of sovereigns—*cette poussière de Souverains*—with which Germany is covered from one end to the other" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 722, folio 229).

² The *Maximes et bases* quoted above points out that the political confusion of the small States was their least inconvenience. They were as enemies contemptible, as allies useless, as neutrals without guarantee (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*, folio 223).

Now most of the smaller secular States were to be suppressed too. The suppression of the small secular States, and especially of the "immediate nobility," had been mentioned as decided upon by Napoleon on November 30, 1805.¹

The second part of the reorganisation of 1805-6 was the uniting of the medium-sized States of Germany into a "Confederation" protected by and depending on the French Empire. Something like this scheme had been thought out, and to some extent put into effect for a few years by Mazarin in his League of the Rhine.² But Napoleon's Confederation was something far more organised, far more systematic.

It appears first to come to light in the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz. On October 2, 1805, when the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt appeared unwilling to join him in the war, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand: "My intention is to include Darmstadt in my German Confederation."³

During the early months of the campaign Talleyrand was hard at work negotiating treaties of alliance, although Napoleon did not wait for treaties to enable him to march his troops through the territories of the South German States.

On August 24, 1805, about four days before war with Austria officially began, France, in the person of ambassador Otto, and Bavaria, in the person of Montgelas, signed a treaty of alliance at Munich. In return for the support of 20,000 Bavarian troops, Napoleon promised "to seize all occasions which present themselves to augment the power and splendour of the House of Bavaria and to procure for its States the rounding (*arrondissement*) and consistency of which they are capable" (art. 1).⁴ This treaty

¹ *Corr.*, No. 9532, Napoleon to Talleyrand, *from the camp in front of Brunn*.

² The League of the Rhine was made by treaty concluded at Mayence on August 15, 1658, between Louis XIV of France and the Electors of Mayence, Trèves, Cologne, the Bishop of Münster, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Duke of Bavaria, the King of Sweden (as Duke of Bremen and Verden), the Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg, and the Landgrave of Hesse. It was a defensive alliance for three years and was twice renewed, in 1661 and 1663. Text in Vast, *Les grands traités du règne de Louis XIV* (1893), I, 72-7.

³ *Corr.*, No. 9307. But the Directory had the idea of a Confederation of the Rhine. See *Concerning the Barrier of the Republic against Austria*, An 4 (sic): "the formation of a powerful State on the right bank of the Rhine to serve as a bulwark to France against Austria. It would also be possible to form a League of the Rhine" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 364).

⁴ De Clercq, II, 120.

(which required to be ratified) was secret, but the Austrians seem to have suspected that something of the kind had, or might soon, take place. They demanded that Maximilian Joseph should show his loyalty to the Empire by adhering to his Lord the Emperor. The unhappy Elector, urged by Otto, fled to Würzburg, but was followed, post-haste, by the Austrian ambassador. On September 9 Austrian forces crossed the Inn into his territory to put military pressure on him. This fact, coupled with the presence of Marshals Bernadotte and Marmont at Würzburg, brought decision to the mind of Maximilian Joseph (October 12, 1805). He ratified the treaty of alliance of August 24, but to save his honour the date of the instrument was changed to September 23, a date subsequent to the violation of Bavarian territory by the Austrians.¹

On September 5, Baden made an alliance with Napoleon, and agreed to contribute 3,000 soldiers. The Elector of Baden, in the preamble of the treaty, gives the curious reason for making it, that "the renewal of hostilities threatened the independence of the States of the German Empire"; therefore he joined with that Empire's enemy.² The real reason is given in a somewhat blunt note of Thiard, the French Minister to the Court of Baden; namely, that the Elector of Baden, through the support of France in 1802-3, had gained greatly in territory and had escaped "from the intolerant and capricious authority of Austria"; but that he could not retain this position unless France remained successful in war. "In these circumstances, His Majesty [Napoleon] has the right to expect from the princes whose existence depends on the issue of the war, and whose increase in power and dignity is one of its principal aims, frank and positive assistance."³ The treaty when presented in draft form to the Baden Minister Edelsheim for signature was of the nature of an ultimatum. Thiard (acting on Talleyrand's orders) would admit of no discussion of it: it must be signed or rejected.⁴ The Elector would have preferred neutrality to alliance.⁵

¹ Lefebvre, *Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe pendant le Consulat et L'Empire* (1866), II, 125-6.

² Treaty in De Clercq, II, 123, signed by Thiard and Edelsheim at Baden.

³ Erdmannsdörffer, *Politische Correspondenz Karl Friedrichs von Baden* (1901), Band V, p. 289.

⁴ Memoir of the Elector of Baden, containing his observations on the treaty (after its signature), September 5, 1805, in Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, V, 292-3. Also Thiard to Edelsheim, *ibid.*, p. 296.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

The Elector of Wurtemberg was also soon to make an alliance with France. Napoleon paid him the compliment of a personal visit at Ludwigsburg.¹

The Treaty of Alliance between France and Wurtemberg was signed on October 5, 1805, at Ludwigsburg, by Didelot and Wintzingerode. By article 1 France guaranteed the integrity and independence of Wurtemberg. In return the Elector agreed to furnish a contingent of 8,000 to 10,000 troops to Napoleon's army (art 2). Then follows a very curious stipulation :

In consequence of the impossibility in which the Elector would find himself of fulfilling in entirety his engagements with the Emperor [of the French] through the constant refusal of the Estates of Wurtemberg to support the levies of men and the expenses of the military chest, H.M. the Emperor promises to his Electoral Highness his support in order that the Estates may be led by all fit means to concur with a measure which obviously tends to the good of the country, as guaranteeing it from all hostile treatment, and sparing it from the contributions of war which would have been necessarily imposed on it.

In other words, Napoleon undertook to help the Elector, who was on very bad terms with his people, to coerce them with the brutal threat of military execution and financial exactions. The treaty also assured solid increases of territory to the Elector (arts. 9-10).²

The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz proved that Napoleon's promises to the German princes were not vain. The patriotic statesmen began to make plans for a new Germany. In November, 1805, Archbishop Dalberg drafted a Memoir to show that the small princes should be suppressed, and that a regenerated Confederation should be constituted, to stand between Austria, Prussia, and Russia.³

Reitzenstein, the Baden Minister of State, also had a project.⁴ His view was that France, after all her victories, wished only for peace, a definite peace : " no more armistices, like Campo Formio

¹ The ruler of Wurtemberg was not much trusted by Napoleon. Le Rochefoucauld, French Ambassador at Vienna in 1806, found that the Prince was again getting into touch with the Austrian Court, and establishing good relations—at the very time when the Confederation of the Rhine, with Wurtemberg in it, was being established (see " Extract from Instructions," July 23, 1806, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 379).

² Text in De Clercq, II, 126-8.

³ In Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, 358-9. The Memoir was forwarded to Talleyrand.

⁴ *Exposition des vœux de tous les bons Allemands relativement aux conditions de la paix future* (November, 1805) in Erdmannsdörffer, *op. cit.*, V, 369-75.

title of Grand Duke—article 5 (the title of King assumed by Wurtemberg and Bavaria had already been recognised in the Treaty of Presburg).¹

The affairs common to the Confederation were to be transacted in a Diet, to sit at Frankfort, and to be divided into two Colleges : the College of Kings and the College of Princes (art. 6).² The Diet was to settle all disputes between the Confederate States (art. 9). The Diet was to be presided over by the Prince Primate (art. 10). The Emperor of the French was to be proclaimed Protector of the Confederation, and on the decease of each Prince-Primate was to nominate the successor (art. 12).

A number of annexations (other than those already provided for in the Treaty of Presburg), and a number of exchanges, were made by all the Confederate Princes, to suppress *enclaves*, and to make their dominions more symmetrical. The chief annexations were Nuremberg to the King of Bavaria (art. 17), and Frankfort (art. 22), which went to the Prince-Primate. Thus two Free Imperial Cities were suppressed : Nuremberg permanently, Frankfort until 1815.

A very large number of small principalities were suppressed, and their territories annexed by the Confederate States (art. 24). The rulers of the suppressed principalities were *Mediatised*, that is, they continued to reign, but not to rule ; they preserved their patrimonial and private property, all their seigniorial and feudal rights which were not inherent in sovereignty, notably low and middle, but not high jurisdiction in civil and criminal affairs ; their domains were subject to tax by the States into which they were assimilated, and could not be sold to any State outside the Confederation ; in criminal matters the Mediatised princes could only be judged by their peers (arts. 27, 28). These Mediatised princes preserved most of their rights later in the treaties of 1815, and remained a strange class, suspended as it were between sovereigns and subjects, until the German Revolution of 1918.

¹ Talleyrand, in a Memorandum of November 26, 1805 (the date is printed wrongly as 1806—an obvious error), one of his preliminary studies for the Confederation of the Rhine, had written down the ruler of Baden, as well as the Bavarian and Wurtemberger, as King. The Baden crown, however, for some unknown reason, did not come into existence (Memoir in Erdmannsdörffler, *op. cit.*, V, 378–82).

² The Grand Dukes sat in the College of Kings. Cp. De Clercq, II, 188, Wurtzburg Treaty, art. 8.

Besides the principalities which were suppressed, the domains of the Free Imperial Knights were also absorbed by their more powerful neighbours. The Imperial Knights were devotedly attached to the Germanic Empire, which was their only protection; they usually took service either in the Austrian bureaux or the Austrian army.¹ Under the Emperor, they were little sovereigns in their little estates, and were an obvious anomaly, embedded as they were in larger and more efficient States. Since 1803 the more powerful princes had been quietly annexing the domains of the *Ritterschaft*. Article 25 of the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine declared: "each of the Confederate Kings and Princes shall possess in full sovereignty the knightly lands enclosed (*enclavées*) within their possessions." The knightage which was thus suppressed was never revived.

The value of the Confederation to France was contained not only in article 12, which made Napoleon Protector of it, but in article 35, which stated:

There shall be between the French Empire and the Confederate States of the Rhine, collectively and separately, an alliance in virtue of which every Continental war which one of the Contracting Parties shall have to sustain shall immediately become common to all the others.

Article 38 fixed the number of troops to be furnished by each of the Contracting Parties in time of war: 200,000 by France, 30,000 by Bavaria, and so on, diminishing, down to Hesse-Darmstadt, 4,000. Nassau and the remaining little princes were to join together to furnish 4,000.

By article 39, the Contracting Parties reserved the right to admit new members to the Confederation. In virtue of this article the Prince-Archbishop of Wurzburg entered the Confederation by treaty on September 25, 1806;² the Elector of Saxony (who received the title of King) by treaty of December 11, 1806;³ the various Saxon duchies—Gotha, Hildburghausen, Meiningen and

¹ Freiherr von Stein, however, had from the first chosen to enter the Prussian administrative service.

² De Clercq, II, 188.

³ *Ibid.*, 196. As king he claimed henceforth equality of etiquette with the Emperor of Austria, insisting upon the *alternative* (see above, p. 42, note 1) in all official Acts with Austria. But he did not expect to have the alternative with the Emperor of the French, "whose superiority he recognised in every case" (Pelletier to Auerstädt, March 12, 1810, in Arch. Nat. AF 1653).

Weimar—acceded by a joint treaty concluded on December 15, 1806;¹ Lippe-Schaumburg and Lippe-Detmold joined the Confederation in April, 1807.² The Kingdom of Westphalia, by its Constitution, was declared to be a Member.³

These supplementary treaties, like the original Act, defined the strength of the military contingent to be provided for any war in which France and the Confederation should be engaged: Wurzburg was to send 2,000 men, Royal Saxony 20,000, the Saxon duchies 2,800, the Lippe principalities 600. The total number of troops which the Confederation had to contribute was 88,400 along with the 200,000 which France had to provide.

The days of the Holy Roman Empire were numbered; it was no longer to cast its majestic but now vain shadow over Europe. Austria, herself, definitely agreed to this.⁴ On August 1, 1806, Napoleon's *chargé d'affaires* at Ratisbon, Bacher, communicated to the Diet of the Empire the news of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine. The Note justly made the following observation:

For a long time successive alterations, which from century to century have only increased, had reduced the constitution of the Germanic Empire to be nothing more than a shadow of itself. The same time had changed all the proportions of greatness and strength which originally existed between the Members of the Confederation [i.e. the Empire]. . . . The Diet had ceased to have a will of its own. The sentences of the supreme tribunals could not be put into execution. Everything attested an enfeeblement so great that the federative tie no longer offered a guarantee to anyone: it was only a cause of dissension and discord between the powerful members. The events of the three Coalitions have brought this process of enfeeblement to its final term. . . . H.M. the Emperor [of the French] is therefore obliged

¹ De Clercq, II, 198.

² *Ibid.*, 200. The Saxon and Lippe treaties, being concluded after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, were able to declare the religious system which had been established by the Treaties of Westphalia at an end. They therefore decreed a new system, equality of the Catholic and Lutheran Cults.

³ Art. 5 of the *Constitution du Royaume de Westphalie*, November 15, 1807, in *Corr.*, No. 13362. The quota of French troops which the Kingdom of Westphalia had to support was fixed by treaty at 12,500 men and 1,800 horses. Yet in 1811 it was supporting 18,900 men and 9,400 horses (Report of General Chambon, forwarded by the Duc d'Auerstädt to Napoleon, December, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657).

⁴ On August 2, 1806, La Rochefoucauld at Vienna reported to Talleyrand that Stadion had assured him that the Emperor was *renouncing* the title of *Empereur d'Allemagne* (Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 379).

to declare that he no longer recognises the existence of the Germanic Empire. . . .¹

On the same day the Members of the Rhenish Confederation, through their plenipotentiaries at the Diet, presented a Note to the same effect. The Diet which received these momentous communications was sparsely attended: few except the Deputies of the Rhenish Confederate States were present. On receiving the messages from France and the Confederation, the Diet dispersed without passing any decree or resolution. It never met again. On August 6, the Emperor Francis II, in a brief and dignified manifesto, laid down the crown of the Germanic Empire.²

In his Note of August 1 to the Diet—the last communication between France and the Holy Roman Empire—Napoleon had declared his hope that war would now cease: a new system had been created for Germany, the French eagles had passed back over the Rhine to their own country, “and have passed it for the last time.” Why did this longed-for peace not come? Surely for the old reason: that to defend the Rhine frontier, a new bastion—the new Confederation—had been made in South Germany; and then to defend this, Prussia had to be met and broken;³ and so France is extended to the Elbe, to the Vistula; and anon to defend this new line, the Grand Army goes to Moscow. Meanwhile Great Britain would never consent to the Napoleonic system of controlling all the continental estuaries—the mouths of the Scheldt, Rhine, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, as well as the Bocche di Cattaro, the bays of Naples and Genoa, and the mouth of the Tagus. Therefore the French eagles had to go to Madrid, to Portugal: and so Great Britain fought the Peninsular War, and Wellington’s army met Blücher’s and Barclay de Tolly’s and Schwarzenberg’s in Paris.

¹ De Clercq, II, 183–4.

² The Manifesto was in French, and the phrase *empire germanique* was used. Text in Neumann, *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par l’Autriche* (1856), II, 228. Since August 11, 1804, Francis had taken the title *Emperor of Austria*, as well as *Emperor of the Romans* (*empereur élu des Romains—empire romain et germanique*) (Patent in Neumann, *op. cit.*, II, 104). From August 6, 1806, he was only Emperor of Austria.

³ In the campaign against Prussia in 1806–7, the Contingents of the Rhenish Confederate States were engaged in reducing the Prussian province of Silesia (Rambaud, *L’Allemagne sous Napoleon I^{er}*, p. 150 ff.).

CHAPTER XVII

JENA

The Treaty of Presburg marks one of the points at which Napoleon would have liked to stop.¹ He had imposed peace upon Germany; he had gained ample material security for France—the Rhine frontier, all North Italy, the alliance of the secondary German States. The grand work of the Revolution was thus completed.

It was Napoleon's misfortune, however, that he could never call a halt to the progress of his Empire. For each fresh success so alarmed the States of Europe that they merely paused to take breath before renewing the struggle. Thus no sooner had Napoleon established a satisfactory frontier for his Empire, than he had to defend that frontier; and again defeating his enemies, he felt bound to take more securities, that is, to extend his frontiers. Hence fresh alarms on the part of Europe, and renewed determination to persist in opposition until his Empire was broken.

The Treaty of Presburg had given him, it seemed, security from Austria. This was followed, on February 15, 1806, by a treaty—the Haugwitz treaty—of defensive alliance with Prussia (*see* p. 147). But there were two parties in the Prussian Ministry: and the weakness and uncertainty of the King's mind resulted in these two parties producing two policies. Thus while Haugwitz was advocating, and ultimately putting into effect, a policy of alliance with France, Hardenberg was achieving similar success with a policy of alliance with Russia. For Frederick William and Alexander had made a treaty of alliance against Napoleon, after the French army had violated the Prussian territory of Ansbach, when the King at last seemed spurred on to actual war. This treaty had

¹ He had hoped, after Austerlitz, that Russia, like Austria, would go out of the war. When the Treaty of Presburg was made, the Austrian plenipotentiaries asked him to release the Russian prisoners. Napoleon at once did so (*see* Gyulai to Talleyrand, December 26, 1805, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 364).

been made at Potsdam, on November 3, 1805. The two monarchs beside the tomb of Frederick the Great had sworn eternal friendship.¹ Then the war-cloud had blown over, so far as Prussia was concerned, but the policy remained, in the breasts and in the actions of Hardenberg and Stein.

While Haugwitz was negotiating the alliance with France, the Duke of Brunswick, sent by Frederick William, was negotiating at St. Petersburg with the Tsar Alexander. The Duke left St. Petersburg after the news of the Haugwitz treaty arrived there, but he carried away the goodwill of the Tsar. "At the first appeal" the Tsar promised "to fly to the succour of Prussia."² About the same time, Frederick William dismissed Hardenberg, or rather, on Hardenberg's request, gave him indefinite leave of absence; but he entrusted the retiring Minister with the *secret portfolio* of foreign affairs. Hardenberg thus remained in control of the Prussian relations with Russia, while Haugwitz retained, nominally at least, the direction of relations with France. This curious division of functions did not make for efficiency in the Prussian foreign policy, nor did it very much mystify Napoleon. He did not yet know of the engagements of Frederick William with Russia, but he saw clearly enough not to trust him. When a Prussian newspaper (without doubt officially inspired) had hinted at the possible help of 200,000 Russians, Napoleon had written to Talleyrand: "Tell M. Haugwitz that this sort of thing has got to stop."³

The long-delayed explosion from the side of Prussia came at last (not very suddenly, however) largely owing to the "Yarmouth" negotiations.

These negotiations are among the curiosities of diplomacy. Their genesis was in the time when Napoleon made himself Emperor. On January 2, 1805, he sent, just as he had done after he became First Consul, a letter to George III, proposing peace. The negotiations were fruitless, as the British Government would not make peace as long as there was a chance of driving the French out of Holland and Belgium. After Austerlitz, however, and more particularly after the death of Pitt (January, 1806), peace seemed more possible. Charles James Fox, the new Secretary of State for

¹ See above, p. 145.

² See Seeley, *Life of Stein* (1878), vol. I, pp. 240-1; Sorel, *op. cit.*, VII, 42. Alex. to Fred. William, March 10, 1806, in Bailleu, *Briefwechsel K. Friedrich Wilhelms III und der Königin Luise mit Kaiser Alexander I* (1900), p. 99.

³ February 6, 1806: *Corr.*, No. 9765.

Foreign Affairs, still kept something of his old illusions about the French Revolution. Fox, moreover, was a gentleman, and when he got the chance he showed courtesy to the French Government.

In February, 1806, a stranger who had landed from a ship at Gravesend obtained an interview with the Foreign Secretary, and offered to assassinate Napoleon. Preparations were, apparently, in a fairly advanced state, for a house had been hired at Passy from which the shooting was to be done. Fox had the man placed in custody, and sent an account of the whole matter to Talleyrand (February 20, 1806).¹ This honourable act, and the friendly letter, were the beginning of a correspondence between the British Government and Talleyrand, a correspondence which survived even Fox's death on September 13, 1806. The negotiations might have come to something, if the British Government would have consented to treat without Russia. Napoleon's method was always to treat separately with his opponents, to detach them one by one, on disadvantageous terms, from the war. But Great Britain would only treat in conjunction with Russia, the ally in the Third Coalition.

Among the English visitors who had been interned by Napoleon on the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, was Francis Seymour, Earl of Yarmouth.² A young man of wit and fashion, he was conversant with Paris society; and after being released from Verdun, by order of Napoleon, on May 23, 1806, he came to Paris and renewed an old acquaintance with Talleyrand. He was already in touch with the British Foreign Office. After a visit to London he was sent back to Paris as special envoy, to carry on negotiations for peace.

At first the Yarmouth negotiations proceeded rather slowly; it is doubtful whether Napoleon wished for peace, and it is certain that the British Government was not ready for peace on Napoleon's terms. The Kingdom of Naples had been occupied by French troops, and made into a subject kingdom under Joseph Bonaparte on March 30, 1806. Sicily, however, was saved for the Neapolitan royal family, and kept safe, by the British fleet. Napoleon wished

¹ Letter in Coquelle, *Napoleon and England*, pp. 82-3. In March or April, 1806, Fox told Stahrenberg, Austrian Ambassador in London, that he (Fox) thought it possible to make peace with France. This was reported to Stadion, who obligingly passed on the information to La Rochefoucauld, French Ambassador at Vienna (La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand, April 15, 1806, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 378).

² The *Dictionary of National Biography* omits this remarkable man.

to complete Joseph's kingdom—and to command the Mediterranean—by getting Sicily too. Consequently when Talleyrand, acting on instructions from Napoleon, proposed peace on the basis of each Power keeping what it had got, with the exception of Sicily, Fox absolutely refused: "the abandonment of Sicily is a point which it is impossible for His Majesty to concede" (July 5, 1806).¹ Thus the negotiations appeared to have arrived at an *impasse*, although Talleyrand offered to indemnify King Ferdinand of Naples for the loss of Sicily (by securing, for example, Albania for him), and to obtain the restitution of Hanover to England. Now Hanover, in accordance with the Treaty of February 15, had been occupied by Prussian troops. The Prussian proclamation of sovereignty was issued on March 27, 1806.²

Lord Yarmouth, who was on terms of very good fellowship with Lucchesini, the Prussian Ambassador, disclosed the French offer of Hanover, when the two were deep in wine after dining together. Probably both the diplomatists were more sober than they appeared to be. Lucchesini noted the information and remitted it to Berlin.³ The news inflamed the spirit of King Frederick William, and fortified the arguments of those members of the Prussian Cabinet who believed that war should be made on France.

Everything that Napoleon did at this time seemed calculated to offend the Prussians. The *intelligentsia* of Berlin were being moved by the arguments of patriotic German pamphleteers of whom Gentz (employed by the Austrian Chancellery) was the chief. At Ansbach, which was formerly Prussian territory, transferred by the Franco-Prussian Treaty of February 15 to Bavaria, an anonymous official wrote and published a pamphlet called *Germany in her deep Humiliation*.⁴ The pamphlet alleged serious offences on the part of the French troops. Napoleon, for whose attention nothing was too small, had the pamphlet proscribed; and Palm, the distributing agent, a bookseller of Nuremberg (which was Bavarian territory⁵), was seized, tried by French court

¹ Document in Coquelle, *op. cit.*, p. 94, quoting F.O. France, 73.

² Jackson, *Diaries and Letters*, I, 423.

³ July 29, 1806, in Sorel, *op. cit.*, VII, 83. *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, III, 76-9. *Briefwechsel K. Friedrich Wilhelms III*, p. 116.

⁴ *Deutschland in seiner tiefen Erniedrigung*, by Yelin, a Councillor of Consistory (Fournier, I, 420).

⁵ Nuremberg was a Free Imperial City until July 19, 1806, when the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine (art. 17) annexed it to Bavaria (De Clercq,

martial at Braunau, and shot (August 25, 1806). "What d'Enghien's murder was to the nobility of Europe, Palm's was to the people."¹

Perhaps the thing that contributed most to Frederick William's ultimate decision for war was Napoleon's creation of the Confederation of the Rhine; the Treaty or Constitution of this was made on July 12, 1806, and was communicated to the Austrian and Prussian Governments.² Prussia was not part of this Confederation, which assured to Napoleon the control of South-west Germany; and Napoleon's suggestion (July 22)³ that Frederick William might make himself a sort of Emperor of North Germany was of little value if, as the Prussian Government learned a few days later, Hanover was to be taken away. Prussia, in fact, thought that she could make herself Head of the North, by force of arms.⁴

Napoleon's diplomacy seems to be at fault here. With a little more care and tact, he might have kept Prussia out of the war. It was his cynical ingenuity in poisoning the relations of Prussia and England by giving Hanover to Frederick William that ruined France's diplomacy in the summer of 1806. For he could not even pretend to make peace with England without offering to restore Hanover, and so offending Prussia.

Finally, the Prussian Government was said to fear seriously that Napoleon meant to make the Elector of Saxony into a king of central Germany.⁵ This rumour was probably exaggerated.

II, 174). Only the direct opposition of Bonaparte had prevented Bavaria from incorporating Nuremberg during the Ratisbon negotiations of 1802-3 (Talleyrand to Laforest, January 23, 1803, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Allemagne* 722).

¹ Fournier, *op. cit.*, I, 420. At the same court martial at Braunau at which Palm was condemned, two Viennese booksellers, Kupfer and Enrich, were also condemned, in absence, to be shot (Metternich to Talleyrand, September 13, 1806, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 379).

² Napoleon announced the Confederation to Vincent, who was Austrian envoy before the arrival of Metternich in Paris (cp. *Corr.*, No. 10502). The information was sent to Berlin by Lucchesini, July 25-8, 1806. But Lucchesini had heard about the Confederation as early as July 15. It was announced to the Diet at Ratisbon on August 1 (*Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, III, 80).

³ Dispatch of Lucchesini, July 22, 1806, in *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, III, 84.

⁴ La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand, September 7, 1806, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 379.

⁵ Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, September 20, 1806. Talleyrand seems to have shared Prussia's fear (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 379).

Napoleon meant to make and did make the ruler of Saxony into a king, but he was not going to make of that country a second Prussia, to threaten his power at some future date.

The Prussian Government was in an unfortunate position. The ally of France, the sharer in the spoils of the revolutionary war, it had lost all dignity. "The enormous blunder," wrote Heinrich von Bülow in the summer of 1806, "was the removal of the Line of Demarcation,¹ as if Prussia felt herself unworthy to rule in North Germany."² At last, however, the King was ready for war, although by this time it appears that the Prussian generals thought the decision unwise. Even General Rüchel—the author of the famous statement: "His Majesty's army can produce several generals equal to M. de Bonaparte"³—was against military intervention now.⁴

The failure of Napoleon's diplomacy to conciliate Prussia coincided with a failure to detach Russia from his enemies. After Austerlitz Napoleon was anxious for peace, and he had not endeavoured to exploit his victory, in the way that he was most naturally fitted to do, by continuous military operations. Although no armistice was concluded with Russia, the Tsar's army retired unmolested.

Napoleon estimated, or affected to estimate, the Tsar very highly. The Tsar was "a fine young man," but surrounded by a "court of *polissons*."⁵ He thought that if only he, Napoleon, could get into direct touch with the Tsar of all the Russias, he might re-establish the Franco-Russian entente of 1800. Nevertheless the relations of the two countries were not improved after the Treaty of Presburg. Napoleon had gained from Austria the cession of Dalmatia, but the Russians refused to give up one of the most vital parts, namely the Bocche di Cattaro, which they had occupied with troops.⁶ This was one reason why the Duke of Brunswick, who left St. Petersburg on March 11, 1806, was able to carry with

¹ The Line of Demarcation ceased to exist when the French occupied Hanover on June 5, 1803; if this did not complete its destruction the creation of the Grand Duchy of Berg, for Murat (on March 15, 1806), certainly did.

² See Memorandum in Seeley, *op. cit.*, I, 249.

³ Seeley, *op. cit.*, I, 248.

⁴ Treitschke, *op. cit.*, I, 265.

⁵ To the Elector of Wurtemberg, December 5, 1805 (*Corr.*, No. 9545).

⁶ It was as a counterpoise to the Russian occupation of Cattaro that Napoleon seized the ancient Republic of Ragusa (June, 1806), which thus lost its independence for all time (*Corr.*, No. 10351).

him cordial assurances for Frederick William from Alexander. Soon after this Hardenberg retired from public office, but continued to work industriously at his secret portfolio, with the result that in July Frederick William and Alexander, by way of Notes, exchanged Declarations of friendship and alliance.¹

Nevertheless there was still a chance of peace between Russia and France. The Tsar had sent an official of his court, young and inexperienced in diplomacy, called Oubril, to negotiate in Paris. He arrived there on July 6, 1806, while the Yarmouth-Talleyrand negotiations were going on. The last thing that Napoleon wanted was for the Russian and British Governments to come to an understanding: so he was much puzzled by the reports of his all-observing police to the effect that Lord Yarmouth paid frequent visits to the house in the Rue Grange-Batelière where Oubril was staying. It so happened that Yarmouth had a mistress who also lodged in the same house as Oubril, and the police could not make out whether it was the Russian ambassador or Mme Saint Amand that the Englishman went to see.² Napoleon's joy and feeling of relief can therefore be imagined when Talleyrand concluded a treaty with Oubril on July 20, 1806.³ This treaty, which required to be ratified by the Tsar, would give to France what she wanted at the moment, namely peace with Russia, the Bocche di Cattaro,⁴ and the recognition of the incorporation of Sicily with Joseph's Kingdom of Naples. The legitimate King of Naples was to be compensated by getting the Balearic Isles which Spain was to be induced to cede.

Meanwhile the Yarmouth-Talleyrand negotiations were going on, the English plenipotentiary being strengthened, and to some extent superseded, by Lord Lauderdale. The Instructions given to Lauderdale, dated August 2, 1806, prove that the British Government was sincerely treating for peace: ⁵ they permitted peace to

¹ The dates of the Declarations were July 1 for Prussia, July 12 for Russia. Texts in *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, III, 45, 120. See also *Briefwechsel K. Fried. Wilhelms III*, pp. 110, 115.

² Coquelle, *op. cit.*, 97, quoting Arch. Nat. F⁷ 3753.

³ It was actually signed by General Clarke for France. The text is in De Clercq, II, 180.

⁴ From the start of the negotiation Napoleon had made it clear that Cattaro was not in question: "the rights of France depend on the Treaty of Presburg, to which Russia is not a party" (Talleyrand to La Rochefoucauld, June 4, 1806, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 378).

⁵ Text of Instructions of August 2, 1806, from F.O. papers, in Coquelle, *op. cit.*, 102 ff.

be made on the basis of *uti possidetis*, but without excluding the consideration of exchanges, by mutual agreement. For instance :

His [Britannic] Majesty is not bound to his Sicilian Majesty by the terms of any treaty which would prevent him from withdrawing his troops from Sicily, if such an arrangement of peace were offered as in his judgement His Sicilian Majesty could reasonably be expected to accept.

Thus the British Government abandoned its *non possumus* on the Sicilian question. The Instructions insisted that "the integrity of Sweden, Spain and Portugal must of course be guaranteed by the two Powers," but they made no mention of Holland and Belgium, with respect to which the British Government was tacitly prepared to accept the existing French system.

Lord Lauderdale arrived in Paris on August 5, 1806.¹ A week earlier (July 31, 1806), Yarmouth had sent to Napoleon a draft treaty proposing, among other things, that Great Britain would recognise the Napoleonic Kings—Joseph, King of the Two Sicilies, Louis, King of Holland, the Kings of Etruria, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, as well as the Grand Duke of Baden and others (art. 5). Holland was to get all her colonies back, except the Cape of Good Hope (art. 9). Great Britain was to retain Malta (art. 14). Ferdinand IV, lately King of Naples, was to be compensated with the Balearic Isles (which were to be detached from Spain, secret article 1). The King of Great Britain was to regain Hanover (art. 7).²

Lord Lauderdale, when he came to Paris, seems to have approved of this draft.³ It is almost certain that the British Government would have ratified the Convention, as both the envoys approved of it, and as it was in accordance with their Instructions. But Napoleon rejected it.⁴ The French and the British Governments later were so ashamed, the one for having offered, the other for

¹ Lauderdale to Talleyrand, August 5, 1806 (Docs. in Hansard, *Parl. Debates*, VIII, p. 140).

² *Corr.*, No. 10604. Coquelle, *op. cit.*, 111.

³ Note of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Clarke, August 7, 1806; text in Coquelle, *op. cit.*, 109.

⁴ The British Government was prepared to make peace on the basis of *uti possidetis*, with the exception of Hanover (Fox to Yarmouth, July 26, 1806, in Hansard, *Parl. Debates*, vol. VIII, p. 130). But the dispatch of Clarke to Lauderdale and Yarmouth, August 8, 1806, absolutely rejects the *uti possidetis* and also the restitution of Hanover to the King of Great Britain (Hansard, *loc. cit.*, p. 154).

having refused, such enormous concessions, that they both suppressed all mention of the draft treaty in their public defence in Parliament and the Press. The draft treaty was not known until published in the grand collection of Napoleonic *Correspondance* in 1863.

It really looks as if Napoleon had no intention of making peace with Great Britain, but that he meant to keep the negotiations on foot until the expected ratification of the Oubril treaty should arrive from St. Petersburg. If this happened, then, being free from all danger from the side of Russia, he could turn upon Great Britain, thus left entirely alone, and, as he hoped, crush her. But when Oubril reached St. Petersburg with his treaty, he was received with scorn and reproaches, like another St. Julien at Vienna.¹ The treaty was rejected by letter dispatched from St. Petersburg to Talleyrand on August 14, 1806. The decision was made known at Berlin to Frederick William, on August 26; Frederick William immediately gave the order for opening hostilities. In about three weeks the Prussian regiments were being concentrated from various quarters, in the region of the Middle Elbe.

The Tsar's refusal to ratify the Oubril treaty was known in Paris on September 3. Napoleon felt the sands shifting beneath his feet: "I cannot have a real alliance with any of the Great Powers of Europe," he wrote to Talleyrand.² On September 26, Frederick William sent from Naumburg, through General Knobelsdorff, Prussian envoy at Paris, a long letter to Napoleon.³ This letter, which was drafted by the Minister Lombard, stated in the language of bitterest complaint all the grievances of the King of Prussia. The creation of the Confederation of the Rhine and the annexation of Wesel to France were especially complained of. The letter reads like the genuine outpouring of the King's heart. Its concluding words were:

May it please heaven that we can come to an understanding on bases which will leave to you all your glory, but which will leave to the

¹ Sorel, *loc. cit.*, VII, p. 328. Cp. La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand, September 15, 1806: "Everybody is asking what could have forced M. d'Oubril to sign a peace absolutely contrary to his instructions" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 379).

² September 3, 1806, Lecestre: *Lettres inédites de Napoleon I^{er}* (1897), I, p. 74.

³ Knobelsdorff, who was a supporter of the French alliance, had replaced Lucchesini at the Prussian Embassy in Paris

peoples their honour, and put an end for Europe to this fever of fear and expectation in the midst of which no one can count on the future nor calculate his duties.¹

Hardenberg thought that the letter was written too much in the tone of a victor. Yet the courier who took it was given still another dispatch to put in his valise. This was nothing less than an *ultimatum*, drafted by Haugwitz, making three demands which Napoleon was to answer by October 8: firstly, that French troops should retire to the left bank of the Rhine; secondly, that Napoleon should oppose no obstacle to the foundation of a North German Confederation to include all the States not mentioned in the fundamental statute of the Confederation of the Rhine; thirdly, that Wesel should be separated from the French Empire.² This Note, delivered to Talleyrand at Paris on October 2, reached Napoleon, who was already with his troops at Bamberg, on October 7,³ the same day as Lord Lauderdale quitted Paris after the breakdown of the Anglo-French negotiations. The Emperor did not read the Prussian letter carefully⁴; instead, on October 8, the day on which the ultimatum expired, he issued *Bulletin Number 1 of the Grand Army*.⁵ This bulletin contained an extraordinary invective against the Prussian Court and Government:

On the 7th, His Majesty the Emperor received a courier of Mayence⁶ dispatched by the Prince of Benevento, bearing two important dispatches: one was a letter of the King of Prussia, twenty pages long, which was really just a poor pamphlet against France, of the kind that the English Cabinet gets done by its writers at 500 pounds sterling a year.⁶ The Emperor did not finish reading it, and said to the people around him: "I have a complaint against my brother the King of Prussia; he does not understand French; he certainly has not read this rhapsody."⁷ To this letter was joined the celebrated note of M. de Knobelsdorff. "Marshal," said the Emperor to the Marshal

¹ Text in *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, III, 179-87.

² *Ibid.*, 187-9.

³ *Corr.*, No. 10953.

⁴ *Je ne l'ai lu que très légèrement* (to Talleyrand, October 7, 1806, *ibid.*).

⁵ *Corr.*, No. 10967. The separate wars of Napoleon had each their own series of Bulletins, each series beginning with No. 1.

⁶ An allusion to Gentz, who had come from Vienna to the Prussian headquarters at Naumburg; see Gentz, "*Journal de ce qui m'est arrivé de plus marquant . . . au Quartier-Général de S.M. le Roi de Prusse*" (*Schriften von Gentz*, ed. Schlesier, II, 197). Gentz was in receipt of an English pension.

⁷ The Prussian letter was written in French, as were all State papers, except the English, at that time.

Berthier, "we have been given a meeting of honour for the 8th : never has a Frenchman failed in this ; but, as it is said that there is a beautiful queen who wishes to be witness of the combat, let us be courteous, and march, without resting, for Saxony." The Emperor had reason to speak thus ; because the Queen of Prussia is with the army, clothed like an amazon, wearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters a day to raise the fire on every side. It is like Armida in her madness setting fire to her own palace.

The campaign of Napoleon against Prussia was brief, and conclusive in its surprising thoroughness. On October 14, one Prussian army was defeated at Auerstädt ; on the same day, another was defeated at Jena. Great Prussian fortresses surrendered before the month was out. On October 27, Napoleon entered Berlin. King Frederick William and Queen Louise took refuge in their province of East Prussia, at Königsberg.

Napoleon stayed at Berlin until November 25 ; then he went on towards the Russian theatre of war. On December 9, he was at Warsaw. A campaign took place on the snow-covered plains of Poland and in East Prussia. On February 8, 1807, a terrible battle was fought between the French and a Russo-Prussian army at Eylau, about twenty-three miles from Königsberg. Napoleon's public announcements claimed a victory, but all the army knew that his losses were as great as those of the Russians,¹ and that he had gained little strategic advantage.

After this, military operations languished until summer. Napoleon established his headquarters in the East Prussian town of Osterode. He inhabited the fine castle of Finkenstein, and lived a busy life, somewhat harder, but in many respects like his life at the castle of Mombello, in the Italian campaign of '96. He continued to spin his diplomatic web from Finkenstein, and received, among other people, envoys from the Shah of Persia. On May 7, a treaty was signed at Finkenstein by Maret (afterwards Duc de Bassano) for France, and Mirza Mehemed Riza Khan for Persia. Article 1 bound the two States to peace, friendship and alliance. In article 2, Napoleon guaranteed the integrity of the Shah's dominions. By article 8, the Shah agreed to close his ports, and to declare war, against England ; and by article 10 he promised to stir up the Afghans also to make war upon England. Napoleon even took the precaution of engaging Persia to offer his army facilities for a

¹ Each side lost about 25,000 men. See Rose, *Life of Napoleon I* (ed. 1922), II, 114, n. 1.

march through the country against the English power in India (art. 12).¹

With a State nearer home, namely Austria, Napoleon made an effort to establish an alliance, offering to the much truncated Habsburg empire the splendid prize of Silesia.² Prussia had only gained this province from Maria Theresa in 1745; and Napoleon now could easily hand it back again to Austria. But the sagacious and patriotic Stadion, who was now Chancellor, would not allow Austria to come into the Napoleonic system by accepting the splendid bribe; nor yet was he ready to throw down the gage of war, and to join the still undefeated Russia and England against Europe's disturber.³ Stadion was probably wise in his decision not to fight in 1807: for the resources of Austria were still in the process of being reorganised and restored. A better opportunity was to come two years later.

A week after the battle of Eylau, Napoleon, whose military position amid the ice and snow of Poland was anything but brilliant, sent General Bertrand to the King of Prussia at Memel; "he will tell Your Majesty," wrote Napoleon, "things which, I hope, will be agreeable to you."⁴ The pleasant thing was an offer on the part of Napoleon "to restore the King of Prussia to his States."⁵ This offer was to be made only verbally.⁶ Thus led onwards, Frederick William was to be induced to make peace on condition, finally, of getting back only his States to the east of the Elbe.⁷

Frederick William, however, did not fall into the trap. "His [Napoleon's] language bears the imprint of moderation," he wrote the Tsar on March 6, "but I leave you to judge, Sire, if we should put trust in it."⁸ There was no doubt about the Tsar's opinion.

¹ Text in De Clercq, II, 201 ff.

² Beer, *op. cit.*, p. 258. The offer of Silesia was first made on December 15, 1806, through General Andréossy, French Ambassador at Vienna. On September 28, 1806, La Rochefoucauld at Vienna, in a conversation with Stadion, had "put forward the word *alliance*," but Stadion had "replied by monosyllables" (La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand, September 28, 1806, in Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 379).

³ Stadion was in favour of Russia; he is "absolutely Russian," wrote La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand on July 23, 1806. But he was following "a very prudently calculated political system" at this time (La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand, April 19, 1806, Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche 378).

⁴ Corr., No. 11809. Eylau, February 13, 1807.

⁵ Instructions to Bertrand, February 13, 1807 (Corr., No. 11810).

⁶ *Qu'il ne lui donnera pas par écrit (ibid.)*.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Briefwechsel K. Fried. Wilhelms III*, p. 153.

Alexander came to Memel (April 2), and strengthened the King's resolution against making a separate peace. More than that, he induced Frederick William to appoint Hardenberg (who since the Jena disaster had been in retirement at Riga) to be his Foreign Minister.¹ Hardenberg was the inveterate supporter of war to the end with Napoleon.

The result of the deliberations of the two sovereigns was the adoption of a Convention drafted by Hardenberg, dated from the Russian General's headquarters at Bartenstein, on April 26, 1807. This Convention, although it ended at the moment in disaster, is really the beginning of the War of Liberation. It based the struggle with Napoleon upon the necessity for freeing Europe from the French yoke, and for establishing the national independence of Germany. The internal affairs of France were not to be interfered with ; but the French were to be driven to the left side of the Rhine, and a new Federal Constitution was to be established for the whole of Germany.²

The war, therefore, went on. Six weeks later, on June 14, the anniversary of Marengo, Napoleon won a decisive victory over the Russians at Friedland, twenty-seven miles south-east of Königsberg. The victory laid open the capital of East Prussia to the French army, and thus took from Frederick William nearly all that was left of his kingdom. The defeat of Russia at Friedland made peace between Prussia and France practically inevitable ; but what sort of peace-terms would Napoleon grant ? Prussia's only chance of obtaining tolerable terms was through a wider peace which should include Russia.

¹ *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, IV, 69-70.

² *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, IV, 74-5.

CHAPTER XVIII

TILSIT

Friedland broke down the military power of Russia. A curious incident is related concerning that battle. Murat with his cavalry was following the routed Russians, who were fleeing across the Niemen. Arriving at the river, near Tilsit, he saw a host of Asiatic barbarians galloping about the plain, shooting clouds of arrows into the air, as if expecting to keep off the French by this display of Oriental mediævalism. Murat charged this host, and "the advance-guard of Asia dissolved."¹

The collapse of the Russian army convinced Bennigsen, the chief General, and the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the Tsar, that further resistance was fruitless: "it is no longer a combat, wrote Bennigsen to the Grand Duke, but a veritable butchery."² Napoleon seems to have guessed, however, that Alexander might go further than peace with France: he might proceed to downright alliance.

The French Emperor, following the natural line of advance of his army, arrived at Tilsit on June 19, five days after the battle of Friedland; and on the 22nd an armistice was signed between the French and Russian armies by Berthier and Lobanoff. Meanwhile Alexander, instead of retiring with his fleeing army, was advancing from Tauroggen³ (whither Frederick William had come) step by step towards Tilsit "as if fascinated."⁴ On the 24th he could see the French camp fires on the left bank of the Niemen. At this

¹ Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I* (1914), I, 48, quoting the *Mémoires de Roustam* in *Revue rétrospective*, No. 8-9.

² Quoted by Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 49, from Lesseps. The lack of diplomatic result after Eylau, and the dynamic diplomacy after Friedland, were due to what everybody really knew, namely, that Eylau had scarcely been a victory at all. Cp. *Memoirs of Madame Junot*, Duchess of Abrantès (trans. 1893), III, 318: "the battle of Friedland was the more gratifying to Napoleon as at Eylau a great part of the glory remained to the enemy."

³ Tatistcheff, *Alexandre I" et Napoléon* (1891), p. 150.

⁴ Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 51.

juncture he was met by Prince Lobanoff, who had signed the armistice of Tilsit, telling the Tsar how Napoleon himself had received him, and had suggested that the Vistula might be the frontier of Russia. This was a very seductive message, for the Russian frontier in 1807 was quite a hundred miles east of the Vistula.¹ Thus a prospect was held out to the defeated autocrat not merely of keeping what he possessed, but actually of gaining more territory : a strange sequel to the *débâcle* of Russia at Friedland !

Lobanoff went back to Tilsit on June 24, bearing an autograph letter of the Tsar, who wrote that "the alliance of France and Russia has always been the object of my desires."² The two monarchs agreed to meet without intermediaries in a tent in the middle of the Niemen. The proposal to meet alone appears to have come from Alexander.³ The King of Prussia had come from Memel (the last place which he possessed) and had joined Alexander. But he was not introduced to Napoleon until the second meeting at Tilsit.⁴

On June 25, about 11 o'clock in the morning, Alexander arrived in a carriage at the right bank of the Niemen. After waiting for half an hour in a half-ruined inn, an *aide-de-camp* announced, "He comes, Sire !" ⁵ and Alexander, issuing forth, saw Napoleon, as his custom was out of doors, galloping on his charger, through a double line of soldiers. The two emperors each embarked in a boat and from opposite sides of the Niemen approached the raft which had been constructed upon boats, in the centre of the river. The raft had on it two tents, one for the two emperors, the other for their staff. As he crossed to the raft, Napoleon stood in the bow of his boat like a legendary figure of the Little Corporal, with his arms crossed, wearing the customary plain uniform of his Guard, the grand cordon of the legion of honour, and on his head the famous beaver hat.⁶

¹ By the Third Partition of Poland, Prussia had acquired Warsaw and Polish lands to the Niemen. In 1806 the Niemen was the frontier between Prussia and Russia.

² Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 53, quoting Tatistcheff.

³ *Ibid.*, quoting Tatistcheff. Cp. Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* (1847), VII, 626.

⁴ *Memoirs of Madame Junot*, III, 321.

⁵ Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 151.

⁶ Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 152. For description of Napoleon's habitual dress see Masson, *Napoléon chez lui*, Chap. III. Napoleon in his typical costume can be seen in Isabey's portrait, *The First Consul at Malmaison* ; it is in the Palace of Versailles.

He reached the raft first, went to receive Alexander as the Tsar got out of the boat, and cordially embraced him. Alexander was equally gracious.

The two young men—Napoleon was thirty-eight years old, Alexander was thirty—arbiters of the world as they doubtless thought themselves to be, engaged in conversation in the emperor's tent. It is said that Alexander's first words were: "I shall be your second against England;" and that Napoleon's reply was: "In that case everything can be arranged, and peace is made."¹ After fifty minutes of conversation, the two monarchs issued from their tent; each presented his Staff to the other,² shook hands and parted, after Alexander had conducted Napoleon to his boat.

The first-fruit of their momentous interview was an armistice which Napoleon, on the request of Alexander, consented to make with Prussia. This armistice was signed on the same day, by Berthier for Napoleon, and General Kalkreuth for Frederick William. It was a very favourable armistice for Prussia, for it simply suspended hostilities without stipulating for the surrender of the Prussian garrisons which still existed.³ Throughout the interview on the raft, poor Frederick William had been sitting on his horse, on the right bank of the Niemen, his eyes fixed on the tent where his fate was being decided. At times his impatience got the better of him, and touching his horse with the spur, he rode the animal breast-high into the river; but he never uttered a word.⁴

Next day, June 26, Alexander brought Frederick William, who had been lodging at Pictupoenen, the Russian military headquarters, on to the raft. The King of Prussia, who had never yet met the Emperor of the French, was presented to Napoleon; but received little encouragement therefrom. "I confess that I am vindictive," said Napoleon; and he continued, "The Baron Hardenberg may be a respectable man, but he has offended me, me and the French nation."⁵ Clearly Hardenberg must be dismissed. Frederick

¹ Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

² Alexander's Staff consisted of his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, General Bennigsen, Baron Budberg, and two *aides-de-camp*; Napoleon's was Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc and Caulaincourt (Tatistcheff, 151).

³ There were still Prussian garrisons in Colberg, Pillau, Graudenz, Stralsund, and several fortresses in Silesia. Text of Armistice in De Clercq, II, 206.

⁴ Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 154, from the reminiscences of Prince Wolkonsky, who was in attendance on Frederick William.

⁵ *Denkwürdigkeiten Hardenberg*, III, 480.

William objected that he had nobody to put in Hardenberg's place. Napoleon brushed aside the excuse, and suggested the names of Schulenburg Zastrow, and Stein (Stein, who was to be his greatest antagonist in Germany!). When the interview ended, and the monarchs took leave, Napoleon had the bad taste to invite Alexander to dine without including the Tsar's companion-monarch in the invitation.¹

Alexander accompanied Frederick William back to Pictupoenen and left him there. The same evening (June 26) the Tsar crossed to the left bank of the Niemen, having accepted Napoleon's invitation to stay there for the rest of the period of negotiations. The town was by a special Convention neutralised, and divided into two, one part being assigned to Alexander and a battalion of the Russian Imperial Guard, the other part to Napoleon and a battalion of the French Imperial Guard.² Alexander now fully trusted the Corsican usurper, who might have taken him prisoner and defied the opinion of Europe as he had done when he kidnapped the Duc d'Enghien or shot Palm.

The stay of the Tsar at Tilsit, which lasted till July 9, was passed in reviews of troops, and conversations with Napoleon, as the two monarchs rode about the country. Frederick William also came to stay in Tilsit on June 28, and accompanied the other two monarchs in their rural rides, an uncongenial task for the awkward, self-conscious Prussian, having to keep up with two energetic horsemen who delighted in speed. The real work, the assigning of lands, the erecting of kingdoms and duchies, and the more shadowy plan to partition the Ottoman Empire,³ was sketched out in conversations *à deux*, in which Frederick William had no part. Alexander and Napoleon met for hours at a time in Napoleon's house. One room was reserved for their talking together. A small room next door had all the necessary maps displayed.⁴ The Tsar dined every afternoon with Napoleon, and every evening Napoleon took tea with the Tsar.⁵ The task of drafting the terms of the eventual treaty was delegated to Talleyrand (who came from Königsberg

¹ *Ibid.*

² Document in Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 155-6.

³ The question of Turkey was carried no further by Napoleon than to suggest that the Tsar might have Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria—not Constantinople (*see* Thiers, *op. cit.*, VII, 644-53).

⁴ Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 82.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83, quoting Lesseps.

for the purpose) and Prince Kourakine, who was summoned by Alexander from Schawel; for Napoleon had told the Tsar quite plainly that Budberg, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was not to his liking. So, like Hardenberg, Budberg had to retire at the bidding of the Emperor of the French.

The next important personage to arrive was Queen Louise, wife of Frederick William. She came from Memel, to plead the cause of fallen Prussia. On July 6, the day that she arrived at Tilsit, she had a visit from Napoleon, who had long ago got over his shyness with women. The Queen wished to talk about peace-terms; instead, Napoleon complimented her on her dress. "Shall we talk of chiffons," she replied, "at a moment so solemn?"¹ At dinner the Queen sat between the two Emperors. She was thirty-one years old, self-possessed, vivacious, beautiful. Napoleon submitted to the charm of her conversation, but when the evening was finished, he ordered Talleyrand to sign the treaty, which was by now in draft form.

Louise crossed the river to Pictupoenen, where she lodged for the night. Next day she returned to Tilsit, and once more dined with the Emperors in company with her husband. Further spirited conversation took place, but Napoleon would not be led on to talk of the terms of peace. Madame Junot relates an incident at Tilsit which Las Casas says happened just before dinner.² Napoleon took from a porcelain vase a rose of exquisite beauty, and presented it to the Queen.

"This gift would be of inestimable value," said she to him, "if you would join to it what justice demands, that you should restore to an orphan, from whom you are wresting it, his inheritance." But what must have been seen to be appreciated, as a spectator afterwards informed me, was the expression of the stolen glance and the supplicating smile.³

Napoleon's answer was that he had communicated the terms to the Tsar Alexander, who would impart them to the King. "The Queen turned pale."⁴ She was a proud woman, and hated stooping to charm into a softer mood the man who had conquered her country, and who in his military bulletins had insulted herself and her husband. Disillusioned, betrayed, as she thought, she departed with

¹ Quoted in Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 26.

² Las Casas, *op. cit.*, tome II, partie IV, p. 225.

³ *Memoirs of Madame Junot*, III, 322.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

a wounded pride that was to bring her to her death.¹ On Napoleon she made absolutely no impression whatever : " he acknowledged," says Madame Junot, " that she was handsome, only *she did not suit his taste* ; the expression of her countenance, he said, was too lofty and severe." The truth is that with the exception of his old mother, who was living in quiet dignity at Paris, Napoleon never really knew or appreciated a good woman.²

The first of the Treaties of Tilsit was signed on the same day as Queen Louise left the town. There were in all four Acts signed at Tilsit. The first was the Patent Treaty between France and Russia. The second consisted of seven Separate and Secret Articles, concluded between the same Powers. The third was a Treaty of Alliance between France and Russia, and was likewise secret. These three Acts were all signed on the same day, July 7, 1807, and by the same plenipotentiaries—Talleyrand for France, and Kourakine and Lobanoff for Russia. The fourth Act was the Treaty with Prussia, signed on July 9 by Talleyrand for France and by Kalkreuth and Goltz for Prussia. No historian to-day would call these treaties statesmanlike ; they did not form a " system " : they contained no promise of finality. They merely prepared the way for certain eventualities which might be exploited in order to obtain for France and Russia the partitioning of Europe.

The chief articles of the Patent Treaty of July 7 between France and Russia were as follows : Napoleon, " out of regard for the Emperor of all the Russias, and wishing to give a proof of the sincere desire which he has to unite the two nations," consented to restore to the King of Prussia certain territories. These territories were the Prussian dominions to the *east* of the Elbe, with certain considerable exceptions, for Saxony was to annex the large enclave of Cöthlen ; and a new Duchy of Warsaw was to be created out of those Polish territories (with the exception of Białystok) which Prussia had got at the Second Partition of 1793, and the Third Partition of 1795. Prussia was even to lose to the Duchy of Warsaw a little of what she had gained at the First Partition ; the part which she had to lose was the district of the Netze to the south of and including the line Driessen—Scheidemühl—Waldau on the

¹ Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 99.

² His experience of his two wives was unfortunate ; the Empress Louise herself became the mistress of the Austrian Count Neipperg after Napoleon's exile to St. Helena. Houssaye, *La Première Restauration* (1899), pp. 158-64.

Vistula. There was a *chaussée*, useful for moving troops, along this line, which was to be on the Duchy side of the frontier. The Duke of Warsaw was to be the Elector of Saxony, erected into King of Saxony (arts. 4, 5). The communications between the Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Saxony were assured by the free use of a military road across Silesia (art. 7).

The city of Danzig was to have its independence restored under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony (art. 6). The navigation of the Vistula was to be free (art. 8). Russia got the District of Bialystok (art. 9). The Tsar of Russia and the King of Saxony undertook, in respect of the annexations made by them under the Treaty, to observe the pecuniary obligations of the former sovereign, the King of Prussia (art. 11).

The Dukes of Saxe-Coburg, Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, who were in a state of war with Napoleon, were restored to their dominions, but French garrisons were to continue in occupation of their posts "until the exchange of ratifications of the future treaty of definitive peace between France and England" (art. 12).

Napoleon agreed to accept the mediation of Alexander, in order to conclude a treaty of peace with England, "on the supposition that this mediation shall also be accepted by England one month after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty" (art. 13). On his part, the Tsar of Russia (art. 23) accepted the mediation of the Emperor of the French to negotiate peace with Turkey, with which State he was at war. The Tsar agreed to withdraw his troops from Moldavia and Wallachia, but Turkish troops were not to be re-admitted to these provinces "until the exchange of ratifications of the future treaty of definitive peace between Russia and the Porte" (art. 22).

The rest of the articles of the Patent Treaty mainly consisted of concessions by Alexander in favour of the Napoleonic system. By article 14, the Tsar acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte to be King of Naples, and Louis to be King of Holland. In like manner he recognised "the Confederation of the Rhine, the actual State of possession of each of the sovereigns who compose it, and the titles given to several among them whether by the Act of Confederation, or by the subsequent treaties of accession;" and the obliging Tsar also promised to recognise all future entrants to the Confederation designated by Napoleon (art. 15). Prince Jerome was recognised

as King of Westphalia (art. 18): the kingdom was to consist of the territories on the left bank of the Elbe ceded by the King of Prussia, "and of other States actually possessed by the Emperor Napoleon" (art. 19). The Emperors of France and Russia guaranteed each other's territories (and the territories of the other States—i.e. the Napoleonic States—included in the Treaty), "such as they are now or as they shall be in consequence of the above stipulations" (art. 25).

A consideration of this analysis of the Patent Treaty shows that it put the Continent of Europe at the disposal of the two Powers of France and Russia, with, however, the balance distinctly in favour of France. The Napoleonic Empire of France with its client States was "recognised" and guaranteed in its full extent, not merely to the Elbe, but to the eastern frontier of the Duchy of Warsaw, that is, to the Niemen.

The immediate object of Napoleon undoubtedly was to impose peace upon England by arraying the weight of the whole Continent against her. He could not command the sea, and so subdue England: but he would attain, as he hoped, the same object by commanding the land. The mediation of the Tsar was not likely to lead to anything: in any case it would not delay the Napoleonic operations long, for it had to be accepted by England within a month. The only place where at the moment, in Napoleon's view, England might seek to make a breach in his "Continental System," was Turkey. But Napoleon had provided for this. He was to offer his mediation to Turkey, and if anything came of this the ensuing treaty would not be favourable to England. If the mediation were not accepted, the Russian troops, even if they had evacuated the Principalities, would re-occupy them, as under the Patent Treaty of Tilsit the Turks were not to re-enter the Provinces before peace was made with England. Besides, although article 23 of the Patent Treaty stipulated that the Russian troops should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, this was done just to put the Turks in a good frame of mind for making costly peace with Russia: and Napoleon had privately assured the Tsar, verbally, that the Russian troops need not be evacuated from the provinces.¹

If the Patent Treaty of July 7 seemed to put the Continent at

¹ Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, p. 219: Instructions to Tolstoi, on proceeding as Russian ambassador to Paris, September 26, 1807. Cp. Instructions of Napoleon to Caulaincourt, November 12, 1807, in Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 508-9.

the disposal of Napoleon and Alexander, and especially of Napoleon, the Secret Articles of the same date aimed at a still more drastic tightening of the "Continental System." The actual text of these articles was one of the best-kept secrets in the whole of diplomatic history. A complete text was not issued until 1891.¹ Yet it was not very difficult for a British Secretary of State to guess that there were Secret Articles, and even to divine their intention.

These articles were as follows: The Russian troops were to hand over the Bocche di Cattaro to French troops (art. 1). The Ionian Isles were to be possessed by France in full sovereignty (art. 2). Alexander agreed to recognise Joseph not merely as King of Naples, but also as King of Sicily; the legitimate King to be compensated with the Balearic Isles or with Crete (art. 4). Article 5 was a concession won by Alexander for the King of Prussia: if Hanover, the fate of which was still in suspense, should be united to the Kingdom of Westphalia, an equivalent area of territory—"three to four hundred thousand souls"—on the left bank of the Elbe, should be detached from Westphalia and be retroceded to Prussia; a vain article this, for Hanover was united to Westphalia but no equivalent retrocession went to Frederick William. The other articles were unimportant. The general aim of the Separate and Secret Articles was to consolidate the Continental System against England. They were not published, so that the British Government might be surprised with the *fait accompli* of French troops in Cattaro and the Ionian Isles.

Besides the Separate and Secret Articles there was still another Act signed on July 7, which likewise remained a mystery for many years,² although George Canning, almost as soon as the ink was dry, guessed at least part of it, and by a lightning stroke of action pulled out the keystone of the whole secret arch. The Act was called the Treaty of Alliance.

Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance engaged France and Russia to support each other, by land and sea, "in every war" which they

¹ In Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, Appendix. Bignon, *Histoire de France* (1830), VI, 347, gives only a very defective analysis.

² The copy of Napoleon, which was kept in the *Ministère des Affaires étrangères* at Paris, disappeared in 1815. The copy of Alexander was preserved at St. Petersburg, and first published by Tatistcheff in *Alexandre I^{er} et Napoléon*, in 1891 (Appendix). It is in French and, like the other Russian *exemplaires* of the Tilsit Acts, is in the handwriting of Nesselrode, who was then learning his business.

"should be under the necessity of undertaking or sustaining against any European Power." In such a war, neither Contracting Party could make a treaty of peace without the consent of the other.

The mediation of the Tsar of Russia in the war between England and Napoleon was only to operate in the way in which Napoleon wished it to do. Under article 13 of the Patent Treaty the mediation had to be accepted by England within a month of the ratification of the Patent Treaty of Tilsit. Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance (secret of course) stated that even if England did accept the mediation, she must also proceed to conclude peace before November 1, and do so on the basis of recognising the perfect equality of the flag of every Power upon the sea. She must also restore all the conquests made from France or French allies since 1805. Failing to impose such a peace, the mediating Power, Russia, was to present to England an ultimatum which "shall contain the positive and explicit declaration that on the refusal of England to conclude peace on the conditions aforesaid, the Emperor of all the Russias shall make common cause with France."

Article 5 carried still further the plan for beating down England :

If the case foreseen in the preceding article arises, the High Contracting Parties shall in concert, and at the same moment, summon the three Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm and Lisbon, to close their ports to the English, to recall their ambassadors from London and to declare war upon England. Whichever of the three Courts refuses this shall be treated as an enemy by the High Contracting Parties ; if Sweden refuses, Denmark shall be constrained to declare war upon her.

Thus the maritime States of Scandinavia as well as Portugal were to be brought into the gigantic coalition against England. With Austria, too, the High Contracting Parties were to "insist with force," to induce her to adopt the principle of article 4, that is, to make common cause against England (art. 6). If England did actually consent to make peace on the hard conditions of article 4, Hanover would be restored to her "in compensation for the French, Spanish and Dutch Colonies" (art. 7).

Lastly, France and Russia raised their masks, or at least partially raised them, to each other, regarding Turkey. If the Porte did not accept French mediation, or if, having accepted it, it did not make a satisfactory peace, "France shall make common cause with Russia against the Ottoman Porte, and the two High Con-

tracting Parties shall come to an understanding to take away from the yoke and vexations of the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman empire in Europe, except the town of Constantinople and the province of Rumelia " (art. 8).

The treaty between France and Prussia was signed on July 9, at Tilsit; it merely repeated the provisions respecting Prussia which were already contained in the Franco-Russian treaty. Frederick William lost one-third of his territory and nearly half of his subjects—about four and a half million out of a total population of ten million.¹ Besides this, all Prussian ports had to be closed to the navigation and commerce of the English (art. 27). The evacuation of French troops from Prussia was to be arranged by a special Convention (art. 28). By an additional article Prussia was bound to make common cause with France against England, if England by December 1 should not conclude peace "on terms reciprocally honourable for the two nations and consistent with the true principles of maritime law."

This Prussian Treaty of Tilsit contained many stings for Frederick William, and nothing can have been more humiliating to him than the loss of one-third of his ancestral dominions. But the real instrument of torture was contained in the Convention which, on the basis of article 28 of the Tilsit Treaty, was signed at Königsberg on July 12, to arrange for the withdrawal of the French garrisons. This Convention was really a means by which Napoleon could and did defer indefinitely the evacuation of Prussian territory. The first few articles of the Convention of Königsberg were quite satisfactory: the French troops were to evacuate Prussia by definite stages. By August 20, they were to be withdrawn from "Old Prussia" as far as the Vistula; by September 5 from Old Prussia as far as the Oder; by October 1 from all Prussia as far as the Elbe, and also from Silesia by October 1, "which will make two months and a half for the entire evacuation of the Kingdom" (art. 2). But article 4 contained the means for nullifying all the stipulations for evacuation: "the above dispositions shall take place at the appointed dates, when the contributions imposed on the country shall have been paid." Thus an indemnity, of undefined amount, was to be paid by Prussia: it would be possible for Napoleon by imposing payments beyond the capacity of Prussia to defer the evacuation for ever; and if the Prussian Government

¹ This is the statistic of Madame Junot, *Memoirs*, III, 324.

contested the charges which Napoleon imposed, and pressed for diminution, Napoleon could refuse to make concessions. Payment would still be in default: the French occupation would continue. The longer the French occupation continued, the less chance Prussia would have of being able to pay off any indemnity, owing to the charges of the French troops and the dislocation of trade. So the occupation would become permanent. Simple, dishonest, cynical, Napoleon's method of veiled annexation was put in practice, and French troops remained in Prussia until driven out by force in 1813.

The results, however, of the wonderful Tilsit schemes were a little disappointing. Napoleon had detached the powerful Russia from the Coalition, but England still defied him and ruled the seas. If this persistent enemy were to be brought to her knees, the terms of Napoleon's secret alliance with Russia must be put in force—that is, the maritime States of Portugal, Sweden and Denmark must be marshalled against her. And the first real step to England's downfall would come when Denmark was induced to close the Sound against England, and to add the Danish Navy to the maritime forces of France. Now the Secret Treaty of Alliance was not known to the English Foreign Office; but when Napoleon and Alexander met on the raft at Tilsit on June 25 and 26, people who heard of the meetings may have guessed that some alliance was brewing. Yet to guess that the alliance included a scheme to seize the Danish fleet in order to compel it to fight England was really an inspiration which few people could have, and fewer still make up their minds promptly to act upon. One hesitates whether to admire more George Canning's power of inference, or the swift assurance with which he acted on it.

Mystery has always clung around Canning's action, and historians have speculated on it for over a hundred years. Yet the facts seem simple enough. On July 16 George Canning received a dispatch from the British Minister at Copenhagen enclosing a letter written from Memel by a Prussian, or Russian, probably in British pay. In this letter, which was dated June 26, the writer mentioned that "yesterday an interview took place at Tilsit on a *pont volant* in the middle of the river between Bonaparte and the Emperor of Russia. They separated on the most amicable terms."¹ From this simple message—there is no

¹ Document in Rose, *Napoleonic Studies* (1906), p. 158, from F.O. Papers, Denmark.

record of any other—Canning surmised that the two Emperors were plotting a continental and maritime coalition against England, that Denmark was the nodal point, and that the Danish Fleet was to be their chief engine. He had not much time to think and act, so he did it at once. On the same day (July 16) on which he received the Copenhagen dispatch-bag, he drew up instructions for the sending of a British Fleet to the Sound, and demanding securities from Denmark.¹ The arrival at London on July 23 of a British Agent, Mr. Mackenzie, who had been at Tilsit at the time of the first Napoleon-Alexander interview, may have resulted in further information coming to Canning's ear. The upshot was that negotiations were opened by the British Government and carried on for the first two weeks of August, for the surrender of the Danish Fleet into pledge with Great Britain.² Compensation was to be paid at the rate of £100,000 a year. The Danish Government refused these terms, and also refused the alternative of an alliance with England against Napoleon. On August 16, troops under General Cathcart were landed on Zealand from the British Fleet.³

On September 2 (1807) Admiral Gambier opened the bombardment of Copenhagen; the capitulation was signed on September 7. Napoleon might well have said of the English, as Hyder Ali did when dying, "I can defeat them by land, but I cannot dry up the sea." The Tilsit scheme was maimed almost as soon as it was made.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 161-2, from F.O. Denmark, No. 53.

² F. J. Jackson conducted the negotiations. Kiel was the place where he conferred with the Danish Minister, Count Bernstorff. See *Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson*, II, 190 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 198.

CHAPTER XIX

NAPOLEON'S FAMILY SETTLEMENT IN ITALY AND THE ANNEXATION OF THE PAPAL STATES

The Treaties of Tilsit and the Acts respecting the Confederation of the Rhine nearly completed the Grand Empire of Napoleon. By the end of the year 1807 the organisation of the Confederation of the Rhine had been achieved; by the end of 1808 the Grand Empire was at its height.

It had come to this full development by using, in addition to war, three diplomatic means—annexation, protection-alliance, family settlement. Annexation had confirmed the conquest of the “natural frontiers of France,” the Alps, and the left bank of the Rhine. Protection-alliance (which might also be called “protection” simply, or “enfeoffment”) had added to Napoleon's Imperial system, for instance, the Confederation of the Rhine and the Duchy of Warsaw. Family settlement added or was going to add Naples, Holland, Westphalia and other States, including Switzerland, now completely dominated by France.¹ The Kingdom of Italy was in a condition between annexation and protection.

The policy of family settlement was not new: it had been practised by the Habsburgs and the Bourbons in previous centuries. Napoleon was merely carrying on a tradition of the *Ancien Régime*.²

The first member of Bonaparte's family to be established as a sovereign was his eldest sister, Elisa. She was the wife of Pasquale Bacciocchi, who shared in her titles. On March 18, 1805, she was made Princess of Piombino. In the same year Lucca was added

¹ Switzerland was fairly free and prosperous internally, but Napoleon did not allow it to have any foreign policy. See Swiss Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to F. von Müller, January 24, 1810: “Switzerland has ceased to be an independent State, and we could easily recall our embassies without any risk” (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

² F. Masson, *Napoléon et sa famille* (1900), III, p. 194. The minute and profound researches of M. Masson have probably brought to light all that is to be known about Napoleon's relations with the members of his family.

to Elisa's dominions. As Princess of Piombino and Lucca, Elisa proved herself to be efficient in a high degree: she raised a tiny army on the Napoleonic model, she kept a court, she exploited the mines and quarries, and she developed the commerce of her territories. When Napoleon wished to prevent all trade of Great Britain with the Continent, Elisa complacently closed the customs-houses of Lucca and Piombino; and in return for this concession Napoleon made her Governor of Tuscany with the title of Grand Duchess (March 2, 1809).

Elisa's Grand Duchy was completely "enfeoffed" to Napoleon. It had gone through various transitions. In 1801 the Treaty of Lunéville had made it into a Kingdom of Etruria for the dispossessed Duke of Parma and his wife the Spanish Infanta Maria Louisa. In 1808, however, Napoleon had begun his unfortunate adventure against Spain, and so he had no reason to benefit the Spanish Bourbons. He had therefore annexed the Kingdom of Etruria, and made it into French Departments (May 11, 1808). When he made Elisa Grand Duchess of Tuscany (it was no longer called Etruria), her position was defined in the Napoleonic decree of March 2, 1809, as merely "Governor General of the Departments of Tuscany."¹ Thus Florence, Leghorn, Lucca, and the Island of Elba were held fast in the Napoleonic system.

Napoleon's diplomatic relations with Elisa were those of a master whose will must prevail. When, as Princess of Lucca and Piombino, she wished to strike money with the motto *Napoleone protegge l'Italia*, the Emperor sent a Decision from Fontainebleau: "This type is not suitable: what is intended to be put in place of *God protect France* is indecent."² When she was Grand Duchess of Tuscany Elisa thought of establishing a casino for gambling at Florence, but Napoleon would not have it:

My sister, take care that no sort of games be established at Florence. I do not allow any, either at Turin or in any part of the Empire: this is a cause of ruin to families, and a bad example to give. I only allow them at Paris, because, in this immense city, it is not possible to prevent them, and because they are useful to the police. But my intention is that there shall not be gaming in any other part of the Empire.³

On the following day he is writing to Elisa to bid her fortify

¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, IV, 457.

² *Décision*, November 11, 1807. *Corr.*, No. 13348.

³ Paris, April 6, 1809, *Corr.*, No. 15024.

Leghorn against the English, and burn down the suburbs, for military reasons ;¹ and another letter, also of April 7, 1809, notifies her that the Emperor has included Elba in the 29th Military Division.² Clearly, Elisa's position was merely that of deputy for Napoleon.³

After Elisa, Joseph became a sovereign. In January, 1805, he left the life of luxurious domesticity which he so much esteemed, at Mortefontaine and the Palais Luxembourg, and went, at Napoleon's orders, to the French Army which was to operate against the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily. He quickly subdued Naples, announced the dethronement of the old Bourbon dynasty, and began to administer the country with the good-sense that marked his character. Napoleon, however, wanted to see the suppression of trade with England, and he expected to get tribute too. "In a conquered country, good-nature is not humanity," he wrote.⁴ Joseph must be severe ; he must also be brilliant :

It is necessary to establish in the Kingdom of Naples a certain number of French families who shall be invested with fiefs. . . . In my opinion, your crown will not have any solidity if you have not around you a hundred generals, colonels and officers attached to your Household, possessing large fiefs in the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily.⁵

The mainland Joseph could, more or less, secure, but Sicily was kept out of his not too eager grasp by the British Fleet. On March 31, 1806, Napoleon issued a decree making Joseph King of Naples and Sicily : but he had said to Miot de Melito, who left Paris shortly before this for Naples :

"You will tell him that I am making him King of Naples, that he remains Grand Elector, and that I am making no change in his relations with France. But tell him that the least hesitation, the slightest vacillation, will ruin him utterly."⁶ Nevertheless, constitutionally, Joseph (owing to the fact that he was not anxious to be a king) was left very free by Napoleon. The Kingdom of Naples

¹ *Ibid.*, No. 15025.

² *Ibid.*, No. 15026.

³ As Napoleon's agent, however, she had great power, and could use her discretion, provided that she reported all her acts. This is seen in her ecclesiastical policy, about which there are some interesting letters from Elisa to the Emperor, for the year 1813, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1695.

⁴ Masson, *Napoléon et sa famille*, III, 242.

⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 243. The fiefs were to be obtained by confiscation of old Crown lands or of monastic property—"thus diminishing the number of convents," adds Napoleon parenthetically.

⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 245. Miot de Melito, *Memoirs* (trans. 1881), II, 156.

was not charged with the duty of providing either tribute or military contingent to the Imperial Army: its only tie was the federative bond indicated by the title of Grand Elector of France.¹ Joseph even avoided creating the fiefs which Napoleon desired for French Generals, and the Emperor had to be content with making Bernadotte Prince of Ponte Corvo, and Talleyrand Prince of Benevento, two *enclaves* of the Papal State within Neapolitan territory.

Joseph worked hard at the administration of the kingdom, maintained an army of 90,000 men, established colleges and schools, and made Naples again a centre of art and society. But he never completely conquered even the mainland territory of the Kingdom; the Peaces of Presburg and Tilsit brought no peace in South Italy; and far from being able to send subsidies to Napoleon, he received them from the Imperial Treasury. Naples became "an open wound" ² of the Empire, like Spain, to which Joseph had to betake himself in May, 1808. Joachim Murat then became King of Naples.

The next principality in the family system was Guastalla, a territory of a few square miles and ten thousand inhabitants; it had been a dependency of the Duchy of Parma. On March 30, 1806, Napoleon ceded it to his second sister, Paulette, under the more distinguished name of Pauline, which she now assumed. Pauline, whose first husband Leclerc had died on the St. Domingo expedition, was now Princess Borghese by her second marriage. She had no sooner received the Duchy of Guastalla than she retroceded it to Napoleon for the sum of 6,000,000 francs, paid by the Kingdom of Italy; ³ it was then incorporated in the Kingdom.

The Kingdom of Italy consisted of Lombardy, Venetia, Istria (without Trieste),⁴ Dalmatia, Guastalla, and the Papal Legations. It had been known (in the days before it was so extended territorially) as the Italian Republic, before Bonaparte became Emperor. After the year 1804, however, it was an anomaly that the same man should be both Emperor of the French and President of the Italian Republic. The Austrian Government, moreover, had views about Italy; and although it had lost Lombardy and Venetia, it still hoped to secure, by diplomacy, that Italy and France should not

¹ Masson, *op. cit.*, III, 246.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 73.

³ Decree of May 24, 1806. See Masson, *op. cit.*, III, 335.

⁴ Trieste was ceded to France by Austria by the Treaty of Vienna or Schönbrunn, October 14, 1809 (see below, p. 230). It was incorporated in France along with Dalmatia, which the Kingdom of Italy was induced to cede on March 3, 1810.

be united. The Italians themselves took this view. They were ardent for Italian unity, and recognised that this could only be achieved at present by Napoleon: but they wished that Italy should be constitutionally separated from France, although united to it by some form of treaty or federal bond.

Napoleon seems to have thought this a reasonable view; so at the end of the year 1804 he offered to make Joseph King of Italy, on condition that he should renounce his right to the Imperial throne. On January 14, 1805, Napoleon actually caused to be drafted a "Pragmatic Statute" incorporating these terms.¹ Joseph, however, refused. Lucien Bonaparte was next thought of; but here too Napoleon's terms were found unacceptable. At last the Emperor decided to keep the Kingdom of Italy, crowned himself at Milan on May 26, 1805,² and named his stepson Eugène Beauharnais, a gay soldier of twenty-four years of age, as his vice-gerent.

Although called Italy, the Kingdom was only a fragment of the Peninsula. Parma and Piacenza, and Piedmont, and the former Ligurian Republic (Genoa) were part of the Empire, and formed French Departments.

The Kingdom of Italy was not held quite so securely as the purely Imperial Italy, for Bonaparte, before assuming the Crown, had declared that when a general peace should be made, the Crowns of Italy and of France should be separated in perpetuity.³ Austria managed to have note of this declaration inserted in the Treaty of Presburg, as article 5 (December 26, 1805).

The whole of Italy has now been accounted for except the States of the Church, which (*minus* the Legations) were still in 1805 under the rule of Pope Pius VII. The annexation of the States of the Church (which took place in 1808) was, like all the results of Napoleon's war and diplomacy, not due to a carefully thought-out system, but to the logic of events: ⁴ it is doubtful whether Napoleon ever looked further than one step at a time.

¹ Document in Masson, *op. cit.*, III, 12 ff. An analysis in Miot de Melito, *Memoirs* (trans. 1881), II, 108.

² See Napoleon to Cambacérès, May 27, 1805 (*Corr.*, No. 8796). *Moniteur*, June 4, 1805, p. 1057.

³ Discourse to the Senate, March 17, 1805, in Thiers, *op. cit.*, V, 284-5. Cp. *ibid.*, p. 279.

⁴ The annexation of the Papal States had, however, been long expected. Cp. Dispatch of Khevenhüller from Rome, June 7, 1806, reporting interview with the Pope, who said "he would not allow his throat to be cut without crying out" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 378).

For about two years after the signing of the Concordat of 1801¹ there were good relations between France and the Papacy. The Concordat was followed by the creation of three French cardinals, among whom was Fesch. Cacault, the French ambassador at Rome, had won the esteem of Pius VII. On April 9, 1803, however, Cacault was notified of his supersession as ambassador by Fesch, who, it was thought, being uncle of Bonaparte and a cardinal, would give more grandeur to the French Embassy.² But Cacault's departure was a real loss to Franco-Papal relations : it is said that when he took his leave of Pius VII and of Consalvi, they, as well as himself, had tears in their eyes.³

Fesch arrived at Rome on July 2, 1803, bringing with him as Secretary, Chateaubriand, whose *Génie de Christianisme* was already almost a religious classic. The new ambassador made a poor show, compared with his brilliant Secretary, who besides being a famous author was a nobleman, and a man of wit and fashion. Fesch, on the other hand, though his moral conduct was much better than that of Chateaubriand, was a bad ambassador. He was avaricious, and, although he had 150,000 francs of salary, kept a meagre table and a small household ; and he had not the tactful, amiable ways of Cacault, whose manners were perfect. Fesch soon irritated the Curia, probably unavoidably, by having to press for the extradition of a French *émigré*, who was considered dangerous to Bonaparte. The news of the seizure and execution of the Duc d'Enghien (March 20, 1804) further estranged Pius VII from the First Consul. That this should be the effect of the murder of the Duc d'Enghien was inevitable, although probably Fesch might have handled the episode more skilfully. It was little more than a month later that Bonaparte had the *Sénatus-Consulte* passed, which made him Emperor (May 18, 1804).

This legal declaration of the Empire was to be followed by a solemn coronation. Bonaparte opened negotiations with Caprara, the Papal Legate at Paris, with a view to the Pope personally coming to crown him. Charlemagne and his successors, the Medieval Holy Roman Emperors, had gone to Rome for coronation. But to invite the Pontiff to make the long journey across the Alps in order to crown a new sort of Emperor at Paris, was something

¹ See above, p. 85

² Masson, *Napoléon et sa famille* (1898), II, 208.

³ Welschinger, *Le Pape et l'Empereur* (1905), p. 9.

beyond the dreams of Charlemagne, Otto the Great, or Barbarossa, men of simpler character, and perhaps of a grander mould than Napoleon. Nevertheless, Pius VII, although surprised and perturbed by the invitation, consented to come. Napoleon, whose mind no detail escaped, arranged to pay the whole expenses of the journey. A large number of Notes were sent between the Curia and the *Ministère des Relations extérieures* before Pius VII definitely made up his mind. The formal invitation of the Emperor did not arrive at Rome until September 2, 1804. Pius VII consented, in the hope of strengthening the Church in France, and especially of obtaining some relaxation in the Organic Laws.

The Pope set forth from Rome on November 2, 1804, accompanied by six cardinals, of whom the best known was Leonardo Antonelli,¹ and several bishops. The Imperial Treasury provided generously for his suite; the company travelled in forty-four carriages, with two hundred and fifty-one horses.² On November 25 the procession reached the Forest of Fontainebleau, and was met by Napoleon, who was out hunting at the time. The meeting was probably not accidental. It gave Napoleon the opportunity to show his superiority to the etiquette of the monarchs of old Europe. He rode his horse up to the Pope's carriage; Pius VII put aside ceremony, got down from his carriage and embraced the Emperor. He was then driven to the palace of Fontainebleau. On November 28 he was installed at Paris in the Tuileries, in apartments furnished and decorated to look precisely like his favourite rooms at Monte Cavallo and the Vatican.

On December 1, the evening before the coronation, the Empress Josephine, suspecting that Napoleon might one day divorce her, came to the Pope and informed him that her marriage with the Emperor had been a purely civil function. Pius was touched in his deep religious sentiments, and declared that he could not take part in the coronation unless the marriage was regularised by the rites of the Church. Napoleon therefore had to allow Fesch, who had come from Rome for the coronation, to perform the marriage ceremony. Thus Napoleon was tied more tightly to Josephine, when he was apparently meditating to undo the looser civil bond.

¹ He was Cardinal-Priest, and Dean of the Sacred College. He died in 1811. Consalvi remained in charge of affairs at Rome while Pius VII went to Paris (Consalvi, *Mémoires*, II, 401).

² Welschinger, *op. cit.*, p. 27, note 1, from the *Archives Nationales*.

But on the next day, December 2, at the coronation Napoleon reasserted his independence, and effectively rebuffed the Pontiff. At the grand ceremony in Notre Dame he received the oath, the holy oil, the ring, mantle, the "hand of justice," and the sceptre from the Pope: but when Pius turned to the altar to take the crown and place it on the Emperor's head, Napoleon quickly passed the hand of justice to the arch-chancellor (Cambacérès), and the sceptre to the arch-treasurer (Lebrun), and, stepping to the altar, crowned himself. Pius, surprised, retained his dignity, and gave his blessing to the Emperor. Then Josephine knelt at the altar, and Napoleon crowned her also.

The Pope remained at the Tuileries until February 23, 1805. He re-entered Rome on May 16.¹ The journey had done him good. He was, for a time, quite vivacious and spirited.² So when Napoleon wrote to him on May 24, asking him to annul the marriage contracted at Baltimore between Jerome Bonaparte and Miss Patterson, "a Protestant daughter of an American merchant,"³ Pius VII summoned up courage to refuse. Napoleon naturally was angry at the refusal, although it did not stop him, for he annulled the marriage by an Imperial edict.

In October, 1805, war began again between France and Austria. Napoleon immediately ordered General Gouvion St. Cyr to occupy Ancona, which was part of the Papal States. It was the only reasonably good port on the Italian side of the Adriatic between Bari and Venice. Pius VII protested in a letter of November 13, 1805. In this he said: "The obligations which we have contracted towards our subjects force us to demand from your Majesty the evacuation of Ancona, on the refusal of which we do not see how the continuation of relations with the Minister of your Majesty at Rome can be agreed upon."⁴

Napoleon received Pius VII's letter on November 23, but being on the point of fighting the battle of Austerlitz, he put it aside until he had triumphed over his enemies. He then wrote to the Pope (Jan. 7, 1806):

I consider myself as Protector of the Holy See, and it is by this title that I have occupied Ancona. I have considered myself, like my pre-

¹ Artaud, *Histoire du Pape Pie VII* (1836), II, 55. ² *Ibid.*, II, 56.

³ Napoleon to Pius VII, May 24, 1805, printed in Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 62-4. The letter of refusal is also printed at length by Artaud (II, 67-71).

⁴ Letter in Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 109.

decessors of the second and third race, as eldest Son of the Church. . . . I repeat, if your Holiness wishes to send away my Minister, you are free to do so ; you are free to welcome by preference both the English and the caliph of Constantinople.¹

Pius returned a dignified and soft answer (January 29, 1806), to which Napoleon replied on February 13 : "*Your Holiness is the Sovereign of Rome, but I am her Emperor.*"² He then went on to demand that Pius should close his ports to English ships. Pius refused to depart from his neutrality. Thus the relations of Napoleon and the Papacy went from bad to worse.

On June 16, 1806, a Note was delivered to Consalvi, through Alquier,³ French ambassador at Rome, to the effect that Napoleon had given the Principality of Benevento to Talleyrand, and the Principality of Ponte Corvo to Bernadotte. These principalities had, since the early Middle Ages, been claimed as Papal fiefs. This only stiffened the attitude of Pius. He instructed his new Secretary of State Casoni (who had replaced Consalvi as Secretary of State on June 17) to protest against the Berlin Decree. This note of defiance reached Napoleon amid the snows at Ostrolenka. The military and political circumstances at the moment did not allow Napoleon to treat the Pope's *obstinacy* (to use Alquier's word)⁴ as he thought it deserved. Yet he kept his eye on Rome. On July 15, 1807, there died at Rome the Cardinal of York, sometimes called Henry IX. He was the last of the House of Stuart. When Napoleon heard of the death, he said : "If the Stuarts had only left a child of eight years, I would have placed him on the throne of Great Britain."⁵

By this time Napoleon had made peace and alliance with Russia at Tilsit, and had his hands free to tackle the Pope. The tone of the Emperor's correspondence became much more minatory.⁶ In

¹ Text in Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 113-14. *Corr.*, No. 9655.

² *Votre Sainteté est Souveraine de Rome, mais j'en suis l'Empereur.* The whole letter is in Artaud, II, 120-2.

³ Napoleon withdrew Cardinal Fesch from Rome and put Alquier, a mere secular official, in his place (May, 1806), to mark the Imperial irritation at the Pope's conduct. Consalvi (*Mémoires*, II, 453) says that Napoleon left Pius to get the news about Benevento and Ponte Corvo from the newspapers. But Artaud prints the Note of Napoleon (*op. cit.*, II, 147).

⁴ Alquier wrote from Rome to Talleyrand towards the end of 1806, "Your Highness cannot have forgotten what I have constantly said about the *obstinate* resistance of the Pope, and of the impossibility which I find of overcoming it" (letter in Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 158).

⁵ Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 165-6.

⁶ See letter of July 22, 1807, in Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 168-9, to Beauharnais.

August (1807) Talleyrand was replaced as Minister of Exterior Relations by Champagny. Shortly afterwards a rumour went round Rome that the Emperor himself was coming to the Holy City. It was believed at Rome also that the Tsar Alexander had said significantly to Napoleon: "*I am not troubled with ecclesiastical affairs: I am the head of my Church.*"¹ On January 10, 1808, Napoleon put an end to all doubts regarding his attitude towards the Temporal Power. He ordered General Miollis, who was in Tuscany, to concentrate troops at Perugia, and from there to march to Rome.

The General Miollis, on his arrival,

will take possession of the Castle of Sant' Angelo, will render to the Pope all possible honours, and will declare that he has a mission to occupy Rome and the Castle of Sant' Angelo in order to stop the brigands of the Kingdom of Naples who seek refuge there. He will cause to be arrested the consul and agents of the King Ferdinand, the English consul and the individual English who are at Rome. . . . It is very important that the greatest secrecy be kept with regard to this expedition.²

Miollis occupied Rome and the castle on February 2. Although Miollis was to proclaim that the occupation was to be a transitory measure, the following Imperial message was sent in cipher to Alquier, who was still representing France at Rome:

The intention of the Emperor is to accustom . . . the people of Rome and the French troops to live together, in order that, if the Court of Rome continues to show itself as misguided as it is, it shall have insensibly ceased to exist as a temporal Power, without anyone being aware of this.³

On April 1, 1808, the Emperor gave to Champagny a Note to be handed to Caprara, the Papal envoy at Paris. This Note demanded that the Pope should enter into an offensive and defensive league: if he refused, he would lose his temporal power.

This will not make the Pope lose anything of his spiritual rights:

A copy of this was forwarded to the Pope by Beauharnais: *Le Pape actuel est trop puissant. . . . Pourquoi le Pape ne veut-il pas rendre à César ce qui est à César*, etc. The complete letter is in *Corr.*, No. 12942.

¹ Artaud, II, 174. Napoleon did visit Italy, but went no farther than Venice.

² To Eugène Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy: *Corr.*, 13441. King Ferdinand was the legitimate King of Naples, whose kingdom was now under Joseph Bonaparte.

³ To Champagny, January 22, 1808: *Corr.*, 13477.

he will be Bishop of Rome, as his predecessors were in the first eight centuries, and under Charlemagne.¹

Before this ultimatum could reach the Pope, an Imperial decree declared the Papal provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino to be annexed to the Kingdom of Italy (April 2, 1808). Pius VII protested against this annexation, but he does not appear to have replied directly to Napoleon's ultimatum.² On April 21, a picket of French soldiers arrested Monsignor Cavalchini, the Governor of Rome.

Throughout the rest of the year 1808, and the first part of 1809, this tense struggle of passivity against force continued. At last, on June 10, 1809, the Papal flag was taken down from the Castle of Sant' Angelo, and the French flag unfurled in its place. A decree of Napoleon, ordering the union of the Roman States with the Empire, was published.³ Early next morning, the people who first went out into the streets near the Palazzo Venezia were surprised at seeing a Papal bull of excommunication⁴ posted up on the wall of the Church of St. Mark. The bull had been drafted for some time, and the courageous Pope had put his signature to it when he had heard of the Imperial decree of annexation.⁵ In the previous year, Joseph Bonaparte had been nominated King of Spain, and the inhabitants of Saragossa had risen against the French troops. A Spanish deputation was secretly in Rome, bearing congratulations to the Pope on his resistance to Napoleon.⁶ On the night of July 4, the Quirinal was entered by French soldiers under General Radet, and Pius VII was made prisoner. He was taken to Florence, Grenoble, Avignon, and at last to Savona, in the beginning of August (1809). Savona was in the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon ejected the Bishop of the place from his "palace" and put it at the disposal of the Pope.

¹ *Corr.*, No. 13709. The policy of secularisation, which in 1803 Bonaparte applied to Germany, he was now applying to the Papal States. Cp. *Maximes et bases fondamentales*, January, 1803: (the principles of secularisation) "shall be likewise applied to the States of the Bishop of Rome" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Allemagne* 722).

² There is no document in Artaud or Welschinger.

³ Artaud, *op. cit.*, II, 206. The decree is in *Corr.*, No. 15219. It is dated May 17, 1809, from "the Imperial Camp at Vienna."

⁴ The bull, called *Quum Memoranda*, did not mention Napoleon by name; it was directed against those who promoted the spoliation which the Holy See had experienced: Artaud, II, 210.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 208-10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 197.

CHAPTER XX

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

In making the Revolution, the French did not emancipate themselves from the ideas of the Ancien Régime: they only pursued these ideas with less moderation. And if this is true in respect of the frontier-policy of France, it is no less true, in respect of her policy in economic affairs. "Colbertism," the policy of the famous minister of Louis XIV, had been rigidly protective at home, rigidly exclusive of importation. A small relaxation in the fiscal barriers of France had been made by the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786: but this treaty is considered to have contributed to the unpopularity of the French Monarchy, and to have weakened its hold on the country.

The French Revolutionary Governments quickly went back to the old system, and the foreign wars in which they became involved were bound to increase this tendency. Thus on September 21, 1793, a law of the Convention declared to be excluded from French ports all goods not carried in French ships or the ships of neutrals. A law of three years later, October 31, 1796, declared that the duty of the Government was to promote French industry, and to shut out the products of the enemy. Thus the Continental System which everyone now connects with the name of Napoleon had already been in existence in an elementary form under the Convention and the Directory. When Bonaparte became First Consul he continued this policy: "the mania for the prohibition of English trade was never greater than at the beginning of the Consulate."¹ It was, in fact, almost the only weapon left which could be used against England.² At the Peace of Amiens the British Government

¹ J. H. Rose on the Continental System in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. IX, chap. XIII, p. 363.

² See Minute signed by Bonaparte and dated 5 Nivose, An 6 (December 25, 1797), in which he says that there is practically no longer any chance of invading England; "the true moment to prepare for this expedition is lost perhaps for ever" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687).

tried to re-establish a system of reciprocal concessions in Anglo-French commercial relations, but the French Government would not hear of this.¹

When the war of the Third Coalition broke out, the French tendency towards a policy of Protection and exclusion was naturally only further increased. States subject to, or in alliance with, France, such as the Kingdom of Italy and Holland, had to close their ports to British ships. One by one other States were forced into this "system"—Spain, Naples, and others. When Prussia made her fatal alliance with France on February 15, 1806, she had to promise (by article 4) to close her ports to British shipping and commerce: and Prussia's observance of this rule brought on a state of war with England and the blockade of the Prussian coast by the English navy, in April and May, 1806.² Article 35 of the Act constituting the Confederation of the Rhine (July 12, 1806) declared that each and all the States of the Confederation were automatically involved in any Continental war waged by any one of the Contracting Parties. Thus these States were involved in Napoleon's system of commerce in so far as they were not permitted to trade with the enemy.

But a system of foreign commerce based upon treaties negotiated piecemeal with various States did not satisfy Napoleon. His military victories in Central Europe in 1805 and 1806 gave him the opportunity of making his commercial system on the Continent, as it were, watertight. In the month after the battle of Jena, when he was staying triumphantly in the Prussian capital, Napoleon issued the first written constitution of the Continental System. The object of the Decree of Berlin was explained in a message from Napoleon, dated from Berlin on November 19, 1806, to the Imperial Senate at Paris.³ This important message begins thus:

Senators, we wish, in the circumstances in which the general affairs of Europe are involved, to make known to you and to the nation the principles which we have adopted as the rule of our policy.

The Emperor then goes on to state that his moderation after

¹ See above, p. 95.

² See Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. VI, pp. 806, 891 ff. The King's message of April 21, 1806, announced the withdrawal of British Ministers from the Court of Prussia, and the adoption of "*measures of just retaliation against the commerce and navigation of Prussia.*" Amicable relations were resumed when Prussia broke with Napoleon in September, 1806 (*Diaries of Sir George Jackson*, 1872, vol. II, pp. 1-11).

³ *Corr.*, No. 11281.

each of the first three wars has only caused another war to follow : “ it is thus that we have had to fight against a Fourth Coalition, nine months after the Third had been dissolved ” : and this in spite of *éclatantes* victories. These victories had failed to bring about a real peace, because

a great number of the Cabinets of Europe are sooner or later influenced by England : and without a solid peace with that Power, our people cannot enjoy the benefits which are the prime aim of our labours, the unique object of our life.

Therefore, in order to force these obstinate Islanders to recognise the Napoleonic Empire

we have put the Britannic Isles in a state of blockade, and we have given command for arrangements against them which are repugnant to our heart. It has cost us pangs to make the interests of individuals depend upon the quarrels of kings, and to return, after so many years of civilisation, to the principles which characterise the barbarism of the first ages of the nations : but we have been compelled, for the good of our peoples and our allies, to oppose to the enemy the same arms as they used against us.

This resolution, Napoleon continued, might “ defer for some time the re-establishment of the general peace . . . but we are certain that our peoples will appreciate the wisdom of our political motives ” ; for in the end, the new system would (it was hoped) result in a real peace instead of a “ truce.” The Emperor fully realised that he was making his final throw : that after the Decree there would be no middle course between the destruction of the British Empire and the destruction of the Napoleonic.

We are in one of those important moments for the destinies of nations : and the French people will show itself worthy of that which awaits it. The *Senatus-consultum* which we have ordered to be proposed to you, and which will place at our disposition, in the first days of the year, the conscription of 1807, which, in ordinary circumstances, ought not to be levied until the month of September, will be carried out with eagerness by the fathers and by the children. And at what finer moment could we call the young Frenchmen to arms ? To betake themselves to their standards, they will have to traverse the capitals of our enemies and the battlefields made famous by the victories of their elder brothers.

Thus it is clear that Napoleon did not underrate the seriousness of the step which he was taking. In one final prolonged effort to break the power of England and so to have his will in Europe and

in the world, he was going to set aside the Law of Nations : and the success or failure of this effort would settle, without any chance of compromise, whether his empire should stand or fall.

The Decree of Berlin was issued on November 21, 1806.¹ It began by reciting in eight clauses the grievances which Napoleon alleged against English maritime policy : the Decree then continued in these words :

The dispositions of the present Decree shall be constantly considered as a fundamental principle of the Empire, until England shall have recognised that the law of war is one and the same on land and on sea ; that it cannot be extended to private property, of whatever kind, nor to the person of individuals who are strangers to the profession of arms, and that the law of blockade ought to be restricted to strong places really invested by sufficient forces.

We have in consequence decreed and decree as follows :

Article 1—The British Isles are declared in state of blockade.

Article 2—All commerce and all correspondence with the British Isles are interdicted.

In consequence, letters or packets addressed either in England, or to an Englishman, or written in the English tongue, shall not pass in the posts, and shall be seized.

Article 3—Every individual subject of England, of whatever state or condition he be, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or by those of our allies, shall be made prisoner of war.²

Article 4—Every store, all merchandise, all property, of whatever nature it may be, belonging to a subject of England, shall be declared good prize.

Article 5—Commerce in English merchandise is forbidden, and all merchandise belonging to England, or coming from her factories and from her colonies, is declared good prize.

The rest of the Decree concerns prize-courts and kindred matters. Article 10 states that the Decree shall be communicated to Spain, Naples, Holland, Etruria and the other allies—it did not say that they would be bound to accept it, although they actually were to be compelled. As a matter of fact the first thing which Napoleon did after issuing the Decree was to order Marshal Mortier to occupy with troops the Hanseatic cities Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck, and to blockade (from the land side) the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser.³

¹ Full text in *Corr.*, No. 11283, and De Clercq, II, 194.

² Napoleon had already made English travellers prisoners of war on the rupture of the Peace of Amiens (*see above*, p. 129).

³ *Corr.*, 11284, 11285 (November 21, 1806).

The following years were a period of tense economic strain between Great Britain and the Napoleonic Empire and Napoleonic Allies. Napoleon's diplomacy, as well as his military measures, were directed towards drawing ever tighter the bonds of the Continental System. The British Government, on the other hand, had two predominant aims in its attitude to the Continental System: firstly it aimed at keeping the seas open, so that any neutrals who cared to do so could trade with Great Britain. Secondly, it attempted to penalise such neutral States as adhered to the Continental System. The first aim, that of keeping the seas open, was achieved, in spite of the efforts of French privateers, by the British Navy. The second aim, that of penalising all who adhered to the Continental System, was carried out under various Orders in Council, which were issued in reply to the Berlin Decree and to its subsequent extensions. The first British Order in Council dealing with the Continental System was issued on January 7, 1807.¹ It declared:

That no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both which ports shall belong to or be in the possession of France or her allies, or shall be so far under their control, as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat.¹

Subsequent Orders in Council increased the pressure upon neutral States, so that even Governments (as well as individual traders) should be constrained to defy Napoleon and to evade his Decrees.

Nobody liked the Continental System, nobody pretended to like it. The Client-States of the Napoleonic Empire really had no choice. They were compelled to put the System into force. Naples, Holland, the Confederation of the Rhine, the Kingdom of Italy, the Duchy of Warsaw,² were all in it. But they disliked it extremely. Louis Bonaparte, who had been made King of Holland on June 6, 1806, felt his heart bleed for the ills of his subjects, whose livelihood

¹ The Orders in Council are reprinted in E. F. Heckscher, *The Continental System* (1922), Appendix. They are also printed in Hansard, *Parl. Debates*, X, pp. 126-48.

² The merchants of the Duchy of Warsaw seem to have been among the first to complain. See Metakowski, President of Warsaw Merchants, to Napoleon, March 5, 1807: when the French troops entered Warsaw, the merchants were compelled to pay to the French intendant all sums due to English merchants for goods; in addition, the goods themselves were sequestrated (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687).

and prosperity depended wholly upon sea-borne commerce. But Napoleon would not allow Louis any exemption from the System : "it is the only way," wrote the Emperor, "to strike at England, and to force her to make peace. Without doubt it will cause harm to Holland and France : but it is worth while to suffer for a time and to have at last an advantageous peace."¹ Yet nothing could quite stop the Dutch from trading with Great Britain or the British Empire. "I am informed," wrote Napoleon to King Louis, on February 25, 1807, "that the commerce between Holland and England has never been more active than since the decree of blockade."²

The Continental System was not a blockade of Great Britain by France, for the French navy was incapable of attempting this. Nor was it a blockade of the French Empire by the English, for the British Government freely issued licences for trading with Europe. The Continental System was a blockade of the French Empire by itself.³ All Napoleon's ingenuity, all his diplomacy, and all his military strength were exerted for years to keep British goods, or goods carried in British ships, out of the French Empire and the territories of its allies. Nearly all the States of the Continent entered into the System, the last to join being Sweden.⁴ Only Turkey, Sicily and Portugal remained outside the System.

In so far as Napoleon was successful in excluding the products of the British Empire, France and her allies suffered distress. The clever French chemists might invent substitutes,⁵ and the Protection afforded by the blockade might give an artificial prosperity to certain trades, but this was at the expense of the consumer who received small quantities of things at high prices. Meanwhile by the English licence-system⁶ breaches were made in the blockade,

¹ To the King of Holland, December 3, 1806: *Corr.*, No. 11378.

² *Corr.*, No. 11880.

³ Cp. "The whole thing not only was, but was intended to be, a *self-denying ordinance*." See E. F. Heckscher (1922), *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴ Sweden declared that she "adopts plainly and entirely the Continental System," by treaty with France, signed at Paris, January 6, 1810 (De Clercq, II, 304).

⁵ See, for instance, the great work of J. A. Chaptal, *Chimie appliquée aux arts* (4 vols.), 1807. See also Heckscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-91. The process of making sugar from beet, although known before the French Revolution, was not exploited commercially until after the Continental System had come into force.

⁶ Heckscher, *op. cit.*, p. 205 ff. In the year 1810 the British authorities were granting 1,800 licences a month. France also had her system of licences.

and English goods percolated through Europe at innumerable points : not in sufficient quantities to keep prices in Europe low or to make goods abundant, but sufficiently to make the blockade fail to ruin British commerce. Neutral ships were encouraged to trade with Great Britain by relaxations made in the British Navigation Acts.

The British Isles were never blockaded : " Bonaparte might equally well have pretended to blockade the moon as to blockade this country." ¹ Napoleon's savage extension of his System by the Decree of Milan, December 17, 1807, ² did no harm to Great Britain, but made the position of neutral sailors and merchants still more lamentable : any ship of any nation which submitted to search by a British vessel, or which paid any British imposition, was declared to be a good prize, and would be seized on its entry into a French port (Article 2 of Decree of Milan). ³

Napoleon's only chance of making the Continental System, as it were, watertight lay in his occupying or dominating all the coasts of Europe. But only the Italian coasts were really firmly held by Napoleon ; after the occupation of the Papal States in 1808, and the annexation of Istria from Austria in 1809, the " coast system " so far as Italy was concerned was complete. In Spain and Portugal it never became more than nominally effective. In " old " France the control of French officials was probably sufficient to enforce the System, but on the Belgian coast this control was feeble, and in Holland it is said scarcely to have existed at all, ⁴ and this failure to enforce the Continental System led to the deposition of King Louis, and the annexation of Holland by the French Empire in 1810. Along the German coasts, the Continental System was continually evaded ; ⁵ and it was in order to put a stop to this that Napoleon, by treaty of May 10, 1811, detached northern Hanover and the Westphalian department of the Weser from the Kingdom of Westphalia, and annexed these districts to the French Empire. Thus the Continental System led to the further and further exten-

¹ Lord Erskine in the House of Lords, February 15, 1808 (Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. X, p. 473).

² Decree in *Corr.*, No. 13391, and *De Clercq*, II, 242.

³ *Corr.*, No. 13391.

⁴ Rambaud, *L'Allemagne sous Napoléon I*, p. 427.

⁵ Cp. a curious statement of the Duc d'Auerstädt in a letter written from his Headquarters, Hamburg, to Napoleon, February 6, 1812: " I cannot prevent the correspondence of some inhabitants of Hamburg [with England] " (*Arch. Nat.* AF IV 1657).

sion of France beyond her natural boundaries : it is to the "fatal reunions of 1811" that a French historian has attributed the ultimate fall of the Napoleonic Empire.¹ Even before these reunions, the Continental System had really failed : its ruin was inevitable after the Tsar had issued his Ukase of December 19/31, 1810 : for this Ukase, by giving preferential treatment to American shipping, opened the door to British commerce and British ships which were now freely using the American flag.²

The truth is that the Continental System was doomed to failure from the beginning. It had no chance of starving out England, for that country could always import enough commodities for her needs from her colonies and from the colonies captured from France. The self-blockade of the French Empire was designed to ruin England's export-trade, and so to ruin her indirectly, by cutting away the foundation of her wealth. If the export trade of Great Britain could be stopped, her surplus wealth would disappear, her revenue from taxation would therefore decline, and consequently she would be unable to bear the immense National Debt which she incurred in the war with France.³ But British exports never in any year failed to enter Europe. The self-blockade, however, was strict enough to raise prices enormously, and to create dissatisfaction in practically every country in Europe.⁴

¹ Rambaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 199, 466-7. Napoleon tried to force the sailors of the annexed districts to serve in his navy (Auerstädt to Emperor, January 2, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF 1654).

² Heckscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-3.

³ Talleyrand had already expounded this plan in his dispatches to Joseph Bonaparte in 1801-2. See Du Casse, *op. cit.*, I, 222.

⁴ Saxony is an exception. The Saxon textile trade flourished greatly, through the diminution of British competition (Heckscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-6).

CHAPTER XXI

THE FALL OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY

Spain, although her colonial interests were sacrificed by the Treaty of Amiens, benefited by the thirteen months of peace which ensued.¹ On May 12, 1803, however, war between England and France again started. Yet Spain was able to preserve her neutrality until the end of the year 1804. Then at last the Spanish Government was faced with a terrible choice: it must have war either with France or England. Bonaparte, in 1804 the Emperor Napoleon, would tolerate neutrality no longer, and he appeared as ready to have Spain's hostility as her alliance. He had been rebuffed in the overtures made by Lucien Bonaparte in 1803 for the marriage of the First Consul to a Spanish Bourbon princess.² He was annoyed too at the high tariffs which the Spanish Government still imposed on French goods entering Spain; and he appears to have been nervous about the increase of the Spanish Militia which Godoy as Generalissimo was reorganising. The Spaniards, on their side, naturally disliked the sale of Louisiana to the United States, for they felt that if Bonaparte was disposing of it, he should have given it back to Spain (as indeed he had, in effect, promised to do).³ However, Spain for a time seemed bound more firmly than ever to France.

Towards the end of the year 1804, the British Government found that it was necessary to treat the Spanish Government as an enemy, for Spanish neutrality only cloaked her real alliance with France. Incidents were taking place which ended with a declaration of war by Charles IV (December 12, 1804)⁴; and on January 4, 1805, a

¹ The order to evacuate was given by Bonaparte on November 21, 1801 (Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 324).

² Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 369. Bonaparte was scarcely an eligible *parti* in the eyes of the Most Catholic King, being still married to Josephine.

³ See above, p. 141.

⁴ Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 432.

Convention, signed by General Decrès for France, and Admiral Gravina for Spain, regulated the forces which each State should contribute for the war against England. Spain's quota was to be chiefly naval; she was to equip and man twenty-nine ships of the line and four frigates. In return for this contribution, Napoleon guaranteed the integrity of Spain and of her actually existing colonies. He even engaged to "employ his influence" to obtain the restitution of Trinidad by Great Britain.¹ But he made no mention of Louisiana. Such then was the Convention which ushered in the fatal year 1805.² Within ten months the navy of Spain, fighting heroically in an alien's cause, had met its doom in the battle of Trafalgar.

Napoleon, although he could not rule the sea, was master of the land, and while the campaign of Trafalgar was being fought he was going from victory to victory in Central Europe. Ulm and Austerlitz led to the dismemberment of Austria at the Treaty of Presburg; and the entry of Joseph Bonaparte into Naples (February 15, 1805) gave the Emperor of the French control of Italy to the Strait of Messina. This, however, like the battle of Trafalgar, was only a cause of grief to the Bourbon Charles IV of Spain. The expulsion of the Neapolitan Bourbons caused a sensation in the court of the elder Spanish branch.³ But a check seemed to come to the victorious career of the Imperial French in 1806 when Prussia at last declared war, and the renowned phalanxes of the Hohenzollern took the field (September 26, 1806). Now was the moment for Spain to throw off her shackles, and to remember her ancient glory. So at any rate thought Godoy, and on October 6, 1806, he issued a stirring manifesto, calling the Spaniards to arms.⁴ Although mentioning no enemy by name, the manifesto clearly was a call to war against France.

A copy of this manifesto, forwarded by the French ambassador at Madrid, reached Napoleon on the battlefield of Jena.⁵

¹ De Clercq, II, 117-19.

² Cp. Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 439: *Tál fué el célebre convenio de 4 de enero . . . y tál era el estado de las cosas cuando apuntaba el año fatal de 1805.*

³ Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 500. Charles IV was the eldest ruling branch of the House of Bourbon. Moreover, his son Ferdinand had married the daughter of the Queen of Naples.

⁴ Text of Manifesto, in French translation, in Du Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 12, note 1 (wrongly dated October 3). Spanish Text in Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 551, taken from the Ministerio de Estado.

⁵ Du Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

sake of the French : and fifteen thousand of the mobilised Spanish troops actually came to Germany and were posted at the mouth of the Elbe. But Napoleon was as astute as he was ruthless. He would use the alliance of Charles IV as long as it suited him : but he doomed the Spanish Bourbons to destruction when he read Godoy's manifesto of October 6.¹

For a time, however, no change took place in the relations between France and Spain. The alliance was maintained, and was indeed further defined. On October 27, 1807, a secret treaty was concluded between France and Spain at Fontainebleau, for the partition of Portugal. For the Portuguese had refused to close their ports to English ships (September, 1807), and therefore 40,000 French troops were at once collected at Bayonne, to invade the country through Spain.²

The Partition treaty between France and Spain arranged that the Portuguese provinces of Minho and Douro were to be given to the King of Etruria (who was to cede his Tuscan realm to Napoleon) ; his new title would be King of Northern Lusitania (art. 1). Alemtejo and Algarves were to go to Godoy with the title of King of the Algarves (art. 2). Beira, Trazos Montes and Portuguese Estremadura would be sequestered until the end of the war, when they might be restored to the House of Braganza, if England would restore Gibraltar and Trinidad to Spain (art. 8). Napoleon agreed to recognise the King of Spain as " Emperor of the Two Americas " at the general peace.³

The signing of this treaty with Spain by Napoleon's ambassador did not mean that he still regarded Spain as a friendly Power. The alliance with Spain would be useful for the Emperor's design of conquering Portugal, which refused to come completely within the Continental System. But the alliance would also admit French

¹ " Twenty times I have heard him say at Bayonne : *I swear then that they would pay me for it.*" Du Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

² See Napoleon to Champagny, September 4, 1807 (*Corr.*, No. 13106) ; to the same, September 7, 1807 (Lecestre, *op. cit.*, I, 105, and *Memoirs of Madame Junot*, chap. XXV). Junot received his orders with regard to Portugal in the last days of August. See also Baumgarten, *op. cit.*, I, 143.

³ Treaty of Fontainebleau, October 27, 1807, signed by General Duroc and Izquierdo. De Clercq, II, 235.

troops into Spain, and these troops were meant to stay there until they had reduced Spain to something like a French province. Thus Napoleon writes to his Minister of War (Clarke) on December 6, 1807 :

Give the order to General Dupont to have his headquarters at Vittoria. . . . I reckon that he will have 25,000 men. You will order him not to quit his army to go to any conference or court ; and to watch over the operations of the Spaniards, but without showing any distrust. His language ought to be that he is destined to support General Junot.¹

Napoleon also refused to publish the Convention of Fontainebleau concerning the projected partition of Portugal : ² publication would have made it difficult for him not to give Charles IV the promised share, whereas Napoleon obviously intended to keep it for himself or his own family.

Meanwhile, Portugal was to be dealt with first. On September 30, 1807, the Spanish and French ambassadors left Lisbon. On October 18 the first French troops under Junot crossed the Bidassoa into Spain, *en route* for Portugal (ten days before the Convention of Fontainebleau). On November 13 a notice appeared in the *Moniteur* at Paris that "the Regent of Portugal is losing his throne."³ When John of Braganza read this, he saw that the time had come to leave his country and trust to the British arms to restore him. On November 29 the Portuguese Royal Family and court left for Brazil, escorted by ships of the British Navy ; on the following day Junot with a few French troops entered Lisbon.⁴

Portugal having fallen before the French, it was now the turn of Spain. The Convention of Fontainebleau had permitted Napoleon to send masses of troops across the frontier. The road from Bordeaux into Spain was covered with marching soldiers.⁵ Probably on December 2, 1807, Napoleon had met his brother

¹ *Corr.*, No. 13378.

² To Charles IV, January 10, 1808. *Corr.*, No. 13444: "I think that affairs are not sufficiently advanced to publish the Convention which we have made concerning the future fate of Portugal."

³ "The Prince Regent of Portugal is losing his throne ; he is losing it influenced by the intrigues of the English ; he is losing it through not having been willing to seize the English merchandise that is at Lisbon" (*Moniteur*, November 13, 1807, p. 1224). Prince John of Portugal was Regent for his mother, the Queen Regnant Maria I.

⁴ Lafuente, *op. cit.*, XXII, 205.

⁵ Du Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

troops in the country, and it was at this time that the King wrote asking Napoleon to publish the terms of the Convention of Fontainebleau, a request which, as we have seen, Napoleon refused. Godoy saw through the Emperor's designs, and now bethought himself at last of throwing down the glove of defiance, and of staking all, like the Portuguese, on the naval power of England, the last resource of vanquished States. He proposed that the whole Spanish court should flee to South America.² But the heir to the throne, Fernando, who hated the favourite Godoy, and who believed that Napoleon would maintain him (Fernando) on the throne, thwarted the plan by carrying out a palace revolution at Aranjuez. A riot of the populace (who doted on Fernando and detested Godoy) brought about not merely the dismissal of the favourite, but at last the abdication of the unfortunate Charles IV, who had never been anything but a *roi fainéant* (March 19, 1808).³ Fernando now reigned in his place.

This, however, did not suit Napoleon's views at all. The new King, Fernando VII, worthless as he was, was the darling of the people, and his crown was a symbol of their national independence. Godoy's fall was felt by the Spanish to be the beginning of a new era.⁴ So Napoleon refrained from recognising the new régime: instead he announced his intention of coming to Spain "to besiege Gibraltar and to go to Africa, and to regulate the affairs of Spain"—i.e. to decide concerning the succession to the throne. In the same letter he threw out a further plain hint: "If the Prince of the Peace or the Prince of the Asturias [Fernando] shows a desire of coming to Burgos, it will be very agreeable to me."⁵ This is

¹ The date and terms of Napoleon's offer to Joseph are still obscure: see Fournier, *op. cit.*, II, 44, note 2. Miot de Melito, *op. cit.*, chap. VII (vol. II, p. 215), says that Joseph set out from Naples on November 28, 1807, to meet Napoleon. The journey to Venice would take some days. Napoleon invited Joseph to be at Venice on December 2. *Corr.*, No. 13368.

² Du Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³ Du Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴ Report from Barcelona, April 2, 1808 (*Arch. Aff. étr. Espagne* 674).

⁵ *Corr.*, No. 13629. To Champagny, March 9, 1808. Cp. F. de Beauharnais to Champagny, April 8, 1808: Beauharnais had informed Fernando that Napoleon disapproved of the abdication of Charles IV, "and was going to put himself *en route* for Bayonne" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Espagne* 674).

apparently the origin of the celebrated meeting at Bayonne. By this time all the chief Spanish fortresses had French troops (whose behaviour was the subject of much complaint),¹ and Murat as French Commander-in-Chief was on the point of making his peaceful entry into Madrid. If Fernando meant to have his title as King recognised by the Emperor, his only chance seemed to be to accept Napoleon's invitation and to go to meet him. By ceding the left bank of the Ebro to France, Fernando might, in the opinion of his Council, gain the consent of the Emperor.² Fernando therefore set out from Madrid on April 10, 1808, and arrived at Bayonne on April 20.³ He had been prompted to this decision by the threatening approach of French troops to Madrid.⁴

Before arriving at Bayonne, at the distance of two leagues from the city, the Spaniards had been met by French commissioners who communicated the intelligence that the abdication of the Bourbons was decreed. At Bayonne, formal visits were given and received. When King Fernando returned Napoleon's call, the Emperor took one of the King's suite, a loyal Spaniard, the Abbé Escoiquiz,⁵ aside and said: "The interests of my Empire demand that the House of Bourbon, whom I must look upon as the implacable enemies of my family, should cease to reign in Spain."⁶ The Emperor offered to give Fernando, in compensation, Etruria, and his niece in marriage. Next day the same communication was made more officially and irrevocably. The Spaniards argued with the Emperor in vain.

Every one in his turn endeavoured to convince him of the impolicy of this measure with regard to the interest of France and his own; we also added that although the King should submit and resign the crown into his hands, this act would be deemed invalid and nugatory,

¹ F. de Beauharnais to Champagny, April 3, 1808 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Espagne* 674).

² *Some Documents* respecting the History of the late events in Spain, including A Plain Exposition of the Reasons which occasioned the Journey of Ferdinand VII to Bayonne, by Escoiquiz. Translated from the Spanish (1815), p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 25.

⁴ Prince Masserano to Champagny, April 9, 1808, and *Gazette extraordinaire de Madrid*, April 9, 1808 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Espagne* 674).

⁵ "M. de Escoiquiz seemed to me very frank and much attached to his pupil [Fernando]."—F. de Beauharnais to Champagny, April 8, 1808, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Espagne* 674.

⁶ *Some Documents*, Doc. No. 3, p. 84.

without the consent of the nation ; but all to no purpose : he would not give up his point.¹

Napoleon professed to fear that Spain was falling into anarchy, and that only he could save it.²

For the miserable Fernando or his courtiers to object that the Spanish Royal Family could not abdicate without the consent of the nation must have seemed to Napoleon a quibble : yet it was on this obstacle that his Empire was to be shattered. Thus did he rush blindly to his doom through an error not of war but of diplomacy. He insisted on regarding as plenipotentiaries agents who plainly warned him that they had not full powers.

A few days after the arrival of King Fernando at Bayonne, his father, King Charles IV, arrived also. Although King Charles had abdicated, he had also signed a protest against his abdication :³ and Napoleon treated him as still reigning. Charles now summoned Fernando, and ordered him to restore the crown "before six o'clock the next morning."⁴ If Fernando refused to agree, he would be treated as an *émigré*.⁵ The wretched son was, in fact, a prisoner of the French ; and the father was in the same situation. Fernando gave in his resignation of the Crown : and Charles, receiving it, did the same. By a treaty of May 5, 1808, he ceded his crown and all its rights to Napoleon.⁶

The Treaty of Bayonne is one of the most curious in the annals of diplomacy, for it stated that the simple object of the cession was "to put an end to the anarchy of Spain, to save this brave nation from the agitation of the factions, and to . . . maintain its integrity, guarantee its colonies, and to enable it to unite its means to those of France in order to arrive at a maritime peace." So much for the preamble. Article 1 stipulated that the prince to whom Napoleon should give the Spanish crown was to be completely independent, and that the territory of Spain was not to be diminished. Article 2 guaranteed the Roman Catholic religion as "the

¹ *Some Documents*, p. 27.

² "The French Revolution had been announced by less disquietude and fermentation." *Précis adressé aux Ambassadeurs*, May 20, 1808, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Espagne* 674.

³ He renewed the protest, declaring his abdication to be null and void, on April 17, 1808 (*Arch. Aff. étr. Espagne* 674, folio 104).

⁴ *Some Documents*, p. 32.

⁵ *Some Documents*, p. 32.

⁶ Treaty signed by Duroc for France and the Prince of the Peace for Spain ; Bayonne, May 5, 1808 : *De Clercq*, II, 246.

only religion in Spain." "Having thus" (so says article 4) "assured the prosperity, the integrity and the independence of his peoples," Charles IV bound the Emperor to give him, his family and the Prince of the Peace a refuge in the French Empire. Charles and the Infants of Spain were also to have a civil list (payable out of the Spanish Exchequer),¹ and the Château of Chambord.²

The new King of Spain was to be Joseph Bonaparte, who, although he had refused the Crown before, now went to Madrid (May, 1808). But the country was rising in arms, and on July 19, General Dupont's division had to capitulate to Cantaneros at Baylen. On August 1 General Wellesley began his first disembarkation at the mouth of the Mondego river in Portugal. A militant national spirit had been aroused which soon found contact with a similar spirit in Germany.³ A war had begun which was to end under the walls of Toulouse.

¹ "It is for the Treasury of Spain to satisfy the engagements which the Emperor has contracted by the treaty of the 5 of this month." (Note to Laforest, Ambassador in Spain, May 8, 1808, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Espagne* 674.)

² Arts. 6-9. The Treaty of Bayonne was to be kept secret. Escoiquiz and Duroc signed a similar cession by Fernando on May 10, 1808. De Clercq, II, 248.

³ See Auerstädt to Emperor, December 4, 1811: "The public spirit at Vienna with regard to France is worse than in the previous year. The affairs of Spain contribute not a little to maintain this exasperation" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657).

CHAPTER XXII

ERFURT

The meeting of Napoleon with the Spanish Bourbons at Bayonne caused great anxiety to the Austrians. Even before Bayonne, Metternich, who was then Ambassador at Paris, had foreseen the ruin of Spain. On April 27, 1808, he had written to Stadion the Austrian First Minister: "The catastrophes which overthrew the throne of Spain are assuredly made to fill the measure of the crafty, destructive, and criminal policy of Napoleon."¹ Austria, said Metternich, was not immediately in danger of attack, but "peace does not exist with a revolutionary system."² Stadion, who had a much more frank and vigorous character than Metternich, was all in favour of fighting at once. The Austrian military system was being secretly and efficiently reorganised. In Prussia, Stein's reforms, such as the Emancipation of the Peasantry in 1807, and the administrative and municipal reforms of 1808, were helping to renew the spirit of the country. In April, 1808, the pervasive secret patriotic society of the Tugendbund was founded;³ and Scharnhorst's Military Reorganisation Committee (1808) was beginning its important work.⁴ At Berlin, Fichte was inspiring the cultivated public with his lofty addresses. With the Spanish throne of Joseph already tumbling to pieces, Napoleon wished wholeheartedly to avoid war with Austria and Prussia. The one man who could prevent or defer war with these States was the Tsar Alexander. Therefore Napoleon now invited him to a Conference.

¹ Metternich, *Mémoires* (French trans., 1886), II, 167.

² *Ibid.*, II, 170.

³ By the year 1811, Germany was covered with secret patriotic societies. There is a Report on them made by General Gersdorf, of the Saxon Army, to the Duc d'Auerstädt, December 29, 1811. Even a Napoleonic State like the Kingdom of Westphalia had its secret society called *La Concorde* (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657).

⁴ The best account of the reforms is in G. S. Ford, *Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807-1815* (Princeton, 1922).

Metternich, who was still ambassador at Paris, was intensely interested in this projected visit. He knew that Napoleon had decided to divorce Josephine, with a view to marrying a Russian princess.¹ When the approaching Erfurt visit was made known, Metternich went to see Talleyrand, who (in spite of his lofty position as Imperial Vice-Grand Elector) was known to favour the anti-Napoleonic party in Europe.² Talleyrand suggested that the Emperor of Austria should boldly go to Erfurt, and take part in the Conference. Without committing himself with regard to this suggestion, Metternich urged that he himself should be invited to go in Napoleon's *suite*, just as General Tolstoi, the Russian ambassador, was going. But the request, when transmitted through Champagny to Napoleon, was refused.

The Emperor set forth from Paris towards the end of September, 1808, accompanied by the indispensable, though ambiguous, Talleyrand, by the hard-working Minister of Exterior Relations, Champagny, and by his favourite councillors, Maret and Duroc. Besides these, there was a considerable number of the staff of the Department of Exterior Relations, including La Besnardière, the political director. To complete the entourage, thirty-two actors and actresses from the *Théâtre Français* were included, among them being the magnificent Talma.

Although the desire to prevent Austria and Prussia from joining together was perhaps the immediate reason for Napoleon's invitation of Alexander to Erfurt, there were wider designs in the French Emperor's mind. On February 2, 1808, he had written a letter, destined to become celebrated, to the Tsar, hinting rather plainly at an alluring plan to partition the Ottoman Empire and to destroy Great Britain :

An army of 50,000 men, Russian, French, perhaps even a few Austrians, going by Constantinople into Asia, could not arrive at the Euphrates without making England tremble and putting her on her knees before the Continent. I am in a good position in Dalmatia; Your Majesty is on the Danube. A month after we have come to an agreement, the army could be on the Bosphorus. The stroke would resound to the Indies, and England would be subjected. I will not

¹ Metternich, *ibid.*, II, 140 (to Stadion, November 30, 1807) and p. 142.

² See Metternich to Stadion, September 24, 1808: "Of Talleyrand's situation and party" (*ibid.*, II, 234). Talleyrand ceased to be Minister of Exterior Relations on August 10, 1807. See Talleyrand to Napoleon, August 10, 1807, in Bertrand, *op. cit.*, p. 476. The new Minister was Champagny.

refuse any preliminary stipulations necessary to arrive at so great an object. But the interest of our two States must be combined and balanced. This cannot be done without an interview with Your Majesty, or at least after sincere conferences between Rumiantsov and Caulaincourt, and the sending here of a man who would be well versed in the system. Everything can be signed and decided before March 15. By May 1 our troops can be in Asia, and the troops of Your Majesty by the same date at Stockholm. Then the English, menaced in the Indies, chased from the Levant, will be crushed under the weight of events with which the atmosphere will be charged. Your Majesty and I would have preferred the sweetness of peace and to have passed our life in the midst of our vast empires, busied in vivifying them, and in making them happy by the arts and benefits of administration: the enemies of the world will not have it. It is necessary to be greater, in spite of ourselves. . . . In those few lines, I express to Your Majesty my soul completely. The work of Tilsit will regulate the destinies of the world.¹

There is no doubt that both Napoleon and Alexander had their eyes on Constantinople. Napoleon has the vision for dominion: "Constantinople," he remarked when he was at St. Helena, "is situated for being the centre and seat of universal domination."² But he did not mean Alexander to have it. Instead, he seems to have had an idea of an intermediate State which should be guardian of Constantinople and the Straits, between the French Mediterranean and the Russian Black Sea.³ As a matter of fact Alexander's attention at the moment was directed rather towards Stockholm, as more likely to be an immediate prize: the winter was approaching, he told the French ambassador Caulaincourt in August, 1808: the ice would enable an army to take Stockholm. Then he varied the dates a little: "in September, at Erfurt; in October movements [of armies]; during winter, results."⁴

Besides these questions, Napoleon at Erfurt would have to deal with the affairs of Spain, for the capitulation at Baylen had disquieted Alexander's mind. And finally there was Prussia. On September 8, 1808, Champagny had signed with King William of Prussia a harsh evacuation treaty. The Prussian revenues were to

¹ *Corr.* (unnumbered, edition 1864), t. XVI, p. 498. Cp. Letter of Napoleon of same date (February 2, 1808) couched in similar terms to Caulaincourt at Petersburg (in *Lecestre*, *op. cit.*, I, 142-5).

² Las Casas, *op. cit.*, tome IV, partie I, p. 83.

³ Vandal, *op. cit.*, II, 271.

⁴ Report of Caulaincourt, August 12, 1808, *apud* Vandal, *op. cit.*, I, 387.

belong to France from the date of the Treaty of Tilsit¹ until the date of signing this treaty. In addition Prussia was to pay an indemnity of one hundred and forty million francs, to be acquitted in full within eighteen months ; in the meantime the three fortresses Glogau, Stettin, and Cüstrin were to be garrisoned by French troops as security for the payments. Moreover Napoleon had discovered that the acquisition of the left bank of the Elbe by the Treaty of Tilsit did not give him the whole of Magdeburg. So, instead of taking the consequences of his mistake in geography, he insisted upon Prussia's consenting to an extension of the Tilsit cession, so as to include the citadel of Magdeburg and a *rayon* of two thousand *toises* of territory around it.² There was nothing of the chivalrous adversary about Napoleon. A separate article limited the Prussian army to 42,000 men for ten years (separate art. 1). More than that, the King of Prussia promised to make common cause with Napoleon if war broke out between France and Austria (separate art. 5).

Alexander very reasonably complained to Caulaincourt that this treaty imposed upon Prussia payments which she could not meet in the specified time, and so made the period of French occupation quite indefinite.³

Thus there were really four outstanding affairs to be handled at Erfurt : Austrian, Prussian, Turkish, and Spanish. Not one of these actually admitted of more than a temporary and precarious settlement.

It was on September 27, 1808, that Napoleon and Alexander met on the Weimar-Erfurt road between the villages of Ottsted and Nora.⁴ They embraced like dear friends, mounted their horses, and entered Erfurt together, surrounded by the magnificently dressed marshals and generals. Spectators noticed the

¹ The Treaty of September 8, 1808, art. 2, simply says, " until the day of the signature of the present treaty." Alexander I took this to mean from the Treaty of Tilsit (*see* Vandal, I, 384). Apparently the revenues of the *whole of the Prussian dominions* were involved.

² Art. 14 of the Franco-Prussian Treaty, signed at Paris, September 8, 1808 (*De Clercq*, II, 272).

³ Report of Caulaincourt, September 23, 1808, *apud* Vandal, I, 386.

⁴ Alexander left St. Petersburg on September 14 ; Napoleon left St. Cloud on the 22nd : Thibaudeau, *Histoire de la France et de Napoléon Bonaparte de 1799 à 1815* (1835), *Empire* t. IV, pp. 56, 57, 59. Napoleon had already entered Erfurt, and left it again at midday to meet Alexander. The meeting took place two leagues from Erfurt (*ibid.*, IV, 59).

difference between Alexander, handsome, noble-looking, trimly clad in his Guard's uniform, sitting his horse firmly and gracefully, like a born rider ; and Napoleon, short in stature, with his habitual plain uniform, riding without grace or style, but yet irresistibly attracting the gaze of all.¹

Erfurt was a quaint old-fashioned town, formerly belonging to the Electorate of Mayence, and secularised by the Imperial Recess of 1803. It had at that time fallen to the share of Prussia ; but since the defeat of Prussia in 1806, Erfurt's fate had been in suspense. The town had remained at the disposition of the Emperor of the French, administered by his officials. Into this sleepy corner of old Germany, this "town of burgesses and functionaries," a stream of grand personages was pouring—*Maréchal-Ducs* of the French Empire, Kings and Princes of the Rhenish Confederation, all the hungry horde of little German sovereigns who hoped still to gain abbeys and towns from the *fortunatus* purse of the French Emperor, and finally all the politicians and semi-political people of fashion who were at the time at their usual spas, Carlsbad, Teplitz, Homburg, Ems, the "coffee-houses of Europe."² Anyone could come. No passports were required, no registration-cards, everybody breathed confidence.³ Fouché's police, however, knew all that was going on.

The Tsar Alexander had the house of a merchant named Triebel ; Napoleon had a palace of the former Elector-Archbishop. The mode of life of the Emperors was simple. At nine in the morning each held a *levée*, frequented by princes, ministers, and ambassadors ; it lasted for half an hour. Every day Alexander sent Tolstoy, his grand-marshal, to enquire for news from Napoleon ; and Napoleon similarly sent some grand personage to Alexander. After the *levées*, the two Emperors transacted their business together, or received deputations, or gave audiences. After midday they frequently went out together on horseback, either for a ride, or to see a military review. Every evening Napoleon entertained Alexander and the kings and queens at dinner ; and the princes were entertained in turn. Berthier, Talleyrand and Duroc entertained on the grand scale and helped to relieve the strain on

¹ *Doc. inéd.* (*apud* Vandal, I, 417).

² The phrase was Metternich's (*Mett. to* Champagne, Arch. Aff. étr. *Vienne* 381, *apud* Vandal, I, 413).

³ Thibaudeau, *op. cit.*, IV, 63.

Napoleon's table. Champagny, as Minister of Exterior Relations, daily entertained the *corps diplomatique*. After dinner the two Emperors went to the theatre, a tiny place holding three hundred people, where pieces were performed by the leading French actors. Admission to the little theatre was granted by permit. As Alexander could not hear well from the boxes, two arm-chairs were placed on the *parquet*, and the Emperors sat side by side. The play always finished at ten o'clock. The Emperors then adjourned to Alexander's lodging, and worked until midnight or later.¹

Nothing could surpass the courtesy of Alexander. On October 3 the *Œdipe* was being performed at the theatre. When Philoctète says to his confidant Dinas :

L'amitié d'un grand homme est un bienfait des Dieux,

the Tsar turned to Napoleon and held out his hand. But Napoleon turned away, refusing the flattering compliment, which everyone in the theatre witnessed.²

After the representation of *Britannicus*, Napoleon pointed out to Talma that he had overacted the despotic part, in the character of Nero. It was not until Nero had been crossed (in love) that his violent character developed. "Talma recognised the justice of the remark."

Incidents like these gave some interest to the Conference, but as a whole the course of life was very uniform, and the hundreds of personages who had flocked to Erfurt found time hang heavy on their hands. But the two Emperors appeared to be enjoying themselves. Alexander was thirty-one years old, Napoleon was thirty-nine. "They were like two young men of good companionship." They bestowed upon each other "the greatest marks of affection."³

The Conference of Erfurt appeared to be a complete success. The friendship of Napoleon and Alexander was cemented (for a time), and Austria appeared to profit by the warning, and to aban-

¹ Thibaudeau, IV, 62-4. The list of plays given between September 28 and October 14 was: *Cinna*, *Andromaque*, *Britannicus*, *Zaire*, *Mithridate*, *Œdipe*, *Iphigénie en Aulide*, *Phèdre*, *La Mort de César*, *Les Horaces*, *Rodogune*, *Mahomet*, *Rhadamiste*, *Le Cid*, *Manlius*. Among the caste were Talma, Saint Prix, Lafont, Dama, Madame Raucourt, Mesdemoiselles Duchesnois et Bourgoin (*Ibid.*, IV, 64).

² Thibaudeau, IV, 64.

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 66.

don hostile intentions. Napoleon pointed the moral of Erfurt in a letter to Francis I of Austria, in which he said :

I have been in a position to dismember the Austrian monarchy, or at least to leave it less powerful. I did not wish this. Such as it is, it is by my consent. . . . The last *levée en masse* would have infallibly produced war if I had feared that this *levée* and these preparations had been made in combination with Russia.¹

The immediate result of the Conference was that Napoleon was able to give orders for stopping the mobilising of the war-levies of the Confederation of the Rhine, and for dissolving the Grand Army.² On October 14, the Conference of Erfurt was terminated. At midday the two Emperors rode alone (their suites following some distance behind) to the place where they had originally met on the Weimar road : there they dismounted, embraced, said adieu, and separated. "Napoleon returned to Erfurt, at a slow pace, dreamy and pensive."³

What was that lonely horseman thinking about, as his charger picked its way over the cobblestones, along the narrow streets of Erfurt ? He had, as it seemed, at least deferred the war with Austria ; and by a new treaty with Alexander, he had done something towards settling the Turkish, Spanish, English, and Prussian difficulties. This treaty was signed at Erfurt, on October 12, 1808, by Champagny and Rumiantsov. Article 1 confirmed the Tilsit alliance, and engaged the two Emperors to make common cause against the enemy, and only to negotiate with him in common.⁴ This then was all that was done at the Conference of Erfurt to settle the English question. It was not likely to have much result. For article 4 stated that the basis of the peace to be negotiated with England was to be the *uti possidetis* ; and article 5 went further and stipulated that no treaty would be made with England unless that Power recognised "the new order of things established by France with Spain." This, Napoleon may have been thinking behind his impassive forehead, England never would recognise.⁵

¹ October 14, 1808 : to Francis I, Emperor of Austria (*Corr.*, No. 14380).

² Thibaudeau, IV, 71-3.

³ Thibaudeau, IV, 75.

⁴ *S'engageant, non-seulement à ne faire avec l'ennemi commun aucune paix séparée, mais encore à n'entrer avec lui dans aucune négociation et à n'écouter de ses propositions que d'un commun accord* (art. 1) : De Clercq, II, 284-6.

⁵ Less than two months after this, George Canning wrote to Champagny, "His Majesty [of Great Britain] is determined not to abandon the cause of the Spanish Nation and of the legitimate Monarchy of Spain" (Canning to Champagny, December 9, 1808, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Angleterre* 604).

Article 8 contained a partial settlement of the Turkish question, for it gave Napoleon's recognition to Alexander's annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia. This annexing, if it became a real thing, would probably prevent Austria and Russia from acting together ; but it left the question of Constantinople and the Straits still open. Indeed by article 11 both Alexander and Napoleon guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire with the exception of Moldavia and Wallachia.

The question of Prussia was slightly treated in a letter of October 14, written by Alexander to Napoleon, and forming a pendant to the treaty of October 12. In this letter the Tsar stated that he would not insist on the execution of secret article 5 of the Treaty of Tilsit of July 7, 1807. By this article, if Napoleon gave Hanover to the Kingdom of Westphalia, he was bound to indemnify the King of Prussia with a territory of 400,000 souls. But now Alexander testified in his letter that he "took no interest in the article." So the King of Prussia was again to be robbed of his rights under one of Napoleon's own treaties.

But was there any prospect of finality in these arrangements ? None ; not even if Napoleon's renewed project of conquering England by a land army from Boulogne succeeded.¹ For even then the Tsar Alexander would still have to be reckoned with. Napoleon and he would not always be at peace. Erfurt only "papered over the cracks." In the *Military History of the Campaign of 1812*, by the Tsar's aide-de-camp, Boutourlin, it is stated that Alexander in 1808 was acting to gain the necessary time for preparing to sustain under favourable conditions the struggle which it was known would very likely be renewed one day.² Napoleon was among those who knew.

¹ *Cent mille hommes de mes troupes vont à Boulogne pour renouveler mes projets sur Angleterre.* Napoleon to Francis I of Austria, October 14, 1808 (*Corr.*, No. 14380).

² Quoted by Thibaudeau, IV, 55.

CHAPTER XXIII

SCHOENBRUNN

After the Erfurt Conference, Napoleon having secured, for the time being, the neutrality of Austria and Prussia, felt that he had a free hand to settle the Spanish trouble. So he went to Spain, to deal with the trouble in person. On November 5, 1808, he was at Vittoria, and inaugurated an active campaign that soon restored to the French eagles their ascendancy in the Peninsula, although they were much disconcerted by the audacious and heroic enterprise of Sir John Moore. Towards the end of December Napoleon was pursuing the retreating English general, from Sahagun towards Corunna, when at Benavente on the 31st he received disquieting news from Paris.¹ The letters may have contained indications that Fouché and Talleyrand were not to be trusted (Napoleon must have known this already), and that they were now beginning to act in collusion. At any rate the letters did almost certainly contain a warning about Austria, for on December 31, writing from Benavente, Napoleon acknowledges the receipt of letters from Cambacérès at Paris,² and, under the same date and address, writes to the Minister of War (Clarke): "You will receive a decree for the levy of the conscription of 1809. . . . It is indispensable that we should be ready by the month of March, if Austria wishes to move."³

So the Emperor left Soult to undertake the pursuit of Moore's army; he himself made what hasty arrangements he could for the prosecution of the Spanish war, and then hastened back to Paris.

¹ It has been generally held that the news reached Napoleon at Astorga on January 2, 1809 (*see* Fournier, *op. cit.*, II, 69-70). Thibaudeau (*op. cit.*, IV, 185) says the Emperor received the dispatches after leaving Benavente, on his way to Astorga on December 31 or January 1. The point is not very important. *Corr.*, No. 14625, quoted below, is conclusive.

² *Corr.*, No. 14624.

³ *Corr.*, No. 14625. Cp. Champagny to Andréossy (ambassador at Vienna), January 25, 1809: "the dispositions of this Power [Austria] are to-day the first object" (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 382).

Leaving Valladolid on January 16, he pressed on with a picket of *chasseurs*, but even these he outdistanced, and arrived alone at Paris on January 23, 1809.¹ He had already sent orders in advance for the coming campaign, and he had taken steps to assuage the war-weariness of the French by getting Fouché to prepare and publish a glowing comparison between the poverty of France in 1709 and its prosperity in 1809.²

It is impossible seriously to hold the view that Napoleon wanted war with Austria.³ It was the revival of the Austrian spirit, under the ardent statesmanship of Count Stadion and the military reforms of the Archduke Charles,⁴ which led to the renewal of hostilities by the Emperor Francis.

Great influence was also due to Metternich's reports from Paris, and more particularly to a Memorandum which he wrote (December 4, 1808) on returning to Vienna, on a brief visit. This Memorandum decided the moment of the outbreak of hostilities. Metternich pointed out that Spain had already put an end to Napoleon's record of unbroken military success: "Spain was called to save Europe." Moreover "it is no longer the [French] nation that fights: the present war is Napoleon's war." This was a correct opinion of Metternich's, although he may have pointed the remark too much when he added: "it is not even the war of his army." Equally correct was he in stating that Talleyrand and Fouché were disaffected towards Napoleon; but when he maintained that these "two men hold at this moment the first rank in opinion and influence in France," he was conveying an impression to the mind of Stadion which required qualification.⁵ Nevertheless, although the Austrian Government might have

¹ Thibaudeau, IV, 194. In the voluminous daily correspondence of Napoleon there is a complete gap from January 16, Valladolid (No. 14731), to January 24, when the correspondence begins from Paris, with No. 14732.

² To Fouché, January 13, 1809, Valladolid: *Corr.*, No. 14695.

³ Treitschke, *History of Germany*, I, 399, says: "Directly the prestige of his eagles had been restored, he resumed his plans against Austria." But Napoleon had *not* really done anything like what he wanted to do in Spain. He required time to finish with Spain, not war with Austria.

⁴ The reorganisation of the Austrian army was begun in 1806, immediately after the Peace of Presburg. La Rochefoucauld reported that the Archduke Charles, as Generalissimo, was beset with many difficulties but that "his devotion to the State will always be superior to the disgusts which he experiences" (La Rochefoucauld to Talleyrand, April 7, 1806, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 378).

⁵ The Memorandum is given in Metternich, *op. cit.*, II, 240 ff.

entered the war more circumspectly (for instance, after concerting measures more carefully with England), it was probably well advised to fight in 1809. The campaign, although it was disastrous to Austria, shook the power of Napoleon, and influenced the ultimate course of the Great War,¹ like the Battles of the Somme in the Great War of a hundred years later.

The Austrian Government chose the spring of 1809 for making its great effort, partly because the European situation was favourable—Metternich suspected that things were not going well for Napoleon in Spain²—and partly because it could no longer bear the expense of keeping its armies on a war-footing. "The actual crisis must be seized for the advantage of our finances," reported one Viennese official. Another stated: "In my department, I have been long in the state of war; the army devours everything, and that cannot endure."³

Naturally, the French ambassador, General Andréossy, was recalled from Vienna. But he was only to say that he was going on leave. The Viennese society, wrote Champagny to him in January, "is given over to madness; but your departure ought to be neither the signal nor the indication of a rupture."⁴ Andréossy did not leave until the end of February. On February 28, the Minister of Saxony, which was allied with Napoleon, dined with Count Stadion. "Here is the Ambassador of France, going: it will soon be my turn, doubtless," said the Saxon. "The General goes, it is true," replied Stadion, "but I believe it will not be as soon for you; besides, M. le Comte, you have, have you not, a beautiful *château* in Saxony? You will be comfortable there."⁵

It was true, the Saxon Minister had to leave, as the Confederation of the Rhine was bound to fight for Napoleon. In Austria, all was enthusiasm. Schoolboys of sixteen years were joining the colours; the ladies of high society became recruiters; Gentz came from

¹ Cp. Extract from *Gazette pour la littérature in Rapports de l'Armée de l'Allemagne*, February 7, 1811: "The measures taken by Austria in 1809 were the first and unique example of the advantage which a Government can draw from the spirit of its subjects" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

² Metternich to Stadion, March 27, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

³ Andréossy's reports to Champagny, February 3 and 15, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁴ Champagny to Andréossy, January 25, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁵ Dodon, *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna, to Champagny, March 1, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

Prague, to labour, it was said, at the war-manifesto of the court of Austria.¹

Although the Austrian forces were never better led, and never fought better, than in 1809, the campaign was brief and decisive. On April 20 one of their armies was defeated by Napoleon at Abensberg in Bavaria, and another at Eckmühl on the 22nd. On May 13 the Emperor was in Vienna,² and the Austrian court had to go off to a movable base in the provinces.³ Nine days later Napoleon was nearly defeated by the Archduke Charles, near Vienna, in the terrible battle of Aspern; but on July 5 he snatched decisive victory from the jaws of defeat at Wagram. On July 12, 1809, at Znaim, an armistice was arranged, and a line of demarcation traced, between the opposing forces; it was to last one month, but fifteen days' warning was to be given if hostilities were to be resumed.⁴

Four days before the armistice was signed, Metternich, who had come back to Austria at the end of May,⁵ replaced Stadion as Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Count Stadion was one of those men of lively imagination and quick understanding, who are easily overcome by the impressions of the moment."⁶ By this not very generous description of his predecessor in office, Metternich indicates that he himself was appointed to adopt a less adventurous but more long-sighted policy. His first task, naturally, was to disembarass the Austrian Monarchy of the war; but his plans were obstructed by the fact that the Emperor Francis allowed

¹ Reports of Dodon, March 6, 10, April 4, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

² The capitulation articles of Vienna, signed by Andréossy for France and Beloutte for Austria, May 12, 1809, take extraordinary care for the well-being both of the wounded, the active soldiers, and civil inhabitants. De Clercq, II, 289.

³ Among other places to Buda, Wolkersdorf, and Znaim (Metternich, *op. cit.*, I, 98, 100. Dodon to Champagny, July 5, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 383).

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 15517. The Russian Government, which did not like the Franco-Austrian war, warmly congratulated Napoleon on the concluding of the Armistice, and expressed a hope for a *merciful* and a *durable* peace (Kourakine to Champagny, July 20, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Russie* 1801).

⁵ He had remained in Paris until May 26, being apparently detained as security for the safety of the *personnel* of the French Embassy at Vienna (Metternich, I, 72). He was ultimately exchanged for Dodon, the French Chargé d'Affaires, at the village of Atsch on July 3, 1809 (*see* Dodon to Champagny, July 5, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 79. Stadion, to save the face of the Austrian Government, retained the title of Minister of Foreign Affairs until the peace was signed, Metternich being Minister *ad interim* (*ibid.*, I, 84).

Napoleon to inaugurate a curious *double* negotiation for peace. Even before the signing of the armistice, Francis had sent his commander-in-chief, Prince John of Liechtenstein (who had superseded the Archduke Charles), to open negotiations with Napoleon.¹ Napoleon agreed to negotiate, and accordingly Metternich for Austria and Champagny for France were ordered to open a peace-conference. The little town of Altenburg, within the French line of demarcation, was neutralised for the purpose.²

Metternich, in his Memoirs written in later life, calls the Altenburg affair a "pretended negotiation."³ By the Austrians, it may have been meant to gain time, but Napoleon, according to his confidential correspondence with Champagny, was sincere enough about it. On August 19 he writes to Champagny (from Schoenbrunn):

Make known to the Austrian plenipotentiaries that if the Emperor of Austria betook himself to any measure to disorganise the administration of the provinces which I occupy, I would immediately take possession of the country in my name; I would plant my eagles, deal out justice in my name, destroy feudal rights, publish the Code Napoléon; and I would suppress the present paper-money and declare that it would no longer be current in the provinces occupied by my troops; I would replace it by another paper-money. You should insinuate that, if the negotiations had no issue, I would take all these measures, and that besides I would separate the three crowns of the House of Austria.⁴

In the same Instructions, Napoleon continues:

Note well above all the principal points of the negotiation: first, the *uti possidetis*; second, that I do not hold to anything in particular. If they wish Salzburg, I will give it; if they wish Trieste, I will give it; if they wish Vienna, I will give it; provided that I obtain an equivalent compensation on the triple basis of riches, population and extent of territory.

Thus Napoleon was prepared to have a definite peace at Altenburg, but on terms that would give him either all that his armies at the moment occupied, or else an equivalent (i.e. a territory of about ten million souls).⁵ But the military situation of the Austrian

¹ *Corr.*, No. 15683 (Napoleon to Champagny, August 19, 1809).

² Metternich, I, 86.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 15683. The three crowns of the House of Austria were Austria, Hungary and Bohemia.

⁵ *Dix millions de sujets de la Maison d'Autriche* (*Corr.*, No. 15683, edition 1866, tome XIX, p. 366).

Government was really much more favourable than was indicated by the amount of Austrian territory at the moment overrun by Napoleon's soldiers. So Metternich was quite right not to negotiate on these bases. Napoleon, however, was willing to compromise. On August 22 he writes (still from Schoenbrunn) to Champagny :

You have negotiated and offered the *uti possidetis*. M. de Metternich has not made any advance. If he offer on the part of his master to support the same losses as Austria sustained at the Peace of Presburg, he will have made a step. You could then make one, and propose to take as basis a *mezzo termine* between the *uti possidetis* and the evaluation of the losses made by Austria at the Peace of Presburg.¹

Thus Champagny and Metternich might have approached step by step nearer to an understanding at Altenburg, but the self-satisfied Austrian plenipotentiary did not quickly enough discern the possibilities of the negotiation. On August 23, Metternich wrote to his mother, from Altenburg :

Our mode of life is regular and uniform. I work from eight o'clock in the morning until one o'clock. We confer from one to four or five. I work again from five to seven. We dine at half-past seven o'clock, and I send off my courier at twelve or one. It would be difficult to say when or how we shall finish.²

In those days the rival plenipotentiaries went to the same entertainments and met on a friendly footing. On August 27, Metternich and Champagny met at a ball and each accused the other of slowness in the negotiations.³

Napoleon appears to have agreed with both plenipotentiaries in thinking them dilatory, for he wrote : "The diplomatists do not know how to get through an affair like the present; we soldiers understand one another better. Let the Emperor send Prince Liechtenstein to me, and we will end the matter in four and twenty hours."⁴ Francis agreed to this, and ordered Liechtenstein, although the Altenburg Conference was still going on, to go to Schoenbrunn and to treat with Napoleon. This second negotiation took the settlement away from the safe if tardy

¹ *Corr.*, No. 15700. By the same losses as Austria had sustained at Presburg, Napoleon means the loss of an equivalent number of inhabitants (about 5-6 millions).

² Metternich, I, 231.

³ Metternich to Emperor Francis, August 28, 1809 (*Arch. Aff. étr. Autriche* 384).

⁴ Metternich, I, 88.

hands of the professional diplomatists and officials of the Austrian Foreign Office, and permitted Napoleon to *brusquer* the peace with the ingenuous Austrian Field-Marshal.

Yet, although the peace-terms were made comparatively quickly, they were preceded by more discussion than Metternich's account suggests. Before Liechtenstein arrived at Vienna, conversations had been going on at Schoenbrunn, at intervals in the period September 14-25, between Napoleon and the Austrian General Bubna.¹ The Emperor Francis complained, through Bubna, that the Altenburg conferences were proving unsatisfactory. Napoleon agreed with this, remarking, with his usual appositeness in historical illustration, that "things were going on as at the Treaties of Münster or Westphalia"; and he pointed out that this was not to the disadvantage of the French armies: in fact he "was eating and drinking at their [the Austrians'] expense."² To Bubna, and in letters to Champagny and to the Emperor Francis, Napoleon made it quite clear that while he consented to abandon his claim to impose peace on the basis of the *uti possidetis* (which he now estimated would mean a cession of nine million subjects by Austria), his ultimatum demand was for territory of one million six hundred thousand souls.³

On September 27 Champagny was recalled from Altenburg to conduct the negotiations with Liechtenstein at Vienna.⁴ On October 14, the treaty of peace was signed. This treaty required to be ratified by the two Emperors, just like all other treaties: but both Liechtenstein and Champagny were plenipotentiaries, so that no valid objection can be taken (although Metternich complained bitterly)⁵ because Napoleon announced the peace-treaty as soon as it was made.

On the day before the treaty was signed, Napoleon was standing between Rapp and Berthier, at a review of troops. A young

¹ *Corr.*, No. 15816, cp. Thibaudeau, IV, 395.

² *Corr.*, No. 15816.

³ *Corr.*, No. 15817, 15823, 15832, 15837.

⁴ Thibaudeau, IV, 395. Napoleon's Full Powers to Champagny are dated Schoenbrunn, October 1, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

⁵ Metternich, I, 89-90. Metternich says the articles of Vienna were only a document called *Project for a Treaty of Peace*. I have found nothing in the *Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères* to justify this assertion. An exemplaire of the Austrian version of the treaty is preserved in the Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382, folios 266-75, in French and German. It is headed, "Peace-treaty concluded at Vienna on October 14, ratified on October 20, ratifications exchanged on October 20."

man advanced, and was permitted to approach Napoleon. Rapp, noticing the young man's air of decision, and also that he had his right hand deep in his pocket, had him arrested, when an enormous two-edged knife was found on him. The young man, whose name was Staubs, was examined. He confessed that he had come from Naumburg in order to assassinate Napoleon and to deliver Germany. He was sentenced to death. After the examination of the would-be assassin, Napoleon, alone with Champagny at Schoenbrunn, said: "It is necessary to make peace. Return to Vienna, and summon the Austrian plenipotentiaries. You are agreed on the important points."¹

Whether the attempted assassination shook the nerve of Napoleon, or in some obscure way influenced his will, no one can say. The incident, in its possible diplomatic bearing, recalls the bomb of Orsini, thrown at Napoleon III when he was hesitating to ally with King Victor Emmanuel in 1858.

The Treaty of Vienna² contained eighteen patent articles and six separate and secret articles. Article 1 was the usual peace-and-friendship clause. After this came the cessions. The Emperor of Austria ceded, to the east of the Inn, Salzburg, Berchtesgaden and a portion of Upper Austria adjoining the Salzburg frontier, to Napoleon, to be joined to the Confederation of the Rhine (these districts were annexed to Bavaria in the following year).³ By the second clause of the same article 3, Austria ceded to France the territories of Gorizia, Montfalcone, Trieste, Carniola, Villach (part of Carinthia) and all the territory on the right of the Save from the point where that river leaves Carniola to the frontier of Bosnia. This latter territory included Fiume and the Hungarian littoral and all the dependent islands.

The King of Saxony benefited through the cession by Austria of Western Galicia, and the circle of Zamosc in Eastern Galicia, which included Cracow (all to be united to the Duchy of Warsaw).⁴

¹ Thibaudeau, IV, 398.

² It is often referred to as the Treaty of Schoenbrunn, e.g. Rose, *Napoleon*, II, 201, because Napoleon ratified it "at our Imperial camp of Schoenbrunn" (text in Neumann, *Recueil*, II, 316).

³ Treaty signed at Paris by Champagny and Montgelas, February 28, 1810 (De Clercq, II, 314).

⁴ The Russian Government had been afraid that Napoleon would extend the Duchy of Warsaw to the Baltic, by incorporating East Prussia in it. The extension actually made was therefore comparatively moderate. (See Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 4, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Russie* 1801.)

Russia (in consideration of such assistance as she had given to France) obtained four hundred thousand souls in Eastern Galicia, the precise district to be determined later, but not to include Brody (Tarnopol was the district which Russia actually acquired).¹

The Austro-Hungarian dominions were thus entirely cut off from the sea. Article 7, however, ran as follows :

The Emperor of the French engages not to oppose any obstacle to the import or export commerce of Austria, by the port of Fiume, except with regard to English merchandise or goods derived from English trade. The dues on transit shall be less for the goods thus imported or exported, than for those of any other nation except the Italian.

Thus something was done for maritime commerce with Austria ; but the Austrian Government had to adhere to Napoleon's Continental System.²

The separate and secret articles included Russia in the peace (art. 1), although there seems no reason why this clause should not have appeared in the patent treaty. By article 2 the Emperor of Austria agreed to limit his army to 150,000 men "throughout the duration of the maritime war." By article 5 Austria agreed to pay a contribution of eighty-five million francs ; of this sum thirty millions were to be paid before the French evacuated Vienna, the rest to be given in bills of exchange drawn on Hamburg, Leipzig, Amsterdam, Augsburg, Frankfort, Bâle and Paris, payable at stated intervals within a period of ten months.

Thus ended the war of 1809, sometimes called the war of the Fourth Coalition ; for Great Britain was hand in glove with Austria. She not merely carried on her now normal maritime and Peninsular wars, but made a powerful diversion on land by the expedition to Walcheren. But the French defence of Antwerp held fast, and the expedition became a disaster.

Failure though the War of 1809 was at the moment, it was really the beginning of the end of the Napoleonic Empire. "It was the first and unique example of the advantage which a Government can draw from the spirit of its subjects."³ When, two years later,

¹ For the Austro-Polish-Russian frontier, see map in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* (1875), I, p. 218.

² This was also specifically stated in Article 16.

³ Extract from *Gazette pour la littérature* in a Report of Army of Germany, February, 1811 (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656). The opinion is a little overstated, for the Spanish insurrection was another instance of the military value of national spirit.

signs appeared in Germany of the impending national war which was to bring about Napoleon's fall, the French Intelligence Service explained the signs as "symptoms almost the same as those which appeared before the last war with Austria."¹

Russia, according to the Erfurt treaty, was bound to make war upon Austria, if that Power attacked France. In Alexander's breast, however, the enthusiasm of Tilsit, and the milder ardour of Erfurt, had now cooled. He tried hard to dissuade Austria from war.² On March 24, 1809, Napoleon sent to the Tsar an autograph letter, saying: "There is not a moment to lose for Your Majesty to encamp his troops on the frontiers of our common enemy."³ Alexander's reply was not effusive:

The destruction of the Austrian Monarchy would be a calamity for Europe . . . if the Austrian Monarchy is to undergo any dismemberment Russia cannot suffer Galicia, in whole or in part, to pass into other hands than her own; for anything added on this side to the Duchy of Warsaw would be a step to the re-establishment of Poland, and therefore contrary to the first interest of Russia.⁴

Actually Russia took almost no part in the Franco-Austrian war. She sent an army into Galicia, formally to meet the obligations of the Erfurt alliance.⁵ More than that Alexander would not do: "he [Napoleon] will understand that having already four wars on my hands, I have done the impossible."⁶ His war with Sweden dragged on through the summer of Napoleon's Danube campaign,

¹ General Thielmann to Auerstädt, August 18, 1811 (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

² See Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 464 ff.

³ Text in Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 472; not in *Corr.* It is reprinted in Lecestre, *op. cit.*, I, 299-300. Napoleon's letter of the same date to Caulaincourt, ambassador at Petersburg, shows his anxiety (Lecestre, I, 296): "If Russia does not march, I shall have Austria on my hands alone, and even the Bosnians."

⁴ Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, 473. When the war broke out the Poles, led by Poniatowski, occupied part of Galicia (Cracow). Alexander was extremely annoyed, and told Caulaincourt so, in an audience on July 17, 1809. He said: *il étoit impossible qu'il consentit jamais à laisser établir sur la frontière une province française* (Arch. Aff. étr. Russie 1801).

⁵ The Polish Marshal, Poniatowski, said that by connivance of the Russian Generals in the part of Galicia which they occupied Austrian officials were allowed to administer the country as if there were no occupation (Poniatowski to Caulaincourt, July 9, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. Russie 1801).

⁶ Reported by Caulaincourt to Napoleon, June 17, 1809, in Tatistcheff *op. cit.*, 489. The four wars were with Austria, Sweden, Turkey and Persia.

and terminated with the Treaty of Friedrichshamm, September 17, 1809, by which Russia acquired Finland.¹

If Napoleon, during his Danube campaign, had not the benefit of energetic Russian support, he was at the same time saved from the danger of a Prussian attack.

The patient but doubting Frederick William III of Prussia might have struck a blow for Germany, but he was without his most vigorous and strong-willed statesman, Stein, who had been exiled before the Austrian war began. On September 8, 1808, the *Moniteur* had published a private letter² which Stein had written to a noble-financier, Prince Wittgenstein, commenting on Napoleon's troubles in Spain, and urging his ideas for rousing Germany against the French domination. "The exasperation in Germany augments daily. It is necessary to nourish it." The letter had been intercepted by French agents; no objection can be taken to Napoleon's publishing it, in order to show how his enemies were working against him. At the same time the Emperor instructed his brother Jerome, King of Westphalia, to sequester all the property of Stein in the kingdom.³ Two months later, the French Emperor took another step. Being in Spain at the time, and victorious over the popular Spanish levies, he announced in the 3rd Bulletin of the Army of Spain, dated November 13:

It would be necessary that the men like Stein who, in default of troops of the line that have not been able to resist our eagles, meditate the sublime project of raising the masses, were witnesses of the misfortunes which they cause, and of the few obstacles which this resource can offer to regular troops.⁴

¹ Napoleon was not interested in Russia's annexation of Finland. See Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 4, 1801—the acquisition of Finland by Russia is no help to France in reducing England, *voilà l'ennemi qu'il faut combattre et qu'on oublie dans tous les épisodes des affaires du continent* (Arch. Aff. étr. Russie 1801).

² *Moniteur*, Thursday, September 8, p. 993. The letter was dated from Königsberg on August 26, 1808. It was printed in the *Moniteur* in the German original tongue, with a French translation in a parallel column. The agent or courier Koppe, in whose papers the letter was found, was (according to the *Moniteur*) sent to prison by Marshal Soult in the fortrees of Spandau.

³ To Jerome Napoleon, September 6, 1808, in *Lecestre, op. cit.*, I, 238. Op. Napoleon to Champagny, December 10, 1808, *ibid.*, I, 259.

⁴ Text in *Moniteur* for Monday, November 21, 1808, p. 1283. The Bulletins of the Army of Spain always appear under the heading not of *Extérieur* (like, for instance, news concerning Russia, England or the Kingdom of Westphalia), but under the heading of *Intérieur*.

This bulletin was followed by a decree of exile, issued by Napoleon from Madrid, against "*le nommé Stein.*" The French ambassador at Berlin, Saint Marsans, was to demand the surrender of Stein from the Prussian Government; and if the Prussian Government had refused, Stein would have easily been seized, and so his fate would have been the same,—that of Enghien.¹ But Saint Marsans gave him (while in Berlin) a hint, and Stein escaped to Austrian territory in January, 1809. His absence from Prussia did undoubtedly weaken the patriotic party, and may perhaps partly explain Frederick William's refusal to join with Austria in the war. It is possible, on the other hand, that with Russia at best benevolently neutral on the side of Napoleon, Frederick William was right to wait for a better chance²: a chance which came with generous amplitude in 1812. If Prussia had joined in the war of 1809, Napoleon (if victorious) would have absolutely dismembered her.²

¹ Napoleon wrote from Madrid to Champagny, his Minister for Exterior Relations, on December 16, 1808, ordering him to demand Stein from the Prussian Government; the Emperor concluded: "Let it be known that if my troops take Stein he will be shot" (text in Lecestre, *op. cit.*, I, 259). When Stein came into the Austrian dominions, the Emperor Francis, who had not yet declared war, was very nervous about the effect on Napoleon. But Napoleon does not seem to have made any objection (Andréossy to Champagny, February 3, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 382).

² See Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 4, 1809 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Russie* 1801).

CHAPTER XXIV

1810: THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT

Napoleon's character, according to Metternich's view of it, consisted of egotism and nepotism.¹ His brothers, sisters, and brothers-in-law were all placed in high positions, thrones, seats of government, or magnificent estates. But all this was not enough for him; he wanted sons. His union with Josephine and his irregular unions had for long left him without hope of male children. But on December 13, 1806, one son, illegitimate, was born²; and in May, 1810, another; this last was a child who was destined for distinction, if not for greatness.³ Being now convinced that he could have a son by a lawful union, Napoleon resolved to have Josephine divorced, and to take the opportunity to marry into one of the old houses of Europe.

Russia and Austria seemed to offer a prospect of possible marriage alliance. The Tsar might give a sister from motives of friendship; the Emperor of Austria might give a daughter from motives of fear. At Erfurt in October, 1808, Napoleon had charged Talleyrand to approach Alexander over the question of a Russian marriage. The Tsar, possibly, was expecting some such *démarche*, and wondering how he should meet it. He must have been pleased, but a little surprised, when instead of demanding the hand of a Russian princess for his master, Talleyrand began, in his polished and confidential way, to abuse Napoleon, and to tear his policy to pieces.⁴ "Sire," said Talleyrand to the Tsar, "what are you going to do here? It rests with you to save Europe, and you

¹ Metternich, *Mémoires*, II, 235.

² Masson, *Napoléon et sa famille* (1900), IV, 1-2.

³ This son was known later as Count Walewski, the eminent ambassador and Minister of Foreign Affairs under Napoleon III. He was the son of Napoleon I and Marie, Comtesse Walewski, and was born at Walewice near Warsaw on May 4, 1810.

⁴ Metternich, *op. cit.*, II, 248. Metternich says that Talleyrand on returning to Paris reported the results of the conferences at Erfurt to him (*ibid.*).

can only accomplish this by resisting Napoleon. The French people are civilised, its sovereign is not."

Nothing therefore happened at Erfurt to further Napoleon's Russian marriage project. Napoleon, however, had a second string to his bow. In Schoenbrunn, at the height of his military success against Austria, he wrote to Champagny (who was in conference with Metternich at Altenburg), "My veritable interest is to separate the three crowns (of Austria) or to make an intimate alliance with the reigning house."¹ On the same day he wrote directly to the Emperor of Austria: "Once peace is re-established between us, it will only depend on Your Majesty to draw close the bonds of our States."²

After this events moved fairly rapidly. On November 30, 1809, Napoleon informed Josephine that he had resolved on a divorce.³ On December 15 he wrote to Cambacérès ordering him to preside at a privy council at the Tuileries, and to present a project of a *sénatus-consulte* of which article 1 should be: "The marriage contracted between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine is dissolved." Matters having advanced so far, it remains uncertain who made the first decisive move towards an Austrian alliance. The accounts are conflicting, but one thing is clear: "both sides were willing."⁵ Even Josephine was now reconciled to the idea of divorce, and aided the diplomacy of her husband. On January 3, 1810, she told the Countess Metternich, who was still in Paris although her husband was now Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna: "I have a plan which occupies me entirely, the success of which alone could make me hope that the sacrifice I am about to make will not be a pure loss: it is that the Emperor should marry your Archduchess." And in the same conversation, Josephine plainly passed on one of Napoleon's threats: "it must be represented to your Emperor that his ruin and that of his country are certain if he does not consent, and it is perhaps the only means of preventing the Emperor from making a schism with the Holy See."⁶

¹ September 15, 1800: *Corr.*, No. 15816.

² *Corr.*, No. 15823.

³ Fournier, II, 107.

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 16050.

⁵ Fournier, II, pp. 111-12, note 2.

⁶ Metternich, II, 315. The Countess Metternich to her husband, January 3, 1810. The Austrians on their side thought that the marriage might still be arranged between Napoleon and a Russian, Saxon or even English princess! See Note of a Frenchman at Vienna, January 1, 1810 (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

The project of Napoleon for a Russian match was now definitely set aside. Alexander had not actually refused, but he had asked for delay. "To adjourn is to refuse," said Napoleon; "besides, I do not wish strange priests in my palace, between me and my wife."¹ So he prepared to marry an Austrian princess of the Catholic faith.

No one showed any objections except the youthful Archduchess² and the aged Pope. The decree of divorce was delivered in the Archiepiscopal Court of Paris on December 15, 1809. Pius VII, who was still living at Savona in a state of captivity which Napoleon did nothing to soften, refused to sanction the divorce. Extra harshness of Napoleon, such as depriving him of writing materials, did not change the Pope's decision. So matters were hastened to a conclusion without him. On February 7, 1810, the Contract of Marriage was signed at Paris and sent by courier to Otto, French ambassador at Vienna.³ The contract was modelled on that of Louis XVI with Marie Antoinette of Austria.⁴ Otto was to obtain the ratification of the Emperor of Austria by February 14, and to dispatch a courier with the news of this to the French General commanding at Strasbourg. From there the General would transmit the news of ratification to Paris by means of the signal-telegraph. Berthier, Prince of Neufchâtel, was then to set out on February 22 (and actually did do so), to go as Ambassador Extraordinary to Vienna, to demand the Archduchess in marriage for Napoleon, and to bring her to Paris. The Archduchess was to bring none of her people with her, or at most only one *femme de chambre*, if there was one to whom she was particularly attached, who, however, was only to remain with her for a month. Nor was the Archduchess to bring a *trousseau*, for Napoleon was providing all of this.⁵

The definite marriage-treaty was signed at Vienna on March 9, 1810, by Berthier for France, and by Trautmannsdorff and

¹ Thibaudeau, V, 103.

² On January 23, 1809, she writes to a friend: "I open the *Frankfurter Zeitung* always expecting to see the name of his new bride, and I confess the delay makes me anxious. . . ." (quoted by Fournier, *Life of Napoleon*, II, 115). The people of Austria liked the marriage because it seemed to be a guarantee of peace with France (Report of St. Rémy, (?) November, 1810, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

³ *Corr.*, No. 16218 (to Champagny, February 7, 1810).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ These details are given in Napoleon's letter to Champagny, February 7, 1810 (*Corr.*, No. 16218).

Metternich for Austria.¹ The religious ceremony of marriage was celebrated by procuration at Vienna on March 11; the civil marriage, after Marie Louise had been conducted to France, took place with Napoleon present in person, at Saint Cloud on April 1.

This moment may be considered that at which Napoleon's power touched its highest point. Paris was becoming the centre of Europe. Even the Kingdom of Italy, nominally independent, although its sovereign was also Emperor of France, was now to have its Foreign Office and Secretariat of State in Paris.² At the same time the provinces of Spain to the north of the Ebro were declared to be annexed to France.³ Any other Spanish provinces, reconquered from the "insurgents" or the English, were to be administered by the French generals. Thus France's territorial influence was to increase, although not for a very reassuring reason. In giving his order for the generals to administer (and take the revenues of) conquered Spanish provinces, Napoleon gave the reason: "I cannot cope with the enormous expenses of my army of Spain."⁴

The truth is that Napoleon had throughout been treating Spain as a part of his Empire, even though he had created Joseph king. Joseph made statesmanlike efforts to gain the good-will of the Spanish, but his only chance of achieving this was in being independent of his brother.⁵ Napoleon, on the other hand, not merely held all the threads of civil and military affairs in Joseph's kingdom, but actually declared his intention of incorporating it in the Empire. The Imperial decree of February 8, 1810, annexing the four provinces on the left bank of the Ebro, took away the best element of prestige in Joseph. When the king received the decree, says his friend Miot de Melito, who was with him: "I saw what a mortal blow it struck him."⁶ In April Joseph sent the Minister of the Indies, Azanza, whom he created Duc of Santa Fé, to Paris, to obtain the rescission of the decree of February 8. Azanza, unfortunately,

¹ De Clercq, II, 318.

² *Corr.*, No. 16232 (Decree of February 9, 1810). The Italian Office was to be in the Rue de Rivoli.

³ Decree of February 8, 1810.

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 16229 (to Berthier, February 8, 1810).

⁵ Miot de Melito, *Mémoires* (1858), III, 48. Joseph raised some Spanish regiments and created a Civic Guard in Madrid, so as to get rid of the French garrison. But the French remained in the fort of Retiro, and so were masters of the city (*ibid.*, II, 144-5).

⁶ Miot de Melito, *Mémoires*, III, 137.

in the course of the negotiations at the French Ministry of Exterior Relations, showed to Champagny the memorandum of instructions which he had brought with him from Spain. This memorandum contained so much plain speaking against Napoleon that Champagny returned it to Azanza as unacceptable.¹ Worse still, he was told that Napoleon had decided to incorporate the whole of Spain in his Empire.² Azanza returned to Spain, and in November the blow fell. Napoleon wrote to the Comte de Laforest, his ambassador at Madrid, saying that "the King of Spain [Joseph] would count for little if he were not the brother of the French Emperor." Apart from the French armies, Joseph's supporters were weaker than "a township of four thousand souls." Therefore the Emperor had decided no longer to hold by the Treaties of Bayonne. With magnificent impudence the Emperor now declared that he considered these treaties as *non avenues*, because "they have not been ratified by the Spanish nation." Thus the sham independence and integrity of Spain had no longer even the sham guarantee of the Treaties of Bayonne. The Emperor added that he was willing to re-open negotiations with the "insurgents" on the basis of the principles contained in the Treaties of Bayonne, if the English would give up Lisbon and depart in their ships.³ Needless to say, the "insurgents" (i.e. the Spanish Cortes which, protected by British cruisers, held its sessions in the Isle of Leon) did not accept Napoleon's offer. The Imperial decree of incorporation was indefinitely deferred, and the Peninsular War continued to sap the vitals of the Empire, although Napoleon confidently declared, in his speech to the *Corps législatif* on June 16, 1811, that he was going to end "this second Punic War," by a *coup de tonnerre*.⁴ It was a curious position that Spain was in—fighting a national war against a nominally Spanish Government, while Napoleon was using Spanish soldiers in garrisons on the shores of the Baltic.⁵

Annexation, which Spain avoided, fell upon Holland and North Germany. Napoleon's younger brother, Louis, was still King

¹ Miot de Melito, *Mémoires*, III, 139.

² Fournier, II, 126, etc.

³ To Laforest, November 7, 1810 (*Corr.*, No. 17111).

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 17813. Napoleon was very badly informed about events in Spain, and never took the wars there seriously enough (see *Revue de Questions historiques*, tome XII, 264).

⁵ See Auerstädt to Napoleon, November 27, 1811, advising that a Spanish regiment at Rostock be not removed into the interior, where it would be induced to desert by Prussian agents (*Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656*).

of Holland, watching sadly the ruin of his kingdom owing to the Continental System. Napoleon was not indifferent to the ruin of the Dutch, but he would not allow Louis to contract out of the System. Rather he would annex Holland himself. In his speech of December 3, 1809, to the *Corps législatif*, the Emperor said :

Holland, placed between England and France, is equally bruised. Nevertheless it is the outlet of the principal arteries of my Empire. Some changes will become necessary : the safety of my frontiers, and the well understood interest of the two countries, imperiously demand this.¹

By the beginning of the year 1810 the Emperor had become impatient : " My affairs do not progress," he wrote to his Minister of Exterior Relations (Champagny) : " the affair of Holland does not make a step." ² On February 22, 1810, he ordered Champagny to demand definitely from King Louis the left bank of the Rhine : " the fundamental principle of the Empire is to have the *thalweg* of the Rhine as a limit." ³ Louis was compelled to conclude a treaty recognising this limit, on March 16, 1810.⁴ Napoleon's correspondence, however, made it abundantly clear that a larger annexation was in view ; but before annexing the whole of Holland the Emperor allowed King Louis to send to London, without official title, an Amsterdam banker called Labouchère. This envoy was to state to the British Foreign Office that if Great Britain would withdraw the Orders in Council of 1807, the French troops would evacuate Holland (the right, not the left, bank which had already been annexed) : " perhaps even they would evacuate the Hanseatic towns." ⁵ The British Government, however, rejected the offer, for the excellent reason that the fate of Holland was, for the time being, past praying for, and because the destiny of the French Empire was now being decided in Spain. Louis, finding his position intolerable, abdicated on July 1, 1810. Before the year had ended an Imperial decree (December 13, 1810) declared Holland (a very unwilling partner) ⁶ to be annexed to the Empire

¹ *Corr.*, No. 16031.

² *Corr.*, No. 16113 (January 6, 1810).

³ *Corr.*, No. 16277.

⁴ De Clercq, II, 328: signed at Paris by Champagny and Admiral Verhuel.

⁵ From the note drafted by Napoleon for Labouchère, and enclosed in a letter to King Louis, March 20, 1810 (*Corr.*, No. 16352).

⁶ Fahrenberg, writing to Metternich, from Ratisbon, on February 7, 1810, was then looking forward to a general revolution in Holland and Brabant (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

along with the entire German coast on the North Sea. Thus Napoleon by a stroke of the pen took the mouths of the Rhine, Ems, Weser and Elbe, and the Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg and even Lubeck, although this was not on the North Sea, but the Baltic. The announcement of the impending annexation of the Hanseatic cities was the occasion of "general mourning."¹ In spite of the extension of Napoleonic jurisdiction, English ships continued to put in along the coast of Mecklenburg and Pomerania to get water and game.² The Westphalians put difficulties in the way of the watch at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser.³

The Labouchère negotiations with England never had a chance of succeeding. Yet they may be regarded as Napoleon's last grand diplomatic throw. He can scarcely have expected England to treat; so he can hardly have been disappointed when she refused. Just as at Tilsit he had been ready, if necessary, to share the East with the Tsar in return for an alliance, so now, in 1810, he was prepared to share the Spanish-American Colonies with England."⁴ But not even for this would England relax her grip on the French forces, now labouring heroically, hopelessly, in the Spanish slough.⁵

¹ Report of December 26, 1810, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654.

² Report of January 18, 1811, in Arch. Nat. *ibid.*

³ The Westphalian Government disliked the occupation of their river-mouths by the French, and the French authorities could not rely on the Westphalian troops (Duke of Feltre to Napoleon, August 16, 1810, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

⁴ Coquelle, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁵ The hopes of Europe were becoming centred on the Spanish struggle. Austrian officers were taking service with the Spanish insurgent armies (Auerstädt to Napoleon, December 4, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657).

CHAPTER XXV

NAPOLEON AND THE NORTH

In the year 1811 the Grand Empire was really besieged.¹ Napoleon's discourse to the *Corps législatif* might describe the map of Europe as French from the Ebro to the Vistula and the Save, but the Empire was nevertheless besieged ; north and south, its coasts were blockaded by the British Navy ; from the west Wellington's army was steadily fighting its way through Spain ; while in the east the Russian frontier was found to be rigid, and impervious to French commerce or French politics.

The famous Continental System was not working properly. "The immense magazines of Heligoland," wrote Napoleon at the end of the year 1810, "would always threaten to flow upon the Continent if a single point remained open to English commerce on the coasts of the North Sea."² The annexation of the North German littoral was decided on, in order to draw closer the bonds of the Continental System. But even French merchants complained of the System. Napoleon gave them what comfort he could :

If I were the inheritor of the throne of Louis XV or of Louis XVI, I would be forced to sue on my knees for peace with England. But I have succeeded to the Emperors of France. I have united to my Empire the mouths of the greatest rivers of Europe, and the Adriatic. Nothing can prevent me from constructing a fleet of 200 large vessels

¹ Internally, France, if not the rest of the Empire, seems to have been perfectly quiet. The Police Reports from Paris for the first six months of 1812 disclose scarcely any political agitation or plotting (Arch. Nat. F⁷ 3200).

² From the *Moniteur*, December 15, 1810 (*Corr.*, No. 17197, vol. XXI, p. 310). Next year (January 19, 1811), the Duc d'Auerstädt reports that "the Island of Heligoland actually discharges by means of smugglers some colonial produce on the coasts of the north of Holland" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654). Another report, December 30, 1810, says that the fishermen of Rügen are great intermediaries of English correspondence (*ibid.*). Another, December 20, 1811, says that Gothenburg is practically an English colony (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657).

and arming them. I know that the English will have better admirals, and that is a great advantage. But through fighting we shall learn to conquer. We shall lose one, two, three battles and we shall gain the fourth, by the simple and natural reason that he who is the stronger must subdue the weaker.¹

By this time, however, Napoleon was aiming at something more than peace, and the stability of his Empire's limits through peace with England. His Empire was to have no limits. It is said that every fifty or hundred years there arises some Disturber, some man, group of men, or nation that conceives the mad design of gaining the whole world. The opposition of Europe to Napoleon, especially the tireless, relentless hostility of Great Britain, had caused him to go on extending his Empire; and now he was to rule the world: "that series of invasions, of which one becomes always the means for the other, puts in the clearest daylight the truth of the assertion that Napoleon has not lost sight for an instant of his project to submit the whole world to his domination."² He could not bear, says the same authority, to be contradicted in Europe any more than in France. "In the gravest debates with the greatest Powers of Europe, he publicly treated their ambassadors as he treated his chamberlains or his *Corps législatif*."³ In November, 1811, in a moment of exaltation, he exclaimed to De Pradt: "In five years, I shall be master of the world; there only remains Russia, but I shall crush it."⁴ He had not forgotten England; but with Russia crushed, the Continental System would be nearly complete: and so England (he hoped) would at last be broken. Therefore in the summer of 1812 he invaded Russia.

According to De Pradt, the war had been fated to come from the very beginning of the Franco-Russian alliance. Since the peace of Tilsit, "that peace in which war was so well established," discerning men had seen "forming and progressively swelling the cloud whence the storm was to burst on the two States."⁵ The

¹ Miot de Melito, *Mémoires*, III (May or June, 1811. Cp. Fournier, II, 146).

² De Pradt, *Histoire de l'Ambassade dans le Grand Duché de Varsovie en 1812* (Paris, 1815), p. 22.

³ De Pradt, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* Apparently the Russians themselves seriously thought that Napoleon meant to be master of at least Europe. "Letters from Petersburg say that people are very discontented with the Russian Government's blindly following Napoleon, whose aim is so to aggrandise himself as to command Europe entirely" (Report of January 6, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

⁴ De Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁵ De Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

year 1812 was the moment when "the system of the Emperor was to acquire the complete development to which it had for long been tending" Napoleon "created the war with Russia as a part of the methodical plan of the invasion of Europe, in which the attack on that Empire had a necessary and inevitable place."¹ "One man the less," he said, "and I were master of the world."² That one man was Alexander. Besides, Europe was too small, too much occupied, too regularly settled for the vast genius of Napoleon: "There has been nothing to do in Europe for two hundred years," he remarked to De Pradt at Mayence in 1804; "it is only in the East that one can work on the grand scale."³

Inspirations and aspirations of this sort may have been at the back of Napoleon's mind. But the train of events leading to the war of 1812 does not have the appearance of being deliberately planned. There are six questions or points of contention which may be said to have occasioned the rupture between Napoleon and Alexander. One was the question of Napoleon's marriage; then followed the questions of Oldenburg, Sweden, the evacuation of Prussia, the Continental System, and Poland.

The refusal of Alexander to give one of his sisters in marriage to Napoleon did, as might be expected, wound the pride of Napoleon. The Emperor, Champagny wrote to Caulaincourt, ambassador at Petersburg, had reason to complain, not of the refusal of the Tsar, but of the delay in answering his overtures.⁴ Any man would be at least a little piqued by such treatment; much more Napoleon, who was used to having his own way both with monarchs and with women. On the other hand, Alexander was believed to dislike Napoleon's Austrian marriage: "if any political bonds were to ensue from it, this must be against Russia. It is therefore not doubtful that from this moment Russia regarded her alliance with France as broken, and that she prepared to seize the first occasion to show herself hostile."⁵

On December 13, 1810, Napoleon, by decree, annexed the North German coast. This act not merely betokened a rather alarming extension of French power: it was also bound to offend the Tsar.

¹ De Pradt, *op. cit.*, p. 50. *That empire is, of course, Russia.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 23.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19: *ce n'est qu'en l'Orient que l'on peut travailler en grand.*

⁴ Quoted in Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}*, II, 270.

⁵ Thibaudeau, V, 119. The passage overstates the case, but in substance it is probably correct.

For the German coast included the territory of the Duke of Oldenburg, who was a distant cousin of the Tsar. Now the Duke of Oldenburg was guaranteed in the possession of his territories by the Franco-Russian Treaty of Tilsit, of July 7, 1807, article 12. The annexation of the Duchy, without any preliminary agreement with Alexander, was as much an offence against Alexander as against the public law of Europe. No wonder that Alexander wrote to Napoleon somewhat bitterly :

A little corner of territory which the only individual who belongs to my family possessed, who has fulfilled all the formalities required of him, member of the Confederation, and by that under the protection of Your Majesty, finds himself dispossessed without Your Majesty having said a word about it to me previously !¹

The annexation of Oldenburg by Napoleon was part of a scheme to control not merely the coast of the North Sea, but also the Baltic. For at the same time as he absorbed the Duchy and also the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg, the French Emperor annexed Lubeck, which is on the Baltic. Now the Baltic, since the decline of Swedish power, was largely a Russian sea. Thus the French annexations of 1810 injured the Tsar both in his family pride and in his political interests ; for Napoleon to do this in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Tilsit was almost certain to put an end to the alliance of the two Emperors. The offer of Erfurt (which was still unallotted) as an indemnity to the Duke of Oldenburg was childish, although quite according to the Napoleonic principles.²

Apart from Oldenburg, the Continental System was a fruitful ground of dispute between the two Emperors. By the secret articles of the Tilsit treaty, the Russian Government was bound, in the event of the Anglo-French war continuing, to break off political and commercial relations with England. Alexander had fulfilled this obligation, and excluded British ships from his ports.³

¹ Alexander to Napoleon, March 25, 1811, in Tatistcheff, *Alexandre I^{er} et Napoleon*, p. 548. At the beginning of the year the Duke of Oldenburg was reported as saying that he would not leave his duchy except *par la force des bayonnettes* (Report of January 6, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF 1654).

² Although obviously included in the general annexation-decree of December 13, 1810, Oldenburg was not *by name* annexed until January 22, 1811 (Vandal, *op. cit.*, II, 527-8).

³ England did not submit tamely to this : see Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 4, 1809, written from Kaminë-Ostrov : *on s'attend toujours à une attaque de la part des Anglais*. Russia's only ice-free port, Kola, was burned by the English Navy (Arch. Aff. étr. *Russie* 1801).

He did not, however, place an embargo on neutral sea-borne trade; and it was notorious that vast quantities of the goods of the British Empire came into Russia in this way. From Russia these goods filtered through Prussia, the Duchy of Warsaw, and Austria, into Germany. The fairs of Leipzig and Frankfort were partly stocked with British and British Colonial products. When he could, Napoleon had these goods seized and burned,¹ but their British origin could not always be proved. At the Leipzig fair of 1810, seven hundred carts of British products came from Russia; and at one time in the same year twelve hundred ships "masked under Swedish, Portuguese, Spanish and American flags," but escorted by twenty English ships of war, discharged their cargoes in Russian ports. And yet, if Russia would "seriously prevent the commerce in colonial products, England will make peace in a year."²

Alexander, however, was not prepared to stop this neutral trade. Russian finances at this time were very disorganised, and the monetary rate of exchange was extremely adverse. The customs-dues levied on foreign goods passing through Russian ports were, in default of a brisk Russian export trade, the only means of rectifying the exchange. In fact, so imperious was the necessity of restricting imports that on December 31, 1810, Alexander issued a ukase increasing the duties on goods entering by land.³ This now celebrated ukase not only placed a prohibitive tariff on land-borne goods, but ordered the burning of all goods which evaded the tariff. The object was

to restrict as far as possible importation by land as the most disadvantageous for our balance of commerce, introducing a quantity of very costly objects of luxury, for which we disbursed our coin, while our own exportation is so extremely hindered. Such are the quite simple

¹ General of Brigade at Magdeburg, Procès-Verbal, December 20, 1810: all the English goods were collected in the Cathedral Square; "I applied the fire to them, and we did not retire until all the effects were consumed" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

² The figures about neutral shipping, as well as this last remark, are from Napoleon's letter to Champagny, November 4, 1810, in *Corr.*, No. 17099. Alexander maintained that he had tried to force England to make peace, and that by doing so he had only injured himself (Rumiantsov to Caulaincourt, July 13, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Russie* 1801).

³ When the rumour of this ukase got about in North Germany, it created great excitement and for a time was a chief subject of conversation (Report of January 23, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

reasons for the tariff-ukase. It is no more directed against France than against all Europe.¹

The ukase was a general restriction against goods brought by land from Europe, but the bulk of such goods were French. So Napoleon felt himself injured, although as Alexander pointed out the French tariff against Russian goods was also "excessive."² But that the Russian Government should burn French goods caused Napoleon to explode with anger: "Monsieur," he said to Tchernycheff, the envoy who brought Alexander's letter, "as I can only reply to an affront by an affront, I have given the order, in all the ports that are in my power, to burn all the wood, potash, hemp, iron (sic), in a word everything that may come from Russia. Here is a charming alliance, a very edifying friendship."³

The selection of Bernadotte to be Crown Prince of Sweden must have caused some anxiety to Alexander, and may for a moment have increased the friction between Russia and France, but not for long.

According to article 5 of the Secret Convention of Tilsit, Alexander was bound to summon Sweden to close her ports to British ships, and, if Sweden refused, to declare war upon her. War had actually ensued, as the result of which Russia gained from Sweden the Grand Duchy of Finland (Treaty of Friedrichshamm, September 17, 1809).⁴

Freed from the Russian war, Sweden began to breathe more easily, and went on trading with Great Britain. The more effectively did the restrictions of the Continental System operate on the North Sea coasts, the more did British shipping concentrate on the Baltic trade.⁵ Naturally, Napoleon objected to this and per-

¹ Alexander to Napoleon, March 25, 1811, in Tatistcheff, p. 549.

² *Ibid.* The society of St. Petersburg thought that Alexander had not shown even yet sufficient independence, and accused him of still "following blindly the impulsion of the French Government" (Report of January 6, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF 1654).

³ Conversation with Colonel Tchernycheff, April 10, 1811, in Tatistcheff, p. 557. Alexander's ukase of December 31, 1810, was not exactly a reply to the annexation of Oldenburg by Napoleon, because even Napoleon's decree of December 13, 1810, did not finally decide the fate of the Duchy.

⁴ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, I, 19.

⁵ A Report of February 18, 1811, says that the French Consuls at Danzig and Königsberg were issuing certificates for the sale of English merchandises: "the porter and the beer of England is abundant there under the name of Double Beer" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

emptorily demanded that Sweden should not merely cease to trade with England, but should also declare war upon her.¹ There was an ancient friendship between Sweden and France, but this friendship was not sufficient to induce Sweden to ruin herself. "The first necessity for a people, prior even to providing for the security and grandeur of the State, is to live. . . . Commerce with the ports of the United Kingdom had become one of the normal and essential functions of Sweden's life."²

Besides providing for their daily bread, the Swedes had to provide a dynasty for the Crown. They had excluded the elder branch of the Vasas from the throne owing to the incompetence of Gustavus IV, and had made his uncle king under the name of Charles XIII. Charles had been a good admiral, but now (1809) he was prematurely aged. Besides, he had no children. In 1809 the Estates of Sweden had chosen as successor the Duke of Augustenburg, but the Duke died on May 28, 1810. In perplexity, King Charles XIII wrote to Napoleon, indicating that he would like to see the succeeding Duke of Augustenburg appointed.³ Napoleon's reply was non-committal.⁴

At this point Napoleon's diplomacy made a terrible blunder. When the Swedish question was thus referred to him, he should have taken steps, which might have been taken without any offence to Sweden, to settle it. The Emperor had indeed decided to support the Augustenburg candidature, and gave explicit orders to Alquier, his ambassador (who was in Paris, ready to set out for Sweden), to press forward this view, when, on June 25, 1810, a Swedish officer made in Paris an offer of the succession to Marshal Bernadotte.⁵

The idea of electing one of Napoleon's Marshals as Crown Prince had come into the minds of an unofficial but active group in Stockholm: "some officers, and some Upsala professors."⁶ Among Napoleon's Marshals there was only one that had been in personal

¹ *Corr.*, No. 16476. A formal state of war was actually proclaimed between Sweden and England, but the governing classes, for commercial reasons, remained in the English interest (Report from Hamburg, December 26, 1810, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

² Vandal, *op. cit.*, II, 448. A report of the Commander of Hamburg, December 26, 1810, says that all the commercial interests of Sweden, including the nobles, were tied to England (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

³ Vandal, II, 450, from Arch. Aff. étr. *Suède* 294: June 2, 1810.

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 16588.

⁵ *Corr.*, No. 16588.

⁶ Vandal, II, 453.

contact with the Swedes; this was Bernadotte, who in 1810 had been French commander in the Hanseatic cities, and who had been a very courteous warrior against the Swedes in Pomerania.

Bernadotte very properly informed Napoleon of the Swedish offer. The Emperor hesitated, reflected, and finally did nothing. He might have pressed on the Augustenburg candidature, and forbidden Bernadotte to move, or he might have adopted the Bernadotte plan, and made it his own. Actually the Emperor did neither. He countermanded the order to Alquier to go to Stockholm,¹ but he did nothing to help Bernadotte. The Emperor was growing fatalistic. Bernadotte went to Sweden, and after a good deal of resistance on the part of Charles XIII (who objected to having a "French Corporal" for Crown Prince),² was elected by the Estates on August 21, 1810.³

When Charles XIII wrote to Napoleon announcing the election of Bernadotte, the Emperor replied: "I was little prepared for this news, since Your Majesty had made known to me that you wished to propose and have elected a brother of the late Prince Royal."⁴ Caulaincourt at Petersburg was instructed to inform the Tsar that Napoleon had nothing to do with Bernadotte's election. The dispatches of the Minister of Exterior Relations were to insist upon this: "You will maintain that it is the exact truth; it is necessary to declare it in a noble and sincere tone without changing; it is necessary to continue to hold the same language, because it is true."⁵ As a matter of fact, Alexander was soon to have a clear indication that the new Crown Prince of Sweden was not going to be an upholder of Napoleon. Colonel Tchernycheff, in one of his journeys between Paris and Petersburg, made a detour through Stockholm in December, 1810. He had several conversations with the Crown Prince, whom he found perfectly at ease in his new position, already turned Lutheran, bearing himself with tranquil dignity, reviewing troops and receiving popular deputations, as if to the manner born. When Bernadotte had ascertained that Tchernycheff was the bearer of friendly messages from Alexander, he received the Russian officer to his heart, and established a durable entente.

¹ Vandal, *op. cit.*, II, 458.

² Vandal, II, 468.

³ *Corr.*, No. 16875: Napoleon to Charles XIII, September 6, 1810.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Napoleon to Champagny, September 7, 1810, *Corr.*, No. 16876.

This orientation of Sweden away from France was increased by the fact that Alquier, when he did finally go to Stockholm to represent Napoleon, proved to be a most unsuitable ambassador. There were considerable altercations between the French ambassador and the Crown Prince. At last Alquier said that he must receive a friendly Declaration or he would leave on the morrow. "You can depart *this* evening," answered the Prince. The Report adds: "Even the French party has seen M. Alquier leave without regret."¹

A real though minor cause of friction between Alexander and Napoleon was Prussia. At the beginning of the year 1812, French troops were still in occupation of Prussian territories watered by the Oder: in particular the fortresses of Glogau, Cüstrin, and Stettin were garrisoned by French troops.²

Alexander demanded that they should be evacuated. Napoleon, however, had no intention of giving up the great Prussian fortresses, at least in the immediate future. His military advisers, alarmed at the reports of "movements" in Prussia, would have gone further, and have kidnapped the Prussian king.³ But even for the abductor of the Duc d'Enghien this proposal was too strong.

¹ Report of February 2, 1812, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657.

² See Franco-Prussian Convention of February 24, 1812, in which Article 14 regulates the provisioning of these French garrisons (De Clercq, II, 359).

³ Auerstädt to Napoleon, November 25, 1811: "I have to bring forward the hypothesis (*poser l'hypothèse*) that the King could be surprised in Berlin; his capture would be so important that I suppose it would be necessary not to forego it" (*je suppose qu'il ne faudrait pas la manquer*), Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE END OF THE TREATY OF TILSIT

Perhaps the existence of the Duchy of Warsaw would, apart from all other grounds of dispute, in the long run have made the alliance of Napoleon and Alexander transitory. The Duchy was only a fragment of old Poland, but Alexander had reason to fear that it might be the nucleus for the resurrection of a great Poland. In 1809 the Duchy had been increased by the addition of West Galicia and of the circle of Zamosc in East Galicia.¹ This fact, coupled with some "nationalist" proclamations made by the French forces in invading Galicia, gave the Tsar great cause to fear.

Napoleon, when warned by his ambassador at Petersburg, Caulaincourt, offered to erase the name of Poland from all his public acts.² Caulaincourt was instructed to negotiate a treaty on this subject. A few weeks later Caulaincourt was given authority to sign, with the injunction: "In general you will not refuse anything that shall have for its object the dispelling of every idea about the re-establishment of Poland."³ At the same time Napoleon, through Caulaincourt, was asking for the Grand Duchess Anna in marriage.⁴ This was why he was so particularly complaisant to Alexander. Accordingly, on January 4, 1810, the treaty was signed at Petersburg by Caulaincourt and Rumiantsov. The treaty is of so unique a kind that the text is worth quoting.

¹ Treaty of Vienna, October 14, 1809, art. 3, paragraph 4; see above, p. 230. M. Tatistcheff estimates that out of 2,000,000 souls in Galicia ceded by Austria, 1,500,000 were attributed to the Duchy of Warsaw, while Russia, in its share of Eastern Galicia (chiefly Tarnopol), got only 500,000 (*Alex. I^{er} et Nap.*, p. 511).

² Champagny to Rumiantsov (Russian Chancellor), October 20 (sic—the real date was probably November 6; see Vandal, *op. cit.*, II, 169), in Tatistcheff, p. 513.

³ Quoted by Vandal, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁴ Champagny to Caulaincourt, November 22, 1809, in Vandal, II, 182-3.

H.M. the Emperor of the French, etc., and H.M. the Emperor of all the Russias, animated by the desire to assure in an unshakable manner the continental peace, and wishing to take from England, which always, and particularly in the last years, has shown itself the declared enemy of the Continent, all hope of troubling the tranquillity anew, have resolved, not only to draw together again more and more the knots of the alliance which so happily unites the two Empires, but also to contribute, by all possible means, to consolidate it, and to render it indissoluble. Their Imperial Majesties have, in consequence, judged it necessary to agree amicably to put aside in advance all the subjects of disquietude which may be an obstacle to their union, in putting an end to the dangerous illusions which the chimerical hope of the revival of the Kingdom of Poland can still nourish in the hearts of the old Poles. . . .

Article 1. The Kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established.

Article 2. The H.C.P. engage to take care that the names of Poland or Polish shall never apply to any of the regions which have previously constituted the kingdom, nor to their inhabitants, nor to their troops, and shall disappear for ever from every official or public act, of whatever nature it may be.¹

Alexander, pleased, ratified the treaty at once, and Caulaincourt sent it to Paris for Napoleon's ratification. While this treaty was being negotiated, the ambassador seized the favourable opportunity to suggest that Napoleon might marry the Grand Duchess Anna (December 28, 1809). The Tsar was gracious: "I tell you frankly"—a favourite phrase in Russian diplomatic circles—"my sister could not do better." But, added Alexander, the decision, by law, lay with his mother.²

On February 6, 1810, Napoleon read the dispatches of Caulaincourt,³ making it clear that the Emperor Alexander and the Dowager Empress were really against the marriage, in spite of all the pleasant things that they said. The news seems to have decided Napoleon forthwith, on his side, to refuse, by similar methods of procrastination, the Convention of January 4 with regard to the extinction of the Polish name for ever:

M. le Duc de Cadore [Champagny] presents to me a project of Convention to substitute for that of the Duc de Vicence [Caulaincourt]. Let him know that I cannot sign this Convention, because there is no

¹ *Corr.*, No. 16177 (January 29, 1810), note 1 (vol. XX, p. 148). There were six less important articles, i.e. eight in all.

² Vandal, II, 226, from Caulaincourt's Reports, in the *Arch. Aff. étr. Russie*, Supp. 17.

³ Vandal, II, 259.

dignity and because there are things in it for which he was not authorised. I cannot say, "*The Kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established*" (art. 1), because that would mean that if, one day, the Lithuanians, or any other circumstance [sic], were going to re-establish it, I would be obliged to send my troops to oppose this. . . . Article 2 is altogether bad: it is not for me "to take care that the names of Poland or Pole shall no longer appear": such an engagement would be ridiculous and absurd. . . . The Russians will not fail to conceive suspicions, to imagine that I have great projects, and they will exhale their anger: but immediately the Duc de Vicence will shut their mouth in announcing to them that he can remit to them within the day a Convention all ratified, and that this Convention shall not differ in anything from the preceding.¹

The new Convention, however, which in any case Napoleon wished to keep secret (while Alexander wanted a public declaration against the Poles), was not accepted by the Russian Government. Napoleon's objections to the original Convention were probably not simply due to its inherent absurdities. In all likelihood he reserved to himself freedom to revive the ancient Polish kingdom, if it suited him and his Empire to do so. In spite of his denials, it was believed by influential people that Murat was designated for the new king.² A year later, February, 1811, Napoleon wrote to Alexander a letter announcing the recall of Caulaincourt (on account of ill-health) and the dispatch of General Lauriston as ambassador in his place. The French Emperor seized the occasion to enumerate, in temperate language, all his grievances against Alexander, and to protest that he had no intention of ever reviving the Kingdom of Poland.³ But the suspicion at Petersburg remained.

The rest of the year 1811 was taken up, so far as the relations of Russia and France were concerned, with discussions of the Convention about Poland, the French counter-project for a Convention, and the Russian counter-project to this. In addition,

¹ Napoleon to Champagny, February 6, 1810 (*Corr.*, No. 16178).

² Whether Napoleon ever seriously intended this or not, any such idea was sufficient to alarm Alexander. In 1809 the Tsar had said to Caulaincourt, that as regards Poland *elle* (i.e. His Majesty the Tsar) *ne voyait aucun moyen d'arrangement à cet égard* (Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 28, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. Russie 1801).

³ *Corr.*, No. 17395, February 28, 1811. The Russian Government, on its side, felt that Napoleon had never disclosed to them his real designs; cp. Rumiantsov's conversation with Caulaincourt in 1809: *nous devons nous attendre à une marche plus franche de votre part* (Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 26, 1809, in Arch. Aff. étr. Russie 1801).

the affairs of Bernadotte and the Swedish Crown, of Oldenburg, and of the Continental System, further exacerbated the relations of France and Russia. When spring came in 1812, both sides were actively preparing for war.

A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, signed on February 24, 1812, on behalf of the French and Prussian Governments, shows that war with Russia, for which the French Staff in North Germany had been for months preparing,¹ was regarded as certain to come. The moral revival which the Prussians had been experiencing since the year 1807 had never shown itself in the King. His inconclusive nature was now to sink to the depths of humiliation. He dared not refuse the alliance of his oppressor. The treaty, signed by Maret, Duc de Bassano, for France, and by the Baron von Krusemark for Prussia, bound the two countries publicly to a defensive, secretly also to an offensive, alliance. The negotiation of this treaty probably prevented a war of Prussia upon Napoleon during the Moscow campaign.²

The treaty stated that "in case war shall break out between France and Russia, H.M. the King of Prussia will make common cause with H.M. the Emperor of France" (art. 1 of additional secret Convention). The number of troops to be contributed by Prussia was 14,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 2,000 artillerymen, with 60 cannon. "This contingent shall be as far as possible united in the same *corps d'armée* and employed by preference in defence of the Prussian provinces, without H.M. the King meaning by this to inconvenience in any way the military dispositions of the army in which these troops shall be employed."³ Nevertheless, in spite of this Alliance, the Prussian dominions were ripe for insurrection, which was certain to come if Napoleon's Russian campaign failed.⁴

¹ See, e.g., Auerstädt to Emperor, November 29, 1811: "had seen how in the 1805 campaign many men stayed behind for lack of shoes. Now he is accumulating six pairs of shoes for each soldier" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

² The Prussian army had been rigorously inspected and its equipment put in order at the end of 1810 and beginning of 1811. Napoleon's military advisers in Germany suspected that this was done with a view to Prussia joining Russia in the campaign against Napoleon (Report of January 19, 1811). Two months later (March 12, 1811) it was reported from Warsaw, "it is now impossible to doubt that Russia and Prussia are acting in concert" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

³ Text in De Clercq, II, 354-9.

⁴ As early as January 10, 1811, the Duc d'Auerstädt had reported to Napoleon: "movements of insurrection are manifesting themselves in all Prussia, and especially in Silesia" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

Before summer came in 1812, Napoleon had ready 650,000 men, of whom about half were allied contingents. The Grand Empire, comprehending all but the extreme East and West of Europe, now put forward its full strength and weight, to break the bonds in which England, in spite of all the Empire's grandeur, held it. Having failed to break through in Spain, the Grand Empire was now breaking through in the Orient. The Emperor undertook the task seriously. He can scarcely be said to have underestimated Russia's resources.¹

Central Europe was now the rendezvous of large masses of men, none of whom precisely knew where they were going. Napoleon left St. Cloud on May 9, 1812. He made a detour through South Germany in order to avoid passing through Weimar, where a sister of Alexander lived.² As he travelled, prince after prince came to pay respect to him: the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hesse-Darmstadt met him at Mayence, the Prince-Primate Dalberg saw him at Aschaffenburg, the King of Wurtemberg (whose friendship had cooled, however)³ and the Grand Duke of Baden at Wurzburg, the King and Queen of Saxony at Freiberg; these last accompanied the Emperor to Dresden. There he held court from May 16 to 29. His wife, the Empress Louise, was with him, but not his son, the King of Rome, born on March 20, 1811.

To Dresden there came the birth, the wit and the beauty of Central Europe: the Emperor and Empress of Austria, the King of Prussia, the King of Bavaria (though Bavaria was now bitterly estranged from France⁴), Hardenberg, Metternich, various high noblemen and their families. Austria was now a belligerent ally of Napoleon, having by treaty (March 12, 1812) agreed to supply 60,000 troops for the war with Russia.⁵ The Emperor Francis

¹ A Report of February 18, 1811, forwarded by the Duc d'Auerstädt to Napoleon, estimated the Russian army at 500,000, even when only on a peace footing (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

² De Pradt, *Hist. de l'Ambassade*, p. 52.

³ In 1810 he had resisted Napoleon's efforts to induce him to send Wurtemberger troops to Spain (Swiss Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to F. von Müller, January 24, 1810, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

⁴ Bavaria was aggrieved because Napoleon had not reimbursed it for the expenses of the War of 1805 (Report of Brousseau, January 26, 1810). Salzburg, an acquisition of Bavaria, had to support Davoust's corps (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

⁵ Text in De Clercq, II, 369-72. Signed by the Duc de Bassano (Maret) and Schwarzenberg.

was "pleased to the extent of tears" ¹ at the opportunity of seeing his daughter again. But Napoleon was not able to induce him to agree to give up his share of Galicia in exchange for Illyria. Thus an opportunity was missed of re-constituting the ancient kingdom of Poland as a military measure against Russia. In its present condition, the Duchy of Warsaw was scarcely a source of strength to Napoleon. ²

On June 24 the Grand Army crossed the Niemen, unopposed, and began its march through an empty waste. On learning that Napoleon was now on Russian soil, Alexander sent one last invitation to him to withdraw; if Napoleon could agree with this request the Tsar would consider the past as *non avenue*. ³ By the time the bearer, Colonel Balachof, came in touch with Napoleon, the French had already advanced to Vilna and Alexander had retired.

The demand of the Tsar was found to be inadmissible, but the Russian envoy had several interviews, of a very heated kind, with Napoleon. Yet it was Napoleon's habit, after violently losing his temper in a conference, to ask his adversary to dinner. He proclaimed his intention of waging the war in a "customary, noble, elevated manner"; ⁴ and he proposed an agreement for assuaging the horrors of war: prisoners were to be exchanged every fortnight; direct communications were to be maintained between the belligerent Governments. ⁵ But nothing came of these proposals. For Alexander and the people of Russia the long period of vacillation since Tilsit was over: the war was now to be a great national struggle for existence. The doom to which the Grand Armée and indeed the Grand Empire now went forward was indicated when the imperturbability of Balachof got its reward at the end of a long series of Napoleon's questions. "What is the road to Moscow?" asked the Emperor. "Sire," replied the Russian, "one takes the road to Moscow at will: Charles XII chose the road by Pultava." ⁶

¹ *Ravi jusqu'aux larmes*: Otto to Maret, March 25, 1812, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1706³.

² See Poniatowski to Auerstädt, March 27, 1811: the defectiveness of the Polish army in artillery, equipment and numbers (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654). Also Auerstädt to Poniatowski, December 4, 1811: pay of Polish army in arrears, no shoes (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

³ Dispatched from Vilna, dated June 25, 1812. Text in Tatistcheff, pp. 587-8.

⁴ Tatistcheff, p. 606.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 610.

⁶ The fullest extracts from the narrative of Balachof are those given in Tatistcheff, *op. cit.*, pp. 588-609. The above words are on p. 606.

The Tsar was ready to meet the invasion ; but he would not have been in a good situation, had not the Treaty of Bucharest (May 28, 1812) put an end to his long-drawn-out and harassing war with Turkey. "The unexpected signing of this treaty excited in the highest degree the indignation of Napoleon."¹ Yet disquieting reports which came through the French Embassy at Vienna had warned him that a Turco-Russian peace was imminent.² The peace when it came was largely due to the efforts of Stratford Canning, the youthful British Minister Plenipotentiary at Constantinople.³

¹ Sbornik of the Imperial Russian History Society, XXXI, 281.

² Otto to Min. des Aff. ext., January 21, 1812, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 392.

³ He was then under twenty-six years old. For the treaty see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, III, p. 2030.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE CONCORDAT OF FONTAINEBLEAU

The great expedition against Russia which was to give the fatal shock to Napoleon's Empire took place at the same time as the Emperor made a grand assault on the Roman Catholic Church.

Since August 21, 1809, the Pope had been living at Savona, near Genoa. The Emperor was anxious at first that the period of residence should not seem in the eye of the public like an imprisonment. The prefect of Montenotte, Count Salmatoris, a member of the old Piedmontese nobility, was respectful and attentive to the Pope.¹ Napoleon sent General César Berthier, brother of the Prince of Wagram, as mayor of the palace of the Pope, with orders to do nothing contrary to the personal habits of Pius. Equipages, horses, a civil list of 100,000 francs a month were offered to His Holiness. Pius, however, tranquilly refused all this, and went on living in two rooms of the Bishop's Palace, faring on vegetables and fish, and never going out except into the little garden of the palace, about fifty paces in length.² The offerings of the faithful sufficed for his meagre needs.³

The Emperor soon stiffened in his attitude towards the Pope. The *Sénatus-consulte* actually incorporating the Papal States in the Empire was issued on February 7, 1810. In April, the marriage of Napoleon and the Archduchess Marie Louise took place. Twenty-six cardinals who, since the break-up of the Papal Curia at Rome, had been summoned to Paris, attended at the civil ceremony of marriage at Saint-Cloud, on April 1; but only thirteen were at the religious ceremony in the Louvre on the 2nd. The thirteen who did not attend were forbidden by the Emperor to wear purple

¹ Haussonville, *L'Eglise romaine et le premier Empire, 1800-1814* (Paris, 1869), tome III, pp. 366-7.

² Haussonville, III, 368, quoting Brit. Museum MSS. 8,369.

³ Lebelzern to Metternich, May 16, 1810. Text in Artaud, *Hist. du Pape Pie VII*, II, 362.

and were exiled to Rheims, Saumur, Sedan, and other provincial towns in France. They became known as the Black Cardinals.¹

In May Count Lebzeltern, an Austrian diplomatist, obtained leave to visit the Pope. In his report to Metternich, in which there could be no reason for mis-stating the facts, Lebzeltern says that personally the Pope always had "the greatest partiality for Napoleon."² But His Holiness complained of having no people to help him: "We have had to promote as secretary a domestic whose handwriting was legible . . . the approach of the faithful to us is not free."³ It must be borne in mind that Pius was a simple monk not specially skilled in Canon Law, so that, without technical assistance, he was in a particularly difficult situation when faced with the problems of Napoleon's ecclesiastical policy. While the old monk (Pius was 68 in 1810) had alone to make decisions on intricate questions, the Emperor at Paris had a regular *ecclesiastical council* of skilled prelates and theologians, whom he consulted frequently.⁴ Even news of the outside world was withheld from the Pope, except through what he could glean from occasional copies of the unvarnished *Moniteur* which César Berthier from time to time sent to him.⁵

In October, 1810, Canova, the famous sculptor, went from Rome to Paris to work on a statue of the Empress Marie Louise. He frequently conversed with Napoleon. The Emperor made no secret of his attitude to the Papacy: "I am the master of France, of the whole of Italy, of three great parts of Germany; I am the successor of Charlemagne! If the Popes of to-day had been as the Popes of former times, all would have been arranged." He complained that Pius VII had not shown a neutral disposition. "In Italy the Pope is *quite German*," said the Emperor, and he looked significantly at Marie Louise. "I can assure you," replied the Empress, "that when I was in Germany, the Pope was said to be quite French." Canova's sad description of the condition of Rome since the departure of the Pope—"the city is a desert"—made no impression on the Emperor. Napoleon wished to accumu-

¹ Artaud, I, 258.

² The text of the letter, of which the original is in French, is reproduced in Artaud, II, 260-6. The above quotation is on p. 261.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 262-3.

⁴ Haussouville, III, 374-5.

⁵ Pius' conversation with Lebzeltern, in the letter quoted above: Artaud, II, 262.

late the best examples of ancient art in Paris : " Here is the centre," he said.¹

Meanwhile Pius VII showed no tendency to relax his firm attitude. He refused (November, 1810) to confirm Napoleon's nominations of bishops to sees recently become vacant. The Emperor's reply (January 4, 1811) to the Pope was a prohibition " from communicating with any church of the Empire, or any subject of the Emperor, under the penalty of disobedience on his own part and of theirs." The prohibition was conveyed through the prefect of the department, and was couched in the terms of a police notice, *defense lui est faite*, etc. It concluded with the words " His Majesty is sufficiently powerful to depose the Pope."² The papal bulls, however, were in spite of the most careful police regulations transmitted to their destinations by associations of faithful people who formed themselves, with this object, on both sides of the Alps.

Gradually something like a regular secret postal system was organised chiefly through committees in the strongly Catholic towns of South France.³ To shut Pius completely off from the outside world, the Emperor had all his papers and even his pens removed, on January 8, 1811. In the course of this search, the Pope's purse, breviary, and office of the Virgin were taken away. " Let the purse go," said Pius ; " but what could they do with my breviary and the little office of the Virgin ? "⁴

The Emperor was quite willing to treat with the Pope, but he clearly did not mean to engage in a conciliatory diplomacy. To the Viceroy of Italy he had written :

I send you a letter from the *Ministre des Cultes*. It seems to me that you are more in a position to know what the Cardinal Antonelli thinks. Sound him, and, if he believes that it is the duty of the Pope to smooth away the difficulties which exist over the affairs of Rome, to institute my bishops and to act the Pope quietly without wishing to act the Cæsar ; if, I say, the Cardinal is sufficiently sane (*sensé*) and sufficiently religious to think thus, you can make him undertake

¹ The conversations of Napoleon with Canova are given in Artaud, II, pp. 269-76.

² Doc. in Artaud, II, 278. Cp. *Corr.*, No. 17266, January 5, 1811, where Napoleon orders his librarian, M. Barbier, to report " the result of his researches into the question whether there are examples of emperors who have suspended or deposed Popes."

³ Haussenville, III, 412-14.

⁴ Haussenville, III, 441.

to write to the Pope, or even to go to the Pope to give him advice, for the misfortunes of the Church are evident.¹

In the spring of 1811 Napoleon had an ecclesiastical council of the whole Empire summoned. This body, known since as the National Council of 1811, held its first session, at Notre Dame, on June 17. It numbered one hundred and four prelates—six cardinals, eight archbishops, eighty-one “regular” bishops, and nine ecclesiastics provided with episcopal sees by the Emperor, but not yet instituted by the Pope.² Cardinal Fesch, the uncle of the Emperor, was elected president of the Council: he considerably astonished and irritated his nephew by taking the oath of 1584 (all the other members following him): “I swear and promise a veritable obedience to the Roman Pontiff.”³

The object of the Emperor, in summoning the National Council, was to obtain the authority of the Church (apart from the Pope) for the institution of the clergy whom he had nominated to bishoprics. He had no intention of claiming to institute bishops himself; still less had he any thought of making a schism and creating an independent National Church.⁴ On a later occasion, at a moment of extreme irritation with the Papacy, one of his anti-clerical councillors—“a new Thomas Cromwell”—advised him to be “the absolute chief of the Church”; but the Emperor replied, “No, that would be to break the windows.”⁵

The Emperor at last got his way—for a time. On August 5, 1811, at the last session of the Council, articles were adopted to the effect: (1) that conformably to the sacred canons, sees could not remain vacant for more than a year; (2) the Emperor was to continue to nominate to vacant sees, and the nominated bishops were to address themselves to the Pope for canonical institution; (3) the Pope will give institution within six months according to the Concordats,—if not, (4) the metropolitan, or in default of him the senior bishop of the province, will proceed to the institution of the nominated bishop; (5) the present decree to be submitted to the approbation of the Pope.⁶

The Emperor agreed to the articles. They were submitted by a

¹ *Corr.*, No. 16797 (August 14, 1810).

² Haussonville, IV, 194-5.

³ Artaud, II, 289; Haussonville, IV, 209-10.

⁴ Haussonville, IV, 295-6.

⁵ Artaud, II, 331.

⁶ The complete text is in Haussonville, IV, 367-8.

deputation of bishops to the Pope, who was showing signs of being worn out by the long struggle. Pius gave his approval, and signified it by issuing a papal bull.¹ The news was flashed by telegraph to Paris.²

Here then was the real triumph of Napoleon. He had carried the great bulk of the clergy of the Empire with him ; he had avoided a breach with the Papacy ; and he had obtained guarantees that his present and future nominations to bishoprics would be confirmed by the Pope. This was a signal victory for the Emperor's diplomacy, and if he had used the victory with moderation, the result would have been favourable to the secular affairs of the Empire, and need not have been at all prejudicial to the moral condition of the Church in France. In 1812, however, Napoleon seemed bent on ruining everything. And in May, at the same time as he took the fatal step of attacking Russia, he made a wanton assault on the Pope. Thus by a double error he ruined his affairs, both secular and ecclesiastical.

According to the Abbé de Pradt Napoleon, a few days before his departure for Russia, said to the deputation of bishops lately returned from Savona : " After I have finished the present undertaking, and two or three other projects that I have there, there will be twenty popes in Europe." ³ Whatever the precise meaning of this somewhat cryptic statement, it shows Napoleon in a reckless frame of mind.

The idea of transferring Pius to Fontainebleau may have been suggested to Napoleon by the presence of a British frigate off Savona in the summer of 1812.⁴ It was ready to take the Pope to an asylum outside Napoleon's reach. The Imperial police redoubled their surveillance.

The order to transfer Pius from Savona to Fontainebleau was issued by the Emperor from Dresden, on May 21, 1812.⁵ The Pope was to have a good carriage, but he was not to wear pontifical habits, and he was to be taken through Turin, Chambéry and Lyons by night, so as not to be recognised. So while the Emperor

¹ Artaud, II, 293. Although the struggle with Napoleon was affecting his health, Pius still showed at Savona "much calmness and even gaiety" (Prince Camille Borghese to Emperor, September 7, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV, 1695).

² *Ibid.*, II, 295.

³ De Pradt, *Hist. de l'Ambassade en Pologne*, p. 23.

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 18710.

⁵ *Ibid.*

was making one dolorous expedition to Russia, Pius was making another to Fontainebleau. He arrived there, after a terrible journey, on June 20, and was lodged in the palace. "Red" (i.e. Napoleonic) cardinals were allowed to come from Paris to see him.¹

Five months passed away. The Grand Army met its doom on the Russian steppes, and Napoleon got back to an Empire, shattered indeed but not beyond repair. In the task of military and administrative reorganisation in which he engaged, the affairs of the Papacy were not overlooked. Several interviews took place between the Emperor and the Pope; and Pius, whose health and strength of mind had for the time being given way, capitulated, almost at the very moment when his adversary's empire was crumbling to the dust. On January 25, 1813, he signed the second Napoleonic Concordat (the first was in 1801), known as the Treaty of Fontainebleau.² Article 1 seemed intended to make the Papacy French instead of Italian: "His Holiness will exercise the pontificate in France and in the Kingdom of Italy, in the same manner and with the same forms as his predecessors." By article 4, the Pope undertook within six months to institute prelates nominated by the Emperor to sees in the Empire and the Kingdom of Italy: if not, the metropolitan would institute. The offices of the Propaganda, the Penitentiary and the Archives were to be established "in the place of sojourn of the Pope" (art. 9). The Temporal Power or Papal States were not mentioned; thus all claim to them by the Pope was abandoned, for the present treaty obviously superseded all previous acts which were inconsistent with it. The Pope came under the French protectorate.

The Treaty of Fontainebleau was of an unusual kind in so far as it was signed personally by the two contracting sovereigns instead of being signed by their plenipotentiaries. Through this personal signature Napoleon perhaps hoped to prevent the need for ratification, lest Pius should change his mind. But this was just what Pius almost immediately decided to do. As soon as the Emperor had departed from Fontainebleau, the Pope fell into a profound melancholy. The return, under the treaty, of certain exiled cardinals, especially the Cardinals Pacca and Consalvi, brought a more independent spirit into his councils. A conclave was held. Some cardinals were for maintaining the Treaty of Fontainebleau,

¹ Artaud, II, 298.

² De Clercq, II, 377.

but of negotiating, if possible, a supplementary Convention, to ameliorate it. Others were for retraction pure and simple; and these carried the day (February 28, 1813).

Shortly afterwards, Pius set himself, with his own hand, to write out his retraction and annulment of the treaty of January 25. The writing occupied several days, and the good priests had to practise a little guile in order that the Emperor's officers might not discover what they were doing. Pius wrote in his private rooms, in the presence of two or three cardinals. When the composition was finished for the day (about 4 p.m.), one of the cardinals concealed it in his robe and thus took it away to safety for the night. Next morning he brought it back to the Pope, who continued writing until towards evening.¹ The complete instrument bears the date of March 24, 1813. It was dispatched to the Emperor on the same day.

In this letter Pius alluded to the speedy repentance and remorse which had "torn his spirit" after the signature of the treaty of January 25; so now he declared that what he had written was done wrongly, and "with the help of God we desire that it be completely broken."²

That Pius agreed to a treaty and then immediately recanted his agreement is true. This, however, is not the same as to say that he made a treaty and broke it. He was a free agent when he signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau, January 25, 1813; and therefore, if the treaty was wrong for him, he ought never to have signed it. His age (71), his health, his long imprisonment, the absence of the strongest cardinals, must all be taken into account. When convinced that he had made a mistake he probably did rightly to retract it, seeing that it was the interest of the whole Church that he felt to be at stake. He did not wait to see how the fortune of war treated his adversary: he withdrew his adhesion almost as soon as he had given it. It must be borne in mind, too, that a reserve for ratification is usually attached to the signature of treaties by the fact that sovereigns themselves do not sign. Pius ought to have made such reserve. But he was unskilled in diplomatic procedure, and his Secretary of State (Pacca) was in confinement.

Napoleon, naturally, refused to receive Pius' withdrawal of the Treaty of Fontainebleau; but the campaign of summer 1813 left the Emperor little leisure to deal with Papal affairs. In January,

¹ Artaud, II, 323.

² Text (not complete) in Artaud, II, 325.

1814, he was still hoping to save something of his empire ; and he offered to negotiate a reconciliation with the Pope, on the basis of a restoration of the Papal States from Rome to Perugia. But Pius now refused to negotiate (January 18, 1814).¹ On January 23 he was taken from Fontainebleau in a carriage, he knew not whither. A leisurely journey through Southern France brought him early in April to the Kingdom of Italy, which Eugène Beauharnais was still administering as Napoleonic viceroy. Here Napoleon's treatment of the Pope had always seriously disturbed the minds of the people.² And now Pius heard that the Empire had fallen, and that a Provisional Government had been established in Paris.

¹ Artaud, II, 346.

² Eugène to the Emperor, April 3, 1812: "At the moment when I am leaving for the army, if I bring disquietude concerning the tranquillity of Italy, it is concerning the effect which the affair of the Pope produces" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1695).

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MOSCOW EXPEDITION

Since the departure of Colonel Balachof from Vilna, Napoleon had had no communication with the Tsar Alexander. On September 14, 1812, the French entered Moscow. On the same evening fire broke out, and soon the city was in flames. On September 20, Napoleon attempted to open negotiations with Alexander by sending him a letter through a Russian ex-officer who was living in retirement at Moscow. The French Emperor complained of the burning of the city : " This conduct is atrocious and without object. Was it aimed at depriving us of certain resources ? But these resources were in the cellars which the fire did not touch." The Tsar ought, said Napoleon, to have confided Moscow to him, as the Russian army was abandoning it : " Administrations, magistrates and civil guards ought to have been left there. It is thus that was done at Vienna twice, at Berlin, at Madrid. It is thus that we ourselves did at Milan, at the time of the entry of Suvarov." The letter ends with an appeal :

I have made war on Your Majesty without animosity ; a letter from you, before or after the last battle, would have arrested my march. If Your Majesty still preserves for me any of his ancient sentiments, you will take this letter in good part. Anyhow, you cannot but be pleased with me for having informed you of what has happened at Moscow.¹

No answer was returned to this letter. Alexander would not negotiate so long as the French were on Russian soil. On October 18 the historic retreat of the French army began. On November 4 snow began to fall. The horrors of the retreat still live in the pages of Thiers, and in the poem of Victor Hugo.² Throughout

¹ *Corr.*, No. 19213.

² Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, tome XIV, chap. 45, especially p. 652 ff. Victor Hugo, *L'Expiation* : " Il neigeait. On était vaincu par sa conquête . . ."

the retreat Napoleon's correspondence continues unbroken, and not altogether on military matters. Maret, Duc de Bassano, and a fairly numerous French diplomatic corps remained all the time, both during the advance and the retreat, at Vilna. It was Maret's duty to maintain good relations with neighbouring States, and to arrange for the reception of the Grand Army when it could shake off the Russian pursuit. While soldiers and politicians were growing doubtful and despairing, the Duc de Bassano never for a moment lost his confidence in the Emperor.¹ On December 2, 1812, Napoleon writes from Selitche to the Duc de Bassano to have it announced at Kovno, at Königsberg, at Vienna, in the gazettes, and at Berlin, that the French have gained a great victory at the Beresina; he is also to have ready "a great quantity of provisions, bread, meat, brandy, in order to make abundance succeed to the misery in which the army is to-day."² In spite of the victory at the Beresina, the condition of the army was certainly low, and could not be made better. Nearly all the officers who had horses had to be collected together, in order to create cavalry of four companies of 160 men each (the original cavalry having lost all its horses).³ The only place from which fresh levies might have come was the Duchy of Warsaw. But the Duchy, where De Pradt was acting as ambassador for Napoleon, did nothing: "I have been very badly seconded by Lithuania, by the Duchy of Warsaw, or rather I have not been seconded at all, either by the Government or by the country,"⁴ wrote the Emperor to the Duc de Bassano. The Abbé de Pradt was not the right envoy to employ: the treatment of the Papacy had probably quite turned him against Napoleon.

It is at this moment, perhaps, that Napoleon showed himself at his greatest. He made no attempt to "play the ostrich"; he did not go on repeating, as Governments have done in similar circumstances, that all was well. The 29th Bulletin of the Grand Army, dated December 3, 1812, from Melodetchna, frankly states, after a full exposition of the military situation:

To say that the army has need of re-establishing its discipline, of re-

¹ Pasquier, *Mémoires*, II, 11.

² *Corr.*, No. 19364. ³ *Corr.*, No. 19365.

⁴ *Corr.*, No. 19369 (December 3, 1812). Warsaw wanted to be left at peace. After the retreat from Moscow, the longing for peace was strengthened: "this desire has become a veritable passion," writes Bignon (*Observations on Polish Questions*, August 7, 1813, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1687).

forming itself, of re-mounting its cavalry, its artillery and its material (sic), is the result of the exposition that has just been made. Its first need is repose.¹

Although this was not a statement of the whole truth it contained enough (for a public document) to indicate that the Moscow expedition had been a total failure, although it proclaimed this without panic.²

On December 4, after the remnants of the Grand Army were across the Beresina, Napoleon departed, and hastened on ahead to Paris. He paused on the way at Dresden, and wrote to his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis of Austria, saying he counted on Austria to maintain her mutually beneficial alliance with France.³ A similar letter was dispatched to Frederick William III of Prussia.⁴

During the time of the advance on Moscow there had been a good prospect, if not of defeating Russia, at least of securing a general peace through the checkmating of Great Britain. For in June, 1812, when the Moscow expedition was beginning, the United States of America, after long wrangles with the British Government on the right of search of ships at sea, had declared war. Napoleon had also been quarrelling with America, until at the advice of his Minister at Washington he suspended the decrees of Berlin and Milan, so far as they concerned the United States.⁵

The war in America not merely endangered Canada, but it put an extra strain on the British Navy which it was hardly able to bear. However, when in the summer it was seen that Napoleon's military adventure in Russia was scarcely succeeding, all hope that the British Government would consent to treat vanished. Instead, something like a new Coalition was arranged through the agency of British diplomacy; on July 20, 1812, a Russo-Spanish treaty of alliance was signed.⁶ Thus Great Britain, Russia, Spain,

¹ *Corr.*, No. 19365.

² Contrast the remarks of Fournier, II, 232: "it was not a straightforward narrative of the facts; the whole truth was not to be read there." But it would have been absurd of Napoleon to disclose *all* his losses.

³ *Corr.*, No. 19385 (December 14, 1812).

⁴ Seeley, III, 26.

⁵ Napoleon's Imperial Decree of April 28, 1811. See Serrurier to Champagny, January 2, 1812: *L'exaspération est tellement contre l'Angleterre que si la Constitution devoit arriver demain avec la nouvelle de l'aplanissement des différends qui subsistent encore entre Sa Majesté et la République, la guerre sera infaillible* (Arch. Aff. étr. États-Unis 67).

⁶ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, III, 230.

and Portugal were all grouped against the French Emperor. Castle-reagh was soon to achieve a still wider combination.

The system of alliances of Napoleon soon began to crumble. A Prussian army, under the command of General von Yorck, had been campaigning for France in the Baltic Provinces of Russia. While Yorck was operating around Riga against Russian forces, the exiled Prussian Minister, Stein, was at Petersburg, advising Alexander, and fortifying the Tsar's mind for resistance to the bitter end. Napoleon knew the value of Stein's work: hence the abuse with which at Vilna, in June, 1812, he had spoken to Colonel Balachof,¹ alluding to the councillors of Alexander: "Armfeld, a depraved, intriguing scoundrel, sunk in debauchery . . . ; Stein, driven from his country as an outlaw, a rogue, a fugitive on whose head is a price; Bennigsen, who has dipped his hand in blood."

By November, 1812, Stein had formed a clear idea of what should be the policy of Russia and the Governments which would be leagued against Napoleon:

We must declare our settled purpose of restoring the independence of Germany, of annihilating the Confederation of the Rhine, and we must invite all Germans to join the allied armies, in order to conquer their liberties. . . . The Princes who adhere to the common cause must then guarantee the sincerity and solidity of their views by surrounding themselves exclusively with well-disposed men, and committing their forces into the hands of their allies, who at the time will seize possession of and administer the territories of any Princes that may continue devoted to Napoleon. We may hope that Austria and Prussia will remember their true interest as soon as the approach of the Russian armies to their frontiers gives them security and protection against Napoleon's tyranny (*Memorandum*, November 5, 1812).²

At the end of December Yorck and his 18,000 Prussians were retreating towards the Prussian frontier. They were at Tauroggen, about twenty miles from Tilsit. The General had dispatched an officer to Königsberg, asking for instructions from Frederick William III. The reply which came is said to have been, to "act according to circumstances." More decisive was a message (doubt-

¹ See Ford (*Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia*), p. 284.

² Quoted in Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein*, III, 10-11. As early as 1809, similar ideas had been put forward for a national German war. See Caulaincourt to Champagny, July 4, 1809 (*Arch. Aff. étr. Russie* 1801).

less suggested by Stein) which came from St. Petersburg, that the Tsar would make an engagement not to lay down arms until Prussia had recovered a position among the Powers of Europe equal to that of 1806.¹ Thus reassured, Yorck (still a little fearful for the head on his shoulders) signed, with the Russian General, Diebitch, the Convention of Tauroggen, December 30, 1812. By this Act he made his army neutral and engaged that it should not fight against Russia for two months, even if King Frederick William repudiated the Convention.² The news of this went like a flame through Germany, and to Napoleon it was a mortal blow. For he was perfectly aware of the fact that Prussia, owing to her adoption of a short-service system, had a much larger body of trained men than the number actually under arms.³ He may, however, have been mistaken in his idea of the character of King Frederick William.⁴ This undecided monarch was now assuming a decisive rôle.

¹ Seeley, III, 27-8.

² Convention in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil de Traités*, I, 556.

³ Report of Colonel Kobylinski, November 23, 1810. The Colonel notes that the Prussian army is limited to 43,000 men, but adds that Prussia could put on foot 80,000 men by means of the recruits who are exercised for eight months, and then are sent back to their homes after having been registered in the *cadres* of the regiments (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654).

⁴ The same observer, Kobylinski, reported on the same occasion, "the King inspires no confidence" (Arch. Nat. *ibid.*).

CHAPTER XXIX

THE AUSTRIAN MEDIATION

Empires are apt to fall with tremendous suddenness, although the Roman dominion was an instance of the contrary. Napoleon's Empire really fell with the snow-flakes that began to descend, on November 4, 1812, upon the Grand Army retreating from Moscow. His adversaries, however, did not at once realise the instability of his gigantic State. They began with a moderate conception of what they would exact from Napoleon in defeat; gradually, negotiating as they marched, they advanced their pretensions, until they stated their final decision—the complete downfall of Napoleon and his dynasty.

Napoleon's only good chance of survival lay in making an early peace with his adversaries: in accepting their early minimum demands. But the hitherto almost almighty soldier-emperor found it difficult to swallow his pride and to accept terms. Besides his *prestige* depended on himself alone: he had no ancient dynasty behind him. An old-established reigning House, engrained in its people's life by generations of use and wont, can acknowledge defeat and accept terms, without having to abdicate. But it was not so with Napoleon. He was *parvenu*: he existed only by reason of successes, and ever more successes. In France the war was becoming very unpopular.¹ Only after a real military victory might he have accepted terms; and it was this that his two best diplomatists, Maret, Duc de Bassano, and Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence, counselled him to do after his hard-won victory at Bautzen (May 20, 1813). But he refused, and so lost his best, perhaps his

¹ The Reports of the Army of Germany for 1811 show that already desertion was common among the conscripts. Also, conscripts on their way through France were very badly treated in the places through which they passed: "the local authorities take no interest in their condition." One draft related that they were housed and fed in gaols; and each man had to pay 10 centimes for his meal of soup (Auerstädt to Emperor, September 14, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

only real, opportunity. He remained to the last, as Duroc said then, "insatiable for combats."¹

So long as there was no Coalition against him, Napoleon might manage to negotiate a peace with Russia. But he made no serious effort to keep Russia, Prussia, and Austria apart.

Nesselrode was now coming into power at the Russian Chancellery. He had grown up amid the not too finely spun threads of Napoleon's diplomacy. As a Foreign Office clerk he had written out the Russian copy of the Treaty of Tilsit. Later, as Councillor of the Russian Embassy at Paris, he had further opportunities of watching Napoleon, in the intervals of making fun to divert the *attachés* who suffered from *ennui* under the pompous inactivity of the Ambassador, Tolstoi. In the winter of 1812-13 he was at Alexander's headquarters. Nesselrode was long-sighted, sagacious, European in outlook, ready to confirm and give the proper direction to the will of Alexander. Russia, Nesselrode pointed out, could not by herself force Napoleon to a peace on any other basis than the *status quo*. But such a peace would not give stability to the European political system, which required that France should be restricted to her *ancient limits*—the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine, and the Scheldt.² Therefore the Coalition must be revived.

The first thing to be done was to bring the doubting Frederick William of Prussia into the war. General von Yorck had already practically done this by the Convention of Tauroggen (December 30, 1812). And now Stein, the German statesman who was cast in the grandest mould, was coming post-haste from Vilna through the Lithuanian forests to East Prussia.³ The King of Prussia was at Berlin (where there was still a French garrison of 12,000 men under Augereau); so Stein, armed with a commission from Alexander, entered Königsberg (January 22, 1813), and began to organise the province, where the people were all aflame for war, against Napoleon: for there is no doubt that the North Germans had in the last few years felt Napoleon's dominion to be a real tyranny.⁴

¹ Marmont, tome V, liv, xvii, *apud* Sorel, VIII, 125. Cp. Sorel, VIII, 111, *ad fin.*

² There is a little confusion here, as the ancient limits did not actually include the Scheldt. Evidently, Nesselrode did not mean France to get her *natural* limits, if these were to include the whole Rhine. See Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, III, 95; VII, 63.

³ Seeley, III, 34.

⁴ The Reports from the Army of Germany, during the years of peace, 1810 and 1811, are very instructive. For instance, when in 1811 Danish sailors

Hardenberg at Berlin was ready to co-operate. On January 22 he had "a little dinner-party" with the French generals and diplomats at Berlin, and announced that King Frederick William was going to leave Potsdam to organise a new Prussian contingent for the French.¹ A few days later Frederick William was at Breslau, and Hardenberg, the Chancellor, and Scharnhorst, his chief military adviser, were with him. On February 27 the king approved a Convention which, taken next day to the Russian headquarters at Kalisch and accepted by Alexander, is known as the Treaty of Kalisch.²

The Treaty of Kalisch was the basis of the Grand Alliance, the Coalition of Powers, which was to destroy Napoleon's Empire and re-establish the European system. It was also the basis of that Russo-Prussian accord which, enduring until 1878, "has governed the nineteenth century."³

The preamble stated that

the total destruction of the enemy forces which had penetrated into the heart of Russia has prepared the great epoch of independence for all the States which shall be ready to seize it to free themselves from the yoke which France has imposed upon them for so many years. . . . The time will come when treaties shall no longer be truces, when they again can be observed with that religious faith, that sacred inviolability on which depend the reputation, the strength and the safety of empires.

Then follow the articles, chief of which are number 2, that Prussia shall be reconstructed; number 3, immediate co-operation of the Russian and Prussian armies; and number 6, no peace without a common accord. A secret article stipulated that Prussia should be restored to the degree of power which she had before the war of 1806. When the treaty had been signed, Stein came to Breslau, and on March 15 Alexander also arrived there. It only required

left Hamburg for Antwerp, to be drafted into the French Navy, a remark was heard in the crowd looking on, "it is the head of one single man that moves all the nations of Europe" (Report of January 8, 1811, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1654). Cp. also the Reports by French officers of the distress occasioned by the Continental System, e.g. Rapp to Auerstädt, December 10, 1810: "the city of Danzig is in a truly alarming crisis"; also Report of Economic Commission, Frankfort, October 14, 1810 (Arch. Nat. *ibid.*).

¹ Sorel, VIII, 56.

² Signed by Hardenberg and Kotusoff, and dated February 28, 1813. Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, III, 234. D'Angeberg, *Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815* (1863), I, p. 1. Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, t. VII, No. 255.

³ Sorel, VIII, 65.

the accession of Great Britain and Austria to make the Coalition complete. A Coalition more perfect than that of 1793 was being formed, and this time the monarchs had the massed opinions of their peoples behind them.¹

There was not likely to be much difficulty with regard to Great Britain's accession. This country alone had inflexibly opposed Napoleon since 1803. The re-entry of Russia and of Prussia into the war found Great Britain still holding the sea, and overcoming the French power in Spain. On April 8 Castlereagh sent to Lord Cathcart (British ambassador with Alexander) a copy of Pitt's celebrated dispatch of 1805. This dispatch had explained the policy and aims of the Fourth Coalition: in particular "to rescue from the dominion of France those countries which it had subjugated since the beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits, as they stood before that time."² Thus while Nesselrode and other Continental statesmen pitched their hopes no higher than a reduction of France to the left bank of the Rhine, the British Government by communicating Pitt's dispatch pointed to its old resolution: France to have her ancient limits, as they stood before the Revolution. This was the same as decreeing war to the death with Napoleon. From this time the British Government acted in concert with Russia and Prussia. On June 14, General Lord Charles Stewart (Castlereagh's brother), who was accredited as ambassador to the King of Prussia, signed with Hardenberg a treaty at Reichenbach in Silesia, June 14, 1813. By this treaty Great Britain entered into the engagements of Kalisch; she was to co-operate "to replace Prussia in possession of her relative power"; the two States were "to act in the most perfect concert . . . and reciprocally engage to enter into no separate negotiation with the common enemy, and sign neither peace, nor truce, nor any Convention whatever, otherwise than by common consent." Prussia agreed to keep on foot 80,000 troops exclusive of garrisons; Great Britain was to give the co-operation of her Navy in defence of the Prussian dominions, and also a subsidy for the year 1813 of £666,666 13s. 4d., payable monthly.

¹ In Germany, especially, the idea of nationality was becoming very prominent. Cp. Auerstädt to Napoleon, February 12, 1812; the plan of German writers is, "by all possible means, by writings and pamphlets, to give to the different peoples who speak the German idiom, the desire to form a single nation" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1657).

² Full text in Webster, *British Diplomacy*, 1813-1815, Appendix 1.

In order to meet the lack of coin in Germany, the British Government also agreed to join with Prussia and Russia in guaranteeing an issue of £5,000,000 of paper money, to be used exclusively for the purposes of the war.¹ A similar Treaty of Reichenbach, with the promise of a British subsidy of £1,000,000, was signed between Great Britain and Russia on June 15. Thus all three Powers were bound never to make peace except by common consent, and so the Coalition was made.² It only remained now to bring Austria into the alliance. If this were done, the minor Powers would almost certainly follow the lead of the greater. Already the King of Saxony was putting difficulties in the way of his military co-operation with Napoleon.³

The position of Austria among the States of Europe was ambiguous and not particularly glorious. The Emperor Francis was the father-in-law of Napoleon, and was in military alliance with him by the treaty of March 12, 1812. An Austrian army under Schwarzenberg was, in the early part of 1813, still nominally co-operating with the French, although by a verbal agreement between Metternich and Stackelberg (Russian ambassador at Vienna), the Austrian Government had promised only to employ its troops in the Bukovina, and not to augment their number. This promise Austria kept.⁴ Finally, on January 30, 1813, in view "of the rigorous season and other circumstances equally pressing," Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, concluded with the Russian commander, Prince Kutusoff, an armistice at Zeycs.⁵ Napoleon, owing to the total failure of his Russian campaign, and of the destruction of his Grand Army, could scarcely deny Austria's claim to save her troops, by an armistice, from a similar fate. Nevertheless, the Treaty of March, 1812, remained; and Austria was still the ally of France. The Austrian Government could not deny this, nor indeed was it anxious to do so, for in the beginning of 1813 Napoleon's Empire

¹ Text in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, III, 2033.

² The British Government had already, by a subsidy treaty of March 3, 1813, signed at Stockholm, engaged Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, to enter the war against Napoleon with 30,000 men.

³ On April 7, 1813, Ney wrote to Napoleon that the King of Saxony refused to put his cavalry at Ney's disposition. The Marshal adds that there is a *mauvaise volonté* in all the princes of the Confederation except the Grand Duke of Frankfort (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

⁴ Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, III, 87, 95. The date of the conversation between Metternich and Stackelberg was April 28, 1812.

⁵ Martens, *Recueil*, III, No. 67.

was still formidable, and a powerful renewed offensive by Napoleon was considered by Metternich to be quite possible for the summer.

The Austrian alliance, and the Austrian failure to understand that the Grand Empire was already broken, together constituted a fact of prime importance for the diplomacy of Napoleon. The French Emperor ought to have made use of Austria to get peace from the Allies and to save something of his empire. Until the summer of 1813 was nearly over, the Austrian Government was offering good offices, and Thiers, who knew Metternich in later life, and conversed with him on the subject, believed that the offer was sincere.¹ But the war-weariness of France, and especially the discontent of the French Marshals with Napoleon, could not fail to come to the knowledge of Metternich; so that by the summer of 1813, he had ceased to wish the Austrian mediation to succeed: he was using it to make the difficult transition for Austria from neutrality to war with France.

This metamorphosis of Austria, from ally to enemy, began almost imperceptibly on December 20, 1812, with the expression of a desire for peace-negotiations, conveyed, on the part of the Emperor of Austria, by General von Bubna, special envoy from Vienna to Napoleon.² In effect, Bubna offered Austria's "good offices." The French Emperor, still powerful enough to negotiate with dignity, accepted the offer of the Emperor of Austria: "I will not take any step (*démarche*) for peace . . . however, I will not refuse assent to the steps which Your Majesty wishes to take."³ On February 2, Bubna informed Napoleon of the Austrian armistice with Russia: the eyes of the French Emperor were suddenly opened: Austria with a free army was something different from an Austria which, while still part of the French military system, offered good offices. An *armed mediator* did not suit Napoleon.⁴ He dispatched Narbonne to Vienna. This diplomatist had the double qualification for his mission of being a man of fashion and of knowing German. He was received "with open arms" by the pleasure-loving Viennese nobility: but the dinners and the balls could not

¹ Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* (1857), XVI, 21-2.

² Documents in Oncken, *Oesterreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege*, I, 390-3.

³ Text of letter of January 7, 1813, in Oncken, *op. cit.*, I, 395.

⁴ See Conversation of Napoleon with Bubna at Dresden, May 16, 1813: "I do not wish your armed mediation" (Document in Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 650).

conceal from him the rising emotion for war with France. The soul of the German people had been stirred, and if the Austrian aristocracy were slow to respond to national sentiment, they were on the other hand cultivated people, open to the persuasion of Gentz, the unrivalled propagandist of war with Napoleon. Nationalist propaganda was assisted by the discontent of the peasantry at the drain of Napoleonic requisitions.¹

Meanwhile the war went on. Alexander and Frederick William entered Dresden. Napoleon came from Paris to lead his reorganised army, and to defend his Empire, still extant in Western Germany. On May 2 he defeated, though he was unable to destroy, the Russo-Prussian forces at Lutzen. The victory was sufficient to restore to Napoleon the line of the Elbe, and to enable him to occupy Dresden. On May 20 he won another victory, though with heavy losses, at Bautzen. The Austrian Government was still (although Metternich now seems to have wished for a refusal) offering mediation. On May 27, Metternich went to confer with Napoleon at Dresden.

The Austrian ideas concerning possible peace-terms were, naturally, not the same as those of Russia and Prussia. Austria was still nominally the ally of Napoleon, although opinion had for long been inflamed against him.² The terms proposed by Metternich as a basis for peace negotiations were reduced to three points: (1) dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, (2) renunciation by Napoleon of the territory annexed in North Germany (known as the 32nd Military Division), (3) the return of Illyria to Austria.³ These points had been put before Napoleon by Bubna on May 16, at Dresden. The Emperor brushed them aside: "I do not wish your armed mediation . . . you talk as people talk to women whom they wish to seduce. . . . I will sacrifice a million men if necessary. . . . You wish to tear Italy and Germany from me, you

¹ Cp. Duke of Valmy to Napoleon, March 25, 1813: "It is a great pity that some other method was not adopted than that of requisition, always disastrous and vexatious" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1658). Even the army reports show the activity of the *Gazetiers Allemands* (e.g. Ney to Napoleon, March 30, 1813, in Arch. Nat. *ibid.*).

² Cp. General Romeuf in Vienna to Auerstädt (enclosed in letter of Auerstädt to Napoleon, December 4, 1811): "At the head of the persons who are worst disposed as regards France, it is necessary to count all the most elevated women. . . . The officers who go to Spain are regarded as heroes who are devoting themselves to the good cause" (Arch. Nat. AF 1657).

³ Instructions to Bubna, May 11, 1813. Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 645.

wish to dishonour me, monsieur. Honour before all ! then wife, then child, then the dynasty. We are going to overturn the world and the order of things established. The existence of the Monarchies will become a problem.”¹ Four days later, he snatched victory from the carnage at Bautzen, and became more intractable than ever. The Russian and Prussian Governments sent an appeal to Austria. Metternich’s hour had come.² He resolved to stop Napoleon’s march, and to make the position of Austria quite clear. Napoleon himself was ready for a pause, an armistice. This was signed with the Russo-Prussian commanders at Pleiswitz on June 4, 1813. It was to endure until July 20, and was actually prolonged until August 10. The Russians and Prussians now could feel secure that by the time the armistice ended they would either have

Austria on their side, or a satisfactory peace with France.
Metternich arrived at Dresden at 2 p.m. on June 25.³ The Duc de Bassano received him. At 11 a.m. on the 26th he had an interview with Napoleon, whose quarters were at the Marcolini Palace. The Emperor’s conversation “consisted of the most wonderful mixture of heterogeneous subjects, of mutual friendliness and outbreaks of anger.” Metternich began : “It depends on Your Majesty to give peace to the world.” Napoleon broke forth into one of his almost incoherent tirades : “My honour before all things, and then peace . . . do you wish to rob me ? . . . I will not give up one inch of ground.” He modified this statement, however, by offering to give a *part* of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia ; but “I will give nothing to Prussia, because she has betrayed me.” Owing to his gesticulations, his hat, which he carried under his arm, fell to the ground ; the Emperor continued to march up and down the parquet floor, speaking rapidly, and pushing along the hat with his foot. Metternich preserved his *aplomb*, and did nothing. Napoleon suddenly saw the absurdity of the affair, picked up his hat himself, and good humour returned. On June 30, Metternich left with a Convention signed, by which Napoleon agreed to accept Austrian mediation in a congress to be held at Prague on July 5.⁴

The Congress of Prague came to nothing. The Allies (Russia, Prussia, Great Britain) would make peace on terms ensuring to

¹ Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 650. Sorel, VIII, 120. ² Sorel, VIII, 131.

³ Metternich, *Mémoires*, II, 461 ; Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 678.

⁴ Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 395. The incident of Napoleon’s hat is related by Fain, *Manuscrit de Mil huit cent treize* (Paris, 1829), II, 43.

Prussia and Austria their frontiers, or at least their strength, as in 1805; they required also the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, of the Confederation of the Rhine, the independence of Holland, and the exclusion of the French from Italy. They might, however, be content with less, with something like the Austrian Three Points.¹ Napoleon, on his side, had still no idea of making such concessions. He ordered his delegates to the Congress, Caulaincourt and Narbonne, not to press on the march of the negotiations, but to reserve everything for the Emperor's consent.

There was no formal Congress. Narbonne and Caulaincourt were at Prague from July 28 to August 10; a few official conversations took place with Metternich and a few notes were exchanged. Outside Prague practically nothing was known about the negotiations, a curious calm prevailed.² On the day of Caulaincourt's arrival, Metternich duly warned him that unless Napoleon signed peace by August 10, Austria would declare war on August 11. Caulaincourt lamented that his hands were tied: and then appeared the rift between Napoleon and France: "You do not see in me," said Caulaincourt, "the representative of the whims of the Emperor, but of his true interest and that of France. I am quite as European in these present questions as you can be. Bring us back to France by peace or war, and you will be blessed by thirty million French and by all the clear-sighted servants and friends of the Emperor."³ This indiscretion of the diplomatist expressed the chief idea of Castlereagh, Nesselrode and Metternich for dealing with Napoleon: to separate the interests of the French people from those of their autocrat who would sacrifice them all for his *amour propre*.

The final terms of Austria's mediation were delivered to Caulaincourt by Metternich on August 7.⁴ They comprised (1) the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, (2) the re-establishment of Hamburg and Lubeck as Free Cities, with other arrangements to be settled concerning the 32nd Military Division, (3) renunciation of the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, (4) reconstruction of

¹ See above, p. 277. The accession of the British Government to the Austrian mediation is given in Castlereagh's dispatch to Cathcart, July 13, 1813 (Webster, *op. cit.*, No. VIII).

² Maret to Napoleon, July 31, 1813: "there is absolutely no news of interest from any quarter" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1706^B).

³ Report of Metternich, July 28, 1813; text in Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 435-7, and 679-80.

⁴ Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 450-1.

Prussia ; Illyria to be given to Austria. These are practically the Austrian Three Points already presented to Napoleon by Bubna in May. Further, to inspire confidence in all parties that the peace was to be definitive, another point was added : " a reciprocal guarantee that the state of possession of the Powers, great and small, such as it shall be fixed at the peace, shall not be altered or injured by any of them." Metternich repeated his warning that, failing an acceptance by Napoleon on the 10th, Austria would declare war on the 11th, and would no longer receive any separate communication.

Caulaincourt's dispatch, containing these terms, reached Napoleon at Dresden on the evening of August 9. The Emperor's reply, if it was to prevent the Austrian declaration of war, had to be drafted within eight and a quarter hours, and sent off on the 10th. He actually did draft an answer which went half-way towards accepting the Austrian Points,¹ and might have formed a basis for further negotiation towards accepting the lot. But he did not like to send it off according to the brusque time-limit named by Metternich. Instead, he sent for Bubna, still in attendance at Dresden, and conversed in a moderate manner about the possibility of peace. Bubna sent off a courier with the report of the conversation ; and Napoleon thought that Bubna's report would induce Metternich to wait a little longer for the official French reply. Thus the day of August 10 passed, with no answer for Napoleon. The hour of midnight struck. Metternich declared the Congress of Prague dissolved. On the 11th Caulaincourt presented Napoleon's reply which had now arrived. On the 12th he received notification of the Austrian declaration of war.²

¹ Napoleon agreed to the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, to the restoration of Danzig, but not Hamburg and Lubeck, and to the cession of Illyria to Austria without Trieste. Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 455.

² Oncken, *op. cit.*, II, 456-7. Documents in D'Angeberg, *Le Congrès de Vienne*, I, 41-4.

CHAPTER XXX

THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE

The end of the Armistice of Pleiswitz and the entry of Austria into the war with the termination of the Congress of Prague led to an offensive movement by the Allies. Russian, Prussian, and Austrian troops attacked the position of Napoleon in front of Dresden (August 26-27). They were defeated. It was the Emperor's last big victory, and its fruits were lost through the piecemeal defeats on the following days of French divisions which Napoleon, contrary to his usual practice, had scattered over the country. The next great battle, at Leipzig, October 16, 17, and 18, was a French defeat: the Saxon and Bavarian contingents went over to the Allied side; the Confederation of the Rhine collapsed.¹ The Napoleonic Marshals cursed the Emperor to each other: they thought him mad. "Does the —— know what he is doing?" said Augereau to Macdonald. "Have you not noticed that during these last events, and in the catastrophe which followed, he has lost his head?"²

Murat, who had long been toying with proposals from Metternich, although he had fought valiantly at Dresden and Leipzig, now obtained Napoleon's leave to go and look after his kingdom. "Our adieus," said Murat later, "were not too cordial"³ (October 23). A few days later Napoleon's brother King Jerome at his capital, Cassel, heard the boom of the Allies' cannon. He took horse and made for Cologne. "Thus ended the kingdom of Westphalia."⁴ For at least two years it had been tottering from internal causes.⁵

¹ The Bavarian contingent of 8,000 men withdrew on October 14, the Saxons on the 18th. At the beginning of the year Napoleon had been informed by Reinhard, his Minister at Cassel, that the spirit of the Confederation was bad, and that the presence of French troops was absolutely necessary (January 30, 1813, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1653).

² Macdonald, *Souvenirs* (1892), p. 224.

³ Report of Mier, December 16, 1813, quoted in Sorel, VIII, 195.

⁴ Sorel, VIII, 195.

⁵ Cp. Auerstädt to Emperor, September 15, 1811: "the Westphalian troops have been infected by German National propaganda" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1656).

Could war or diplomacy have done anything further to lessen the downfall? No one can say, for Napoleon in these fateful days after Leipzig did nothing: "he was impassive, indifferent, looking on at his own catastrophe, as he had done lately in Russia, and as he was to do later at Waterloo."¹ On October 29 at Hanau his forces had to fight through the Bavarian army, now on the Allies' side. On November 2 the Emperor was at Mayence, with the frontier of his Empire at the right bank of the Rhine.

It was not to be fixed even there. The Allied forces were now in full career towards France, commanded by an Austrian, Schwarzenberg, so high had Metternich's diplomacy suddenly raised the prestige of his Government. Austria's entrance into the Coalition had been confirmed by treaty with Russia at Teplitz on September 9.² This treaty contained a clause preventing negotiations for a separate peace. There was not yet, however, a common treaty of alliance for all the Powers who were fighting Napoleon, as Castlereagh desired.

Castlereagh's design was to a large extent realised by a treaty concluded by Austria and Great Britain at Teplitz on October 9. This treaty contained the clause excluding separate negotiations. As there was a similar clause in the Anglo-Prussian treaty of Reichenbach,³ and in the Prusso-Russian Treaty of Reichenbach, the Coalition was now an effective diplomatic unit. About the same time—on October 8—Bavaria had joined the Coalition by treaty negotiated with Austria, at Ried. Article 10 contained the clause exclusive of separate negotiations.⁴

The next stage in the negotiations was at Frankfort, at which ancient city, reminiscent of all that was best in seventeenth and eighteenth century Germany, the Allied sovereigns and ministers arrived on November 4. Here semi-official overtures were made to Napoleon through Saint Aignan (a brother-in-law of Caulaincourt), accredited French Minister to the Duke of Saxe-Weimar. Saint Aignan had been taken prisoner at Weimar, and was now in the train of the Allied headquarters. Metternich, Nesselrode and Lord Aberdeen, who was now at Allied headquarters as British representative, declared to Saint Aignan that the Allies were unanimous

¹ Sorel, VIII, 195.

² Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, III, No. 70.

³ June 14, 1813 (see above, p. 274).

⁴ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, I, 610.

on the question of leaving to France her *natural limits*, the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees.¹

It was this famous phrase which occasioned almost all subsequent controversies about the peace. The Allies, in the secret chambers of their minds, meant by natural frontiers the Pyrenees, Alps, and Rhine as far as the Lauter and the hills of Lorraine.² But the French public meant the limits of Lunéville, that is, the left bank of Rhine from Basle to the frontier of Holland. Believing that they were offered this for a frontier, the French public would be ready to make peace, and would be detached from Napoleon if he, understanding the real design of the Allies, refused to accept their offer. The difficulty in which the diplomacy of Napoleon was involved can therefore be readily understood. If he accepted the Allies' overture, France would be reduced to something very near to her pre-Revolutionary limits: he would lose all his prestige with the French people, and his throne would fall. On the other hand, if he rejected the Allies' overture, the French people would hold him responsible for the continuation of a hopeless and ruinous war.³ Napoleon was certainly in a difficult position, for the Allies had warned him through Saint Aignan that they were firmly united for the purpose of gaining their objects.⁴ He could no longer put into practice his favourite device of separate peace treaties.

There were four different forces in France, all anxious for peace and all probably with different views about the making of it. Firstly, there was Napoleon himself, still clinging to the idea of making peace after a victory, and expecting vaguely to keep a good deal of his Empire. Secondly, there were his chief Ministers, Maret, Duc de Bassano, and Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence, without any illusions about a possible victory, and only anxious to induce the Emperor to make peace as soon as possible, before matters became worse. Thirdly, there was a group of men, former officials of

¹ Note of St. Aignan, Frankfort, November 9, 1813, in D'Angeberg, I, 76. Metternich also said that the Allies were not against the dynasty of Napoleon, and that England was much more moderate than people thought. This was printed in the *Moniteur* of January 20, 1814. The Report is included, under that date, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1706^B.

² See Note of Count Nesselrode on the subject of territorial modifications, February 15, 1814, in Martens, *Recueil des Traités conclus par la Russie*, XI, No. 418.

³ Sorel, VIII, 210.

⁴ Report of Saint Aignan, November 9, 1813, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Mémoires et Documents: Affaires intérieures* 668.

Napoleon, men highly placed in society, with fortunes founded on the Napoleonic régime. Such men were Talleyrand, Prince de Bénévente ; De Pradt, Archbishop of Malines ; Dalberg, Archbishop of Frankfort ; the Baron Louis.¹ These used to meet together in Paris. They knew that the Empire was doomed, and their aim was to save France and themselves from shipwreck, by making terms with the Allies on the basis of treating Napoleon alone as responsible for all the wars. Lastly, there was the mass of the French people, willing to give up the Empire and all the client kingdoms, but pathetically attached to the natural limits, as well as to their civic equality, the great gains of the Revolution. Of these four groups or forces working for peace amid the ruin of the Napoleonic system, only that which Talleyrand headed had sufficient coolness and sufficient detachment from official trammels to have a fair chance of attaining its object.

Napoleon certainly had little chance. At Frankfort the Allies decided to invade France, Schwarzenberg taking one army through Switzerland, Blücher taking another across the Rhine by the northern route. Napoleon was back at Saint Cloud on November 10. Four days later came Saint Aignan, with his note of conversations at Frankfort, and the offer of "natural limits." Napoleon kept his head clear. He accepted nothing, but deputed Caulaincourt to go to meet the Allies as plenipotentiary where he could find out precisely what the Allies' offer meant. But the contents of Saint Aignan's note got about the *salons* of Paris ; the "Frankfort bases" were taken as a firm offer of peace, and "there formed in the palace, in the city, in the council a sort of league to push Napoleon into that way of safety. M. le Duc de Vicence was the soul of it, and M. de Talleyrand was not a stranger to it." ²

There was still much fighting-power left in the French army and in Napoleon. Nor were the Allies completely united. The Austrians hoped to be able to preserve the Napoleonic dynasty, perhaps under a regency for the King of Rome. Alexander desired that Bernadotte should be King of France. The British Government still adhered to the views of Pitt, that the restoration of the Bourbons was the only way to a stable European peace. On December 1, 1813, they agreed upon a Proclamation, drafted by Metternich ; and distributed it broadcast :

¹ Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, II, 135.

² Pasquier, *Mémoires* (1893), II, 107.

The Allied Powers are not making war against France, but against that loudly announced preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe and of France, the Emperor Napoleon has for too long exercised outside the limits of his Empire.

The sovereigns desire that France be great, strong and happy, because the power of France, great and strong, is one of the fundamental bases of the social edifice.

The Powers confirm to the French Empire an extent of territory which France never knew under her kings.¹

Napoleon, on his side, was not blind to the necessity of propaganda in his own interest in France. He explained his negotiations to the Senate; but he refused Caulaincourt's suggestion (made on December 13) that the diplomatic correspondence should be published.² He made the mistake, too, of keeping control even of the detail of all business, although he had not time merely to read important dispatches which were sent to him.³

Caulaincourt was now at Lunéville, trying to arrange for the peace-conference to which Napoleon had accredited him. At last it was agreed, by correspondence between Metternich and Caulaincourt, that a Congress should be held at Châtillon.⁴ Before this took place, however, a good many things happened.

Just before the year 1813 ended, Napoleon tried to end his Spanish troubles by making a treaty with Ferdinand VII (hitherto a prisoner at Valençay) acknowledging Ferdinand to be King of Spain in place of Joseph Bonaparte. But the Spanish Regency refused to ratify the Treaty of Valençay, as being contrary to Spain's prior engagements with Great Britain.⁵

Castlereagh, the British Secretary of State, himself now came to take part in the Allied Councils. Hitherto (since the end of August), he had been represented by Lord Aberdeen, a young nobleman,

¹ Declaration of Frankfort, December 1, 1813, in D'Angeberg, I, 78.

² Caulaincourt to Napoleon, December 23, 1813, in Arch. Aff. étr. *Mém. et Doc., Affaires intérieures* 668.

³ [Control of detail:] Junot, on January 2, 1814, writes to Napoleon asking if he may be allowed to pay a claim for 8,400 francs made by the Duke of Padua for the police service of the previous year at Leipzig.

[Difficulty in finding time to read dispatches:] Junot, enclosing important letter of the Duke of Ragusa, concerning the war on the Rhine, to Napoleon, adds: "This letter ought to be read in entirety by Your Majesty" (February 14, 1814). Arch. Nat. AF IV 1667.

⁴ Castlereagh to Liverpool, January 29, 1814 (Webster, No. LXXXVIII).

⁵ Treaty of Valençay, December 11, 1813, in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, I, 654. Joseph Bonaparte had left Madrid for good on March 13, 1814.

cautious and honourable, but not sufficiently energetic or decisive for grappling with the diplomatic situation. Castlereagh, who arrived at Fribourg (a temporary stopping-place of the Allied headquarters) on January 18, 1814, came with the firm intention of inducing the Allied sovereigns to consolidate their various agreements with each other into one general treaty of alliance. Thus concentration of aim and of action would be best secured. He also brought with him the intention of his dead master, Pitt, to restore the Bourbons.¹

When Castlereagh came to headquarters he found the Allies not particularly united, nor particularly secure in their military situation. His common-sense, however, and decisiveness made an effect.²

After a long discussion at Langres, at which Metternich, Stadion, Nesselrode, Rasumovsky, Pozzo di Borgo and Hardenberg were present, he induced them to agree on a protocol. Castlereagh's view was that the Frankfort basis of negotiation should no longer be entertained, because in that negotiation the rights of war had been reserved: "the Allies as well as the enemy must be considered as entitled to all the legitimate results of successful war."³ The protocol adopted at Langres (January 29, 1814) made it clear that "the ancient French territory shall be the proposition to be made to France for the demarcation of its limits with the rest of Europe."⁴

While the protocol was being completed, the Prussians under Blücher were fighting Napoleon and being beaten at Brienne (January 29); but three days later they defeated him at La Rothière. Actually Napoleon's resources were rapidly being exhausted on every side. He could not pay his Marshals. Ney, on the point of leaving Paris (where he was the guest of Junot), was unavoidably detained: "he is ready to depart, but he has not the *sou*."⁵ While

¹ Castlereagh to Aberdeen, November 13, 1813; Aberdeen to Castlereagh, December 9, 1813 (Webster, Nos. LXIII, LXVIII).

² On January 11, 1814, Caulaincourt wrote to Napoleon: "It appears certain that the negotiation depends principally upon England, since nobody decides upon anything without first having seen Lord Castlereagh" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Mém. et Doc., France* 668). Cp. Thiers, *Hist. du Consulat et de l'Empire*, XVII, 240-1.

³ Castlereagh to Liverpool, January 29, 1814 (Webster, No. LXXVIII).

⁴ Sbornik of the Imp. Russian History Society, XXXI, p. 361. Thiers, *op. cit.*, XVII, 241-2.

⁵ Junot to Emperor, January 6, 1814 (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1667).

the German armies were actually invading France, the Prefect of the Rhone was asking that Lyons merchants might be allowed to trade with Germany through Switzerland, in order that manufacture may not stop and the workmen be thrown into misery.¹ At the same time the Minister of War could not procure 4,000 men to complete the levy of 300,000.²

It was in these circumstances that the Allied statesmen went to Châtillon, to confer with Caulaincourt, on February 3.

At the Congress of Châtillon one more chance was offered to Napoleon of making terms. For, although his resources were nearly exhausted, on the other hand the Allied armies were, it was said, war-weary and anxious for peace.³ The Emperor's own indecision, and his inveterate habit of gambling on the prospect of military success, ruined this chance. He did indeed give Caulaincourt *carte blanche* to negotiate and to sign;⁴ but he would not himself say "accept such and such terms," and that was precisely what Caulaincourt wanted him to say.

Caulaincourt, sincerely convinced as he was of the necessity of peace, could not, without reference to the Emperor, take upon himself to sign a capitulation, because Napoleon had bound him, by written Instructions, to negotiate only according to the bases of Frankfort. The Emperor even thought that he would be allowed to retain Antwerp.⁵

The Congress of Châtillon opened on February 5. Caulaincourt had been "received very politely."⁶ He was now offered the Langres terms—which would have saved Napoleon's throne—namely (1)

¹ Junot to Emperor, January 5, 1814 (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1667).

² Clarke, Duke of Feltre, to Emperor, January 12, 1814 (*ibid.*).

³ Report of an Austrian Surgeon-Major (prisoner), February, 1814: "It is said that a Congress is going to open at Châtillon to-day. Peace is desired, we wish for it more than to march to Paris" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1668).

⁴ The Full Powers to Caulaincourt are dated January 4, 1814: *négociar, conclure et signer non seulement tout traité de paix définitif, mais aussi tous articles préliminaires*. The original document, signed by Napoleon, is in the *Musée des Archives Nationales*, No. 1658. See also Arch. Aff. étr. *Mém. et Doc.*, France 668.

⁵ Napoleon to Caulaincourt, January 4, 1814 (sent along with the Full Powers): *Moi, je la veux* [i.e. I wish peace], *mais solide, honorable. La France, sans les limites naturelles, sans Ostende, sans Anvers, ne serait plus en rapport avec les autres États de l'Europe* (Arch. Aff. étr. *Mem. et. Doc.*, France 668).

⁶ Caulaincourt to Napoleon, January 24, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*). Caulaincourt was at Châtillon for about ten days before the Congress opened.

the ancient limits of France, (2) the disposition of the territories thus renounced, to be settled without the intervention of France (February 7). If Caulaincourt had signed these terms, peace would have been made, and Napoleon's dynasty might still be on the throne of France. The terms were presented to Caulaincourt in the morning. He was willing to sign, but discussed a few points, and asked time for reflection. Meanwhile he consulted La Besnardière, who had been entrusted by Napoleon with the keeping of the protocol. At 8 p.m. the plenipotentiaries assembled again, and Caulaincourt read a note (drafted by La Besnardière) recalling the bases of Frankfort and the "natural limits." Rasoumovsky and Stadion at once interrupted the reading, and an argument ensued which ended the meeting for the night. The Congress was then suspended: the Allies at this moment did not wish it to succeed, because they believed that their arms would go to greater victories, and Napoleon did not wish it to succeed, because he won a few successes which revived his hopes of a better issue.¹

When Caulaincourt, on February 8, sent a letter asking for Napoleon's orders, the Emperor again refused to give a clear answer. Nevertheless, as he appeared to be yielding, a dispatch was drafted by Maret and brought to the Emperor for signature (7 a.m. on February 9). But Napoleon had received news which made him think that he could defeat Blücher's divisions in detail. "I am on the point of beating Blücher in the eye. . . . Do not precipitate anything. *There will always be time to make such a peace as they are proposing to us.*"

The blame of the failure of the Congress must be laid at Napoleon's door more than Caulaincourt's. It is true that Caulaincourt had power to sign; but he was never told how far he ought to go in concessions. He was left to judge, according to the necessity of the situation. But Napoleon was the last man (even if he knew) to tell how desperate the military situation was. "I am given necessity for rule," wrote Caulaincourt to the Emperor, on February 8, 1814; "but necessity arises from events . . . when I know nothing of what is going on, when Your Majesty sends me no news,

¹ *Corr.*, No. 21179. Caulaincourt knew better and warned him *que la Coalition ne peut être dissoute que par la paix ou par la destruction à peu près totale des armées du Continent* (to Napoleon, February 25, 1814, in *Arch. Aff. étr. Mem. et Doc., France* 668).

I find myself reduced to march in obscurity and without guide." ¹

The Congress of Châtillon, although suspended, remained nominally in existence until March 19. It continued to give some bad nights to Louis XVIII, who was living quietly at Hartwell in Buckingham and knew very little of what was going on.² The Allied headquarters, where the three sovereigns were (the Tsar Alexander, the Emperor Francis, and Frederick William of Prussia), was at Troyes. The military aspect of affairs was changing. On February 10, 11, and 12, Napoleon won three actions (Champaubert, Montmirail and Château Thierry). Naturally Napoleon was encouraged. Even at Allied headquarters confidence was not high: "it is by no means yet impossible that the Allies may get possession of the enemy's capital," wrote the tenacious Castlereagh;³ the tone of the remark is not very optimistic. Nevertheless he had taken back with him from Troyes to Châtillon (February 16) the final offer of the Allies to Napoleon; in particular, the frontiers of 1792, and the rearrangement of the ceded territories to be made without France being represented at the settlement. These were the substance of the terms which had been presented to Caulaincourt on February 8;⁴ but the victories at Champaubert, Montmirail and Château Thierry had raised Napoleon's hopes too high for him to accept terms of virtual surrender. The bases of Frankfort were all that he would consider. On February 17 he defeated the Austrians at Montereau, and heard on the same day the latest terms of the Allies, in a dispatch from Caulaincourt, who pleaded for him to agree. The Emperor's reply again was the "bases of Frankfort."⁵ In their meeting at Châtillon, on February 28, the Allies appointed March 10 as the last date for Napoleon agreeing with their terms.

Until March 10 the Allies were prepared to negotiate with Napoleon, although Alexander would have liked to decree the

¹ Arch. Aff. étr. *Mem. et Doc.*, France 668.

² Louis XVIII to Marquise de Bonnay, March 3, 1814: "without doubt you will have viewed with terror the Congress of Châtillon" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1668).

³ To Lord Liverpool, February 16, 1814 (Webster, No. LXXXI). Castlereagh's dispatches to London "reanimated the spirits" which the news of negotiations had depressed (Lieven to Nesselrode, March 8, 1814, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1668).

⁴ They were somewhat harder than the terms of February 8, because the Allies also demanded the surrender of Mayence, Hamburg, Antwerp, Mantua, and the other fortresses outside France still held by French garrisons.

⁵ *Corr.*, No. 21285.

dethronement of Napoleon at once.¹ The terrible battles around Laon settled nothing, although they nearly forced the Army of Schwarzenberg to retire. Causes of dispute existed in the Allied councils, especially the question of the disposal of Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw, Prussia claiming the whole of the first, and Russia the whole of the second. "The criminations and recriminations between the Austrians and Russians are at their height, and my patience is worn out with combatting both," wrote Castlereagh on February 26, 1814.² Further, Schwarzenberg was entering into propositions with Napoleon for an armistice—a step which, in Castlereagh's opinion, might be fatal, for he was earnest in urging that there should be no relaxation in the military pressure until Napoleon had agreed to the Allied terms or been forced into surrender.

To cement together the Coalition which was in danger of being disintegrated, Castlereagh pressed forward his fixed idea for a general treaty of alliance. The idea was difficult to resist, for the Allies were already bound by separate treaties with each other—Reichenbach Treaties, Teplitz Treaties, and others. Nevertheless Alexander at least was curiously averse to a general treaty; Metternich was "constitutionally temporising"; the Austrian Emperor was difficult of access and not very intelligible as to his projects.³ But the victories of Napoleon came to the aid of Castlereagh's obvious common-sense. Thus the British statesman was able to make his greatest achievement, the Treaty of Chaumont. Chaumont was the little town to which the Allied headquarters had been forced to retire. This famous treaty, signed on March 9, was antedated to March 1.⁴ Article 1 bound the Contracting Parties (Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia) to apply all the resources of their States to the vigorous prosecution of the war, if Napoleon refused the proffered terms. By article 2 they agreed not to

¹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, February 16, 1814 (Webster, No. LXXXI, particularly pp. 149, 155). Castlereagh maintained the position that until Napoleon had refused to treat on the terms of the ancient limits, the Allies must consider him as lawful ruler (*ibid.*, pp. 155-6).

² To Liverpool (Webster, No. LXXXV).

³ Castlereagh to Liverpool, February 26, 1814 (Webster, No. LXXXV).

⁴ Although in fact a General Act of Alliance, the Chaumont pact was technically not one treaty, but three treaties, each of which contained, *verbatim*, the same stipulations. The three treaties were Great Britain and (1) Austria, (2) Russia, (3) Prussia, all concluded on the same day (see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, III, p. 2043).

negotiate or sign treaties, separately, with the enemy. Article 5 reserved to the Powers the right to concert together, after the conclusion of peace, the proper means to guarantee the continuance of that peace. By article 7 the Powers bound themselves to come to the aid of any of them who should be attacked by France, each with a body of 60,000 men. Article 16 stated that the treaty was to endure for twenty years ; three years before it should expire, the Allies were to consider its renewal.

Thus at the time when Napoleon was winning victories, and when the Coalition looked as if it was breaking up, Castlereagh raised against him the solid wall of Europe. Napoleon's Empire endured for three more weeks.

The combats around Laon did not end with Blücher's destruction. Schwarzenberg, though he talked of having to retire to the Rhine,¹ actually improved his position, and advanced his Austrians towards Paris. Caulaincourt at Châtillon still discussed terms, always returning to the bases of Frankfort, although Stadion, who was more blunt in speech than most Austrian diplomatists, declared unequivocally that to insist on " the bases of M. de Saint Aignan " would be regarded as a rejection of the Allies' terms.² Pyrrhic victories were useless to Napoleon, for he was getting no recruits to make up his losses. Besides, his Empire was crumbling behind him. On March 12 Wellington's Peninsular army entered Bordeaux.³

At Paris, Talleyrand's coterie were orienting themselves for a change of Government : " there was no plan or conspiracy against the Emperor at Paris, but the conviction was unanimous that his power was undermined by his follies and extravagances, and that he himself would be the victim of his mad resistance and of his system of continual deception." ⁴ They had an old Royalist officer, M. de Vitrolles, on mission at Allied headquarters from March 10 to March 21. He gave Alexander the advice to march straight for

¹ Letter to his wife, March 12, 1814, *apud* Sorel, VIII, 296.

² March 13, 1814 (*ibid.*).

³ Very little news came to the Ministry of War at Paris about the progress of the English army from the Peninsula. On January 17, 1814, it was reported from the Police at Bayonne that Lord Wellington had held an important council of his Generals at St. Jean de Luz. After this, only the most meagre scraps of information came through (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1668).

⁴ *Mémoire* by the Duc de Dalberg, in Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, II, p. 257, *Appendice*.

Paris, instead of carrying on regular operations against Napoleon. It was now quite clear that Alexander had decided for the restoration of Louis XVIII.¹ Yet Caulaincourt at Châtillon presented a project of terms from Napoleon (March 15), which, according to Metternich, were only worth accepting if the Allies were driven back to Vienna.² The Allies resolved at last to end the Congress. The official declaration of rupture was made on March 19. On the 25th the great step was taken. An Allied manifesto, printed and published, stated, although without mentioning his name, that Napoleon must be dethroned.³ Yet on that very day Napoleon was saying, in conversation with the Austrian diplomatist, Wessenberg, "I insist upon Antwerp."⁴ On March 30 the Allied army was at Montmartre; on the 31st the city capitulated. On April 2 a Provisional Government was brought into existence by Talleyrand and the Imperial Senate which was still in session.

¹ Report of Hasel to *Ministère de Guerre* states on March 1, 1814, that Alexander and the Russian officers are wearing a white scarf on their arm for Louis XVIII (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1668).

² To Hudelst, March 16, 1814, *apud* Sorel, VIII, 303. Napoleon offered to resign the French Departments beyond the Alps and Rhine, but the Kingdom of Italy was to go to Eugène Beauharnais (D'Angeberg, I, 130).

³ Declaration of Vitry (D'Angeberg, I, 146). Actually, the march on Paris was decided on at the end of February. See Lützow to Blücher, March 1, 1814: "General Benckendorff has communicated to me Your Excellency's order to march towards Paris" (Arch. Nat. AF IV 1668).

⁴ Arneth, Wessenberg, I, 188-93, *apud* Sorel, VIII, 306. Wessenberg had been surprised and taken prisoner by some of Napoleon's cavalry. Cp. Napoleon to Caulaincourt, March 17, 1814: "the treaty [which C. was trying to negotiate] should have for result the evacuation of our territory" (*Corr.*, No. 21505).

CHAPTER XXXI

NAPOLÉON'S LAST TREATY

The failure of the Châtillon negotiations must be laid entirely at the door of Napoleon. The first grand cause of failure was that the Emperor could not make up his mind to submit to a great sacrifice : he was always hoping for something from the "chance of a battle." Secondly, Napoleon partly did not believe, partly was not told by his advisers, the true state of affairs. Maret, the Secretary of State, was far too optimistic : "Behold the finest army of Russia destroyed," he writes to Caulaincourt, after the defeat of one division. . . . "This news is given you to govern your conduct."¹ In vain did Caulaincourt reply, "For mercy's sake, paint to him [Napoleon] the position with the energy which the moment requires. We are no longer at the epoch of Lunéville or Tilsit."² To Berthier, Caulaincourt wrote that Maret was "the misguiding genius who for three years has spoiled the fine destinies of the Emperor and still circumvents him. . . . See that the truth gets to the Emperor ; explain to him how grave the circumstances are." Maret's gazettes were useless : "it is with these tales that we have lost all our conquests."³ After Napoleon had announced triumphantly to him the French victories at Champaubert and Montmirail, Caulaincourt honestly replies : "I dare believe that in these circumstances there is nobody who thinks like me that to negotiate with success, if one negotiates at all, it is necessary to make it [peace], and to make it quickly."⁴ A fortnight later he warns Napoleon again : "I doubt that military events can now have a great influence on the fundamental questions of the peace."⁵

The blame for the breakdown of negotiations can scarcely be

¹ Letter of February 12, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Mem. et Doc., France* 668).

² Letter of February 14, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

³ Letter of February 3, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁴ Letter of February 14, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

⁵ Letter of March 1, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

thrown on the Allies, because they told Caulaincourt plainly enough what their intentions were, and he told Napoleon. One evening during the Châtillon Congress, Caulaincourt, after writing his dispatch, went to the Allied plenipotentiary "who appeared to be the most accessible" (probably Metternich), and asked him, under the seal of secrecy, if an armistice would be granted immediately on acceptance of the Allied peace-terms. To this the Allied plenipotentiary answered, No: "you will not obtain an armistice. The hostilities cannot cease until the exchange of ratifications. Put yourself therefore in a condition to make peace in forty-eight hours."¹ This message seems to have made no impression on Napoleon.

Lastly, Napoleon must be blamed for having left Caulaincourt unaided to carry on his terribly arduous and responsible negotiations against a complete battalion of skilled Allied diplomatists and statesmen.

I find myself placed here (writes Caulaincourt from Châtillon), *vis à vis* four negotiators, counting the three English plenipotentiaries only as one. These four negotiators have only one sole and identical instruction drafted by the Ministers of State of the four Courts; their language has been dictated to them in advance. The declarations which they put forward have been given to them ready-made. They make no step, they say not a word, without having previously agreed upon it. They decide to have a protocol, and if I wish myself to insert the simplest observations in it about the most certain facts, my most moderate expressions become a subject of difficulty, and I have to yield in order not to consume the time in vain discussions. I know how precious the moments are.²

When the Allied armies entered Paris, Napoleon was at Fontainebleau, with his Marshals and the remnants—about 30,000—of his army. Caulaincourt, faithful to the last, spent his time trying to get an audience at Alexander's quarters at the Hôtel Saint-Florentin,³ or in persuading Napoleon to abdicate in favour of the King of Rome.

The final scene took place in the Palace of Fontainebleau on

¹ Caulaincourt to Napoleon, February 9, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *Mém. et Doc.*, France 668).

² Caulaincourt to Napoleon, February 6, 1814 (Arch. Aff. étr. *ibid.*).

³ Talleyrand's house, No. 2, Rue St. Florentin (close to the Place de la Concorde); the Tsar stayed here at Talleyrand's invitation. See Fain, *MS de 1814*, p. 209, and Talleyrand, *Mémoires* (1891), II, 162-3, especially 163, note 1

April 4, Napoleon striding up and down the *salon*; Ney and Moncey with other Marshals and Generals looking on; Caulaincourt scanning his papers. At last the Emperor stops in front of his diplomatist: "I will abdicate." A draft of abdication is produced, prepared by the Secretary of the Cabinet, Fain. Caulaincourt's labours are not finished. He reads the draft; it will not do. Another is made. The Emperor abdicates in favour of his son, under the regency of Marie Louise.

Ney and Caulaincourt took the deed of abdication to Paris, to secure its acceptance by the Allies. All that they could bring back was a prospect of Elba and six million a year. "Six millions!" said the Emperor. "It is much too much; what shall I do with it? I do not need a *louis* a day. I have become a soldier again. . . . I have desired the happiness of France, and I have been deceived."¹ On April 6 the Senate decreed the restoration of the Bourbon Louis XVIII.

Alexander of Russia and Frederick William of Prussia were the monarchs who entered Paris on March 31 with the Allied army. The Emperor Francis remained at Troyes for another fortnight. Castlereagh arrived on April 10, and found the affairs of France and Napoleon already practically settled "under the exigency of the moment."² A treaty was on the point of being signed with Napoleon. This was the last service of Caulaincourt to his master. "I felt," wrote Castlereagh, ". . . the utmost repugnance to anything like a treaty with him [Napoleon] after his *déchéance* had been pronounced."³ A treaty is an act of public law concluded between two bodies which, by the very fact of the treaty, are regarded by international law as having authority. Castlereagh, quite logically, argued that as the Allies had declared Napoleon to be dethroned, they should regard him only as a private man who, "if he was humble enough to accept a pension," should get it only as an act of grace.⁴ However, the British Minister agreed to accede to the treaty, although he refused to be a signing party.

The treaty was signed at Fontainebleau, on April 11, 1814, by Metternich, Nesselrode and Hardenberg for the Allies, and by Caulaincourt and Marshals Ney and Macdonald for Napoleon.⁵

¹ Sbornik of the Imperial Russian History Society, XXXI, 409. Fain, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-1; Macdonald, *Souvenirs*, pp. 265-7. The Act of Abdication is given in the Sbornik, *ibid.* It is dated April 11, 1814.

² Castlereagh to Liverpool, April 13, 1814 (Webster, No. XCIV).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ D'Angeberg, I, 149.

Napoleon renounced for himself and his successors all right of sovereignty over the French Empire and "every other country" (art. 1). He was allowed to retain his titles and rank (art. 2). Elba (a Tuscan island, lately part of the Napoleonic *Département de la Méditerranée*) was to be his place of residence, and to form a principality for him, for life only. His annual revenue was to be 2,000,000 francs, a rent-charge on the public revenues of France (art. 3).¹ The Duchies of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla were to be granted in full property and sovereignty to the Empress Marie Louise, and were to pass to her son and his line (art. 5).

The treaty gave very good terms to Napoleon. Yet even with the Act in his portfolio Napoleon did not feel quite safe, and would have preferred internment with the enemy whom he hated and respected most: "I did not feel," wrote Castlereagh, "that I could encourage the alternative which Caulaincourt assured me Bonaparte repeatedly mentioned, namely, an asylum in England."²

¹ The 2,000,000 francs were part of the 6,000,000 which Alexander had offered to Napoleon (*see above*, p. 295). The remaining 4,000,000 a year were allocated as annual revenue to Napoleon's mother, and to his brothers and sisters (Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, II, 167).

² To Liverpool, April 13, 1814 (Webster, No. XCIVII).

CHAPTER XXXII

THE LAST FLIGHT OF THE EAGLE

Castlereagh's forebodings about the dangers of treating with Napoleon as an independent sovereign were soon to be justified. At first all seemed to be well. Napoleon went to Elba, escaping assassination on the way, and occupied himself in making a model little State there. He had his Court, his army (three battalions), his navy (one brig and four smaller vessels), his theatre. He made roads, began to construct a harbour, and planned other important public works. Many travellers came to visit him, so that he was not without society. He was especially pleased with the British Commissioner, Campbell, and insisted upon having as much of his society as possible.¹ Campbell's opinion, given in December, 1814, was that Napoleon was sufficiently happy in Elba, and would stay there if the French Government carried out the Treaty of Fontainebleau and paid him the stipulated revenue.²

The non-payment of the two millions was certainly a serious fault of the French Government, although Napoleon had for the time being plenty of money, owing to the sums from the former Imperial treasury which he was allowed to carry with him to Elba.³

More serious than the want of money was the treatment accorded to the Empress Marie Louise. Napoleon expected that she would pass her time between her Duchy of Parma and Elba; and that he would have both her and his son for months at a time. But the Emperor Francis, or rather Metternich, kept the son at Vienna, educating him as an Austrian archduke; while Marie Louise was

¹ Houssaye, 1815 (*Les Cent Jours*) [1899], pp. 156-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176. Campbell, *Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba* (1869), p. 343.

³ Napoleon, on returning from Elba, claimed that, owing to the non-payment of his revenue, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was broken by the Powers, and not by him. *Le Moniteur universel*, 1815, p. 420.

sent for a "cure" to Aix-les-Bains with an Austrian chamberlain whose mistress she became.¹

Napoleon took ship from Porto Ferrajo in Elba on the night of Sunday, February 26, 1815. At the moment, Campbell, the British Commissioner, was absent on holiday in Italy. While Napoleon was setting sail on the brig *Inconstant*, Campbell was embarking on the British frigate *Partridge* from Leghorn, to return to Elba. But even if Campbell had been present on the island, he could not have prevented the Emperor from leaving; for Napoleon was completely master of Elba; all the arrangements for the departure were made in a few days, and nobody was allowed to leave the island in the meantime.

Napoleon was always lucky when at sea. After an exciting voyage, practically in the midst of French and British cruisers,² the Emperor's little flotilla cast anchor in the Gulf of Jouan, at 1 p.m. on March 1.³ The little army of 1,100 men was at once disembarked, and with the Emperor at its head set out for Grenoble. It was moral, not physical, force that Napoleon brought with him. He had already had manifestoes drafted and printed.⁴ In one of them he made the now celebrated statement that the Bourbons had *forgotten nothing and learned nothing*.⁵

The journey was not exactly a triumphal procession: at least not at first. "Until Grenoble," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "I was an adventurer." The attitude of the companies of troops who were ordered to bar his way was ambiguous, but the Emperor, by taking risks, induced them not to fight. After Grenoble, many defections from the Bourbons' side to Napoleon took place: in particular, the defection of Marshal Ney, sent to capture Napoleon, could not help making a profound impression in France. A paper,

¹ Apparently in April or May, 1815: see Houssaye, *Les Cent Jours*, p. 449, note 2. The Chamberlain, General Count Neipperg, had been attached to the household of Marie Louise after her marriage with Napoleon. Otto, the French ambassador in Vienna, learned there that he was not trustworthy: "he appears to me too light (*léger*) to merit great confidence" (Arch. Aff. étr. *Autriche* 392).

² It must be remembered that by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, April 11, 1814, Napoleon had the right to fly the flag of Elba on his ships. Thus the appearance of the Emperor's flotilla on the sea did not necessarily excite suspicion.

³ *Le Moniteur universel*, 1815, p. 285.

⁴ Houssaye, *Les Cent Jours*, p. 189, note 3. Cp. *Corr.*, Nos. 21681-21683.

⁵ Proclamation to the Old Guard, March 1, 1815: *Corr.*, No. 21683.

which was found one morning attached to the column in the Place Vendôme at Paris, contained both wit and truth. It read: "Napoleon to Louis XVIII: my good brother, it is useless to send me any more soldiers. I have enough."¹

The Bourbon Government soon realised that it could not stay. When Napoleon reached Fontainebleau, the scene of his hours of bitterest anguish less than twelve months before, the capital was his. On March 19, Louis XVIII, with his Swiss Guards and his cabinet of Ministers, took carriage and departed for Lille; from there he soon found himself constrained to pass on to Ghent.

The news of Napoleon's departure from Elba came to the ears of the Allies (they were still Allies under the Treaty of Chaumont) on the night of March 6. Since September, 1814, their plenipotentiaries had been assembled at Vienna in Congress (according to article 32 of the Treaty of Paris)² to settle the destiny of the territories which the fall of the Napoleonic Empire had left at their disposal. Although the French Government was not entitled to share in this Congress,³ Talleyrand, who had become Minister of Foreign Affairs for Louis XVIII, had managed to gain admission to it. More than this, he had so far taken advantage of disputes among the Allies, with regard to the disposal of the Polish and Saxon territories, that on January 3, 1815, Castlereagh and Metternich had actually signed a treaty of alliance with France. By this act, Great Britain, Austria and France promised to come to the aid of each other with one hundred and fifty thousand men, if any of them was menaced by one or two other Powers.⁴ The one or two Powers meant Russia or Prussia or both, desiring to absorb the whole of Saxony and Poland. Talleyrand considered this treaty to be the *chef d'œuvre* of his diplomacy. "The Coalition is dissolved, and dissolved for ever," he wrote to Louis XVIII.⁵ He was soon to be undeceived, however; the Coalition was only in a condition of suspended animation; indeed, Talleyrand was

¹ Houssaye, *op. cit.*, 323, note 1, from the *Archives nationales*.

² Treaty of Peace between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden on the one hand, and France on the other, May 30, 1814. The peace which the Allies made with Louis XVIII after their entry into Paris (Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, I, No. 1. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy* (1922), pp. 4-5).

³ See Additional and Secret Article 1 of the Treaty of Paris, May 30, 1814 (Hertslet, *op. cit.*, I, p. 18).

⁴ Text in Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, II, 561-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, p. 556.

himself the first to stir it into action again. In conjunction with his skilled draftsman, La Besnardière, he drew up a manifesto¹ which the plenipotentiaries of the seven Powers and France signed on March 13, declaring Napoleon to be a European outlaw :

In breaking the Convention which established him in the Isle of Elba, Bonaparte is destroying the sole legal title to which his existence is attached. In reappearing in France with projects of troubles and upsettings, he has deprived himself of the protection of the laws, and has manifested in the face of the universe that it cannot have peace or truce with him.

The Powers declare, in consequence, that Napoleon Bonaparte is placed outside civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and disturber of the peace of the world, he has delivered himself over to public prosecution.²

Napoleon complained that this proclamation was an incitement to assassinate him.³ Twelve days later the Four Powers, Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, reinforced their alliance (which still nominally existed under the Treaty of Chaumont) by another treaty, signed at Vienna, March 25, 1815. By this Act they bound themselves to prosecute war with Napoleon until he should "be put absolutely outside the possibility of exciting troubles."⁴ Thus they drew their alliance ever closer at the same time as they "separated Bonaparte from France."⁵

Thus the Allies early intimated to Napoleon and to the world that they did not recognise his authority, and that they were determined to destroy his power. From this moment they regarded themselves as being in a state of war with Napoleon, stopped his couriers,⁶ seized his ships, and refused to enter into diplomatic communication. An "almost impenetrable barrier was raised between the French Government and its agents abroad."⁷ The rapidity and decision with which the Allies were able to act was due to the circumstance that when Napoleon reappeared in France, the Allied plenipotentiaries, and chief ministers (except Castle-

¹ Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, III, p. 106.

² Text in Talleyrand, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 111-113. See also *Le Moniteur universel*, April 13, 1815, p. 419.

³ *Le Moniteur*, *ibid.*

⁴ Art. 3. Text in Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, III, 136-9.

⁵ This, according to Pozzo di Borgo, was the conclusion to be drawn from the manifesto of March 13, and the treaty of March 25 (Pozzo di Borgo, *Correspondance Diplomatique* (1890), I, 129).

⁶ *Le Moniteur universel*, 1815, p. 424.

⁷ *Ibid.*

reagh, who was in London) were concentrated in or near Vienna, and so could confer and make decisions quickly, without waiting for exchange of notes.

As the Allies thus put Napoleon outside the public law, he was thrown back upon his old vocation of soldier. Diplomacy could do nothing. Even before Napoleon's circulars could arrive at foreign courts, the manifesto and Alliance against him had been signed. There can be no doubt at all that Napoleon on his return from Elba desired peace above all things : but he can scarcely have expected it. The Allies, as Castlereagh wrote to Wellington on March 12, regarded the re-establishment of Bonaparte's authority as incompatible with the peace and security of Europe.¹ Napoleon would have been glad to be a peaceful emperor in 1815 or 1816. But he had taken his eagles to the distant confines of Europe only a few years before : the record of his life only too obviously pointed the same way for the future.

What diplomacy could do was certain to be done by Caulaincourt, who, after living in retirement for nearly a year, once again became responsible with the Duc de Bassano for the conduct of Napoleon's foreign affairs.² Before the ambassadors and Ministers of the Allies left Paris, Caulaincourt showed to the Russian representative the French original of the treaty of January 3. This was the famous alliance signed by Talleyrand, Castlereagh and Metternich, and aimed against Prussia and Russia during the "Saxo-Polish" controversy. When Louis XVIII and his Government left Paris, they had, with inexcusable negligence, left the treaty behind them in the archives. Napoleon was justified in making use of this to open the eyes of Russia and Prussia to the fact that England and Austria had only a month ago contemplated war with them. But though naturally irritated when they learned of the treaty, the Russian and Prussian Governments suppressed their feelings in view of the grand necessity of combining to resist Napoleon.

Prospects for the restored Empire were not very bright. Marshal Macdonald, when he took leave of Louis XVIII at Lille on March 23, had said, not good-bye, but *au revoir, in three months*.³ This hope or prophecy was fulfilled to within a few days.

¹ Webster, No. CLXXIX.

² Bassano was Secretary of State ; Caulaincourt was Minister of Exterior Relations.

³ Macdonald, *Souvenirs* (1892), p. 380.

It was inevitable that Napoleon should inaugurate a liberal and moderate régime. On March 29, by decree, he abolished the trade in slaves. The nationalised property, which Louis XVIII had restored to its former owners, was, apparently, only *formally* put into sequestration, but was really left to its owners. The distinguished liberal politician and author—a royalist—Benjamin Constant, was invited to draft a Constitution. This Constitution, called the *Acte Additionnel*, was publicly sworn to by the Emperor at the brilliant function held on the Champ de Mars, on June 1.¹ The armed royalist resistance, which had been energetically aroused in the South by the Duchesse d'Angoulême, had been suppressed by the middle of April.

"The Empire is peace," said Napoleon.² He appears to have believed, even after the terrible manifesto of the Powers on March 13, that war might be avoided.³ He declared that the Treaty of Paris would be respected. Caulaincourt thought as Napoleon did. "So far, the question of war is still undecided," he wrote to Cardinal Fesch, on April 8.⁴ A circular letter to the sovereigns of Europe announced Napoleon's return from Elba, and his pacific intentions (April 4).⁵ The letter, when it reached London, was answered by a curt *fin de non recevoir*, from Castlereagh. On March 25 the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia signed the new Act of Alliance against Napoleon, engaging each Power to put 150,000 men in the field.⁶ If Great Britain could not contribute her full quota of men, she could compound at the rate of £30 *per annum* for each man. In addition she had to give a subsidy of £125,000,000 towards the war-expenses of the Allies.⁷

The determination of the Allies not to lay down arms until Napoleon was "absolutely put outside the possibility of exciting troubles,"⁸ had a depressing effect in Paris. The Stock Exchange quotation of the Funds fell from 78 at the beginning of March to

¹ The *Acte Additionnel* is to be found in Duguit et Monnier, *Les Constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (1915), p. 190.

² *L'Empire, c'est la paix*, see Houssaye, *op. cit.*, 509.

³ *Corr.*, No. 21862 (to Davoust, May 1, 1815): "if we have peace . . ." etc.

⁴ *Arch. Aff. étr. France* 672 and 1801, in Houssaye, 435, note 2.

⁵ *Corr.*, No. 21769.

⁶ See above, p. 300.

⁷ Additional Treaty of April 30, 1815: Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, II, 121.

⁸ Art. 3 of treaty of March 25 (see above, p. 300).

57 at the end of April.¹ On April 14, the *Moniteur* published, for the enlightenment of the French people, a survey of the diplomatic situation, written by Caulaincourt. It concluded with these words : "In circumstances so grave, in the midst of these incertitudes concerning the effective dispositions of the foreign Powers, dispositions of which the outward acts are of the nature to arouse just alarms, the sentiments and the wishes of Your Majesty for the maintenance of peace and of the Treaty of Paris ought not to prevent legitimate precautions."²

This report did nothing to cheer the public. A plebiscite was taken in the country (April 26-30) for the acceptance or refusal of the *Acte Additionnel*, the new Imperial Constitution ; it gave approval to the Act, but a very large number of qualified voters (about 3,500,000 out of 5,000,000) abstained from voting at all.³ Moreover the French clergy, owing to Napoleon's treatment of the Pope, were, in the towns at least, against the Empire.⁴ Meanwhile a very serious rising had broken out in *La Vendée* (April 10), and was only with difficulty suppressed by the first days of June, about a week before Napoleon left Paris for the war in Belgium.

The Hundred Days really offered Napoleon no scope for diplomacy. France was practically shut off from international communications : the couriers of the French Foreign Office were not allowed to pass the frontiers by the Allied pickets. Fouché, Duke of Otranto, whom Napoleon had again made Minister of Police, was a traitor, and in touch with the Allies. Curiously enough, the Allies and Napoleon both knew that Fouché was ready to be false to everyone. Napoleon, however, judged him to be useful : "I no longer learn the truth except from traitors," said the Emperor.⁵ Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian diplomatist, saw clearer about Fouché : "the Powers have no need to have transactions with people like him," he said.⁶ Fouché was a clever official, with a character so universally recognised to be worthless that it deceived nobody.

¹ Figures in Houssaye, *op. cit.*, 518, note 4.

² *Le Moniteur universel*, 1815, p. 424.

³ Figures in Houssaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 555-6.

⁴ "The spirit of the clergy is generally little reassuring in the towns. It is undoubtedly better in the country" (Report of May 26, 1815, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1935).

⁵ Houssaye, *op. cit.*, p. 569 ; Villemain, *Souvenirs contemporains*, II, 227.

⁶ Pozzo di Borgo, *Corr. diplomatique*, I, 109 (to Nesselrode, May 4, 1815).

Nevertheless Napoleon may have been right when he said, regretfully, at St. Helena: "I ought to have had Fouché hanged."¹

Since the restoration of Napoleon, Fouché, without the knowledge of the Emperor, had been in subterranean communication with Metternich, and had arranged to send a confidential agent to Bâle.² The channel of communication between Metternich and Fouché was a Vienna banker who came with letters of credit to a Paris banker:³ the letters, apparently, being sent as financial notes of some kind, with a sympathetic ink which, after the application of a certain powder, would reveal the real message. The Paris banker detected the intrigue, and told Napoleon that there was an Austrian agent in Paris. Napoleon sent for Fouché, but could get nothing out of the imperturbable scoundrel. So he resolved to send to Bâle an agent of his own, who should pretend to be a secret agent of Fouché.

Napoleon's agent was Fleury de Chaboulon; Metternich's was the Baron Ottenfels (under the name of M. Werner).⁴ It was arranged that interviews should take place at the inn of the Three Kings at Bâle. The two agents met on May 3. Ottenfels' Instructions stated definitely that the Allies would make no peace with Napoleon: the only alternatives which they would consider were a Bourbon restoration, or an Orleans monarchy, or possibly a regency for the young Napoleon. Fleury de Chaboulon (who kept up his rôle of secret agent of Fouché without the knowledge of Napoleon) tried to find out how the Allies hoped that Napoleon could be got rid of without a European war. It was suggested by Ottenfels that a revolution in Paris might accomplish the work. Further communications between the two agents brought matters no nearer to a conclusion. Napoleon could gather from the negotiation that the only chance of peace lay in an abdication by him in favour of his son. But he was not going to abdicate a second time: "I am not such a fool as that," he said to Lucien.⁵ It is very doubtful if the Powers would have allowed the young Napoleon, the Duke of

¹ Nevertheless, Napoleon also said at St. Helena, "If I had been victorious, Fouché would have been faithful." Las Casas, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, tome II, partie III, p. 40.

² Metternich to Ottenfels, *Instructions*, April 9, 1815, in Metternich, *Mémoires*, II, 514. Metternich says in his subsequently written reminiscences that it was Fouché who gave the invitation to the conference at Bâle (*ibid.*, I, 208).

³ Las Casas, *op. cit.*, t. II, partie III, p. 40.

⁴ See Fleury de Chaboulon, *Mémoires* (1901), II, p. 1 ff.

⁵ Houssaye, *op. cit.*, 592, from Arch. Aff. étr. France 1815.

Reichstadt, to reign ; but there was a chance, in view of the fact that the Duke of Reichstadt was the grandson of the Emperor Francis of Austria.

Napoleon had still one friend among the monarchs of Europe who, if not very secure in his own position, could still, if he had acted like a statesman, have helped France. This was Joachim Murat, King of Naples. The Powers as a whole did not like the idea of one of Napoleon's Generals sitting on an ancient European throne ; but Austria had guaranteed Murat's position by the treaty of January 11, 1814.¹ Thus Murat had the prospect of remaining a monarch in Europe and taking part in its councils. But Murat was no statesman.

At first, when the escape from Elba took place, Murat assured Austria of his pacific intentions. Then—it is impossible to account for the impulsive decisions of an ardent mind—he determined that the hour had arrived for him to make himself King of Italy. On March 29, he crossed the line between the Austrian and the Neapolitan military posts in Ancona. On April 10 he issued from Bologna a proclamation calling on “all Italians” to defend “the cause of their country.”²

Such a manifesto was absolutely contrary to the system which Napoleon in the Hundred Days was trying to observe. The Emperor's only chance of survival lay in his convincing the Powers that his restoration was a change in the *headship* of France only : that the European system would in no way be disturbed by him. Now for Murat to start again the old Napoleonic policy of tearing up boundary-marks, and remaking Europe, merely justified the Powers in their determination to make “no peace with Bonaparte.”

Murat's dramatic march through the Papal States was soon finished. On May 2 and 3 he was signally defeated by the Austrians at Tolentino. He made his way back to Naples ; left it on May 19, disguised as a sailor ; disembarked at Cannes, and took up his abode in a hired villa at Toulon. He was a king without a kingdom, a general without an army. His rash appeal to arms had enabled the Allies to remove the last obstacle in the way of completely outlawing both Napoleon and the Napoleonic system. He still

¹ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, I, 660.

² Text in Weil, *Joachim Murat : La Dernière Année* (1909), III, 533.

hoped to take his old post of general of one of Napoleon's armies, but the Emperor coldly rejected him. Murat returned to redeem his fortunes or at least his fame in Italy. He was captured by the Austrians, and shot at Pizzo on October 13, 1815.

While the rival hosts of Napoleon and Wellington were drawing together for the last struggle, the diplomatists at the Congress of Vienna hastily finished their work, and signed the grand European Treaty, the Final Act of Vienna, June 9, 1815, which remade the international system. As far as was possible, the work of Napoleon outside France was destroyed, and the monarchies which had suffered so many vicissitudes since 1793 were compensated or restored. Yet nobody knew whether the Final Act of Vienna would in a fortnight's time be worth the paper it was written on.

Time soon decided the matter. The defeat at Waterloo, June 18, 1815, sent Napoleon, depressed but not despairing,¹ back to Paris. He arrived on June 21, at 8 o'clock in the morning, at the Elysée. A warm bath, the Emperor's continual specific for every trouble or discomfort, quietened his nerves, and he was able to hold a Council of State, and to animate his Ministers to further efforts of resistance. But the *Chambre de Députés*, in secret session on June 21, solemnly called on him to abdicate. A Council of Ministers, held on next day, convinced Napoleon that he had no sure foundation for resistance. On the same day he dictated his Act of Abdication to his brother Lucien, who, almost alone, went on advising resistance to the end. The Act of Abdication was the last piece of Napoleon's diplomacy; for, when he published it, in the Decree to the French nation, he proclaimed his son to succeed him. But this *démarche* was without effect. "My political life is finished," he stated:² this was true. A Provisional Government of Three Commissioners (Fouché, Carnot, and a certain General Grenier) was elected by the Chamber of Deputies.

On June 25, Napoleon left Paris for Malmaison. On June 29 he departed from Malmaison. Rambouillet, Niort, finally Rochefort each sheltered him for a few days. His only companions were the Duke of Rovigo (Savary), Colonel Bertrand, and M. de Gourgault, an *officier d'ordonnance*. The Emperor showed some irritation at not finding the sea open to him to make a passage "to Germany" (so

¹ See description of Napoleon in Houssaye, 1815, *La Seconde Abdication* (edition 1908), pp. 13-14, and p. 14, note 1.

² June 22, 1815: *Corr.*, No. 22063.

he said): in other respects his conversation was on "indifferent matters." The local Prefect had met him at Niort, unexpectedly; "in such an unlooked-for conjuncture, I did for him what I was constrained to do by respect for misfortune and for the man who for so long a period ruled the destinies of France."¹ On July 15 the Emperor surrendered himself to Captain Maitland, of H.M.S. *Bellerophon*.

¹ *Le Préfet des Deux-Sèvres au Ministre de l'Intérieur*, July 3, 1815, in Arch. Nat. AF IV 1935.

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